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1	TABLE OF CONTENTS
2	Page(s)
3	ARGUMENT
5	I. THE CITY'S TOTAL BAN ON HANDGUN PURCHASES AND POSSESSION CONFLICTS WITH PENAL CODE § 12026
6	AND GOVERNMENT CODE § 52071
7	II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 53071
8	III. GOVERNMENT CODE § 53071'S EXPRESS PREEMPTION OF LOCAL "LICENSING" OF FIREARMS SHOULD BE READ
10	ACCORDING TO THE BROAD MEANING OF THE LICENSING CONCEPT DESCRIBED IN <i>GALVAN</i> , TO WHICH SECTION 53071 WAS A DIRECT LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE.
11	IV. THE ORDINANCE CONFLICTS WITH, DUPLICATES, AND FRUSTRATES MULTIPLE STATE LICENSING SCHEMES
12	A. Statutes Regulating Firearms
13 14	B. Statutes Licensing Handgun Possession
15	1. Carrying Concealed or Loaded Handguns in Public
16	2. Other Firearm Possession Restrictions and Allowances/Licenses 10
17 18	V. THE SUPREME COURT'S RULINGS IN GREAT WESTERN AND NORDYKE CONCERN THE NARROW ISSUE OF REGULATING GUN SHOWS ON PUBLICLY-OWNED PROPERTY; TO THE EXTENT THEY ADDRESS DOE, THEY REAFFIRM RATHER THAN REPUDIATE
19	ITS HOLDINGS
20	A. Great Western Upheld an Ordinance Banning Sales of Guns and Ammunition at Gun Shows on County Property, Only – It
21	Failed Even to Address Whether a Countywide Ban on Gun Show Sales Would Survive a Preemption Challenge
22	B. Great Western Cited Doe Approvingly, Noting the Hand Gun Ban Ordinance In Doe Impermissibly Conflicted with Both Government
23	Code § 57031 and Penal Code § 12026
24	C. Nordyke, the Companion Case to Great Western, Addressed and Resolved a Similarly Narrow Issue Regarding Gun Shows on
25	County-owned Property
26	CONCLUSION
27	
28	

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s)
2	FEDERAL CASES
3	Great Western Shows, Inc. v. Los Angeles County, (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 1258, 1263
4	
5	STATE CASES
6 7	California Ass'n. of Psychology Providers v. Rank, (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 1, 21, 270 Cal.Rptr. 796
8	Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 509, 186 Cal.Rptr. 380
9	Galvan v. Superior Court, (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 51
10	
11	Great Western v. Los Angeles, (2002) 27 Cal.4th 853
12	California Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood, (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 591
13	
14	Nordyke v. King, (2002) 27 Cal.4th 875
15	Olsen v. McGillicuddy; (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 897, 93 Cal.Rptr. 530
16 17	People v. Romero, (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 520, 53 Cal.Rptr. 789
18	People v. Wells,
19	(1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 986
20	Sippel v. Nelder, (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 173, 101 Cal.Rptr 89
21	Suter v. Lafayette, (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1111, n.2, 67 Cal.Rptr. 420
22	(1557) 57 Gain pp. 101 1105, 1111, 11.2, 07 Gain par 120
23	STATUTES & RULES
24	Business and Professions Code Section 7596.3
25	Civil Code Section 1714.3
26	Civil Code Section 3482.1
27	Education Code Section 48900
28	
	ii AMICUS BRIEF OF SENATOR H. L. RICHARDSON

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	Page(s)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Page(s)
26 27 28	77 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 147 (1994)
	iii AMICUS BRIEF OF SENATOR H. L. RICHARDSON

Code § 53071 and the significance of that intent in evaluating the legality of the ban on handgun purchases and possession in San Francisco's Proposition H. Understanding the intended scope and application of § 53071 is critical to understanding the preemptive effect of that statute on Proposition H. This is a topic about which these particular amici can provide valuable information to the court, since amicus Senator H. L. Richardson (ret.) was the author of the bill that became Government Code § 53071. We will also briefly address the conflict evident in the plain language of the legislation at issue (Part I), before turning to the legislative history in Parts II and III. In Part IV, we examine the comprehensive regulatory scheme of firearms control, and how the Ordinance conflicts with it. Finally, in Part V, we will examine specific misplaced arguments raised by the City regarding recent case law and the continuing validity of the *Doe* case, which is dispositive on the matter now before this Court.

The accompanying brief primarily addresses the Legislative history and intent of Government

### **ARGUMENT**

# I. THE CITY'S TOTAL BAN ON HANDGUN PURCHASES AND POSSESSION CONFLICTS WITH PENAL CODE § 12026 AND GOVERNMENT CODE § 52071

The question whether the City's handgun ban conflicts with State law is beyond the purview of reasoned debate, for the plain meaning of the language of the statutes at issue cannot logically be reconciled with the City's ordinance. While the plain language of § 12026 declares that all law abiding California residents have a statutory right to possess handguns within the sanctity of their own

Pen. Code § 12026(b) provides: No permit or license to purchase, own, possess, keep, or carry, either openly or concealed, shall be required of any citizen of the United States or legal resident over the age of 18 years who resides or is temporarily within this state . . . to purchase, own, possess, keep, or carry, either openly or concealed, a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person within the citizen's or legal resident's place of residence, place of business, or on private property owned or lawfully possessed by the citizen or legal resident. (Pen. Code § 12026(b)(emphasis added).)

Government Code Section 53701 provides: It is the intention of the Legislature to occupy

the whole field of regulation of the registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms as encompassed by the provisions of the Penal Code, and such provisions shall be exclusive of all local regulations, relating to registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms, by any political subdivision as defined in Section 1721 of the Labor

Code. (Gov. Code § 53701 (emphasis added).)

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>City's Ordinance provisions</u>: Section 3: Within the limits of the City and County of San Francisco, *no resident* of the City and Countrmed forces, security guards and, then, only within the scope of their duties].

homes and businesses without being subject to local license/permit laws, the Ordinance declares just the opposite. It bans, *inter alia*, the purchase and in-home/business possession of *any* handgun by California residents who reside in the City – with or without a permit.

Moreover, any doubt as to the state-wide concern and the State's exclusive authority over this area of gun control is eliminated by the plain language of § 53071, which expressly declares the Legislature's intent to occupy the whole field of firearm registration and licensing to the exclusion of local governments. Further, § 53071 prohibits "all local regulations, relating to registration or licensing of commercially manufactured firearms . . . ." To argue that a complete ban on the purchase and possession of handguns does not relate to the licensing of handguns or that it does not conflict with State law prohibiting the requirement of a license to possess a handgun on private property, is to ignore the plain meaning of §§ 12026 and 53071. In short, taken together, the two statutes necessarily preclude local governments from banning possession of state-approved handguns within the sanctity of one's own home or business. The legislative history of § 53071, discussed below, simply reinforces that conclusion.

### II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 53071

San Francisco's Proposition H is the latest in a long line of attempts to ban guns in that city, and may best be understood in terms of a time line of significant developments:

In 1923 the California Legislature was considering a massive collection of gun control laws. This included a prohibition against anyone buying a handgun without a permit. That provision was ultimately not enacted. But the Legislature went even further, taking affirmative action. It enacted into law what is now Penal Code § 12026, declaring that law abiding, responsible adults would *never* be subject to a permit law, i.e., a law that bans handgun possession unless you have a permit.

In 1969 San Francisco enacted a handgun registration ordinance, which was then challenged in the state Supreme Court on the ground that it constituted a law requiring a permit to own handguns in violation of § 12026. The Supreme Court rejected that challenge, saying that a registration law only requires that handguns be "registered" but does not require the owner to have a "permit" or license. Galvan v. Superior Court (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 51. The Galvan court went to great length to define and distinguish between the concepts of "license" and "registration." Significantly, the Court in Galvan

referred to the "no license or permit shall be required" language of § 12026 as conferring a *right* upon California's residents to possess a handgun in the privacy of their own homes and businesses, stating:

In 1923, the provision prohibiting carrying concealed firearms without a license was changed to concealable weapons (Stats. 1923, ch. 339, § 2, at p. 696), and a paragraph added-substantially, Penal Code section 12026, that "no permit or license" could be required to possess a firearm at one's residence or place of business . . ..

The Legislature intended that the **right** to possess a weapon at certain places could not be circumscribed by imposing any requirements . . . (Id. at 858.)

In 1970, displeased with the *Galvan* result regarding registration, the Legislature enacted a new statute to supercede it. Authored by *amicus* herein Senator H. L. Richardson, that new statute (originally Gov. Code § 9619) became § 53071. Section 53071 was intended to ban any local law that required either "registration" or "licensing," as *Galvan* had broadly defined those terms, with respect to the purchase or possession of any kind of firearm.

In 1971 the Court of Appeals (First District) in Olsen v. McGillicuddy; (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 897 [93 Cal.Rptr. 530], declined to find preemption under § 53071 of "the subject of the regulation of the use of BB guns by minors. . ." The ordinance in question was a possession and use regulation of BB guns. (Section 53071 was never intended to preclude localities from regulating the use of firearms or BB guns (which are not "firearms") – hence the plethora of local firearm discharge ordinances.)

Again displeased, in response to the *Olsen* decision the Legislature passed § 53071.5, preempting the field of BB gun regulation, including manufacturer, sale, and possession. In drafting § 53071.5 differently from the language it had used in § 53071, the Legislature was tailoring the language of the new statute to respond to the language and terms used in the *Olsen* decision, just as it did in drafting § 53071 in response to the terms used in *Galvan*.

In 1972 San Francisco tried again, enacting an ordinance which purported to require a permit to buy a handgun. This was quickly stricken down as contrary to both §§ 12026 and 53071. (Sippel v. Nelder (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 173 {101 Cal.Rptr 89].) Similar to the Court in Galvan, the court in Sippel found that under § 12026 Californians were "entitled" to purchase [and possess] a handgun, even without resorting to § 53071's express preemption language:

The plaintiff in the instant case did not fall within the excepted classes prescribed by Penal Code, section 12021, and he was therefore entitled, under Penal Code section 12026, to possess a concealed firearm at his residence without obtaining a license or

permit of any kind. Under the reasoning of the Galvan case, municipal regulations such as the San Francisco ordinances would clearly have been invalid even prior to the enactment of Government Code, section 9619 [now, section 53071], since they are in direct conflict with Penal Code, section 12026.

(Id. at 177 (emphasis added).)

On June 28, 1982, San Francisco tried once again, enacting an ordinance which purported to ban the *possession* of all handguns, but did not seek to abolish *all* exceptions, e.g., the power the state grants to local police chiefs and sheriffs to issue concealed carry licenses under to Penal Code § 12050.

On August 3, 1982 the California Attorney General issued an opinion at the request of *amicus* herein Senator H. L. Richardson addressing the issue of whether a city could enact legislation of the type being contemplated by San Francisco, and finding such a regulation would be preempted. (65 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 457 (1982); 1982 WL 155982 (Cal. A.G.).)

Then, in *Doe v. City & County of San Francisco* (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 509 [186 Cal.Rptr. 380], the Court of Appeal struck down the San Francisco ordinance on three grounds: (a) it created licensing scheme in violation of § 53071; (b) it violated § 12026's prohibition on local permit requirements to keep a handgun in the home because it left the police chief free to issue concealed carry licenses that allowed the holder to have a handgun in the city; and (c) the existence of § 12026 impliedly deprives cities of the power to ban handguns (whether with or without a permit requirement). *Doe* rejected the claim that § 12026 precludes only a license-issuance scheme but allows a total ban, stating: "It strains reason to suggest that the state Legislature would prohibit licenses and permits but allow a ban on possession."

Because *Doe* is still good law it flatly invalidates the Ordinance. In addition to the Ordinance being in conflict with § 53071, § 12026 has an *identically phrased* preclusion of any local ban of handgun *purchasing*. It equally "strains reason" to suggest that § 12026 (b)'s prohibition of local licensing of handgun sales allows a flat ban on such sales. You cannot have a purchase without a sale.

In 1998, an appeals court upheld a local ban on the sale of certain specific handguns that the ordinance misidentified as "Saturday Night Specials." (California Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 591] (CRPA).) Unfortunately, CRPA misinterpreted § 53071 to not apply to local sales bans if the ordinance banned only the sale of certain

kinds of guns, but not others. (Id. at 1321-1322.) Even under CRPA's view of § 53071, however, § 53071 still invalidates the Ordinance, which bans the sale of all guns, and possession of handguns unless licensed (i.e., non-residents, police, etc.). Notably, CRPA in no way, either expressly or implicitly, purported to overrule the 1982 Doe case. Rather, it acknowledged Doe, but distinguished that case, and §§ 12026 and 53071, on the ground that they dealt with bans on the purchase and possession of all handguns, not with bans on the sale of only specific types of handguns.<sup>2</sup>
In 2002, the California Supreme Court took up firearm preemption issues in a pair of cases

In 2002, the California Supreme Court took up firearm preemption issues in a pair of cases certified to that Court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See, Nordyke v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 875; Great Western v. Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 853. The cases involved the attempt by Alameda and Los Angeles Counties to ban gun shows from county fairgrounds by prohibiting either the possession, or the sale, of firearms on county-owned property. Although the California Supreme Court ultimately found that the local ordinances were not preempted, the holdings are limited to the facts of those cases and the questions certified, as described more fully in Part V, below, and do not bear directly on the validity of the Ordinance in this case. In fact, the Court in Great Western cited Doe approvingly, as an example of a case wherein an ordinance was properly preempted, i.e, it affirmed rather than limited the holding in Doe. (Id. at 863-64.).

Despite the repeated decisions rejecting San Francisco's attempts to ban firearms, some recent decisions (or politics) have apparently emboldened San Francisco to try again. This time San Francisco apparently hopes to distinguish its attempt by limiting part of the ordinance's application to City residents to try to transform the bun ban into purely a municipal affair.

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For example, in listing discrete areas of regulation <u>fully preempted</u> by the State law, the *CRPA* court stated: "In summary, the Legislature has expressly declared that the City may not require the licensing or registration of firearms. (Gov. Code § 53071.) The Legislature has also declared that the City may not require permits or licenses to purchase, own, possess, keep, or carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed within a place of residence, place of business, or on private property owned or lawfully possessed. (Pen. Code § 12026.)" (*Id.* at 1313.) Note also, that the Legislature has since passed the Unsafe Handgun Act, Penal Code sections 12125-12233, designating which handguns may be sold in the State, thus precluding further such ordinances – and most cities voluntarily dropped such laws – including West Hollywood.

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III. GOVERNMENT CODE § 53071'S EXPRESS PREEMPTION OF LOCAL "LICENSING" OF FIREARMS SHOULD BE READ ACCORDING TO THE BROAD MEANING OF THE LICENSING CONCEPT DESCRIBED IN GALVAN, TO WHICH SECTION 53071 WAS A DIRECT LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE.

Section 12026 prohibits local bans on handgun purchase and ownership. Section 53071 extends this to all guns by expressly preempting any local "licensing" power. Section 53071, which was written in reaction to the Galvan decision, was also intended to reverse its holding by expressly preempting local registration or licensing of firearms.<sup>3</sup> So § 53071's preemption of local "licensing" must be read in light of the broad meaning Galvan gave to the concept of licensing.

As Justice Baxter reminds us, it is normally presumed that when legislating on the same subject "the Legislature intended that similar phrases be accorded the same meaning, particularly if the terms have been construed by judicial decision." People v. Wells, (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 986. Regarding § 53071, that presumption is fortified by our knowledge that its author, amici Senator Richardson, and its sponsors were well aware of Galvan and the construction it had given the concept of "licensing" in interpreting Penal Code § 12026, and that they were adopting that construction, i.e. a "license" is defined as "permission or authority to do a particular thing or exercise a particular privilege." Galvan, supra, 70 Cal.2d at 856.

Further confirmation of § 53071's intent to deprive cities of any power to ban gun sales or possession are documents provided by the Legislative Intent Service. These include a contemporary statement by § 53071's primary author, letters urging its enactment (including one by then Assemblyman Floyd Wakefield), and the Governor's press release upon signing § 53071 into law.4 These are all consistent in their refutation of the argument that by "licensing" § 53071 only precludes ordinances that involve the issuance of a physical license while allowing cities to ban guns altogether. The governor's press release epitomizes all the documents. He described what he was signing as:

legislation which will insure uniform regulations on their [firearms'] use throughout the state . . . in much the same way as the state establishes uniform regulations governing such things as traffic safety on highways throughout California.

<sup>3</sup> Suter v. Lafayette (1997) 57 Cal. App. 4th 1109, 1111, n.2 [67 Cal. Rptr. 420].

<sup>4</sup> See Request for Judicial Notice which will be filed forthwith.

Gov. Reagan said, "Without this legislation, sportsmen might well be confronted in the future by <u>a chaotic maze of differing local firearm licensing regulations</u> each time they entered another local jurisdiction to go hunting.

"Imagine driving along a freeway from one county to another, not knowing from one mile to the next if traffic regulations had changed and, if so, in what way," he said. He noted that California now has a comprehensive Deadly Weapons Control Act which provides for statewide regulation of firearms. [Emphasis added.]

These documents are irreconcilable with the Ordinance. Allowing cities to enact a chaotic maze of total gun bans without recognizing the exceptions built into carefully-crafted state laws perpetuates the very problem § 53071 was intended to eliminate. Its intent can only be fulfilled by understanding that § 53071 preempts all local power to ban guns, regardless of what form the ban takes. The intent was to "insure uniform regulations" on the *purchase and possession* of firearms, by placing those subjects exclusively in the power of the State to establish.

Although the Legislature could have worded § 53071 differently to make it clearer that § 53071 prohibits local bans of gun sales or possession, in light of precipitating § 53071 (and *Olsen* later separately precipitating 53071.5) the language of § 53071 is completely understandable. When enacting § 53071.5, the legislature simply did not simultaneously go back and amend § 53071. This is typical in Sacramento. At the time § 53071.5 was passed, the state of law as affirmed in *Doe* had already been interpreted as supporting the position that *amici* are urging here, therefore there was no need to amend § 53071.

Moreover, the Legislature had no reason to rewrite §§ 12026 or 53071. The legislators have been authoritatively and repeatedly advised that the wording of the §§ 12026 and 53071 do preclude flat local bans of either firearm sale or possession, so there was no need to change it. Those words were interpreted to mean just that in Galvan, Doe, and three opinions by the Attorney General and Legislative Counsel,<sup>5</sup> respectively, finding that localities are precluded from banning the acquisition

Legislative Counsel opinions are entitled to as much weight as Attorney General Opinions, or even more. The Legislative Counsel is, after all, the Legislature's own lawyer. "It must be presumed that [such opinions] have come to the attention of the Legislature, and if [they] were contrary to the legislative intent that some corrective measure would have been adopted." (California Ass'n. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 1, 21 [270 Cal.Rptr. 796] (referring to Attorney General opinions, but applying the same point to the Legislative Counsel in the next paragraph).)

and possession (by persons qualified under state law) of handguns permitted by state law.6

The only reason for the Legislature to rewrite these laws would be if it disagreed with those opinions. Far from disagreeing, the Legislature ratified the opinions by reenacting § 12026 repeatedly over the years without relevant change.<sup>7</sup>

At least eight bills to allow cities to ban gun or handgun acquisition and possession have been introduced -- but rejected -- over the past thirteen years. Ordinarily the non-enactment of legislation has little import. But here there is a pattern of repeated attempts to change the law, all being repeatedly rejected. These repeated attempts show the Legislature's knowledge that localities have no such power under current law. (*People v. Romero* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 520 [53 Cal.Rptr. 789].) The fact of their non-enactment confirms the Legislature's intent that localities should not have such power. As summarized in the hearing memorandum on Assembly Bill 634:

The Legislature, in enacting pre-emption statutes, has expressed its intent for the need for uniform statewide standards relating to . . . firearms, [a subject] already involving extensive and comprehensive regulation by the state[. Here] . . . the need for existing statewide standards and the uniformity it provides could not be more necessary. Conversely, permitting any widespread additional local restrictions [regarding] . . . firearms could not possibly add anything other than general confusion to the regulatory scheme.

# IV. THE ORDINANCE CONFLICTS WITH, DUPLICATES, AND FRUSTRATES MULTIPLE STATE LICENSING SCHEMES

The general approach taken by the state regulatory scheme is to identify a problem area,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> "Cities may not enact an ordinance to prohibit sale or possession of handguns." March 2, 1982 Legislative Counsel Opinion (emphasis added) (see request for Judicial Notice filed herewith); 65 Ops. Cal. Att. Gen. 457 (1982) ("A California city does not have the legislative authority to prohibit the possession of operative handguns within the city even if law enforcement officers are precluded from the prohibition"); 77 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 147 (1994) (state law occupies the field as to the sale of any kind of firearm or ammunition).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Acts of 1995, Ch. 322, § 1; Acts of 1989, Ch. 958, § 1; Acts of 1988, Ch. 577, § 2. The one noteworthy change is that § 12026 is now subdivided.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Assem. Bill No. 136 (1997-98 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Bill No. 247 (1997-98 Reg. Sess.); Sen. Bill No. 644 (1997-98 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Bill No. 634 (1995-96 Reg. Sess.); Assem Bill No. 2706 (1993-94 Reg. Sess.) Sen. Bill No. 1293 (1993-94 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Bill 2865 (1993-94 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Bill 137 (1993-94 Reg. Sess.).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Jan. 23, 1996 <u>Assembly Committee on Public Safety Hearing Memo on AB 634</u>, p. 2 (emphasis added).

regulate it, and then to create myriad exceptions to the regulations for situations or persons that are not part of the problem. In essence, this approach creates a comprehensive licensing scheme throughout the dangerous weapons control statutes contained in Penal Code §§ 12000 through 12809. It was this scheme that §53071 was enacted to protect.

### A. Statutes Regulating Firearms

There is no other piece of personal property so highly regulated in California as firearms.

There are state laws concerning manufacture, distribution and sale, acquisition, transfer, use, where possessed, by whom possessed, in what manner possessed, storage, ownership, transportation, forfeiture, sale, receipt, inheritance, composition, design, size, safety features, accessories, age and function.<sup>10</sup>

As noted above, § 53071 indicates an express intent by the legislature to occupy the whole field of the regulation of firearms licensing and registration. That code section was interpreted in *Doe* when the Appellate Court questioned "whether the San Francisco Handgun Ordinance merely regulates possession or instead constitutes a licensing ordinance in violation of the express preemption of § 53071." (*Doe*, 136 Cal.App.3d at 516.)

Later, in the *CRPA* case, the court found no preemption of local ordinances with respect to the sale of a certain classes of allegedly dangerous firearms designated as "Saturday Night Specials." That court found that firearm sales are regulated by only a relatively few sections of California Penal Code: §§ 12070, 12071, 12071.1, 12071.4, 12072, 12078, 12081, 12082 and 12084.

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10 For example, in addition to the laws addressing carrying handguns in public, there are laws dealing with gun design. [See the various law regulating semi-automatic and full automatic weapons, at both the State and Federal level.] There are laws regulating size and function. [See Penal Code section 12125-12133 (which is the State counterpart to now preempted local ordinances regulating "Saturday Night Specials")]. There are laws classifying guns by age. [See California Penal Code § 12001 and 18 USC 921(a)(16).] There are laws proscribing who may have a gun. [See Penal Code § 12021 and Welfare & Institution Code §§ 8100 et seq.] There are laws regulating the transportation of firearms. [See e.g. Penal Code §§ 12070 and 12021] There are laws for the concealed carry of handguns. [See Penal Code § 12050]. There are laws regulating the transfer of firearms.

[Penal Code § 12072] There are laws requiring training before purchase of a firearm. [Penal Code § 12081]. This list is not nearly exhaustive and does not address federal law.

### B. Statutes Licensing Handgun Possession

In contrast, the state law scheme with respect to *possession* of firearms is much more comprehensive, and the express statutory permissions to possess handguns that are created by statutory exemptions to the general prohibitions are much more comprehensive. All of those statutory privileges are invalidated by the Ordinance, in direct conflict with Government Code § 53071.

### 1. Carrying Concealed or Loaded Handguns in Public

Perhaps the best place to start to understand the state's approach to handgun possession is with the laws that regulate and license the carrying of concealed or loaded handguns in public. The Ordinance contains no exception to its general ban on handgun possession for persons with a valid CCW license under Penal Code § 12050. Nor does it respect the statutory licenses to carry a concealed handgun without a CCW found in §§ 12025.5, 12026, 12026.1, 12026.2, 12027, or 12027.1.

Regarding loaded firearms, § 12031 generally prohibits carrying a loaded firearm in public, but §§ 12031(b), 12031(j), 12031(k), and 12031(l) create situations where a loaded handgun can be possessed, all of which are also prohibited by the ordinance.

It is thus possible for a person found in possession of a handgun in San Francisco, to be adjudged not guilty of violating §§ 12025 or 12031, yet still be found guilty of violating the Ordinance.

### 2. Other Firearm Possession Restrictions and Allowances/Licenses

In addition to dealing with the carrying of concealed or loaded handguns in public, California state law also regulates firearm possession under approximately *fifty* statutes.<sup>11</sup> Many of these statutes

See, e.g., Business and Professions Code § 7596.3, et seq., for issuance of firearms to employees of a security and alarm company. Civil Code § 1714.3 imposing civil liability for negligent possession and storage of a firearm. Civil Code § 3482.1 regulating shooting ranges and activities thereon. Education Code § 48900, which provides for the expulsion of a student for unlawful possession of a firearm. Family Code § 6389 prohibits persons subject to domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms while the order is in effect. There are several Fish and Game Code sections regulating possession of firearms while engaged in certain activities and in certain areas: §§ 2005, 6854, 10651, 10662, 10663 and 10665. Sections of the Health and Safety Code prohibit possession of a firearm by any person in possession of a controlled substance. Penal Code § 171d prohibits possession of a firearm by unauthorized persons in the Governor's, or any other constitutional officer's residence. Penal Code § 186.22, et seq., regulates possession of firearms by persons found to be members of street gangs. Penal Code § 417, et seq., criminalizes the irresponsible display – brandishing – of a firearm. All of the sections of Penal Code § 830, et seq., not mentioned previously, pertain to the possession of firearms by persons designated a peace officers. Penal Code § 1203 governs possession of firearms by persons on probation. Penal Code §

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are broad in their reach, quite long in their text, quite complex in their application, and most importantly for § 53071 analysis, quite thorough in their exceptions. Clearly, the subject matter of possession of firearms in general and handguns in particular has been so fully covered by general law, and by the scheme of express and de facto licenses created through statutory exceptions so extensive, as to be covered by the express preemption provisions of Government Code § 53071.

V. THE SUPREME COURT'S RULINGS IN GREAT WESTERN AND NORDYKE CONCERN THE NARROW ISSUE OF REGULATING GUN SHOWS ON PUBLICLY-OWNED PROPERTY; TO THE EXTENT THEY ADDRESS DOE, THEY REAFFIRM RATHER THAN REPUDIATE ITS HOLDINGS

The anti-gun lobby has consistently exaggerated the impact of the narrow holdings in both Great Western Shows, Inc. v. Los Angeles County (2002) 27 Cal.4th 853, and Nordyke v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 875. The City will no doubt follow suit. But these companion cases were certified for Supreme Court review to resolve specific legal issues regarding possible conflicts with the State's new gun show laws on gun shows held on county-owned property, an issue of first impression. (See, Great Western Shows, Inc. v. Los Angeles County (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 1258, 1263). Both the issues

12020.5 criminalizes the unlawful advertising of, among other things, certain kinds of firearms. Penal Code § 12021 penalizes possession of a firearm by a convicted felon or any person found guilty of a set of enumerated misdemeanors. Penal Code § 12026.1 outlines the regulations for transporting a firearm in a motor vehicle. Penal Code §§ 12028, 12028.5 & 12090 each provide for the disposition of firearms after a trial, firearms temporarily taken during a domestic dispute, and firearms declared to be a nuisance. Penal Code § 12032, outlines the procedures for disposition of surplus firearms in the possession of an official of a state or local agency. Penal Code § 12034 makes the owner of a vehicle responsible for the safe and lawful transportation of firearms in his/her vehicle. Penal Code § 12035 addresses the issue of criminally negligent storage of a firearm. Penal Code § 12040 makes it a crime for a person to be in possession of a firearm while wearing a mask. Penal Code § 12095, et seq., outlines the state permit process for possession of a short barreled rifle and/or short barreled shotgun. Penal Code § 12101 places tight restrictions on possession of a firearm by a minor. Penal Code § 12200, et seq., regulates possession of machine guns in California. Penal Code § 12275, et seq. [also known as the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Act], regulates the sale and possession of certain specified rifles, shotguns and pistols. Penal Code § 12590 prohibits possession of a firearm while engaged in a labor dispute and picketing in a public place. Welfare and Institutions Code § 8100, et seq., prohibits the possession of firearms by mental patients and sets forth due process requirements for firearm forfeiture. For polling places in the county, the Ordinance duplicates Election Code §18544. The Ordinance duplicates (and conflicts) with Penal Code §171b for firearms brought into state and public buildings in the county. For any place within the county where a committee of the California Assembly or Senate might hold hearings, the Ordinance duplicates Penal Code §171c. For any school located in the county, the ordinance is redundant with respect to Penal Code §§ 626.9 and 626.95.

presented and the holdings in these cases were narrowly tailored, and are easily distinguished from the facts and issues in *Doe*. To the extent *Great Western* and *Nordyke* addressed *Doe*, they did so approvingly. (*Great Western*, supra, at 864-64 (*Nordyke* neither criticized nor mentioned *Doe*).)

Briefly, both *Great Western* and *Nordyke* arose out of disputes between local governing bodies and operators of local gun shows that traditionally had been held on county fairgrounds. In each case, the challenged ordinance was designed to stop the gun shows. In *Great Western* the county sought to halt the gun shows by banning the sale of guns and ammunition at the Los Angeles County Fairgrounds; in *Nordyke*, the county sought to ban possession of firearms at its fairgrounds. (See *Great Western, supra*, at 859; *Nordyke, supra*, at 880-81.)

A. Great Western Upheld an Ordinance Banning Sales of Guns and Ammunition at Gun Shows on County Property, Only – It Failed Even to Address Whether a Countywide Ban on Gun Show Sales Would Survive a Preemption Challenge

The specific and narrow issues certified to the Court in *Great Western* were stated – unambiguously – at the outset of the Supreme Court opinion:

1. Does state law regulating the sale of firearms and gun shows preempt a county ordinance prohibiting gun and ammunition sales on county property?

2. May a county, consistent with article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, regulate the sale of firearms on its property located in an incorporated city within the borders of the county?" (Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 858 (emphasis added).)

The holding in *Great Western* was equally narrow, and based on the county's ability to control activities on its own property:

Thus, a county has broad latitude under Government Code section 23004, subdivision (d), to use its property, consistent with its contractual obligations, "as the interests of its inhabitants require." . . . the County is not compelled to grant access to its property to all comers. Nor do the gun show statutes mandate that counties use their property for such shows. If the County does allow such shows, it may impose more stringent restrictions on the sale of firearms than state law prescribes. For all the above reasons, we conclude that the Ordinance is not preempted by the sale of firearms and/or ammunition on County property. We do not decide whether a broader countywide ban of gun shows would be preempted. (Id. at 870 (emphasis added).)

Thus, the Court in *Great Western* based its decision on the County's discretion to use its own property to suit its needs, as manifest by the Court declining to extend its holding beyond County-owned property, specifically stating that it was <u>not</u> deciding whether a countywide ban on gun show sales would conflict with State law or survive a preemption challenge. (*Id.*) In short, in terms of the issue presented and the case holding, *Great Western* has absolutely *nothing* to do with handgun

possession in the privacy of one's own home or business. Moreover, in terms of the preemption analysis in *Great Western*, the Court cited *Doe* as an example of a case wherein an ordinance was *properly* preempted, i.e., it affirmed rather than limited the holding in *Doe*. (*Id.* at 863-64.)

B. Great Western Cited Doe Approvingly, Noting the Hand Gun Ban Ordinance In Doe Impermissibly Conflicted with Both Government Code § 57031 and Penal Code § 12026

Before the Court in *Great Western* turned to the specific issue at hand, i.e., whether the Los Angeles ordinance banning sales of ammunition and firearms at gun shows on County-owned property conflicted with the State's gun show laws, it first examined the spectrum of firearms preemption cases. After discussing certain cases where ordinances were found valid, the Court turned to *Doe* as an example of a case where an ordinance *did* conflict with State laws. Further, in its discussion of *Doe*, the Court referenced both statutes that the appellate court relied upon in finding that San Francisco's ordinance banning hand gun possession conflicted with and was preempted by State laws. That is, it recognized and approved *Doe's* alternate holdings based on § 57031 and § 12026 – and without a single word of criticism nor any attempt to limit the holding in *Doe*. The Court did *not* treat *Doe's* alternate holdings (based on § 12026) as dictum, something anti-gun groups are wont to do.

The California Supreme Court's respect for *Doe*, using it as an example of a case where preemption was appropriate, comports with the analysis above regarding the reaction of the Legislature to *Doe*. Thus, both the Legislature and the Supreme Court have examined and approved *Doe*, implicitly in the case of the Legislature and explicitly in the case of the Court, without limitation. It is the law. And any ordinance that would prohibit law abiding citizens from keeping hand guns within the sanctity of their own homes or businesses must be examined based on that law.

C. Nordyke, the Companion Case to Great Western, Addressed and Resolved a Similarly Narrow Issue Regarding Gun Shows on County-owned Property

As in *Great Western*, the Court in *Nordyke* was faced with a narrow issue of first impression and, as in *Great Western*, the question certified for review by the Court was stated unambiguously at the outset of that opinion, as follows:

We granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for certification pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 29.5 to address the following question: Does state law regulating the possession of firearms and gun shows preempt a municipal

ordinance prohibiting gun possession on county property?"

(Nordyke, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 880 (emphasis added).)

As it did in *Great Western*, the Court in *Nordyke* (1) relied heavily upon the county's statutory right to regulate activities on its own property, and (2) answered the narrow issue presented with an equally narrow holding:

We further conclude that under Government Code section 23004, subdivision (d), a county is given substantial authority to manage its property, including the most fundamental decision as to how the property will be used, and that nothing in the gun show statutes evince an intent to override that authority. The gun show statutes do not mandate that counties use their property for such shows." (Id. at 882.)

In sum, whether or not the Ordinance is partially preempted, Alameda County has the authority to prohibit the operation of gun shows held on its property, and, at least to that extent, may ban possession of guns on its property. (*Id.* at 885.)

Thus, both *Great Western* and *Nordyke* stand for the narrow proposition that State gun show regulations do not preclude local governments from banning the sale or possession of firearms and ammunition at gun shows on county-owned property. Neither case addressed the validity of such laws beyond the limited context of the facts presented. Indeed, the Court in both cases went out of its way to disabuse anyone of that notion. (*Great Western*, supra, at 870; Nordyke, supra, at 885.)

To be sure, both cases provide guidance for courts reviewing preemption challenges to local firearms regulations, finding that a "review of the gun law preemption cases indicates that the Legislature has preempted discrete areas of gun regulation rather than the entire field of gun control." (Great Western, supra, at 861.) Clarification on that point arguably was necessary due to the voluminous and ever-increasing State regulation of firearms licensing, registration, use, sales, possession and, specific to those cases, gun shows. But it was not a change in existing law. For example, the court in Doe recognized that, notwithstanding comprehensive State regulation of firearms, "the Legislature has not prevented local governmental bodies from regulating all aspects of the possession of firearms." And further: "It is at least arguable that the state Legislature's adoption of numerous gun regulations has not impliedly preempted all areas of gun regulation." (Doe, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at pp. 516, 518 (emphasis in original); see also, CRPA, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at 1316 (quoting Doe for the same proposition).) Both Doe and CRPA predate the Supreme Court's decisions

in Great Western and Nordyke.

But to say that "not all areas" of gun regulation are preempted is not to say that none are, nor does it mean that the preemption analysis is any less rigorous regarding local gun regulations than it is regarding other local laws concerning areas heavily regulated by the State. This is manifest in the Court's use of the *Sherwin-Williams* test when examining the specific gun show ordinances at issue in *Great Western* and *Nordyke*. The Court did not establish a separate preemption test for gun regulations; there is no "preemption-lite" that applies exclusively to local gun regulations. If local regulations conflict with State law or are otherwise preempted under the *Sherwin-Williams* test, either expressly or impliedly, then they are void. As in *Doe*, San Francisco's (renewed attempt) to ban or confiscate its residents' handguns conflicts with State law and fails the *Sherwin-Williams* test for multiple reasons, as outlined above.

### CONCLUSION

Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition defines "prohibit" as follows: To forbid by law; to prevent; – not synonymous with "regulate." San Francisco is not trying to use Proposition H to regulate pubic safety with any police powers reserved to it under California constitutional and statutory law. They are trying to prohibit the enjoyment of rights and privileges enjoyed by the rest of Californians who rightly look to Sacramento for statewide gun policy.

San Francisco's attempt to ban handguns must be rejected based on the plain language of the State laws implicated, the legislative history that supports a common sense reading of those laws, and the *Doe* decision, which remains good law and must be followed. Accordingly, Petitioners' request for relief should be granted.

Date: January 31, 2006

LAW OFFICES OF DONALD KILMER

Donald E. Kilmer, Jr. Attorney for Petitioners

16
AMICUS BRIEF OF SENATOR H. L. RICHARDSON

1	Donald Kilmer S.B.N 179986 LAW OFFICES DONALD KILMER	ENDORSED
2	1261 Lincoln Ave Ste 111   San Jose, CA 95125-3030	FILED San Francisco County Superior Court
3	Telephone: (408) 998-8489 Facsimile: (408) 998-8487	FEB 0 3 2006
4	Attorneys for Amici	GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk
5	Senator H. L. Richardson	BY: MARY ANN MORAN Deputy Clerk
6	Gun Owners of California California Rifle and Pistol Association	
7	The Madison Society	
8	SUPERIOR COURT	OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9	COUNTY	OF SAN FRANCISCO
10	UNLIM	ITED JURISDICTION
11	PAULA FISCAL et al.,	) CASE NO. CPF-05-505960
12	D	) EXPARTE APPLICATION OF SENATOR
13	Plaintiffs and Petitioners,	<ul><li>H. L. RICHARDSON (RET.), GUN</li><li>OWNERS OF CALIFORNIA,</li></ul>
14	vs.	) CALIFORNIA RIFLE & PISTOL ) ASSOCIATION, AND THE MADISON
15		<ul><li>SOCIETY TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF IN</li><li>SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS;</li></ul>
16	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.,	<ul><li>MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND</li><li>AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF:</li></ul>
17		) DECLARATION OF DONALD KILMER )
18	Defendants and Respondents.	) Hearing Date: February 15, 2006
19		) Hearing Judge: Warren ) Time: 9:30 a.m.
20		) Location: Dept. 301
21		) Date Action Filed: December 29, 2005 ) Trial Date: None scheduled
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Senator H. L. Richardson (Ret.), the Gun Owners of California, California Rifle & Pistol Association, and the Madison Society respectfully move this Court for leave to file the concurrently-submitted brief as *amicus curiae* in support of Plaintiffs and Petitioners.

This application is based upon this Ex Parte Application, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, the attached Declaration of Donald Kilmer, and any oral argument heard by the Court, and the entire record in this action.

## **REASONS FOR FILING**

This application should be granted because this Court has already permitted the Legal Community Against Violence to file an overlength *amicus* brief in support of Defendants and Respondents. The accompanying brief primarily addresses the Legislative history and intent of Government Code Section 53071 and the significance of that intent in evaluating the legality of San Francisco's Proposition H. Understanding the intended scope and application of section 53071 is critical to understanding the preemptive effect of that statute on Proposition H. This is a topic about which these particular *amici* can provide valuable information to the court, since *amicus* Senator H. L. Richardson (ret.) was the author of the bill that became section 53071.

## INTERESTS OF THE AMICI

# SENATOR H. L. RICHARDSON (RETIRED)

Senator H. L. "Bill" Richardson first entered the California Senate in 1966 – the same year Ronald Reagan was elected governor. During the ensuing 22 years, he bypassed three opportunities to go to Congress, instead remaining in the Senate and working in the GOP leadership. Richardson tackled his job with ample energy and good ideas. The result was a record of success, even in the face of opposition. He left the Senate, following his own timetable, in 1988. Today, California continues to feel his influence.

## GUN OWNERS OF CALIFORNIA

Gun Owners of America, Inc., and its associated entity, Gun Owners of California, is a California non-profit corporation organized in 1974. It has offices in Sacramento, California and in

the Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It monitors government activities at the national, state and local levels that may affect the rights of the American public to chose to own firearms.

# CALIFORNIA RIFLE AND PISTOL ASSOCIATION

Falls Church, Virginia, convenient to lobbying the government. Gun Owners of America is a leading

voice in the United States supporting the right to self defense and to keep and bear arms guaranteed by

CALIFORNIA RIFLE AND PISTOL ASSOCIATION, Inc. (hereinafter "CRPA") is a non-profit membership organization with roughly 65,000 members. CRPA is incorporated under the laws of California, with headquarters in Fullerton. Among its other activities, CRPA works to preserve constitutional and statutory rights of gun ownership, including the right to self-defense and the right to choose to keep and bear arms.

### THE MADISON SOCIETY

Amicus MADISON SOCIETY is a Nevada non-profit, membership corporation with numerous chapters in California. Its purpose is to preserve and promote the legal and constitutional right to arms of its members and of law abiding, responsible Americans in general. To that end, Amicus MADISON SOCIETY engages in and/or supports litigation in California and nationwide. The Madison Society also engages in political education and advocacy through public meetings, advertising, publishing and distribution of literature, and contact with public officials. Amicus sometimes pursues these activities at trade shows by engaging in the educational display, delivery, or transfers of control over firearms. Trade and gun shows provide a unique opportunity for organizations such as the Madison Society to engage in their protected activities, because they attract not only individuals interested in firearms but a broader cross-section of the population, all of who may be persuaded of amicus's views and may be recruited to advocate its position.

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#### ARGUMENT

"With the permission of the court, an amicus curiae may file briefs setting out his or her views and arguments." 48Cal.Jur.3d Parties §19 (2005) (footnote omitted). The practice of allowing the participation of amici curiae is well established in California trial courts. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 212 Cal. 736, 738 (1931) (noting that a brief by amici curiae was filed at the trial court's request); County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 735 (1971) (noting that the trial court denied motion to intervene but allowed appearance as amicus curiae: In re Veterans' Industries, Inc., 8 Cal. App.3d 902, 924-25 (1970) (discussing that an amicus curiae lacks standing to appeal a superior court judgment against the amicus curiae's position): Padres Hacia Una Vida Mejor v. Davis, 96 Cal.App. 4th 1123, 1127-28 (2002) (noting that the superior court granted a request to file amicus curiae brief in mandamus action): cf. Cal.R. Ct. 105(b) (providing that in the appellate division of the Superior Court, an amicus curiae brief "may be filed on permission first obtained from the presiding judge, subject to conditions he or she may prescribe.")

The Richardson *amicus* brief will assist provide this Court with a perspective on the ordinance from those with legislative experience. This perspective has not been directly and fully addressed in either the Petitioners' Writ Motion, nor in the City's Opposition. The Court should therefore grant *Amici's* request for permission to file its brief.

### CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the *amici curiae* ask that this Court grant leave to file the *amicus* brief submitted herewith.

Date: January 31, 2006

LAW OFFICES OF DONALD-KILMER

Donald Kilmer

Attorney for Amici

# DECLARATION OF DONALD KILMER IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION OF SENATOR RICHARDSON (RET.), ET AL., TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF

### I, DONALD KILMER, declare as follows:

- 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of California. I have first hand knowledge of the matters set forth below; if called as a witness I could and would testify to the same.
- 2. On Monday, January 30, 2006, I spoke with C. D. Michel, counsel for Petitioners, and informed him that I would seek a court order on behalf of the Gun Owners of California, Senator Richardson, the California Rifle and Pistol Association, and the Madison Society granting them permission to file an *amicus* brief in support of Petitioners. I informed Mr. Michel that we would appear *ex parte* on this request at 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 in Department 301 of the San Francisco Superior Court. Mr. Michel stated that Petitioners would not oppose the request.
- 3. On Monday, January 30, 2006, at approximately 4:50 p.m. David Speakman from my office called Wayne Snodgrass, counsel for Respondents, and informed him that the Gun Owners of California, Senator Richardson, the California Rifle and Pistol Association, and the Madison Society intended to seek an ex parte order granting permission to file an amicus brief in support of Petitioners. My office informed Mr. Snodgrass that we would appear ex parte on this request at 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 in Department 301 of the San Francisco Superior Court. Mr. Snodgrass did not indicate whether Respondents would oppose the request.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration is executed on January 31, 2006 at San Jose, California.

Donald Kilmer

1	PROOF OF SERVICE			
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES			
4	I, David Speakman, am employed in the City of San Jose, Santa Clara County, California. I ar			
5	over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 1261 Lincoln Ave., Suite 108, San Jose, California.			
6	On February 1, 2006, foregoing document(s) described as			
7	EX PARTE APPLICATION OF SENATOR H. L. RICHARDSON (RET.), GUN OWNERS OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, AND THE MADISON			
<b>8</b> 9	SOCIETY TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; DECLARATION OF DONALD KILMER			
10	on the interested parties in this action by placing			
11	[ ] the original [X] a true and correct copy			
12	thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows:			
13	C. D. Michel Vince Chhabria TRUTANICH - MICHEL, LLP OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY			
14	180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802  1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place City Hall, Room 234			
15	(Attorney for Petitioners) San Francisco, CA 94102 (Attorney for Respondents)			
16	X (BY MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and			
17	processing correspondence for mailing. Under the practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at San Jose, California, in			
18	the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after date of deposit for			
19	mailing an affidavit. Executed on February 1, 2006, at San Jose, California.			
20	(VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION) As follows: The facsimile machine I used complies			
21	with California Rules of Court, Rule 2003, and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rules of Court, Rule 2006(d), I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the			
22	transmission, copies of which is attached to this declaration.			
23	(PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to delivered by hand to the offices of the addressee.			
24	Executed on February 1, 2006, at San Jose, California.			
25	X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.			
26	(FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of the member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.			
27 28	ont ah			
~	DAVID SPEAKMAN			

1 2 3 4 5 6	Donald Kilmer S.B.N 179986 LAW OFFICES DONALD KILMER 1261 Lincoln Ave Ste 111 San Jose, CA 95125-3030 Telephone: (408) 998-8489 Facsimile: (408) 998-8487  Attorneys for Amici Senator H. L. Richardson Gun Owners of California California Rifle and Pistol Association The Madison Society		
8	SUPERIOR COURT C	F THE STATE OF CA	LIFORNIA
9	COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO		
10	UNLIMIT	TED JURISDICTION	•
11	PAULA FISCAL et al.,	) CASE NO. CPF-05-	505960
12	Plaintiffs and Petitioners,		DECLARATION OF R IN SUPPORT OF
13	,	APPLICATION O	
14	vs.	BRIEF AND IN SU APPLICATION O	PPORT OF
15 16	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.,	) ENTERTAINMEN	
17	Defendants and Respondents.	) ) Hearing Date: ) Hearing Judge:	February 15, 2006 Warren
18		) Time: ) Location:	9:30 a.m. Dept. 301
19 20		) Date Action Filed: Trial Date:	December 29, 2005 None scheduled
21		) That Date. )	None scheduled
22		,	
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COPY

I, DONALD KILMER, declare as follows:

- 1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of California. I have first hand knowledge of the matters set forth below; if called as a witness I could and would testify to the same.
- 2. I am counsel for the Gun Owners of California, Senator Richardson, the California Rifle and Pistol Association, and the Madison Society in the above-captioned matter. I have also agreed to appear specially on behalf of Bruce Colodny, counsel for the American Entertainment Armorers Association, on his application for permission to file an *amicus* brief in this matter.
- 3. My office and Bruce Colodny's office had originally given notice to Petitioners and Respondents that they would seek *ex parte* orders to file *amicus* briefs on behalf of their clients on Wednesday, February 1, 2006 at 11:00 a.m. in Department 301 of the San Francisco Superior Court.
- 4. On the morning of Wednesday, February 1, 2006, David Speakman from my office called Wayne Snodgrass, counsel for Respondents, and told him that I would not be able to appear in court on November 1, 2006, and that I would instead seek an *ex parte* order on behalf of my own clients and specially on behalf of Mr. Colodny's client to file *amicus* briefs on Friday, February 3, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 301 of the San Francisco Superior Court.
- 5. On the morning of Wednesday, February 1, 2006, David Speakman from my office also called C. D. Michel, counsel for Petitioners, and told him that I would not be able to appear in court on February 1, 2006, and that I would instead seek an *ex parte* order on behalf of my own clients and specially on behalf of Mr. Colodny's client to file *amicus* briefs on Friday, February 3, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 301 of the San Francisco Superior Court.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration is executed on February 2, 2006 at San Jose, California.

Donald Kilmer

#### 1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 3 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 I, Cally Van Drielen, am employed in the City of San Jose, Santa Clara County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 5 1261 Lincoln Ave., Suite 108, San Jose, California. 6 On February 2, 2006, foregoing document(s) described as 7 SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DONALD KILMER IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION OF SENATOR RICHARDSON, ET AL., TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF AND IN 8 SUPPORT OF APPLICATION OF AMERICAN ENTERTAINMENT ARMORERS ASSOCIATION TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF 9 on the interested parties in this action by placing 10 the original [X] a true and correct copy 11 thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: 12 C. D. Michel Vince Chhabria TRUTANICH - MICHEL, LLP OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 13 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place Long Beach, CA 90802 City Hall, Room 234 (Attorney for Petitioners) 14 San Francisco, CA 94102 (Attorney for Respondents) 15 X (BY MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and 16 processing correspondence for mailing. Under the practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at San Jose, California, in 17 the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after date of deposit for 18 mailing an affidavit. Executed on February 2, 2006, at San Jose, California. 19 (VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION) As follows: The facsimile machine I used complies with California Rules of Court, Rule 2003, and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant 20 to Rules of Court, Rule 2006(d), I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the transmission, copies of which is attached to this declaration. 21 22 (PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to delivered by hand to the offices of the addressee. 23 Executed on February , 2006, at San Jose, California. 24 <u>X</u> (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 25 (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of the member of the bar of this 26 court at whose direction the service was made. 27 28

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DONALD KILMER

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Donald Kilmer S.B.N 179986 LAW OFFICES DONALD KILMER 1261 Lincoln Ave Ste 111 San Jose, CA 95125-3030 Telephone: (408) 998-8489 Facsimile: (408) 998-8487  Attorneys for Amici Senator H. L. Richardson Gun Owners of California California Rifle and Pistol Association The Madison Society  SUPERIOR COURT	OF	THE STATE OF CAI	LIFORNIA
9	COUNTY	Y OI	F SAN FRANCISCO	
10	UNLIM	ITE	D JURISDICTION	
11	PAULA FISCAL et al.,	)	CASE NO. CPF-05-	505960
12 13	Plaintiffs and Petitioners,	)	(PROPOSED) ORI SENATOR H. L. I GUN OWNERS O	DER GRANTING RICHARDSON (RET.), DF CALIFORNIA,
14 15	vs. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN	) ) )	<ul> <li>CALIFORNIA RIFLE &amp; PISTOL</li> <li>ASSOCIATION, AND THE MAD</li> <li>SOCIETY PERMISSION TO FIL</li> <li>AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF</li> <li>PETITIONERS</li> </ul>	
16 17 18	FRANCISCO et al.,  Defendants and Respondents.	) ) )	Hearing Date: Hearing Judge: Time: Location:	February 15, 2006 Warren 9:30 a.m.
19 20		)	Date Action Filed: Trial Date:	Dept. 301  December 29, 2005  None scheduled
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PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING SENATOR H. L. RICHARDSON TO FILE AMICUS BRIEF

1	Having considered the Ex Parte Application of the Gun Owners of California, Senator				
2	Richardson, the California Rifle and Pistol Association, and the Madison Society,				
3	IT IS ORDERED that the Gun Owners of California, Senator Richardson, the California Rifl				
4	and Pistol Association, and the Madison S	Society, are granted permission to file an amicus brief in			
5	support of Plaintiffs and Petitioners.				
6	Date: February, 2006				
7		The Honorable James Warren Judge of the Superior Court			
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE		
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
4	I, David Speakman, am employed in the City of San Jose, Santa Clara County, California. I am		
5	over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 1261 Lincoln Ave., Suite 108, San Jose, California.		
6	On February 1, 2006, foregoing document(s) described as		
7	[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING SENATOR H. L. RICHARDSON (RET.), GUN OWNERS OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, AND THE MADISON SOCIETY PERMISSION TO FILE		
8	AND THE MADISON SOCIETY PERMISSION TO FILE  AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS		
9			
10	on the interested parties in this action by placing  [ ] the original  [X] a true and correct copy		
11	thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows:		
12	C. D. Michel Vince Chhabria TRUTANICH - MICHEL, LLP OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY		
13	180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200  Long Beach, CA 90802  Office of The City Affoliate  City Hall, Room 234		
14	(Attorney for Petitioners)  San Francisco, CA 94102  (Attorney for Respondents)		
15	X (BY MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and		
16	processing correspondence for mailing. Under the practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at San Jose, California, in		
17	the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after date of deposit for		
18	mailing an affidavit.  Executed on February 1, 2006, at San Jose, California.		
19			
20	<u>(VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION)</u> As follows: The facsimile machine I used complies with California Rules of Court, Rule 2003, and no error was reported by the machine. Pursuant to Rules of Court, Rule 2006(d), I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the		
21	transmission, copies of which is attached to this declaration.		
22	(PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to delivered by hand to the offices of the addressee.		
23	Executed on February 1, 2006, at San Jose, California.		
24	X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.		
25	(FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of the member of the bar of this of this		
26	court at whose direction the service was made.		
27 28	DAVID SPEAKMAN		
20	DATE SECTION		

	II		·
1 2 3 4 5 6	LAW OFFICES DONALD KILMER 1261 Lincoln Ave Ste 111 San Jose, CA 95125-3030 Telephone: (408) 998-8489 Facsimile: (408) 998-8487  Attorneys for Amici Senator H. L. Richardson Gun Owners of California		ENDORSED FILED San Francisco County Superior Court FEB 0 3 2006 GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk BY: ERICKA LARNAUTI Deputy Clerk
8	SUPERIOR COURT O	F THE STATE OF CA	LIFORNIA
. 9	COUNTY	OF SAN FRANCISCO	
10	UNLIMIT	ED JURISDICTION	
11	PAULA FISCAL et al.,	CASE NO. CPF-05	-505960
12	Diginstiffs and Datit	[ <del>PROPOSED</del> ] OR	DER GRANTING
13	Plaintiffs and Petitioners,	SENATOR H. L. GUN OWNERS	RICHARDSON (RET.), OF CALIFORNIA
14	vs.	ASSOCIATION.	IFLE & PISTOL AND THE MADISON
15 16	CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.,	AMICUS BRIEF PETITIONERS	IISSION TO FILE IN SUPPORT OF
17	Defendants and Respondents.	Hearing Date: Hearing Judge:	February 15, 2006
18 19	)	Time: Location:	Warren 9:30 a.m. Dept. 301
20		Date Action Filed: Trial Date:	December 29, 2005 None scheduled
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Having considered the Ex Parte Application of the Gun Owners of California, Senator Richardson, the California Rifle and Pistol Association, and the Madison Society,

IT IS ORDERED that the Gun Owners of California, Senator Richardson, the California Rifle and Pistol Association, and the Madison Society, are granted permission to file an *amicus* brief in support of Plaintiffs and Petitioners.

Date: February 2, 2006

# JAMES L. WARREN

The Honorable James Warren Judge of the Superior Court