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LCAV therefore provides this short written clarification in response to an issue of obvious interest to the Court.

agreed with *Doe's* statement on implied preemption, the City has set out its position on that issue in its brief -- *Doe's* inference is legally unsound. (See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Respondents' Opposition to Motion for Writ of Mandate and/or Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief, filed January 25, 2006 ["Opposition"], p. 13, fn. 10.) Among other things, *Doe's* cryptic statement does not employ the three-part implied preemption standard used by the Supreme Court in *Galvan* and reaffirmed in *Great Western/Nordyke*.<sup>2</sup> It appears that the City anticipated, however, that this Court would be reluctant to disregard the *Doe* court's seemingly unequivocal statement, quoted above. Therefore, for purposes of its argument in this Court, the City has rested on its primary argument that Section 3 of Proposition H is a municipal affair within the City's Home Rule power. The City has assumed that the quoted statement from *Doe* creates a conflict with Section 3 to satisfy the "preliminary consideration" required by the *California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. City of Los Angeles* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 16-18 (*CalFed*) analysis. (Opposition, at p. 13.)

LCAV agrees with the City that if the *CalFed* preliminary consideration is satisfied, the Court should uphold Section 3 of Proposition H as a municipal affair. Alternatively, however, the Court may wish to dig deeper to "satisfy itself that [Section 3] presents an actual conflict" with Penal Code Section 12026 before reaching the municipal affair argument. (*CalFed, supra, 54* Cal.3d at p. 16.) LCAV submits that this Court is not necessarily bound by the quoted statement in *Doe* and there may be no "real conflict" as required to satisfy the *CalFed* preliminary consideration. For the reasons explained in LCAV's Amicus Brief, the statement in *Doe* about implied preemption arguably was dicta inasmuch as it was not necessary for the *Doe* holding of express preemption. (See Amicus Brief of Legal Community Against Violence in Support of Respondents' Opposition to Writ of Mandate, filed January 25, 2006, p. 4, fn. 5.) In addition, because the same statement in *Doe* led directly to the Supreme Court's accepting certification from the Ninth Circuit in *Great Western* and *Nordyke*, the fact that those decisions did not endorse (or even mention) the *Doe* inference suggests disapproval. (See *Id.* at pp. 10-12.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Galvan v. Superior Court (1969) 70 Cal.2d 851; Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 853 (Great Western) and Nordyke v. King (2002) 27 Cal.4th 875 (Nordyke).

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In sum, it is not clear that this Court must accept the quoted statement in *Doe* as established law. The City's position has assumed that *Doe* creates the requisite conflict required to apply the *CalFed* Home Rule analysis to uphold the validity of Section 3. The fact that the City elected not to pursue at argument the alternate ground for reaching the same result -- that there is no preemption of Section 3 -- discussed in the LCAV brief, does not foreclose the Court's consideration of the alternate ground on its merits. Indeed, because the Court of Appeal is free to revisit that purely legal issue, this Court may wish to address the arguments advanced by LCAV on this point, which have been thoroughly briefed by Petitioners and their amici.

DATED: March 6, 2006

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Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Legal Community Against Violence

## 1 PROOF OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, declare as follows. I am employed in the County of San Francisco 2 where this service occurred. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. 3 My business address is 235 Montgomery Street, 30th Floor, San Francisco, California. On the 4 date below I served true copies of the document(s) listed below: 5 6 AMICUS LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE'S POST ARGUMENT CLARIFICATION 8 FACSIMILE -- same day delivery to the addressee's facsimile number to all listed below. 9 MAIL -- placed in the US mail at San Francisco, postage fully prepaid. X 10 I am familiar with this firm's practice for processing of US mail. In the ordinary course of business this firm deposits US mail on the day 11 collected. 12 FEDERAL EXPRESS -- placed in a Federal Express facility for delivery by overnight courier to the addressee - as noted below (Mediation Brief 13 w/Exhibits) 14 PERSONAL SERVICE - caused delivery by hand to the addressee via Specialized Legal Services. 15 16 ELECTRONIC MAIL - transmitted via electronic mail in Portable X Document Format ("PDF") Adobe Acrobat. 17 C.D. Michel Dennis J. Herrera 18 Don B. Kates Wayne K. Snodgrass Trutanich Michel, LLP Vince Chhabria 19 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place Long Beach, CA 90802 City Hall, Room 234 20 Tel: 562-216-4444 San Francisco, CA 94102-4682 Fax: 925-930-6620 Tel: 415-554-4675 21 Fax: 415-554-4699 22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the 23 foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California on March 6, 2006. 24 25 26

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