1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN, County Counsel ROGER H. GRANBO, Assistant County Counsel JENNIFER A.D. LEHMAN, Principal Deputy County Counsel (SBN 191477) • jlehman@counsel.lacounty.gov JONATHAN McCAVERTY, Deputy County Counsel (SBN 210922) • jmccaverty@counsel.lacounty.gov 648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012-2713 Telephone (213) 974-1908 Fax: (213) 626-2105 Attorneys for Defendants LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT & LEE BACA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
12 13	JONATHAN BIRDT,	CASE NO. CV	10-08377 RGK (JEMx)	
14	Plaintiff,		DANTS' MOTION RY JUDGMENT/	
15	V.	AND CONCU	MMARY JUDGMENT RRENT OPPOSITION	
16	CHARLIE BECK, LEE BACA, THE LOS ANGELES POLICE	SUMMARY J	FF'S MOTION FOR UDGMENT; UM OF POINTS &	
17	DEPARTMENT and THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, and DOES 1 through		S IN SUPPORT	
18	50,		ntly with Defendants'	
19	Defendants.	Separate Statem Facts & Conclu	nent of Uncontroverted usions of Law &	
20 21		Statement; Dec. Support Thereo	nintiff's Separate larations & Exhibits in of; Proposed Order	
22		MSJ Date;	May 16, 2011	
23		Time: Dept:	9:00 a.m. 850	
24		Trial Date:	October 4, 2011	
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TO: ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 16, 2011 at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard in Courtroom 850 of the above-entitled court, the Honorable R. Gary Klausner presiding, located at 255 West Temple Street (Roybal), Los Angeles, California, Defendants Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and Sheriff Lee Baca (hereinafter "the LASD Defendants") will and hereby do move the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment or, alternatively, partial summary judgment on the grounds that there are no triable issues as to any material fact and that the LASD Defendants are entitled to judgment, or alternatively partial summary judgment, as a matter of law.

The attached Memorandum also serves as the LASD Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, set for hearing on the same date.

Specifically, the LASD Defendants move for summary judgment on the following grounds:

- 1. The LASD Defendants' policies and practices in implementing California Penal Code section 12050 do not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights and are otherwise lawful.
- The LASD Defendants' "good cause" policy does not violate equal 2. protection.

If for any reason, summary judgment cannot be granted, the LASD Defendants move for partial summary judgment as to each of the above issues.

This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, Response to Plaintiff's Separate Statement, and Conclusions of Law submitted by the LASD Defendants and the exhibits attached thereto, and the records, files and papers herein; and on such other matters as may be presented by

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the other parties in this matter, and at the time of the hearing. The parties have met and conferred in compliance with Local Rule 7-3. Said conference took place on February 9, 10, and 14, 2011. DATED: April 16, 2011 Respectfully submitted, ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN County Counsel By Principal Deputy County Counsel Attorneys for Defendants LOS-ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and LEE BACA

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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jonathan Birdt claims that he was improperly denied a concealed weapons (CCW) permit by the City of Los Angeles and moving Defendants Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and Sheriff Lee Baca (hereinafter "the LASD Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges that the LASD Defendants' definition of "good cause" as required by California Penal Code § 12050 violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. His argument fails, and it is Defendants, not Plaintiff who should be entitled to summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

California Penal Code § 12050(a)(1)(A) authorizes a county sheriff to issue a license to carry a concealed pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person (hereinafter "CCW permit") upon the existence of good cause, and provided that the applicant meets other criteria provided for in the Penal Code. California Penal Code § 12050 gives extremely broad discretion to the sheriff concerning the issuance of concealed weapons licenses, and explicitly grants discretion to the issuing officer to issue or not issue a license to applicants meeting the minimum statutory requirements. *Gifford v. City of Los Angeles*, 88 Cal.App.4th 801, 805 (2001) quoting in part, *Nichols v. County of Santa Clara*, 223 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1241 (1990).

LASD CCW Application Process

Larry L. Waldie is the Undersheriff for Los Angeles County. As part of his responsibilities as Undersheriff he has been designated to act as the Sheriff's sole authorized representative for reviewing applications for CCW licenses for the County of Los Angeles. While members of his staff make recommendations

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regarding applications, he is the final decision-maker. (LASD UF¹ 1) As part of his evaluation of CCW applications, he will review the entire application packet and any and all supporting documentation. He has been involved in these decisions since he became Undersheriff in 2005. (LASD UF 2)

In Los Angeles County, there are four distinct categories of CCW licenses: Employment, Standard, Judges, and Reserve Police Officers. The Employment CCW license is issued only to a person who spends a substantial period of time in his or her principal place of employment or business in Los Angeles County. The Standard CCW license is issued to residents of Los Angeles County or to residents of a particular city within Los Angeles County. The Judge CCW license is issued to California judges, full-time commissioners, and to federal judges and magistrates of the federal courts. The Reserve Police Officer CCW license may be issued to reserve police officers appointed pursuant to California Penal Code § 830.6. (LASD UF 3)

If an applicant resides in an incorporated city not policed by the LASD, the applicant must apply to the chief of police of their city of residence for a concealed weapons license and have such application acted upon. Within 60 days after a denial of such application, such city resident may file a separate application with the LASD, attaching a copy of the application denied by the chief of police. The LASD will exercise independent discretion in granting or denying licenses to such person but may review, consider, and give weight to the grounds upon which such denial was made. (LASD UF 4) California Penal Code §§ 12050-12054 set forth the general criteria that CCW applicants must meet. Applicants must be of good

¹ The LASD Defendants' Undisputed Facts are contained in their Response to Plaintiff's Separate Statement.

moral character, be a resident of, or spend substantial time in the County they apply in, take a firearms course, and demonstrate good cause for the license. (LASD UF 5)

LASD's Good Cause Requirement

The issuance of licenses enabling a private citizen to carry a CCW is of great concern to the LASD. The LASD's overriding policy is that no CCW license should be granted merely for the personal convenience of the applicant. No position or job application in itself shall constitute good cause for the issuance, or for the denial, of a CCW license. (LASD UF 6) The LASD defines "good cause" under California Penal Code section 12050 as requiring convincing evidence of a clear and present danger to life or of great bodily harm to the applicant, his spouse or dependent child, which cannot be adequately dealt with by existing law enforcement resources and which danger cannot be reasonably avoided by applicant's carrying of a concealed firearm. (LASD UF 7) Each application is individually reviewed for cause. The LASD's definition of good cause has been in existence since Undersheriff Waldie began reviewing CCW applications in 2005. This definition of good cause, or one similar to it, is utilized by many other counties within California, including the cities of Los Angeles and San Diego.² (LASD UF 8)

In evaluating whether an applicant has presented "convincing evidence of a clear and present danger to life or of great bodily harm to the applicant, his spouse or dependent child, which cannot be adequately dealt with by existing law

² Defendant City of Los Angeles maintains the same good cause requirement, as shaped by *Assenza v. City of Los Angeles*, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 115813 (1994) (further discussed in the LAPD Defendants' motion filed concurrently)

enforcement resources and which danger cannot be reasonably avoided by applicant's carrying of a concealed firearm," an applicant's stated reason of self-defense is not enough. (LASD UF 9) The applicant must demonstrate a credible threat of violence which would justify the need to possess a concealed weapon. If an applicant claims that he or she has been threatened, the LASD looks for documentation of that threat, such as police reports or other evidence. (LASD UF 10)

One of the purposes for the LASD's policy is to protect against gun violence to the community at large, as well as to protect officers conducting law enforcement operations on the streets. (LASD UF 11) Gun violence is a problem throughout the State of California and Los Angeles County is no exception. The vast majority of homicides in Los Angeles County are committed with the use of guns. Handguns are of particular concern because they are much more likely to be used than shotguns and rifles. Because handguns are small, easy to conceal, and deadly at short range, they are of paramount concern and danger. Further, most of the violent acts committed in this County involving the use of guns are by

The presence of more guns on the streets of Los Angeles County creates many problems for law enforcement officers. Officers are often charged with monitoring public gatherings as well as with breaking up public nuisances. Officers must act quickly whenever a disturbance occurs. Often times, this involves isolating one or two problem individuals. However, if multiple persons within a crowd are carrying concealed weapons, this creates an increased likelihood that guns will be brandished or used. Thus, the increased presence of guns creates not only increased safety problems for officers but also for members of the community at large. (LASD UF 13) It is the LASD's position that increasing the numbers of concealed weapons in the community increases the threat of gun violence to the community at large, to those who use the streets and

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gang members. (LASD UF 12)

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go to public accommodations, and to law enforcement officers patrolling the streets. Further, the increased presence of concealed handguns make law enforcement operations more difficult thus taking away valuable resources which would be better used conducting law enforcement operations. (LASD UF 14) Los Angeles County's "good cause" requirement is intended to drastically restrict the number of persons who are secretly armed in the County. (LASD UF 15) At present, there are approximately 400 concealed weapons permits that were issued by the LASD. The population of Los Angeles County was estimated to be 10,441,080 people as of January 2010. (LASD UF 16)

Plaintiff's CCW Application to the LASD

The LASD reviewed Mr. Birdt's first application and determined that he failed to show good cause as required by LASD policy, and as defined above. (LASD UF 17) In his initial application to the LASD, Plaintiff states as justification:³

Details of Reason for Applicant Desiring a CCW License.

Volunteer LA Superior Court Judge. Frequent Las Vegas Travel with large sums of cash. Unprotected/Unsecured office with threat against employer. Representation of victims of violence, abuse + murder.

(LASD UF 18.) Plaintiff never spoke with anyone from the LAPD to report threats against him and to his knowledge, no report was ever generated. (LASD UF 19) Plaintiff was never threatened in his capacity as a volunteer judge. (LASD UF 20) Plaintiff was never specifically threatened as a result of his

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³ LASD has not yet responded to Mr. Birdt's second application as of the date of the Undersheriff's Declaration. However, his second application provides no further evidence of an imminent threat. (See Waldie Decl., Exh. 4, p. 13.)

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position on the juvenile dependency court panel. (LASD UF 21) Plaintiff himself has never been expressly threatened with harm at all. (LASD UF 15)

ARGUMENT

I. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CARRY A LOADED CONCEALED WEAPON IN PUBLIC UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT.

Plaintiff claims that the LASD policy requiring "good cause" for the issuance of a CCW license violates the Second Amendment. In *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2788, 2822 (2008), the United States Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to possess firearms in the home for self-defense and that the city's total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated that right. In *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3026, 3044 (2010), the court evaluated restrictions similar to those in *Heller* and held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense.

A. The Second Amendment Does Not Include the Right to Keep and Carry a Weapon in Any Manner.

Contrary to Plaintiff's position, these decisions do not affect the constitutionality of Penal Code § 12025(a) or Penal Code § 12050 pertaining to concealed weapons <u>in public</u>. In *Heller*, the Supreme Court acknowledged that:

the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right [to keep and bear arms] was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.

Id. at __; 128 S.Ct. at 2816. Thus, the Court has specifically stated that "core right" embodied in the Second Amendment does not include the right to keep and carry any weapon in any manner. See id.

Penal Code § 12025(a) and Penal Code § 12031(a) have been upheld in

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California against a Second Amendment challenge after Heller. People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th 568, 575-576 (2008); People v. Yarbrough, 169 Cal. App. 4th 303, 312-314 (2008). In *People v. Yarbrough*, Yarbrough was convicted of violating Penal Code § 12025(a)(2), for carrying a concealed weapon on residential property that was fully accessible to the public. Yarbrough challenged his conviction on many grounds, including the Second Amendment. Noting that Heller had "specifically expressed constitutional approval of the accepted statutory proscriptions against carrying concealed weapons," the *Yarbrough* court held:

> we find nothing in Penal Code section 12025, subdivision (a), that violates the limited right of the individual established in *Heller* to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. Section 12025, subdivision (a), does not broadly prohibit or even regulate the possession of a gun in the home for lawful purposes of confrontation or self defense, as did the law declared constitutionally. or self-defense, as did the law declared constitutionally infirmed in *Heller*. Rather, section 12025, subdivision (a), in much more limited fashion, specifically defines as unlawful carrying concealed within a vehicle or "concealed upon his or her person any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person." Further, carrying a firearm concealed on the person or in a vehicle in violation of section 12025, subdivision (a), is not in the nature of a common use of a gun for lawful purposes which the court declared to be protected by the Second Amendment in Heller. (See People v. Wasley 245 Cal. App. 2d 383, 386 (1966).)

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residence, carrying a concealed firearm presents a recognized "threat to public order." and is "prohibited as a means of preventing physical harm to persons other than the offender.' Id. at 314, citing People v. Hale, 43 Cal.App.3d 353, 356 (1974). A person who carries a concealed firearm on his person or in a vehicle, which permits the individual immediate access to the firearm but impedes others from detecting its presence, poses an 'imminent threat to public safety. Id. at 313-

The Yarbrough court held that, unlike possession of a gun for protection within a

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314. Thus, Penal Code § 12050's prohibitions did not violate the Second

Amendment.

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Similarly, in *People v. Flores*, 169 Cal.App.4th 568 (2008), the court affirmed convictions under sections 12025 and 12031 in the face of a Second Amendment challenge. With regard to the section 12031 conviction, the court reasoned: "there can be no claim that section 12031 in any way precludes the use of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home...[i]nstead, section 12031 is narrowly tailored to reduce the incidence of unlawful public shootings, while at the same time respecting the need for persons to have access to firearms for lawful purposes, including self-defense. *Id.* at 576.

B. California Penal Code Section 12050's Restrictions on Concealed Weapons Do Not Infringe on the Right of Self-Defense in the Home.

Penal Code section 12050 does not regulate the possession of a gun in the home for lawful purposes of confrontation or self-defense, as did the law declared unconstitutional in *Heller*. Rather, it involves the licensing of persons in the context of the regulation of the carrying of concealed weapons in public places. Carrying a firearm concealed on the person or in a vehicle is not in the nature of a common use of a gun for lawful purposes which the court declared to be protected by the Second Amendment in *Heller*. Unlike possession of a gun for protection within a residence, carrying a concealed firearm presents a recognized "threat to public order," and is "'prohibited as a means of preventing physical harm to persons other than the offender.' [Citation.]" *People v. Hale*, 43 Cal.App.3d 353, 356 (1974). A person who carries a concealed firearm on his person or in a vehicle, "which permits him immediate access to the firearm but impedes others from detecting its presence, poses an 'imminent threat to public safety' [Citation.]" *People v. Hodges*, 70 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1357 (1999).

Here, California law does not impede the ability of individuals to defend themselves with firearms in their homes, as set forth in *Heller*. Instead, as the California courts recognize above, there is no right to carry a concealed weapon in public under the Second Amendment. California's regulation of both concealed

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carry of firearms and carry of loaded firearms in public do not infringe on the Second Amendment. See e.g. *Robertson v. Baldwin*, 165 U.S. 275, 281-282 (1897) ("the right of people to keep and bear arms is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.") Similarly, the LASD Defendants' policies and practices regarding the issuance of CCW permits do not impact any recognized Second Amendment right.

II. THE LASD DEFENDANTS' LICENSING PRACTICES WITHSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY.

A. The LASD Defendants' Policies in Limiting CCW Licenses to Individuals With Specifically Identifiable and Documented Needs Withstands Scrutiny.

Nonetheless, even if this Court finds that the core right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment is infringed and that *Heller's* narrow holding does not reach or decide the issue in this case, the LASD Defendants' policies and practices withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The majority of courts both before and after *McDonald* have employed an intermediate scrutiny standard when evaluating gun regulations. See *Peruta v*. *County of San Diego*, United States District Court Case No. 09 CV-23712010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130878 at *23-25 (citing *United States v. Skoien*, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010); *United States v. Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3td Cir. 2010); *Heller v. District of Columbia* (*Heller II*), 698 F.Supp.2d 179, 188 (D.D.C. 2010) (surveying the landscape of post-*Heller* decisions and joining the majority of courts in holding that intermediate scrutiny is the most appropriate standard). Intermediate scrutiny requires that the challenged statute or regulation "be substantially related to an important governmental objective." *Clark v. Jeter*, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).

The LASD Defendants' policies and practices in limiting concealed carry *licensing* to individuals with specifically identifiable and documented needs for concealed carry withstand intermediate scrutiny. Maintaining public safety and

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preventing crime are clearly important governmental interests. *Medtronic, Inc. v.*Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (noting that States have "great latitude" to use their police powers); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) ("there is no better example of the police power than the suppression of violent crime")
The regulation of concealed firearms is a critical factor in accomplishing these interests. McDonald, supra, 130 S.Ct. at 3126 ("private gun regulation is the quintessential exercise of a State's police power.")

Handguns are unquestionably dangerous and contribute to the majority of criminal cases that result in a person's death. LASD UF 11-15; see also *Heller*, *supra*, 554 U.S. at 636 (acknowledging the problem of handgun violence in the U.S.). A 2001 study revealed that a ten percent increase in handgun ownership correlates with a two percent increase in homicides. *See* Michael B. de Leeuw et al., *Beyond the Final Frontier: a "Post-Racial" America?: The Obligations of Lawyers, the Legislature, and The Court: Ready Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v. Heller and Communities of Color, 25 Harv.BlackLetter J. 133, 149 (Spring 2009). Handgun possession is a particular problem in Los Angeles County due to the influx of gang members in recent years. (See LASD UF 11-15.)*

Concealed handguns, in particular pose an obvious threat to the public as a concealed handgun generates no special notice until the weapon is brandished. (LASD UF 11-15.) As more than 90% of police officer killings are caused by guns, high rates of concealed gun carry especially endanger police officers. *Id.* Of the 536 law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty between 2000 and 2009 (including 47 in California), 490 were killed with firearms and of those, handguns were used by the perpetrator 73% of the time. *See* Fed. Bureau of Investigations, U.S. Dep't of Justice, *Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted* (2009), tables 1 and 27, *available at* http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/leoka/2009/leoka-2009.

In *Peruta*, the Southern District of California found that the San Diego Sheriff had "an important and substantial interest in public safety and in reducing the rate of gun use in crime;" "in reducing the number of concealed weapons in public in order to reduce the risks to other members of the public who use the streets and go to public accommodations;" and "in reducing the number of concealed handguns in public because of their disproportionate involvement in life-threatening crimes of violence, particularly in streets and other public places." *Peruta*, *supra*, 2010 U.S.Dist. LEXIS at *26-27. The court also held that the Sheriff's policy which differentiated between "individuals who have a bona fide need to carry a concealed handgun for self-defense and individuals who do not" was reasonably related to the government's important and substantial interest in public safety. *Id.* at *27. Accordingly, the court in *Peruta* upheld the San Diego Sheriff's concealed weapon permitting policy.

That interest is no different in Los Angeles County. Los Angeles County's practices in limiting CCW licenses to those with specific and documented needs is consistent with the compelling and significant legislative goals underlying Penal Code sections 12025 and 12031: the protection of the public from widespread and unchecked public carry of concealed and loaded firearms. For the exact reasons expressed by the court in *Peruta*, this Court should likewise uphold LASD's policy. LASD's policy creates a balance between the competing Second Amendment interests in self-defense and public safety. The LASD enables those with a clear and present need for self-defense to obtain a concealed weapon permit, so long as they also meet the requirements enumerated in California Penal Code section 12050. The LASD's policy is reasonably related to the government's important and substantial interest in public safety and concealed weapon control. Therefore, the policy satisfies the intermediate scrutiny standard.

Maintaining public safety and preventing crime are clearly important (if not paramount) government interests and the regulation of concealed firearms is a

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critical factor in accomplishing that interest. (LASD UF 11-15) See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) ("The promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State's police power ..."); People v. Yarbrough, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at 312-314. The relevant Penal Code provisions are narrowly tailored and substantially related to furthering public safety and reducing crime. Concealed handguns are the priority of law enforcement everywhere because of the use of the concealed handgun in vast numbers of criminal offenses. See (LASD UF 11-15.) Concealed carry of handguns allows for stealth and surprise. Limiting the number of loaded and concealed firearms in public places helps to keep the balance in favor of law enforcement and avoids the necessity for every place that is open to the public – restaurants, malls, theaters, parks, etc.— to be equipped with metal detectors, fencing and other forms of security, in order to protect patrons from the fear of widespread and unchecked concealed firearms.

Numerous courts have discussed the need for firearm regulation and the need for imposing restrictions on their use:

...[A]ccidents with loaded guns on public streets or the escalation of minor public altercations into gun battles or, as the legislature pointed out, the danger of a police officer stopping a car with a loaded weapon on the passenger seat. ... [T]hus, otherwise "innocent" motivations may transform into culpable conduct because of the accessibility of weapons as an outlet for subsequently kindled aggression. ... [T]he underlying activity of possessing or transporting an accessible and loaded weapon is itself dangerous and undesirable, regardless of the intent of the bearer since it may lead to the endangerment of public safety. ... [A]ccess to a loaded weapon on a public street creates a volatile situation vulnerable to spontaneous lethal aggression in the event of road rage or any other disagreement or dispute. The prevention of the potential metamorphosis of such "innocent" behavior into criminal conduct is rationally related to the purpose of the statute, which is to enhance public safety. Because the legislature has a compelling interest in preventing the possession of guns in public under any such circumstances, the statute is

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reasonably related to the legislature's purpose of "mak[ing] communities in this state safer and more secure for their inhabitants."

People v. Marin, 795 N.E.2d 953, 958–59 (Ill. App. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Marshall v. Walker, 958 F.Supp. 359, 365 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (individuals should be able to walk in public "without apprehension of or danger from violence which develops from unauthorized carrying of firearms and the policy of the statute to conserve and maintain public peace on sidewalks and streets within the

cities ...") (quoting *People v. West*, 422 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ill.App. 1981)).

While the LASD Defendants contend their policy passes intermediate scrutiny, assuming arguendo that a different level of scrutiny applies, the LASD policy still passes constitutional muster. Strict scrutiny requires that a statute or regulation "be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest" in order to survive a constitutional challenge. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997). Finally, a statute or regulation survives an "undue burden" analysis where it does not have the "'purpose or effect [of] plac[ing] a substantial obstacle in the path'" of the individual seeking to engage in constitutionally protected conduct. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)). Regardless of the level of constitutional scrutiny, Plaintiff's challenge fails. The LASD's policy to limit CCW licenses to those with specific and documented needs is consistent with the compelling and significant legislative goals underlying sections 12025 and 12031, i.e. the protection of the general public from widespread and unchecked public carry of concealed and loaded firearms. There is a "compelling state interest in protecting the public from the hazards involved with certain types of weapons, such as guns." State v. Cole, 665 N.W.2d 328, 344 (2003).

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B. The LASD Defendants Did Not Improperly Deny Plaintiff's Application.

Further, LASD's good cause policies, were constitutionally applied to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's application was reviewed like every other application and underwent the same evaluation every other application did. (LASD UF 8, 17-18.) Plaintiff's application was denied because he did not present evidence of a clear and present danger, as required under the LASD's good cause policy. (LASD UF 8, 17-18.) Plaintiff has provided no evidence that he was protected by a restraining or other court order, or that he had any police reports to support his claimed threats. In fact, Plaintiff acknowledged during his deposition that he never spoke with anyone from the LAPD to report threats against him and to his knowledge, no report was ever generated. (LASD UF 12) He was never threatened in his capacity as a volunteer judge, nor in his position on the juvenile dependency court panel. (LASD UF 13, 14) Birdt himself has never been expressly threatened with harm at all. (LASD UF 15)

C. The Denial of Plaintiff's CCW Application Did Not Violate His Right to Interstate Travel.

To the extent that Plaintiff claims that his right to interstate travel was violated because he could not pass from Nevada where he has a CCW permit to California, his claim similarly fails. A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses a classification that penalizes the exercise of that right. *Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez*, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986). Only activities "sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation" are encompassed in the right. *Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman*, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988) (quoting *Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n*, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978). The denial of a concealed weapons permit is not a deprivation of the right to travel. See *Pencak v. Concealed Weapons Licensing Bd.*, 872 F.Supp.410, 414 (E.D. Mich. 1994.) As such, summary judgment on this issue is warranted.

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III. THE LASD POLICY DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION.

As his second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges a violation of equal protection by application of the "good cause" requirements. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a directive that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). When a government's action does not involve a suspect classification or implicate a fundamental right, even intentional discrimination will survive constitutional scrutiny for an equal protection violation as long as it bears a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. *New Orleans v. Dukes*, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976); *Cleburne*, *supra*, 473 U.S. at 439; *Lockary v. Kayfetz*, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1990).

To prevail on this cause of action, Plaintiff must show actual evidence that others similarly situated have not been treated in a like manner, and that the denial of Plaintiff's concealed weapons permit was based on impermissible ground. Plaintiff has no such evidence. In fact, the evidence shows that the LASD applies its policy equally. (LASD UF 17-22) As such, it is Defendants, not Plaintiff, who are entitled to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the LASD Defendants ask that the Court grant their Motion, and deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

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