	C. D. Michel - SBN 144258 Clinton B. Monfort - SBN 255609 Sean A. Brady - SBN 262007 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802 Telephone: (562) 216-4444 Fax: (562) 216-4445 cmichel@michellawyers.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners		
8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
9	FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO		
10			
11	SHERIFF CLAY PARKER, TEHAMA COUNTY SHERIFF; HERB BAUER) CASE NO. 10CECG	02116
12	SPORTING GOODS; CALIFORNIA RIFLE AND PISTOL ASSOCIATION) PLAINTIFFS' EVII OBJECTIONS TO	
13	FOUNDATION; ABLE'S SPORTING,	REQUEST FOR JU	
14	INC.; RTG SPORTING COLLECTIBLES, LLC; AND STEVEN STONECIPHER,))) Doto:	Ianuam: 19, 2011
15	DI ' d'CC I D' d'd') Date:) Time:	January 18, 2011 8:30 a.m.
16	Plaintiffs and Petitioners,) Location:) Judge:	Dept. 402 Hon. Jeff Hamilton
17	VS.) Date Action Filed:	June 17, 2010
18	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; JERRY BROWN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE)))	
19	STATE OF CALIFORNIA; THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF))	
20	JUSTICE; and DOES 1-25,) }	
21	Defendants and Respondents.		
22		(
23	TO THIS HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:		
24	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plain	ntiffs SHERIFF CLAY	PARKER, TEHAMA COUNTY
25	SHERIFF, et al., make the following evidentiary objections to the Request for Judicial Notice made in		
26	support of Defendants THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.'s Opposition to Motion for Summary		
27	Judgment. These objections are made pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1354.		
28			
		1	

Objections to Request For Judicial Notice

Objection No. 1

Entirety of Exhibit "A".

Grounds for Objection No. 1:

Relevance. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Here, the State asks the Court to take judicial notice of a federal complaint which also challenged AB 962, but fails to identify in its opposition papers for what purpose the complaint is to be judicially noticed, other than a vague reference to "the truth of the results reached". Nowhere in the opposition points and authorities or separate statement is any citation made to Exhibit "A". Thus, it is entirely unclear what bearing the document has on this litigation or why its consideration in this matter is therefore proper.

Not the Proper Subject of Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.) Here, the State asks the Court to take judicial notice of a federal complaint for "the truth of the results reached". Except for the purposes of asserting the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel against the same party to that prior action who is also a party to the present action, "factual findings in a prior judicial opinion are not a proper subject of judicial notice." (*Kilroy v. State of California* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 149.) As none of the plaintiffs in this matter were parties to the federal action, there would be no proper basis for judicially noticing the results of the federal action. (See *id.* at 149.)

Objection No. 2

Entirety of Exhibit "B".

Grounds for Objection No. 2:

Relevance. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Here, the State asks the Court to take judicial notice of an order of dismissal in a federal lawsuit which also challenged AB 962, but fails to identify in its opposition papers for what purpose the complaint is to be judicially noticed, other than a vague reference to "the truth of the results reached". Nowhere in the opposition points and authorities or separate statement is any citation made to Exhibit "B". Thus, it is entirely unclear what bearing the document has on this litigation or why its consideration in this matter is therefore proper.

Not the Proper Subject of Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.) Here, the State asks the Court to

take judicial notice of a federal order for "the truth of the results reached". Except for the purposes of asserting the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel against the same party to that prior action who is also a party to the present action, "factual findings in a prior judicial opinion are not a proper subject of judicial notice." (*Kilroy v. State of California* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 149.) As none of the plaintiffs in this matter were parties to the federal action, there would be no proper basis for judicially noticing the results of the federal action. (See *id.* at 149.)

Objection No. 3

Entirety of Exhibit "D".

Grounds for Objection No. 3:

Alteration of Writing Not Explained. (Evid. Code, § 1402.) The State asks the Court to take judicial notice of a printout of a webpage from the website of Plaintiff Able's Ammo which is purported "to show how several ammunition vendors *classify ammunition as handgun ammunition.*" (Deft's Req. For Jud. Not., at 3:3-4 [emphasis added].) The State fails to disclose that the printout provided is an alteration of the normal operation of the webpage, insomuch as the Plaintiffs' website does not have a category for "handgun ammunition" displayed on its webpage. Rather the State caused the webpage to list the calibers and cartridges in Exhibit "D" by entering the specific search term "handgun ammunition" into the webpage's search feature. That action materially altered the normal function of the webpage. The State has not met its burden of explaining the alteration it made to the website before the printout purported "to show how several ammunition vendors *classify ammunition as handgun ammunition*" may be admitted into evidence as a genuine writing.

Hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) The State insists the printouts are being offered "not for their factual content, and that "[i]t is appropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the existence of a website." (Deft's Req. For Jud. Not., at 3:2-4 [emphasis added].) Contrary to the State's characterization, how ammunition vendors "classify ammunition" on their website is not seeking to merely prove the existence of the website, but is seeking to prove the truth of the otherwise hearsay statements on the site, i.e., that certain cartridges and calibers of ammunition have been stated by that particular vendor to be "handgun ammunition."

The hearsay exception generally applicable for the undisputed fact of the existence of a webpage and its contents under Evidence Code section 452(h), is not available here because the fact for which the webpage is submitted is reasonably subject to dispute, i.e., what vendors consider "handgun ammunition." In fact, each of the other website exhibits sought to be judicially noticed are not uniform in their listing of calibers and cartridges of "handgun ammunition" on their sites. At most, the exhibit is noticeable only for the fact that some ammunition vendors have a category called "handgun ammunition" listed on their site, not what is listed under that category.

Foundation. (Evid. Code, § 702.) In addition to the website printouts being hearsay of what the vendors state regarding handgun ammunition, there is no foundation provided for assessing how or why the vendors made such characterizations. As the State's expert admitted in his deposition testimony, no effort was made to determine what each of the vendor's websites meant when it listed "handgun ammunition," i.e., whether such designation was puffery designed to encourage buyers to purchase certain stock of ammunition, whether such designation reflected an understanding of the vendor regarding which types of ammunition were popular with its customers as handgun ammunition, whether such designation reflected whether such ammunition was sold for use in both handguns and rifles to the vendor's customers, and in what proportion such use was intended or made by the customers as between handguns and rifles, or whether such designation is based upon the vendor having the "common understanding" of the use of the ammunition that the State avers exists among firearm vendors and owners:

Q: Okay. Did you, at any point, contact the administrators of this Web site or the owners of the Cheaper Than Dirt Web site to find out what they meant about "most popular"?

A: No.

Q: No. Did you do any other type of independent investigation to determine whether or not Cheaper Than Dirt's representation of what the most popular ammunition they sold was an accurate representation?

A: Did I contact other Web sites? Is that what your question was?

Q: Did you do anything to find out? So contact other Web sites, call the owner, call a competing Web site and find out that Cheaper Than

Dirt's reputation regarding what its most popular ammunition type sold was an accurate representation?

A: No. I made no other -- no phone calls to ammunition vendors to check on the validity of Cheaper Than Dirt's, I guess, statements that they make.

Q: Okay. And then let's look at the J & G Sales. What part of this particular Web site did you rely upon to help formulate your opinion that .45 caliber ammunition was appropriately included on the DOJ's caliber list?

A: The section here that says "ammo for handguns" and it gives a listing of various rounds, there's a portion of it that says ".45 ACP, .45 GAP and .45 LC," which I understand to be Long Colt.

Q: Okay. And again, you didn't contact the proprietors of J & G Sales, either the store or Web site, to determine how they came up with this particular listing; is that correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. And would it be fair to say that, similarly true, you didn't contact the proprietors of Cabela's or Midway USA to determine how they ended up listing those calibers on their Web sites?

A: That's correct.

(Deposition of Blake Graham, Vol. 2, at 262:10-263:23 [emphasis added].)

Although the State's own expert correctly characterizes the information sought to be obtained as "statements" by a witness, subject to laying of a foundation, in the absence of any information regarding the speaker's use of the terms "Most Popular" and "Handgun Ammunition" on the subject webpages, the webpages the State seeks to have judicially noticed have no context, no reasonable indication of their meaning, and lack foundation for admission.

Not the Proper Subject of Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.) As argued above, the State seeks judicial notice not just of the existence of the webpage, and what is listed on it, but wants to impute to the

author of the webpage the statements made and the truth of those statements regarding what constitutes handgun ammunition.¹ This is an inappropriate use of judicial notice.

Although the State asserts in its request that webpages are properly judicially-noticed for their "existence", and cites cases identifying circumstances where webpages were and were not judicially noticed, the State's characterization fails to acknowledge that in each of those cases, the meaning of the content of the webpage was not in dispute and hence judicial notice could be made under Evidence Code section 452(h) because the undisputed contents of the webpage were all that were sought to be noticed; the meaning of those contents, and the intent of the authors of those contents, was not at issue.

Thus in *In re Mille*, the court took judicial notice of the mission statement on the webpage of a psychiatric hospital as a background fact for discussing the hospital's role in the treatment of patients, plaintiff in that action was a patient. (See *In re Mille* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 635.) The meaning of the mission statement was not disputed by the parties. (See *id*.)

Although the State purports that In Searles Valley Minerals Operations, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization supports the taking of judicial notice of the websites for the purposes the State desires, Searles Valley supports Plaintiffs' position that the websites are not the proper subject of judicial notice to prove or disprove an understanding of handgun ammunition. In Searles Valley, the appellate court upheld the trial court's refusal to take judicial notice of two websites containing information regarding the uses of coal, the key issue in a tax assessment matter. "[A]Ithough it might be appropriate to take judicial notice of the existence of the Web sites, the same is not true of their factual content." (See 160 Cal.App.4th 514, 519.) Thus, the websites were not admissible to help prove that the uses of coal by the taxpayers fell within an exempt category of taxation. (See id.)

Whether the State characterizes its attempts to have the websites judicially noticed is merely for their existence, it is clear that the State is seeking to use the information on the websites to prove what "handgun ammunition" is, or what it is understood to be. These are underlying facts regarding the

Per Section 452(h), judicial notice can be taken as to "[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy." It is under this subdivision that each of the cases cited by the State allowed or disallowed judicial notice to be taken of a webpage.

1	characterization of handgun ammunition on the websites, and judicial notice is therefore entirely
2	inappropriate. (See Searles Valley, supra, at 519.)
3	
4	Objection No. 4
5	Entirety of Exhibit "E".
6	Grounds for Objection No. 4:
7	Hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.); Foundation. (Evid. Code, § 702.); and Not the Proper
8	Subject of Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.)
9	
10	Objection No. 5
11	Entirety of Exhibit "F".
12	Grounds for Objection No. 5:
13	Hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.); Foundation. (Evid. Code, § 702.); and Not the Proper
14	Subject of Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.)
15	
16	Objection No. 6
17	Entirety of Exhibit "G".
18	Grounds for Objection No. 6:
19	Hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.); Foundation. (Evid. Code, § 702.); and Not the Proper
20	Subject of Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.)
21	
22	Objection No. 7
23	Entirety of Exhibit "H".
24	Grounds for Objection No. 7:
25	Hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.); Foundation. (Evid. Code, § 702.); and Not the Proper
26	Subject of Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.)
27	
28	

1	Objection No. 8				
2	Entirety of Exhibit "I".				
3	Grounds for Objection No. 8:				
4	Hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.); Foundation. (Evid. Code, § 702.); and Not the Proper				
5	Subject of Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.)				
6					
7	Objection No. 9				
8	Entirety of Exhibit "J".				
9	Grounds for Objection No. 9:				
10	Hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200.); Foundation. (Evid. Code, § 702.); and Not the Proper				
11	Subject of Judicial Notice. (Evid. Code, § 452.)				
12					
13	Dated: January 7, 2011 Respectfully Submitted, MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.				
14					
15					
16	Clinton Monfort / Attorney for Plaintiffs				
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					
26					
	$oldsymbol{V}$				
27 28					

1	PROOF OF SERVICE			
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
3	COUNTY OF FRESNO			
4	I, Claudia Ayala, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I			
5	am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802.			
6	On January 7, 2011, I served the foregoing document(s) described as			
7	PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE			
8	on the interested parties in this action by placing			
9	[] the original [X] a true and correct copy			
10	thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows:			
11	Edmund G. Brown, Jr. Attorney General of California			
12	Zockary P. Morozzini			
13	Peter A. Krause			
14	Deputy Attorney General (185098) 1300 I Street, Suite 125			
15	P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550			
16	(BY MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and			
17	processing correspondence for mailing. Under the practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Long Beach, California,			
18	in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after date of deposit for			
19	mailing an affidavit. Executed on January 7, 2011, at Long Beach, California.			
20	(PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to delivered by hand to the offices of the			
21	addressee. Executed on January 7, 2011, at Long Beach, California.			
22	X (VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of			
23	collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery by UPS/FED-EX. Under the practice it would be deposited with a facility regularly maintained by UPS/FED-EX for receipt			
24	on the same day in the ordinary course of business. Such envelope was sealed and placed for collection and delivery by UPS/FED-EX with delivery fees paid or provided for in accordance			
25	with ordinary business practices. Executed on January 7, 2011, at Long Beach, California.			
26	X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.			
27	Totagoing is true and correct.			
28	CLAUDIA AYALA			