1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258 Glenn S. McRoberts - S.B.N. 144852 Clinton B. Monfort - S.B.N. 255609 Anna M. Barvir - S.B.N. 268728 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802 Telephone: 562-216-4444 Facsimile: 562-216-4445 Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs IN THE UNITED ST	TATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
10	SAN FRAN	CISCO DIVISION	
11	ESPANOLA JACKSON, PAUL COLVIN,	CASE NO. C09-2143-RS	
12	THOMAS BOYER, LARRY BARSETTI, DAVID GOLDEN, NOEMI MARGARET) PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF UNOPPOSED	
13	ROBINSON, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., SAN) FRANCISCO VETERAN POLICE) MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS) PLAINTIFF PAUL COLVIN; NOTICE OF) MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS	
14	OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,	PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT;	
15	Plaintiffs) DECLARATION OF CLINTON B.	
16	vs.)) Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)	
17	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, THE MAYOR OF) Date: November 8, 2012	
18 19	SAN FRANCISCO, AND THE CHIEF OF THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT, in their official capacities,) Time: 1:30 p.m.) Place: Courtroom 3 - 17th Floor 450 Golden Gate Ave.	
20	and DOES 1-10,	San Francisco, CA 94102	
20	Defendants.		
21	·)	
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	PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS P	LAINTIFFS COLVIN & BOYER C-09-2143-RS	

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: Notice is hereby given
that on November 8, 2012, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard by the
above-entitled Court, located at 450 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, California, in the
courtroom of the Honorable Judge Richard Seeborg, Plaintiffs will and hereby do move for
voluntary dismissal of certain individual plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiffs will seek an order dismissing all claims of the individual plaintiffs Thomas Boyer
and Paul Colvin against all defendants. Mr. Colvin seeks dismissal of his claims against
defendants due to his age, serious medical condition, and unreliable memory. The City does not
oppose Mr. Colvin's dismissal. Dismissal of Mr. Boyer's claims is proper because he has
legitimate concerns regarding his continued participation in this lawsuit, and because the City
cannot establish any legally cognizable prejudice resulting from his removal.

This motion shall be based on this notice of motion and motion, the memorandum of points
and authorities in support, the declarations filed concurrently herewith, and upon any further
matters the Court deems appropriate.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

18 I. INTRODUCTION

19 Plaintiffs Colvin and Boyer initially joined this lawsuit to secure the ability to exercise their 20 right to keep and bear arms within the City and County of San Francisco free from threat of 21 criminal prosecution in the same manner that all other Americans do. But, in light of Mr. Colvin's 22 age, memory loss, and current medical condition and in light of Mr. Boyer's legitimate fears of 23 harassment and retaliation by the City, they have each realized that the pressures and risks of 24 actively participating in this lawsuit have become too great. No matter how deeply and sincerely 25 they believe the challenged ordinances unconstitutionally infringe upon their Second Amendment 26 liberties, the risks are simply not worth the fight. And they each seek dismissal from this lawsuit. 27 The City has indicated it will not oppose Mr. Colvin's dismissal, but seems insistent on 28 forcing Mr. Boyer to continue his active participation in this lawsuit over his legitimate concerns.

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1	Through past discovery efforts, the City delved into irrelevant and private details about Mr.		
2	Boyer's gun ownership and possession, and now seeks to keep him in the case and compel him to		
3	disclose such details when all he seeks now is to be released from the case and to be left alone.		
4	Defendants will suffer no legally cognizable prejudice if the court dismisses Mr. Boyer at		
5	this time. The City has expended no significant time or effort in specifically defending itself		
6	against Mr. Boyer's claims. Plaintiffs have neither engaged in excessive delay nor demonstrated a		
7	lack of diligence in prosecuting their claims. Mr. Boyer has explained his legitimate reasons for		
8	seeking dismissal. And the City has not yet filed a motion for summary judgment, such that might		
9	suggest Mr. Boyer seeks dismissal of his claims to prevent an unfavorable final ruling on the		
10	merits. Indeed, four individual plaintiffs and two organizational plaintiffs remain willing and able		
11	to continue pursuit of their identical claims and they each remain available for deposition.		
12	Absent any legal harm to the City by Mr. Boyer's dismissal, the Court should reject the		
13	City's attempt to coerce his continued participation and grant Plaintiffs' request to dismiss the		
14	claims of both Mr. Boyer and Mr. Colvin against all defendants.		
15 16	II. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF PAUL COLVIN		
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17 18	The City has indicated that it will not oppose Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Mr. Colvin's claims against all defendants, based on his age, medical condition, and unreliable memory.		
	The City has indicated that it will not oppose Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Mr. Colvin's		
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18 19 20	The City has indicated that it will not oppose Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Mr. Colvin's claims against all defendants, based on his age, medical condition, and unreliable memory. Declaration of Clinton B. Monfort ("Monfort Decl.") ¶ 2. As such, Plaintiffs request this Court issue an order granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Paul Colvin and dismissing all claims brought by Mr. Colvin against all defendants.		
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 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 	 The City has indicated that it will not oppose Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Mr. Colvin's claims against all defendants, based on his age, medical condition, and unreliable memory. Declaration of Clinton B. Monfort ("Monfort Decl.") ¶ 2. As such, Plaintiffs request this Court issue an order granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Paul Colvin and dismissing all claims brought by Mr. Colvin against all defendants. III. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER IS PROPER BECAUSE MR. BOYER HAS LEGITIMATE CONCERNS REGARDING HIS CONTINUED PARTICIPATION AND BECAUCE THE CITY WILL SUFFER NO LEGAL PREJUDICE Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff, pursuant to court order, to voluntarily dismiss an action by court order at any time. Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 96 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Armilla Int'l B.V., 889 		

1 stipulate to a voluntary dismissal, the Court has discretion to grant a motion for voluntary 2 dismissal "upon such terms and conditions as [it] deems proper." Burnette v. Godshall, 828 F. 3 Supp. 1439, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)). The Court should freely 4 grant a motion for voluntary dismissal unless the defendant can demonstrate that it will suffer 5 some "plain legal prejudice" as a result. Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 Because Mr. Boyer has legitimate concerns regarding his continued participation in this lawsuit, 7 and because the City cannot establish any legally cognizable prejudice resulting from Mr. Boyer's 8 dismissal, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' request. 9

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A. Mr. Boyer Has Legitimate Concerns Regarding His Continued Participation in this Lawsuit and Seeks Dismissal of His Claims

Mr. Boyer previously faced harassment from the City and its agents which followed his
participation in other litigation against the City. Boyer Decl. ¶ 3. He legitimately fears further
retaliation from the City and, for that reason, he wishes to be released from the case at this time.
Boyer Decl. ¶ 3.

Additionally, Mr. Boyer is HIV positive, and he believes that his ongoing participation in
this lawsuit and the stress it causes is deleterious to his health. Boyer Decl. ¶ 5. For this additional
reason, Mr. Boyer wishes to be dismissed from this lawsuit. Boyer Decl. ¶ 5.

Further, in December 2011, during the preparation of responses to the City's written discovery, Mr. Boyer first became concerned that the types of questions posed by the City would expose to the government personal information regarding, among other things, the types and number of firearms he owns. Boyer Decl. ¶ 2. He was particularly concerned about requests for an itemized list of all firearms and ammunition he had possessed at any point and for any duration since 2007,¹ Boyer Decl. ¶ 2, the answers to which would entail the creation of a de facto

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- ¹ The City specifically asked Mr. Boyer to identify "each firearm that has been in [his] private residence while in your possession, custody or control at any time since August 2007, including but not limited to its make, model and serial number and the period of time during which [he] kept that firearm in [his] home." Pl. Boyer's Resp. to Defs.' Interrogs. Set One 4 (attached as Ex. B to Monfort Decl.). The City also asked him to "[i]dentify every type of ammunition [he] has purchased for or used in each of the firearms [he] identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2,

including but not limited to its manufacturer or brand name, caliber, jacket construction, place of

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registration of his gun collection with the City. Mr. Boyer agreed to provide substantive and
 relevant responses to the City's written discovery, but Plaintiffs' counsel raised numerous
 objections consistent with Mr. Boyer's concerns. *See, e.g.*, Pl. Boyer's Resp. to Defs.' Interrogs.
 Set One 4-8 (attached as Ex. B to Monfort Decl.). Mr. Boyer, then satisfied that his sensitive,
 personal information would not be divulged to the City, elected to remain a party to this action for
 the time. Boyer Decl. ¶ 2.

7 In recent weeks, however, Mr. Boyer again raised concerns that his continued participation 8 in this lawsuit would ultimately result in the City learning of his sensitive, personal information 9 and further intimidation and harassment, similar to that faced following his past participation in 10 litigation against the City. Boyer Decl. ¶ 4. Because the City is the party seeking to force Mr. 11 Boyer's deposition (and continued participation in this suit), the common avenues for protecting a 12 party's privacy, including the filing of deposition testimony under seal, are insufficient to alleviate 13 these concerns. Mr. Boyer further fears retaliation his continued participation in this lawsuit in 14 any other capacity, and he wishes to be removed from the lawsuit to prevent this.

For each of these reasons, Mr. Boyer seeks dismissal of his claims against all defendants.
The identical claims of Plaintiffs Jackson, Barsetti, Golden, Robinson, the National Rifle
Association, and the San Francisco Veteran Police Officers Association would remain.

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B. The City Cannot Establish Any Legally Cognizable Prejudice Resulting From Dismissal

Dismissal of Mr. Boyer's claims is proper because the City cannot establish any legally
cognizable prejudice that dismissal of Mr. Boyer's claims would invite upon it. When ruling on a
Rule 41 motion to dismiss, the district court must first determine whether the defendant will
suffer legal prejudice. *Hyde & Drath v. Baker*, 24 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1994). Legal
prejudice "is just that – prejudice to some legal interest, some legal claim, some legal argument." *Westlands Water Dist. v. United States*, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996). To decide the question of
"legal prejudice" to a defendant, courts generally consider: (1) The defendant's effort and expense

purchase and date of purchase." Pl. Boyer's Resp. to Defs.' Interrogs. Set One 6(attached as Ex. B to Monfort Decl.).

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involved in preparing for trial; (2) excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff in
 prosecuting the action; (3) insufficient explanation of need to take a dismissal; and (4) whether
 summary judgment has been filed by the defendant. *United States v. Berg*, 190 F.R.D. 539, 543
 (E.D. Cal. 1999).² None of these factors counsel in favor of denying Mr. Boyer's request to be
 released from this lawsuit.

6 First, there remain in this litigation four individual plaintiffs, who are each willing and 7 physically able to continue pursuit of their identical claims against all defendants. Any effort or 8 expense the City has already expended in preparing this case for summary judgment or trial will 9 undoubtedly be essential to the City's continued defense against the remaining plaintiffs' claims. 10 Further, any efforts directed toward Mr. Boyer alone have been insufficient to justify denial of 11 Mr. Boyer's request for dismissal. Indeed, his claims are identical to those remaining, the City's 12 previously raised standing and ripeness defenses applied equally to each individual plaintiff, Mr. 13 Boyer's deposition has not yet taken place, and the only written discovery propounded on Mr. 14 Boyer was simply copied from the discovery propounded on every other individual plaintiff.³ All 15 of these points make it highly unlikely that the City has spent any significant time or effort 16 defending itself specifically against Mr. Boyer's claims.

Further, Plaintiffs have not engaged in "excessive delay" or shown a "lack of diligence" in prosecuting their claims. While it is true this case was filed some three years ago, the long procedural history is not the fault of Plaintiffs. In fact, all proceedings were stayed for more than a year – on the parties' stipulation – pending the determination of whether the Second Amendment applies against the states. Min. Order, Aug. 27, 2009 [Doc. No. 21]. And even then, the City itself opposed Plaintiffs' motion to lift that stay when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *McDonald v*.

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³ *Compare* Defs.' Interrogs. to Pl. Espanola Jackson Set One (attached as Ex. B to Monfort Decl.), *with* Pl. Boyer's Resp. to Defs.' Interrogs. Set One (attached as Ex. B to Monfort Decl.).

²⁴ Conversely, courts have concluded that the following harms do not constitute the required legal prejudice: (1) any harm flowing from defendant facing prospect of second lawsuit or plaintiff merely gaining a tactical advantage; (2) uncertainty because a dispute remains unresolved; (3)
²⁶ expenses incurred in defending against a lawsuit; and (4) the threat of future litigation. *Petaluma City Sch. Dist. v. Victor D.*, No. 00-01979, 2001 WL 492466, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2001).

City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 2025, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), that it does. Defs.' Partial Oppn. Mot. 1 2 Relief from Stay [Doc. No. 32.]. The City thereafter filed its second Rule 12(b)(1) motion to 3 dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the ordinances and the case was not 4 yet ripe for review. Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss [Doc. No. 61] 12:17-20. That motion was 5 not heard until May 5, 2011, and it was not decided until September 27, 2011. Min. Entry, May 5, 6 2011 [Doc. No. 81]; Order Den. Mot. Dismiss for Lack of Standing [Doc. No. 89].) As a result, 7 the City was not even required to file its answer until October 17, 2011. Order Setting Deadline to 8 Resp. to Compl. [Doc. No. 91]. And since that time, Plaintiffs have continued to seek the prompt 9 conclusion on its merits, filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for 10 preliminary injunction. Pls.' Mot. Partial J. Pldgs. [Doc. No. 109]; Pls.' Mot. Prelim. Inj. [Doc. 11 No. [Doc. No. 136]. As such, denial of Mr. Boyer's request on grounds of delay or lack of 12 diligence is improper.

Third, Mr. Boyer has explained his need to dismiss his claims against all defendants in Part
II.A. above and in his supporting declaration. In light of Mr. Boyer's legitimate concerns, forcing
his continued participation is not warranted as the City can show no other legally cognizable
prejudice.

The final factor also weighs in favor of granting dismissal as no motion for summary
judgment has yet been filed by the City, and so Mr. Boyer does not seek dismissal of his claims
simply to prevent an unfavorable final ruling on the merits.

As an aside, the City will suffer no legal harm from being unable to pursue the deposition of Mr. Boyer as a party if the Court dismisses his claims. It is Plaintiffs' position that the individual circumstances of *any* person are irrelevant to the merits of this facial challenge. To the extent the City disagrees, any testimony it could elicit regarding Mr. Boyer's individual circumstances or his personal desire or ability to engage in Second Amendment conduct would certainly be irrelevant to the determination of whether the remaining plaintiffs' claims have merit.

In sum, the City suffers no legally cognizable harm from Mr. Boyer's dismissal at this
juncture, all four factors weigh in Plaintiffs' favor, and Plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal
of Mr. Boyer's claims against all defendants should be granted.

1	III. CONCLUSION		
2	Based on the foregoing, Pla	intiffs respectfully request that this Court grant Plaintiffs'	
3	Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Paul Colvin. Plaintiffs further request that this Court		
4	grant Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismi	ss Plaintiff Thomas Boyer.	
5	Date: October 3, 2012	MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.	
6			
7		s/ C. D. Michel C. D. Michel	
8		Attorney for Plaintiffs	
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		7 DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COLVIN & BOYER C-09-2143-RS	

DECLARATION OF CLINTON B. MONFORT

I, Clinton B. Monfort, declare as follows: 2

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I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to this action. I am an attorney licensed to 3 1. practice law before all district courts in the State of California. I am an associate attorney at the 4 law firm Michel & Associates, P.C., attorneys of record for plaintiffs in this action. 5

On or about September 19, 2012, I contacted Ms. Christine Van Aken, counsel of 6 2. record for defendants, via e-mail regarding her client's position regarding the dismissal of 7 plaintiffs Colvin and Boyer's claims. Ms. Van Aken responded via email on September 20, 2012, 8 indicating that the City would oppose dismissal as to both plaintiffs. In a responsive email to Ms. 9 Van Aken, I clarified that Mr. Colvin's age, medical condition, and unreliable memory made it 10 impossible for him to continue as a plaintiff, and that Mr. Boyer had faced harassment from 11 agents of the City and County of San Francisco ("the City") during his participation in previous 12 litigation against the City and reasonably feared similar retaliation in connection with this lawsuit. 13 In light of that further information, Ms. Van Aken stated that she would not object to Mr. 14 15 Colvin's dismissal, but would continue to object to Mr. Boyer's dismissal.

On or about November 17, 2011, the City served Plaintiffs David Golden, Espanola 16 3. Jackson, Thomas Boyer, Larry Barsetti, Noemi Margaret Robinson, and Paul Colvin with a first 17 set of interrogatories. Each plaintiff was asked identical questions. As an example of the written 18 discovery propounded on plaintiffs, attached hereto as "Exhibit A" is a true and correct copy of 19 Plaintiff [sic] City and County of San Francisco's Interrogatories to Espanola Jackson (Set One). 20

21 4. On or about December 16, 2012, Plaintiff Thomas Boyer responded to the City's first set of written interrogatories. Plaintiff Boyer's original response was served on defendants by my 22 office via mail. Attached hereto as "Exhibit B" is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff Thomas 23 Boyer's Response to Defendants City and County of San Francisco Interrogatories Set One. 24

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on 25 26 October 3, 2012.

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1/0 Clinton B. Monford

8 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COLVIN & BOYER C-09-2143-RS

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
3	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION		
4	ESPANOLA JACKSON, PAUL COLVIN,) CASE NO.: CV-09-2143-RS THOMAS BOYER, LARRY BARSETTI,)		
5	DAVID GOLDEN, NOEMI MARGARET) ROBINSON, NATIONAL RIFLE) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
6	ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., SAN) FRANCISCO VETERAN POLICE		
7	OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,		
8	Plaintiffs		
9	vs.		
10	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN) FRANCISCO, THE MAYOR OF		
11	SAN FRANCISCO, AND THE CHIEF) OF THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE)		
12	DEPARTMENT, in their official capacities,) and DOES 1-10,		
13	Defendants.		
14)		
15	IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT:		
16 17	I, the undersigned, am a citizen of the United States and am at least eighteen years of age. My business address is 180 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, California, 90802.		
17 18	I am not a party to the above-entitled action. I have caused service of		
18 19	PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF UNOPPOSED MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFE PAUL COLVIN: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS		
20	PLAINTIFF PAUL COLVIN; NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT; DECLARATION OF CLINTON B. MONFORT		
21	on the following party by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the District Court		
22	using its ECF System, which electronically notifies them.		
23	Wayne Snodgrass, Deputy City Attorney Christine Van Aken, Deputy City Attorney		
24	Office of the City Attorney 1 Drive Carlton B. Goodlett Place		
25	City Hall, Room 234 San Francisco, CA 94102		
26	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on		
27	October 3, 2012. /s/ C. D. Michel		
28	C. D. Michel Attorney for Plaintiffs		
	9		
	PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COLVIN & BOYER C-09-2143-RS		

EXHIBIT A

æ.				
1	DENNIS J. HERRERA, State B.	ar #139669		
2				
3	SHERRI SOKELAND KAISER, State Bar #197986			
4	1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place City Hall, Room 234			•
5	San Francisco, California 94102 Telephone: (415) 554-4691	-4682		
6	Facsimile: (415) 554-4747			
7	I main shorthadiser e sigov.org			
8	Attorneys for Defendants CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,			
o 9	THE MAYOR OF SAN FRANCISCO and THE CHIEF OF THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT			
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
11	1 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
12				
13	ESPANOLA JACKSON, PAUL THOMAS BOYER, LARRY BA	ARSETTI.	Case No. CV-09-2143-RS	
14	DAVID GOLDEN, NOEMI MA ROBINSON, NATIONAL RIFI ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA	Æ	PLAINTIFF CITY AND FRANCISCO'S INTER	ROGATORIES TO
15	SAN FRANCISCO VETERAN OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,	POLICE	ESPANOLA JACKSON	(SEI ONE)
16	Plaintiffs,			
17	vs.			
18				
19				
20				x
21	their official capacities,			
22	Defendan	ts.		
23			-	
24				
25	REQUESTING PARTY: CI	TY AND COUI	NTY OF SAN FRANCISCO	C
. 26	RESPONDING PARTY: ES	SPANOLA JAC	KSON	
27	SET NUMBER: OI	NE		
28				
20	FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO CASE NO. CV-09-2143-RS	E. JACKSON		n:\govlit\li2011\091333\00738381.doc

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant City and County of San Francisco hereby requests that Plaintiff Espanola Jackson answer in writing and under oath the following Interrogatories within thirty (30) days of the date of service.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answers and objections must conform to the requirements of Rule 33(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N. D. Cal. Civil Local Rule 33-1.

2. Objections on the basis of privilege or work-product protection must be made expressly, and the responsive information or materials withheld on the basis of such an objection must in a log in accordance with Rule 26(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and governing case law. The privilege log should be served simultaneously with the answers and objections.

3. Words used in the Interrogatories should be given their common meaning unless the word or 12 words appear in the following list of definitions, in which case the provided definition should be used. 14 4. To the extent required by Rule 26(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, you must promptly furnish, in the form of supplemental answers, any information requested in these interrogatories that first becomes known to you after the date of your response. 16

DEFINITIONS

- A. Unless otherwise stated, the terms "and" and "or" are to be read in both the conjunctive and disjunctive and shall encompass all information that would be responsive under a conjunctive reading and all information that would be responsive under a disjunctive reading.
 - B. "Any" is understood to include and encompass "all." "All" also includes "each," and vice versa.
- C. "Concerning" means and includes constituting, referencing, explaining, stating, describing, containing, relating to, referring to, reflecting, evidencing, memorializing, repeating, incorporating, reporting, confirming, discussing, listing, summarizing, showing, supporting, refuting, depicting, connected with, embodying, or mentioning.

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D. "You" and "your" mean Espanola Jackson, plaintiff in the above-captioned lawsuit, her employees, agents, representatives or anyone else acting on her behalf.

INTERROGATORIES

INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

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Describe the circumstances in which you first became aware of San Francisco Police Code sections
4512 and 613.10(g), including, but not limited to, the date on which you first became aware of each
ordinance, the speaker or document from which you learned of each ordinance, and the content of that
communication.

10 INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Identify each firearm that has been in your private residence while in your possession, custody or
control at any time since August 2007, including but not limited to its make, model and serial number
and the period of time during which you kept that firearm in your home.

14 INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Identify every type of ammunition you have purchased for or used in each of the firearms you
identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2, including but not limited to its manufacturer or brand
name, caliber, jacket construction, place of purchase and date of purchase.

18 INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

19 Identify by manufacturer or brand name and model every trigger lock, lockbox, or other locking
20 device you have used at any time to secure a firearm while it was in your possession, custody or
21 control, whether in your home or elsewhere.

22 INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

23 Describe every communication, whether written or verbal, between you and any employee or official

- 24 || of the City and County of San Francisco concerning the subject matter of your complaint in this
- 25 action, including but not limited to the date, medium, participants in and content of the
- 26 communication.
- 27 || ///
- 28 ///

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1	INTERROGATORY NO. 6:	
2	If you have ever been arrested in any jurisdiction for any reason, identify the date, the arresting	
3	agency, the alleged offense(s), the charge(s) brought, and the disposition of any charge(s).	
4	INTERROGATORY NO. 7:	
5	List every permit, license or registration issued to you concerning the possession or use of firearms or	
6	ammunition, including its type, date of issue, the issuing agency, the expiration date (if any), any	
7	conditions or restrictions it imposes, any period during which it was suspended or revoked, and the	
8	reason given for the suspension or revocation.	
9	INTERROGATORY NO. 8:	
10	List every permit, license or registration concerning the use or possession of firearms for which you	
11	have applied but which application was denied, including its type, the issuing agency, the date you	
·12	applied, and the reason given for the denial.	
13	INTERROGATORY NO. 9:	
14	Identify every person and organization other than your counsel with whom you have discussed or	
15	otherwise communicated about the subject matter of this lawsuit or your participation in it at any time,	
16	whether such discussion or communications were verbal or written, the subject matter of those	
17	discussions or communications, and the date or dates on which such discussions or communications	
18	took place.	
19	INTERROGATORY NO. 10:	
20	Describe any training you have had in gun safety, including its date, the person or agency that	
21	provided the training, the length of the training, and its general content.	
22	INTERROGATORY NO. 11:	
23	Describe any training you have had in using a firearm in self defense, including its date, the person or	
24	agency that provided the training, the length of the training, and its general content.	
25	INTERROGATORY NO. 12:	
26	Identify every residence in which you have lived during the last ten years, including its address, its	
27	owner, and the period of time in which you lived at that location.	
28	///	
	FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO E. JACKSON 3 n:\govlit\li2011\091333\00738381.doc	

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1 2 3 4 5 6	INTERROGATORY NO. 13: For each residence you identified in response to Interrogatory No. 12, provide the full name of any person who lived with you in that residence at any time, that person's approximate age at the time, and the most recent address, telephone number, email address or other contact information you have for that person.			
7	Dated: November 17, 2011			
8	DENNIS J. HERRERA			
9	City Attorney WAYNE SNODGRASS			
10	SHERRI SOKELAND KAISER Deputy City Attorneys			
11				
12	By:			
13	SHERRI SOKELAND KAISER			
14	Attorneys for Defendants CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, THE MAYOR OF SAN FRANCISCO and THE CHIEF OF THE SAN			
15	FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT			
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20	FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO E. JACKSON 4 n:\gov\it\\i2011\091333\00738381.doc			

EXHIBIT B

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258 Glenn S. McRoberts - SBN 144852 Clinton B. Monfort - S.B.N. 255609 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, LLP 180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802 Telephone: 562-216-4444 Facsimile: 562-216-4445 Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
9	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
10	SAN FRA	ANCISCO DIVISION	
11	ESPANOLA JACKSON, PAUL COLVII THOMAS BOYER, LARRY BARSETTI		
12	DAVID GOLDEN, NOEMI MARGARET ROBINSON, NATIONAL RIFLE		
13 14	ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. SA FRANCISCO VETERAN POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,		
15	Plaintiffs)	
16	VS.		
17	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN		
18	FRANCISCO, THE MAYOR OF SAN FRANCISCO, AND THE CHIEF		
19	OF THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT, in their official capacitie) 25,)	
20	and DOES 1-10,		
21	Defendants.		
22)	
23			
24	PROPOUNDING PARTY: CITY AN	D COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO	
25	RESPONDING PARTY: THOMA	S BOYER	
26	SET: ONE (1)		
27			
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		1	
	PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER'S	RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE	

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") Rule 33, Plaintiff Thomas Boyer ("Plaintiff") hereby responds to Defendants' Special Interrogatories, Set One, propounded to Plaintiff Thomas Boyer as follows:

GENERAL RESPONSE

Plaintiff reserves the right to amend, supplement, or otherwise revise each and every
 one of the responses given herein as warranted by information learned through other proceedings
 connected with this action, or otherwise.

8 2. Each response is made without waiver of any objections as to privilege,
9 confidentiality, competence, relevance, materiality, propriety, and admissibility, and of any and all
10 other objections on any grounds that would require exclusion from evidence of any statement
11 herein, any documents produced, or any interrogatory asked of, or any statements contained in or
12 made by, any witness while present and testifying in court, all of which actions and grounds are
13 expressly reserved and may be interposed at trial.

No incidental or implied admissions are intended by the responses herein. The fact that
 Plaintiff has responded or objected to any Interrogatory shall not be construed as an admission
 that Plaintiff accepts or admits the existence of any documents or facts set forth or assumed by
 such Interrogatory or that such response or objection constitutes admissible evidence. The fact
 that Plaintiff has answered part or all of any Interrogatory is not intended to be and shall not be
 construed as a waiver by Plaintiff of any part of any objection to any Interrogatory.

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GENERAL OBJECTION

Plaintiff generally objects to the Interrogatories, instructions, and definitions contained therein, to the extent they purport to impose obligations on Plaintiff other than those imposed by the FRCP and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiff also objects to the Interrogatories to the extent that they seek information or materials that are protected by the attorney-client privilege (including, but not limited to, the joint defense and common interest privileges) and/or attorney work product doctrine. Plaintiff will not disclose any privileged or confidential information in its response to the Interrogatories.

|| <u>IN</u>

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INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Describe the circumstances in which you first became aware of San Francisco Police Code
sections 4512 and 613.10(g), including, but not limited to, the date on which you first became
aware of each ordinance, the speaker or document from which you learned of each ordinance, and
the content of that communication.

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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 1 is irrelevant and is not
 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence. When and under which
 circumstances Plaintiff "became aware" of San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and
 613.10(g) is not at issue in this litigation and, because this is a facial challenge, each plaintiff's
 personal situation is ultimately irrelevant to the determination of the case. *Reno v. Flores*, 507
 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993); *see also Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff further objects to this Interrogatory on the ground that Defendants'
 definition of the term "you" is overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and
 have no connection to this case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone
 else acting on his behalf." Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

Plaintiff, having conducted a reasonable investigation and search, has been unable to
 locate or otherwise obtain the information Defendants request in Interrogatory No. 1 because such
 was not committed to a writing and Plaintiff no longer recalls the exact date, source, or content of
 any communication or writing that first made Plaintiff aware of the passage or existence of San
 Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10(g).

Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
Though he does not recall the circumstances under which he first became aware of either San
Francisco Police Code section 4512 and 613.10(g), Plaintiff knows that he learned of the laws
before their passage because he expressed his opposition to the ammunition ordinance to the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors at the time the law was being contemplated. Plaintiff believes he
likely first learned of one or both of the ordinances through reports in the general news media at
the time the laws were being contemplated by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.

INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Identify each firearm that has been in your private residence while in your possession, custody or control at any time since August 2007, including but not limited to its make, model and serial number and the period of time during which you kept that firearm in your home.

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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 2 is irrelevant and is not 6 1. 7 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence; it is also overbroad as it 8 seeks information pertaining to any long gun that has been in Plaintiff's private residence at any 9 time since August 2007. Whether Plaintiff has ever owned, possessed, or had in his control a long gun within his private residence is immaterial to the litigation because long guns are not regulated 10 by or subject to either of the ordinances challenged in this lawsuit. The discovery is also irrelevant 11 and overbroad to the extent Defendants seek information pertaining to any firearm not currently 12 13 owned by, possessed by, or under the control of Plaintiff within his private residence.

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No.2 is not only irrelevant and
 unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants' definition of "you" is
 overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this
 case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf."
 Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

19 3. Defendants' discovery request is oppressive and unduly burdensome, and its likely 20 benefit is far outweighed by the burden of producing the requested information. Interrogatory No. 2 seeks a list of each and every firearm to have been within Plaintiff's residence and under his 21 22 ownership, possession, or control at any time since August 2007. A responsive list would thus 23 include the entirety of Plaintiff's current firearm collection, any firearm that Plaintiff has transferred to another person since August 2007, and any firearm ever carried into Plaintiff's 24 residence and held by Plaintiff, no matter how long that firearm was in the home. Responding to 25 26 this Interrogatory would thus require a time-consuming search for and description of incidental, 27 irrelevant, and trivial details (e.g., the serial number of firearms no longer in Plaintiff's 28 possession) not necessary to the determination of any material issue of fact. When weighed

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against the heavy burden of preparing such a list, Defendants' need for this information is
 insignificant – for all that is necessary is that Plaintiff establish that he presently keeps at least one
 handgun in his private residence for self-defense. Taking into account the needs of the case, the
 issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the requested discovery in resolving
 material issues, the burden of producing the information sought by Defendants in Interrogatory
 No. 2 outweighs any benefit.

4. The information sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 2, when weighed against
its probative value as to the material issues of the current litigation, constitutes an unreasonable
invasion of privacy and a significant intrusion upon the rights of Plaintiff because it seeks
sensitive information regarding all types of firearms Plaintiff has at any time owned, possessed, or
had control of within his private residence since August 2007.

Because it is recognized that people have at least some privacy interest in the firearms that 12 13 they own or possess, at least some of the firearms that would be subject to disclosure under 14 Interrogatory No. 2 are not registered with the state of California and the records pertaining to 15 those firearms for which registration *is* required are protected from public disclosure. While the 16 ownership or possession of a firearm is by no means discreditable, a great deal of social, political, 17 and moral controversy often surrounds gun ownership in our culture. More importantly, gun owners reasonably fear public disclosure of the number and types of firearms one owns to his 18 19 neighbors and to officials in a city that is known as fanatically anti-gun. In short, at least some 20 members of the public, including Plaintiff, are reasonably more interested in the protection of 21 their privacy regarding the number and types of firearms they keep in their homes than they are in 22 divulging how often they buy toothpaste and which brand they prefer.

The sensitive and private nature of the information Defendants seek in Interrogatory No. 2 thus merits heightened protection from disclosure, requiring Defendants to establish a significant need for it before disclosure should be required. *See Johnson v. Bryco Arms*, 224 F.R.D. 536, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). Because the number of firearms Plaintiff owns and the make, model, and serial number of each of his firearms is irrelevant and unnecessary to the determination of any factual issue (i.e., whether Plaintiff owns a handgun), Defendant cannot demonstrate a sufficient need for the disclosure of Plaintiff's private, sensitive information.

5. California Penal Code section 28210 prohibits any government from compiling a
registry "of firearms that are not pistols, revolvers, or other firearms capable of being concealed
upon the person." To the extent Defendants seek information regarding Plaintiff's past or present
ownership or possession of long guns and other firearms that are not "pistols, revolvers, or other
firearms capable of being concealed upon the person," that information is not discoverable by the
government Defendants as a matter of law.

8 Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
9 Plaintiff owns or possesses at least one lawfully acquired and possessed handgun that he keeps
10 within his home for self-defense and other lawful purposes.

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12 INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Identify every type of ammunition you have purchased for or used in each of the firearms
you identified in response to Interrogatory No. 3, including but not limited to its manufacturer or
brand name, caliber, jacket construction, place of purchase and date of purchase.

16 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 3 is irrelevant and is not
 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence because the types of
 ammunition that Plaintiff has had, currently has, or has used in the past is irrelevant to whether
 Plaintiff has a right to access constitutionally protected ammunition in the future. Interrogatory
 No. 3 is also overbroad insofar as it seeks information pertaining to ammunition that is not
 prohibited by San Francisco Police Code section 613.10 and any ammunition acquired before that
 code section took effect.

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 3 is not only irrelevant and
 unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants' definition of "you" is
 overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this
 case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf."
 Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

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Defendants' discovery request is oppressive and unduly burdensome, and its likely 1 3. benefit is far outweighed by the burden of producing the requested information. Interrogatory No. 2 3 3 seeks a list of each and every type of ammunition Plaintiff has purchased for or used in each and every firearm to have been within Plaintiff's residence and under his ownership, possession, 4 5 or control at any time since August 2007. Responding to this Interrogatory requires a timeconsuming search for and description of incidental, irrelevant, and trivial details not necessary to 6 7 the determination of any material issue of fact (e.g., the purchase date and location of fully jacketed ammunition acquired before the passage of San Francisco Police Code section 613.10). 8 9 When weighed against the heavy burden of preparing such a list, Defendants' need for this 10 information is insignificant - for all that is necessary is that Plaintiff establish that he intends to purchase arguably constitutionally protected ammunition, the sale of which is prohibited by San 11 Francisco Police Code section 613.10. Taking into account the needs of the case, the issues at 12 stake in the litigation, and the importance of the requested discovery in resolving material issues, 13 14 the burden of producing the information sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 3 outweighs 15 its likely benefit.

4. The information sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 3, when weighed against
its probative value as to the material issues of the current litigation, constitutes an unreasonable
invasion of privacy and a significant intrusion upon the rights of Plaintiff because it seeks
sensitive information regarding each and every type of ammunition Plaintiff has ever purchased
for or used in each and every firearm to have been within Plaintiff's residence and under his
ownership, possession, or control at *any* time since August 2007.

The use, ownership, or possession of ammunition, like the ownership and possession of firearms, often sparks a great deal of social, political, and moral controversy in our culture. More importantly, gun owners reasonably fear public disclosure of the number and types of firearms and ammunition one owns to his neighbors and to officials in a city that is known as fanatically anti-gun. In short, at least some members of the public, including Plaintiff, are reasonably more interested in the protection of their privacy regarding the number and types of firearms they keep in their homes than they are in divulging how often they buy toothpaste and which brand they

1 prefer.

2 The sensitive and private nature of the information Defendants seek in Interrogatory No. 3 3 thus merits heightened protection from disclosure, requiring Defendants to establish a significant need for it before disclosure should be required. See Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 224 F.R.D. 536, 543 4 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). Because the specifics of every type of ammunition Plaintiff has ever purchased 6 or used in any firearm to have been within Plaintiff's residence and under his ownership, 7 possession, or control at any time since August 2007 is irrelevant and unnecessary to the 8 determination of any factual issue (i.e., whether Plaintiff intends to purchase allegedly 9 constitutionally protected ammunition), Defendant cannot demonstrate a sufficient need for the disclosure of Plaintiff's private, sensitive information. 10

Plaintiff, having conducted a reasonable investigation and search, has been unable to 11 5. 12 locate or otherwise obtain some of the information Defendants request in Interrogatory No. 3. The 13 discovery Defendants seek in Interrogatory No. 3 relies in part on information found in receipts, documents, or product packaging no longer in the possession of Plaintiff, those items having been 14 15 lost, destroyed, transferred, or otherwise disposed of. Additionally, as it pertains to ammunition that was gifted or loaned to Plaintiff or has since been transferred from Plaintiff to another person, 16 17 Defendants seek information regarding ammunition that is currently under the control of 18 individuals other than Plaintiff.

Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
Plaintiff intends to purchase ammunition for his lawfully owned and possessed firearms,
including ammunition prohibited from sale and purchase in the City and County of San Francisco
under San Francisco Police Code section 613.10.

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24 INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

Identify by manufacturer or brand name and model every trigger lock, lockbox, or other
locking device you have used at any time to secure a firearm while it was in your possession,
custody or control, whether in your home or elsewhere.

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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

2 The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 4 is irrelevant and is not 1. 3 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence; it is also overbroad as it 4 seeks information pertaining to the locking or securing of firearms not regulated by San Francisco 5 Police Code section 4512 (i.e., long guns), the locking or securing of firearms when outside of 6 one's residence, the use of locks loaned or borrowed from third persons, especially when outside 7 of one's residence, and the use of trigger locks, lockboxes, or other locking devices acquired and 8 used only before the passage of San Francisco Police Code section 4512. In any event, the 9 particular brand name and model of any trigger lock, lockbox, or other locking device used to 10 secure Plaintiff's firearm is irrelevant under this facial constitutional challenge to San Francisco Police Code section 4512. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993); see also Ezell v. City of 11 Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011). 12

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 4 is not only irrelevant and
 unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants' definition of "you" is
 overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this
 case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf."
 Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
Plaintiff owns or possesses at least one trigger lock, firearm safe, lockbox, or other locking device
that he presently uses to secure any handgun in his residence as required by San Francisco Police
Code section 4512.

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23 INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Describe every communication, whether written or verbal, between you and any employee or official of the City and County of San Francisco concerning the subject matter of your complaint in this action, including but not limited to the date, medium, participants in and content of the communication.

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1 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

To the extent Interrogatory No. 5 seeks information regarding communications with
 law enforcement or city officials over the enforcement of the challenged ordinance, the request is
 irrelevant and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence
 because facts surrounding enforcement and threats of enforcement of the challenged ordinances
 are irrelevant to the determination of standing and ripeness in this case.

7 2. The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 5 is not only irrelevant and 8 unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, it is also overbroad insofar as it seeks all 9 communications related to the "subject matter" of Plaintiff's Complaint in this action, which can 10 be read to include even tangential communications concerning the broad subject of firearms and 11 ammunition. The 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require relevance as 12 to "any claim or defense," not simply the "subject matter" of the litigation. Further, Defendants' definition of "you" is overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no 13 14 connection to this case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else 15 acting on his behalf." Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

16 4. Finally, Interrogatory No. 5 is vague and ambiguous as to the term "subject matter": 17 Plaintiff is uncertain whether Defendants are referring to a broad category of "subject matter," 18 such as firearms and ammunition or the Second Amendment, to a more specific category like 19 firearm storage requirements, or even more specifically to San Francisco Police Code sections 20 4512 and 613.10. Therefore, Interrogatory No. 5 fails to describe the requested information with 21 reasonable particularity. Plaintiff is, therefore, unable to determine what information is sought. In 22 good faith, Plaintiff will answer this question as though "subject matter" refers only to San 23 Francisco Police Code section 4512 and/or section 613.10.

Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
Though he does not recall the date of the communication, Plaintiff spoke in opposition to San
Francisco Police Code section 613.10 at the Board of Supervisors Committee hearing in which
the ordinance was considered for passage.

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To his knowledge and recollection, Plaintiff has had no other communications with

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Defendant the City and County of San Francisco, its employees or officials, concerning the
 subject matter of his complaint in this action.

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INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

If you have ever been arrested in any jurisdiction for any reason, identify the date, the
arresting agency, the alleged offense(s), the charge(s) brought, and the disposition of any
charge(s).

8 <u>RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:</u>

9 1. The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 5 is irrelevant and is not
10 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence; it is also overbroad as it
11 seeks information pertaining to *all* arrests, including those for irrelevant non-violent
12 misdemeanors, non-violent felonies, juvenile offenses, and offenses that do not impeach one's
13 veracity, to those for which no charges were ever brought, and to wrongful arrests made solely to
14 harass.

It also appears from the Complaint, Answer, and all other pleadings that the discovery
 sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 6 is totally unrelated to any "claim or defense of any
 party" because it seeks information pertaining to *all* arrests, including those for irrelevant non violent misdemeanors, juvenile offenses, and offenses that do not impeach one's veracity, to those
 for which no charges were ever brought, and to wrongful arrests made solely to harass. No claim
 or defense is thus impacted by the information sought in Interrogatory No. 6 , and the request,
 therefore, exceeds the scope of permissible discovery.

3. The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 6 is not only irrelevant and
unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants' definition of "you" is
overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this
case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf."
Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

27 4. Plaintiff, having conducted a reasonable investigation and search, has been unable to
28 locate or otherwise obtain some of the information Defendants request in Interrogatory No. 6. The

discovery Defendants seek in Interrogatory No. 6 relies in part on information found in documents
 or records that are no longer in the possession of Plaintiff, those items having been lost,

3 destroyed, or otherwise disposed of.

4 Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows: 5 Plaintiff is not prohibited from owning or possessing firearms and ammunition under state or 6 federal law. To the extent Defendants are asking whether Plaintiff is somehow disqualified from 7 exercising his right to keep and bear arms, the answer is "no." Plaintiff is not prohibited from 8 owning or possessing firearms and ammunition under state or federal law. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 9 12021, 12021.1, 12316(b); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 8100, 8103; 18 U.S.C. 922(g), (n). To the extent Defendants are asking whether Plaintiff has ever been convicted of a crime that might 10 relate to his veracity, e.g., a felony, the answer also is "no." 11

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13 INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

List every permit, license or registration issued to you concerning the possession or use of firearms or ammunition, including its type, date of issue, the issuing agency, the expiration date (if any), any conditions or restrictions it imposes, any period during which it was suspended or revoked, and the reason given for the suspension or revocation.

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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 7 is irrelevant and is not 19 1. reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence because the types of 20 21 firearms and ammunition licenses, permits, or registrations that Plaintiff has had in the past or currently has is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff has a right to engage in constitutionally protected 22 conduct now or in the future. And again, because this is a facial challenge, each plaintiff's 23 personal situation is ultimately irrelevant to the determination of the case. Reno v. Flores, 507 24 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993); see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011). 25 26 Interrogatory No. 7 is also overbroad as it seeks information pertaining to all sorts of licenses, 27 permits, and registrations having to do with firearms and ammunition, including those that deal 28 with specialized firearms and ammunition and those that have nothing to do with the types of

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firearms and ammunition regulated by San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10.

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2 It also appears from the Complaint, Answer, and all other pleadings that the discovery 2. sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 7 is totally unrelated to any "claim or defense of any 3 4 party" because no claim or defense is impacted by whether and to what extent Plaintiff has 5 licenses, permits, or registrations concerning the possession or use of firearms. Regardless of whether Plaintiff has zero, one, or multiple such permits, Plaintiff holds a right to engage in 6 7 conduct protected by the Second Amendment. And the determination of whether San Francisco 8 Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10 infringe on that right is not affected by the information sought in Interrogatory No. 7. The discovery, therefore, exceeds the scope of permissible 9 10 discovery.

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 7 is not only irrelevant and
 unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants' definition of "you" is
 overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this
 case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf."
 Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

Plaintiff, having conducted a reasonable investigation and search, has been unable to
 locate or otherwise obtain at least some of the information Defendants request in Interrogatory
 No. 7. The discovery Defendants seek in Interrogatory No. 7 relies in part on information found in
 documents that are no longer in the Plaintiff's possession, those items having been lost, destroyed,
 transferred, or otherwise disposed of. Moreover, Plaintiff has conducted a diligent search in an
 unsuccessful attempt to locate the materials described in this objection.

5. The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 7 is further irrelevant and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence because the types of firearms and ammunition licenses, permits, or registrations that Plaintiff has or has had in the past and whether any of those licenses, permits, or registrations have been revoked has no bearing on whether Plaintiff can own or possess firearms under state or federal law.

Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
Plaintiff owns or possesses at least one lawfully acquired and possessed handgun that he keeps

1 within his home for self-defense and other lawful purposes.

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INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

List every permit, license or registration concerning the use or possession of firearms for
which you have applied but which application was denied, including its type, the issuing agency,
the date you applied, and the reason given for the denial.

7 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 8 is irrelevant and is not 8 1. reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence because the types of 9 firearms and ammunition licenses, permits, or registrations that Plaintiff currently has or has been 10 denied is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff has a right to engage in constitutionally protected conduct 11 now or in the future. And again, because this is a facial challenge, each plaintiff's personal 12 situation is ultimately irrelevant to the determination of the case. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 13 300-01 (1993); see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011). Interrogatory 14 No. 8 is also overbroad as it seeks information pertaining to all sorts of licenses, permits, and 15 registrations having to do with firearms and ammunition for which Plaintiff has applied, including 16 those that deal with specialized firearms and ammunition and those that have nothing to do with 17 the types of firearms and ammunition regulated by San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 18 613.10. 19

It also appears from the Complaint, Answer, and all other pleadings that the discovery 20 2. sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 8 is totally unrelated to any "claim or defense of any 21 party" because no claim or defense is impacted by whether Plaintiff has been denied any license, 22 23 permit, or registration concerning the possession or use of firearms. Regardless of whether Plaintiff has zero, one, or multiple such permits, Plaintiff holds a right to engage in conduct 24 protected by the Second Amendment. And the determination of whether San Francisco Police 25 Code sections 4512 and 613.10 infringe on that right is not affected by the information sought in 26 Interrogatory No. 8. The discovery, therefore, exceeds the scope of permissible discovery. 27

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The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 8 is not only irrelevant and

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unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants' definitionof "you" is 2 overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf." 3 Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals. 4

5 4. Plaintiff, having conducted a reasonable investigation and search, has been unable to 6 locate or otherwise obtain some of the information Defendants request in Interrogatory No. 8. The 7 discovery Defendants seek in Interrogatory No. 8 relies on information found in documents that are no longer in the possession of Plaintiff, those items having been lost, destroyed, transferred, or 8 9 otherwise disposed of. Moreover, Plaintiff has conducted a diligent search in an unsuccessful 10 attempt to locate the materials described in this objection.

11 5. The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 8 is further irrelevant and is 12 not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence because the types of firearms and ammunition licenses, permits, or registrations that Plaintiff has had denied has no 13 bearing on whether Plaintiff can own or possess firearms under state or federal law. 14

15 Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows: Many years ago, the date now unknown, Plaintiff wrote a letter to the San Francisco Sheriff 16 17 inquiring as to the procedure for applying and receiving a Concealed Carry Weapon (CCW) permit within the City and County of San Francisco. The San Francisco Sheriff's office responded 18 that it would be the responsibility of the San Francisco Chief of Police to consider Plaintiff's 19 application. Plaintiff never followed up with the Chief of Police. Plaintiff no longer has 20 documentation of these communications. 21

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23 **INTERROGATORY NO. 9:**

Identify every person and organization other than your counsel with whom you have 24 25 discussed or otherwise communicated about the subject matter of this lawsuit or your participation in it at any time, whether such discussion or communications were verbal or written, 26 27 the subject matter of those discussions or communications, and the date or dates on which such discussions or communications took place. 28

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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

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1. To the extent Interrogatory No. 9 seeks information regarding communications with law enforcement or city officials over the enforcement of the challenged ordinances, the request is

irrelevant and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence
because facts surrounding enforcement and threats of enforcement of the challenged ordinances
are irrelevant to the determination of standing and ripeness in this case. Additionally, it seeks
irrelevant oral and written communications with third parties who have no relationship to this
case and regarding only the existence of San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10, the
status of this lawsuit, and Plaintiff's participation in it.

2. 10 The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 9 is not only irrelevant and 11 unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, it is also overbroad insofar as it seeks all 12 communications related to the "subject matter" of Plaintiff's Complaint in this action, which can 13 be read to include even tangential communications concerning the broad subject of firearms and ammunition. The 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require relevance as 14 15 to "any claim or defense," not simply the "subject matter" of the litigation. Further, Defendants' definition of "you" is overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no 16 17 connection to this case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else 18 acting on his behalf." Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

Defendants' discovery request will cause Plaintiff annoyance, oppression, and undue 19 3. burden because it seeks a list of each and every person Plaintiff has ever discussed with or 20 21 communicated (orally or in writing) about the subject matter of or Plaintiff's participation in this 22 lawsuit - this purports to include even brief comments made in passing to friends and 23 acquaintances and comments made on open, internet message boards. Plaintiff estimates a 24 responsive list would include hundreds of individuals. Responding to this Interrogatory would 25 thus require a time-consuming search for and description of incidental, irrelevant, and trivial 26 details not necessary to the determination of any material issue of fact (e.g., the identities of third 27 parties who have merely been apprised of the existence of the challenged ordinances, the status of 28 this lawsuit, or Plaintiff's participation in it and the date(s) of communications with those

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persons). When weighed against the heavy burden of preparing such a list, Defendants' need for
 this information is insignificant. Taking into account the needs of the case, the issues at stake in
 the litigation, and the importance of the requested discovery in resolving material issues, the
 burden of producing the required information sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 9
 outweighs its likely benefit.

4. By so broadly requesting information regarding any communication to any
organization pertaining to the subject matter of this lawsuit and Plaintiff's participation in it, the
request infringes upon Plaintiff's right to freely associate, speak and petition the government for
redress of grievances under Article I, Sections 2, 3, and 13 of the California Constitution and
Amendments I, IV, and XIV of the United States Constitution.

5. Plaintiff, having conducted a reasonable investigation and search, has been unable to
 obtain the information Defendants request in Interrogatory No. 9. He cannot recall the
 circumstances surrounding every communication he has made regarding the subject matter of this
 lawsuit or his participation in it, and Plaintiff does not know, and in fact never knew, the identities
 of all persons who have read Plaintiff's internet message board postings regarding the existence
 and status of the present litigation.

Finally, Interrogatory No. 9 is vague and ambiguous as to the term "subject matter";
 Plaintiff is uncertain whether Defendants are referring to a broad category of "subject matter,"
 such as firearms and ammunition or the Second Amendment, to a more specific category like
 firearm storage requirements, or even more specifically to San Francisco Police Code sections
 4512 and 613.10. Therefore, Interrogatory No. 9 fails to describe the requested information with
 reasonable particularity. Plaintiff is, therefore, unable to determine what information is sought.

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24 || <u>INTERROGATORY NO. 10:</u>

Describe any training you have had in gun safety, including its date, the person or agency
that provided the training, the length of the training, and its general content.

27 <u>RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10:</u>

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1. The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 10 is irrelevant and is not

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reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence because whether and to
 what extent Plaintiff has been formally or informally "trained" in "gun safety" is irrelevant to
 whether Plaintiff has a right to engage in constitutionally protected conduct now or in the future.
 And again, because this is a facial challenge, each plaintiff's personal situation is ultimately
 irrelevant to the determination of the case. *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993); *see also Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011).

7 2. It also appears from the Complaint, Answer, and all other pleadings that the discovery 8 sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 10 is totally unrelated to any "claim or defense of any 9 party" because no claim or defense is impacted by whether and to what extent Plaintiff has been 10 formally or informally "trained" in "gun safety." Plaintiff has not challenged any regulations 11 regarding firearms training, nor is such training or lack thereof a defense to Plaintiff's claims. 12 Regardless of whether Plaintiff has had zero or hundreds of hours of "training" in "gun safety," 13 Plaintiff has a right to engage in conduct protected by the Second Amendment. And the determination of whether San Francisco Police Code sections 4512 and 613.10 infringe on that 14 15 right is not affected by the information sought in Interrogatory No. 10. The discovery, therefore, 16 exceeds the scope of permissible discovery.

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 10 is not only irrelevant and
 unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants' definition of "you" is
 overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this
 case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf."
 Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

Plaintiff, having conducted a reasonable investigation and search, has been unable to
 locate or otherwise obtain some of the information Defendants request in Interrogatory No. 10.
 The discovery Defendants seek in Interrogatory No. 10 relies in part on information found in
 documents that are no longer in the possession of Plaintiff, those items having been lost,
 destroyed, transferred, or otherwise disposed of. Moreover, Plaintiff has conducted a diligent
 search in an unsuccessful attempt to locate the materials described in this objection.

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Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:

18

Plaintiff has had training in gun safety, that includes the following:

Many years ago, Plaintiff held a permit to carry a weapon as an armed guard, for which
 Plaintiff had to re-qualify twice annually. Plaintiff does not recall the dates or other particulars of
 this recurring training.

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2) On a date unknown, Plaintiff completed an education/training program for his
 Handgun Safety Certificate. The program, administered by the California Department of Justice,
 generally includes safety rules regarding the use and storage of handguns.

8 3) Plaintiff is presently a National Rifle Association (NRA) Certified Handgun Instructor. 9 He has participated in training through the NRA to obtain and maintain his certification. To 10 qualify as an NRA Instructor: Candidates must possess and demonstrate a solid background in 11 firearm safety and shooting skills acquired through previous firearm training and/or previous 12 shooting experience. Instructor candidates must be intimately familiar with each action type in the 13 discipline they wish to be certified. Candidates must demonstrate solid and safe firearms handling 14 skills. And candidates must satisfactorily complete an NRA Instructor Training Course in the 15 discipline they wish to teach (e.g., NRA Basic Pistol Course), and receive the endorsement of the 16 NRA Training Counselor conducting that training.

4) Plaintiff is presently an NRA Refuse to Be a Victim Instructor. He has participated in
training through the NRA to obtain and maintain his certification, and he conducts a number of
courses annually. The course is a personal safety program that teaches strategies you can use to
avoid situations where self-defense is required. This course focuses on proactive courses of
action, rather than reactive.

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Plaintiff was formerly an NRA Women on Target Instructor.

24 INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

5)

Describe any training you have had in using a firearm in self-defense, including its date, the
person or agency that provided the training, the length of the training, and its general content.

- 27 RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11:
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1. The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 11 is irrelevant and is not

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reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence because whether and to what extent Plaintiff has been formally or informally "trained" in self-defense is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff has a right to engage in constitutionally protected conduct now or in the future. And again, because this is a facial challenge, each plaintiff's personal situation is ultimately irrelevant to the determination of the case. *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993); *see also Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011).

7 2. It also appears from the Complaint, Answer, and all other pleadings that the discovery 8 sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 11 is totally unrelated to any "claim or defense of any party" because no claim or defense is impacted by whether and to what extent Plaintiff has been 9 formally or informally "trained" in self-defense . Regardless of whether Plaintiff has had zero or 10 11 hundreds of hours of "training" in self-defense, Plaintiff has a right to engage in conduct protected 12 by the Second Amendment. And the determination of whether San Francisco Police Code sections 13 4512 and 613.10 infringe on that right is not affected by the information sought in Interrogatory No. 11. The discovery, therefore, exceeds the scope of permissible discovery. 14

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 11 is not only irrelevant and
 unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants' definition of "you" is
 overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this
 case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf."
 Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

4. Plaintiff, having conducted a reasonable investigation and search, has been unable to
 locate or otherwise obtain at least some of the information Defendants request in Interrogatory
 No. 11. The discovery Defendants seek in Interrogatory No. 11 relies in part on information found
 in documents that are no longer in the possession of Plaintiff, those items having been lost,
 destroyed, transferred, or otherwise disposed of. Moreover, Plaintiff has conducted a diligent
 search in an unsuccessful attempt to locate the materials described in this objection.

5. Interrogatory No. 11 is also vague in that it does not clarify whether it refers to formal
or informal "training" or both. And if informal "training" is included, what type of instruction and
practice constitutes "training." Therefore, Interrogatory No. 11 fails to describe the requested

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PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER'S RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE

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information with reasonable particularity. Plaintiff is, therefore, unable to determine what
 information is sought.

Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
Plaintiff has had training in gun safety, that includes the following:

Many years ago, Plaintiff held a permit to carry a weapon as an armed guard, for which
Plaintiff had to re-qualify twice annually. Plaintiff does not recall the dates or other particulars of
this recurring training.

8 2) On a date unknown, Plaintiff completed an education/training program for his
9 Handgun Safety Certificate. The program, administered by the California Department of Justice,
10 generally includes safety rules regarding the use and storage of handguns.

Plaintiff is presently a National Rifle Association (NRA) Certified Handgun Instructor. 11 3) 12 He has participated in training through the NRA to obtain and maintain his certification. To 13 qualify as an NRA Instructor: Candidates must possess and demonstrate a solid background in 14 firearm safety and shooting skills acquired through previous firearm training and/or previous 15 shooting experience. Instructor candidates must be intimately familiar with each action type in the 16 discipline they wish to be certified. Candidates must demonstrate solid and safe firearms handling 17 skills. And candidates must satisfactorily complete an NRA Instructor Training Course in the discipline they wish to teach (e.g., NRA Basic Pistol Course), and receive the endorsement of the 18 19 NRA Training Counselor conducting that training.

20

4) Plaintiff is presently an NRA Refuse to Be a Victim Instructor. He has participated in
training through the NRA to obtain and maintain his certification, and he conducts a number of
courses annually. The course is a personal safety program that teaches strategies you can use to
avoid situations where self-defense is required. This course focuses on proactive courses of
action, rather than reactive.

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5) Plaintiff was formerly an NRA Women on Target Instructor.

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27 || INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

Identify every residence in which you have lived during the last ten years, including its

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PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER'S RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE

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address, its owner, and the period of time in which you lived at that location.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 12 is irrelevant and is not
 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence, as the owner of any
 residence in which Plaintiff has lived in at any time within the last ten years has no bearing on any
 claim or defense.

7 2. Interrogatory No. 12 is also overbroad insofar as it seeks information pertaining to any
8 residence outside the City and County of San Francisco in which Plaintiff has resided at any time
9 within the last ten years.

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 12 is not only irrelevant and
 unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; Defendants' definition of "you" is
 overbroad insofar as it includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this
 case, including Plaintiff's "employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf."
 Plaintiff cannot respond on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

Without waiving the foregoing general or specific objections, Plaintiff responds as follows:
Plaintiff currently resides, and for the last ten years has resided, within the City and County of San
Francisco. Plaintiff fears retaliation from the City if his full address is disclosed.

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19 INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

For each residence you identified in response to Interrogatory No. 12, provide the full name of any person who lived with you in that residence at any time, that person's approximate age at the time, and the most recent address, telephone number, email address or other contact information you have for that person.

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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

The discovery sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 13 is irrelevant and is not
 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence, as the identities, ages,
 and current contact information of every person who has ever lived with Plaintiff in the residence
 described in response to Interrogatory No. 13, including in periods *before* San Francisco Police

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PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER'S RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE

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Code section 4512 took effect, has no bearing on any claim or defense. This is especially true in
 light of the fact that this is a facial challenge to section 4512, where each plaintiff's personal
 situation is ultimately irrelevant to the determination of the case. *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292,
 300-01 (1993); *see also Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011).

Interrogatory No. 13 is also overbroad insofar as it seeks information pertaining to any
residence outside the City and County of San Francisco in which Plaintiff has resided at any time
within the last ten years. Further, Defendants' definition of "you" is overbroad insofar as it
includes third parties who are not parties and have no connection to this case, including Plaintiff's
"employees, agents, representative or anyone else acting on his behalf." Plaintiff cannot respond
on behalf of any or all of these individuals.

3. The information sought by Defendants in Interrogatory No. 13, when weighed against
its probative value as to the material issues of the current litigation, constitutes an unreasonable
invasion of privacy and an intrusion upon the privacy rights of third parties who have no
relationship to or contact with this litigation.

14	relationship to or contact with this litigation.	
15	Date: December 16, 2011	MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, PC
16		Mill
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18		C. D. Michel Attorney for Plaintiffs
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	PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER'S RE	SPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE

1	VERIFICATION		
2	I, THOMAS BOYER, am a Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the foregoing		
3	PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS CITY AND COUNTY OF		
4	SAN FRANCISCO INTERROGATORIES SET ONE and know the contents thereof. The same is		
5	true of my own knowledge, except as to any matters stated therein on information and belief, and		
6	as to such matters I believe them to be true.		
7	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is		
8	true and correct and that this verification was executed on December 15, 2011, in San Francisco,		
9	California.		
10	Momas Loger		
11	Thomas Boyer		
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	24 PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER'S RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES. SET ONE		
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,

1	PROOF OF SERVICE	
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	
4 5	I, Claudia Ayala, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am a citizen of the United States, over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, California	
6	90802.	
7	On December 16, 2011, I served the foregoing document(s) described as	
8	PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO INTERROGATORIES SET ONE	
9	on the interested parties in this action by placing	
10	 [X] the original [] a true and correct copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: 	
11		
12	Wayne Snodgrass, Deputy City Attorney Sherri Kaiser, Deputy City Attorney	
13	City and County of San Francisco Office of the City Attorney	
14	City Hall 1 Drive Carlton B. San Francisco, CA 94102	
15	X (BY MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and	
16	processing correspondence for mailing. Under the practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Long Beach, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party	
17 18	served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing an affidavit. Executed on December 16, 2011, at Long Beach, California.	
19	(<u>PERSONAL SERVICE</u>) I caused such envelope to delivered by hand to the offices of the	
20	addressee. Executed on December 16, 2011, at Long Beach, California.	
21	<u>(OVERNIGHT MAIL</u>) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery by UPS/FED-EX. Under	
22	the practice it would be deposited with a facility regularly maintained by UPS/FED-EX for receipt on the same day in the ordinary course of business. Such envelope was sealed and	
23	placed for collection and delivery by UPS/FED-EX with delivery fees paid or provided for in accordance.	
24	Executed on December 16, 2011, at Long Beach, California.	
25	X (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of the member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.	
26		
27	CLAUPIA AYALA	
28		
	25	
	PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER'S RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE	

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1 2 3 4 5 6	C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258 Glenn S. McRoberts - S.B.N. 144852 Clinton B. Monfort - S.B.N. 255609 Anna M. Barvir - S.B.N. 268728 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802 Telephone: 562-216-4444 Facsimile: 562-216-4445 Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com	
7	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
8	IN THE UNITED ST	TATES DISTRICT COURT
9	FOR THE NORTHERN	DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	SAN FRAN	CISCO DIVISION
11 12	ESPANOLA JACKSON, PAUL COLVIN, THOMAS BOYER, LARRY BARSETTI, DAVID GOLDEN, NOEMI MARGARET) CASE NO. C09-2143-RS)) DECLARATION OF THOMAS BOYER IN
12	ROBINSON, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., SAN	SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
13	FRANCISCO VETERAN POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,)) Date:
15	Plaintiffs) Time: 1:30 p.m.) Place: Courtroom 3 - 17th Floor
16	vs.) 450 Golden Gate Ave. San Francisco, CA 94102
17	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, THE MAYOR OF	
18	SAN FRANCISCO, AND THE CHIEF OF THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE	
19 20	DEPARTMENT, in their official capacities, and DOES 1-10,	
20	Defendants.)
21)
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24 25		
23 26		
20 27		
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	ΠΕΟΙ Α ΒΑΤΙΟΝ ΟΓ ΤΠ	IOMAS BOYER C-09-2143-RS
		101VIAN DUTER U-17-2140-KO

1 **DECLARATION OF THOMAS BOYER** 2 I, Thomas Boyer, declare as follows: 3 I, Thomas Boyer, am a plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I make this declaration of 1. 4 my own personal knowledge and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently to 5 the truth of the matters set forth herein. 6 2. On or around December 16, 2011, during the preparation of my responses to 7 defendants' written interrogatories, I became concerned that the types of questions posed by 8 defendants would expose to the government information that I consider personal and sensitive, 9 including, among other things, the types and number of firearms I own. At the time, I was 10 particularly concerned about requests for an itemized list of all firearms and ammunition that I 11 have possessed at any point and for any duration since 2007. I worked with my attorneys to 12 provide responses to defendants' written interrogatories, and I reviewed my attorneys' objections 13 to the same. Based on my attorneys' objections to the City's written discovery, I was then 14 satisfied for the time that my sensitive, personal information would remain secure, and I elected to 15 remain a party to this lawsuit. 16 Following my participation in litigation against the City and County of San Francisco 3. 17 ("the City"), I have faced harassment from the City and its agents. I reasonably believe that 18 harassment to have been motivated by my participation in other litigation against the City. I fear 19 further retaliation from the City and/or its agents in connection with my participation in this 20 lawsuit, and I no longer wish to involve myself in this case. 21 4. On or about September 12, 2012, to avoid further retaliation by the City and/or its 22 agents as a result of the release of my sensitive, personal information to the government and as a 23 result of my ongoing participation in this lawsuit, I requested that my attorneys seek dismissal of 24 my claims against all defendants. 25 /// 26 /// 27 111 28 111

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1	5. Further, I am HIV positive, and I believe that my ongoing participation in this lawsuit
2	and the stress it causes me is deleterious to my health. For this additional reason, I wish to be
3	dismissed from this lawsuit.
4	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
5	October 3, 2012.
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7	Monard Boy
8	Thomas Boyer
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	DECLARATION OF THOMAS BOYER C-09-2143-RS

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
3	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION	
4	ESPANOLA JACKSON, PAUL COLVIN,) CASE NO.: CV-09-2143-RS	
5	THOMAS BOYER, LARRY BARSETTI,) DAVID GOLDEN, NOEMI MARGARET) ROBINSON, NATIONAL RIFLE) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
6	ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., SAN)	
7	FRANCISCO VETERAN POLICE) OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,)	
8	Plaintiffs	
9	vs.	
10	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN	
11	FRANCISCO, THE MAYOR OF) SAN FRANCISCO, AND THE CHIEF)	
12	OF THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE) DEPARTMENT, in their official capacities,)	
13	and DOES 1-10,	
14	Defendants.	
15	IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT:	
16	I, the undersigned, am a citizen of the United States and am at least eighteen years of age. My business address is 180 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, California, 90802.	
17	I am not a party to the above-entitled action. I have caused service of	
18	DECLARATION OF THOMAS BOYER IN SUPPORT OF	
19	MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER	
20	on the following party by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the District Court using its ECF System, which electronically notifies them.	
21	Warma Smadamaga Damutu City, Attomasy	
22	Wayne Snodgrass, Deputy City Attorney Christine Van Aken, Deputy City Attorney	
23	Office of the City Attorney 1 Drive Carlton B. Goodlett Place	
24	City Hall, Room 234 San Francisco, CA 94102	
25	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on	
26	October 3, 2012.	
27	/s/ C. D. Michel C. D. Michel	
28	Attorney for Plaintiffs	
	3	
	DECLARATION OF THOMAS BOYER C-09-2143-RS	

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1 2	Glenn S. McRoberts - S.B.N. 144852	
3	Anna M. Barvir - S.B.N. 268728 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, PC	
4	180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802	
5	Telephone: 562-216-4444 Facsimile: 562-216-4445	
6	Email: <u>cmichel@michellawyers.com</u>	
7	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
8	IN THE UNITED ST	TATES DISTRICT COURT
9	FOR THE NORTHERN	DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	SAN FRAN	CISCO DIVISION
11	ESPANOLA JACKSON, PAUL COLVIN,) THOMAS BOYER, LARRY BARSETTI,)	CASE NO.: CV-09-2143-RS
12	DAVID GOLDEN, NOEMI MARGARET) ROBINSON, NATIONAL RIFLE)	[<i>PROPOSED</i>] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION TO
13	ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., SAN) FRANCISCO VETERAN POLICE	DISMISS PLAINTIFF PAUL COLVIN; GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
14	OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,	DISMISS PLAINTIFF THOMAS BOYER
15	Plaintiffs)	
16 17	VS.)	
17 18	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, THE MAYOR OF SAN FRANCISCO, AND THE CHIEF OF THE	
10	SAN FRANCISCO POLICE) DEPARTMENT, in their official capacities,)	
20	and DOES 1-10,	
21	Defendants.	
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	[PROPOSED] OR	RDER CV-09-2143-RS

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I	
1	Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Paul Colvin and Motion to Dismiss
2	Plaintiff Thomas Boyer came on for hearing before this Court on November 8, 2012. C.D. Michel
3	and Clinton Monfort appeared for Plaintiffs, and Christine Van Aken appeared for Defendants.
4	After consideration of the briefs and arguments of counsel and all other matters presented, the
5	Court finds good cause exists for the dismissal of the claims of Plaintiffs Colvin and Boyer and
6	that defendants can establish no legally cognizable prejudice sufficient to justify the denial of
7	Plaintiffs' request. As such, dismissal of Plaintiffs Colvin and Boyer's claims against all
8	defendants is proper.
9	The Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Paul
10	Colvin. The Court also GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Thomas Boyer. All
11	claims of Plaintiff Paul Colvin and Plaintiff Thomas Boyer are hereby dismissed against all
12	defendants.
13	The Court further orders as follows:
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17	IT IS SO ORDERED.
18	Date:
19	Honorable Judge Richard Seeborg United States District Court Judge
20	Childe States District Court stage
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	PROPOSED] ORDER CV-09-2143-RS

1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
2	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
3	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION		
4	THOMAS BOYER, LARRY BARSETTI,)		
5 6	ROBINSON, NATIONAL RIFLE) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. SAN)FRANCISCO VETERAN POLICE)		
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12	SAN FRANCISCO POLICE) DEPARTMENT, in their official capacities,) and DOES 1-10,)		
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15 16	IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT:		
10	I, the undersigned, am a citizen of the United States and am at least eighteen years of	age.	
18	I am not a party to the above-entitled action. I have caused service of		
19	[<i>PROPOSED</i>] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION TO DI PLAINTIFF PAUL COLVIN; GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISM	SMISS ISS	
20			
21	on the following party by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the District (using its ECF System, which electronically notifies them.	Court	
22	Christine Van Aken, Deputy City Attorney		
23	1 Drive Carlton B. Goodlett Place		
24 25	San Francisco, CA 94102		
23 26	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on		
27 28	/s/ C. D. Michel C. D. Michel Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
	[PROPOSED] ORDER CV-09-2143-RS		