1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
3	SHAWN GOWDER,) Docket No. 11 C 1304
4	Plaintiff,) Chiraga Illinaia
5	vs.) Chicago, Illinois vs.) October 18, 2011) 9:00 o'clock a.m.
6	CITY OF CHICAGO, a muncipal) corporation, et al.,)
7	Defendants.
8	berendanes.
9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - Motion BEFORE THE HONORABLE SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN
10	BELOILE HONOIGIBEE DEIC TEOHIATAN
11	APPEARANCES: For the Plaintiff: FORD & BRITTON PC
12	BY: MR. STEPHEN KOLODZIEJ 33 North Dearborn Street
13	Suite 300 Chicago, Illinois 60602
14	
15	For the Defendants: CITY OF CHICAGO BY: MS. REBECCA ALFERT HIRSCH
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17	Chicago, Illinois 60602
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(The following proceedings were had in open court:)
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             COURTROOM DEPUTY: 11 C 1304, Gowder versus City of
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    Chicago.
             MR. KOLODZIEJ: Good morning, your Honor. Stephen
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    Kolodziej, K-o-l-o-d-z-i-e-j, for the plaintiff.
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             THE COURT: Good morning.
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             MS. HIRSCH: Good morning, your Honor. Rebecca
    Hirsch on behalf of the defendants.
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             THE COURT: Good morning. Thanks for waiting
    patiently. I set your case at the end because I wanted to
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    have a little discussion with you about the filings.
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             I was reviewing the plaintiff's motion and it has
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    three parts, that the DOAH's decision was erroneous, the
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    administrative law, that the denial of the, whatever, based
    on misdemeanor violates 2nd and 14th Amendment and the
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    Illinois Constitution. And then, thirdly, you're asking that
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    defendant should not be allowed to introduce evidence outside
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    the administrative record since it was not considered by DOH.
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    Correct?
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: With respect to the administrative
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    law claim, yes.
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             THE COURT:
                         Yeah.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: And then I have an argument that
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    that would similarly apply to the constitutional claim if we
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    get there.
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THE COURT: Yeah.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: Because it's --
             THE COURT: I understand.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ:
                             Right.
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             THE COURT: Now the defendants in their filings,
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    they are saying because of the stay of discovery, defendants
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    have not been afforded the time and opportunity basically
    relating on the constitutional issues, correct?
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             MS. HIRSCH: Correct.
             THE COURT: So this is like a motion for judgment on
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    the pleadings, counsel, right?
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: Yes.
             THE COURT: And -- but it also addresses the
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    constitutional -- constitutionality of the regulations --
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: Correct.
             THE COURT: -- even as it applied to Mr. Gowder.
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             So I am at a situation where, you know, on one hand
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    I can rule on the judgment on the pleadings; on the other
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    hand, defendants are saying we haven't had sufficient time
    for this issue.
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             Now what type of discovery will it be needed,
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    counsel for defendants?
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             MS. HIRSCH: I don't anticipate that it would be
    very extensive. However, in light of the -- and this is
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    again only for the constitutional claims brought by
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plaintiff, but I think that a few pieces might be key.
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    think that it would necessarily entail at least one
    deposition of the plaintiff.
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             THE COURT: What would that do to the deposition of
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    the plaintiff if I may ask because there is a -- and I'll get
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    to the issue of conviction. What would entail, like what
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    would that change, deposition of the plaintiff?
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             MS. HIRSCH: We believe that because it is an
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    as-applied challenge, that -- and even though these facts
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    were not in evidence at the administrative hearing, whether
    he's been convicted of other crimes, what he was actually
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    doing during this conviction is probative for the as-applied
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    challenge to the constitutional claim and I think the -- I
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    think it was either -- it was Williams in the Seventh Circuit
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    said that the plaintiff -- the evidence of the bad acts of
    the plaintiff was relevant to the decision on a --
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             THE COURT: Well, those are the facts before the
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    denial, right?
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             MS. HIRSCH: I'm sorry?
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             THE COURT:
                         I mean, why would it be relevant if the
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    decision was based on you being convicted of unlawful use of
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    a weapon, period?
             MS. HIRSCH: Well, that's for the -- that's for the
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    statutory claim but I think the constitutional claim of
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    whether, as applied to him and what he was doing, goes beyond
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that. That's our position.

THE COURT: Counsel?

MR. KOLODZIEJ: Well, this is an issue that we raised at the time we filed the motion for judgment on the pleadings when we simultaneously filed a motion for protective order on discovery because as I pointed out at that time, your Honor, it's not germane because the statute itself doesn't look at any of the underlying facts. It's simply categorically banned you from having a CFP if you have an unlawful use conviction.

THE COURT: In any jurisdiction.

MR. KOLODZIEJ: In any jurisdiction. And it was not relevant at the administrative hearing, it wasn't relevant at the time the police department denied the application, and it didn't become relevant until they decided in this case that they need this -- for whatever purpose because they keep saying I have an as-applied challenge which, as I pointed out in my motion papers, this is really a hybrid type of claim because, yes, it was applied to Mr. Gowder but on its face, that ordinance is a categorical ban on a misdemeanor --

THE COURT: Did you like address that? Are you claiming that the ordinance itself should be found unconstitutional or as applied to your client?

MR. KOLODZIEJ: Well, as I -- I pointed it out in my reply brief, Judge. I addressed this. It is

unconstitutional to the extent if the court agrees with the interpretation given by the DOAH that unlawful use encompasses carrying and possessing, then --

THE COURT: Okay. Let's assuming arguendo that -- MR. KOLODZIEJ: Right.

THE COURT: -- I agree that they properly applied if the ordinance is constitutional.

MR. KOLODZIEJ: And my point is, if you do decide that, then on its face that is at least a partially invalid ordinance because it is a categorical ban on misdemeanors that is not -- that are otherwise qualified under federal and state law to have firearms.

THE COURT: But are you going -- I mean, this is -this is -- constitutional issues are very serious. I don't
like to just, you know, on a couple motions rule on
constitutionality unless it's so slam-dunk black and white.
Maybe it is; maybe it's not. I'm not saying. But defense
has raised an issue that, look, we're going to be prejudiced,
you know, and maybe it's best to give a little time for
defense to do whatever discovery they need even if I find
that it doesn't -- it's not material relating to what
happened here. Then you'll file a summary judgment motion
fully briefing the constitutional issue even if you like,
like you're saying, claiming that this regulation itself is
unconstitutional. I mean, you could do so on top of whether

it's applied. And then they could answer, you could reply and I could have a full decision on all aspects. It might make more sense. And also since the briefing, there is a new decision from D.C. I don't know if you've seen it.

MS. HIRSCH: In Heller.

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THE COURT: You might -- Heller.

MS. HIRSCH: Heller, too, yeah. That's what we found.

THE COURT: Yeah. You might want to look at it. It's got lots of language both by the majority and by the dissent and you might want to look at that and it might make more sense.

I could tell you right now that I have one other factual concern -- when I say concern, looking into the conviction, I don't know what happened. And I don't like to guess what happened in my decisions when I'm talking about facts. And if you guys could help me, maybe -- you know, I have the conviction that was attached, certification of record, and I'm looking here -- I don't know if you guys have a copy of the -- and you probably are experts in this in state court. It says 720 dash 5 slash 24 dash 1 capital A in parentheses and 10, 1. Then it says F4. Does that mean felony four?

MR. KOLODZIEJ: He was originally charged with a felony. At that time the statute -- it was deemed a felony

until there was an appellate court decision that came out 1 that ruled -- invalidated the statute and so his conviction 2 was then reduced to a misdemeanor. 3 THE COURT: Okay. So at the time he was convicted 4 5 in 1995, right, or -- let's see. The exact date of conviction is when? 6 7 MR. KOLODZIEJ: I believe it was '95, the original. 8 9 THE COURT: Yeah, I know, '95 but I'm trying to see the exact date of conviction. 8-21-95, defendant sentenced 10 11 to probation one year. 12 MR. KOLODZIEJ: Right. THE COURT: Okay. Can you be sentenced to probation 13 14 if you've been convicted of a felony in Illinois state court? MR. KOLODZIEJ: Judge, I apologize. I haven't read 15 the case in a while. But there was an issue on this and 16 17 that's -- I could submit the case to the Court if you like but this -- it was addressed, I believe, in that decision. 18 19 THE COURT: What I'd like to know is what happened 20 to his case. I appreciate the decision if you give it to me 21 but I see here that he was charged felony four and then he was convicted August 21, 1995, judgment on finding, verdict 22 23 slash plea, defendant sentenced to probation one year. So I need to know first whether he was convicted of a felony. 24

MR. KOLODZIEJ: Well, the initial conviction was.

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It was subsequently changed.
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             THE COURT: No. Forget subsequently. Initial
    conviction, was he convicted of a felony?
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: According to that -- according to
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    that record, Judge, it was a felony.
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             THE COURT: Can you be sentenced to probation if you
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    were convicted of a felony?
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: Apparently so.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. KOLODZIEJ: At that time under that statute.
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    And I apologize, Judge, you're taking me a bit off guard here
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    because it's been awhile --
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             THE COURT: That's okay. I'm just addressing it
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    now. Not definitive but I --
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: I understand.
             THE COURT: -- need to know about this. I'm just
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    telling you this.
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             And then at one point, which you're going to
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    provide, the Appellate Court said that statute that he was
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    convicted under was what?
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: I have to -- I don't want to
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    misspeak here but I'd be happy to put a quick little brief
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    together if you'd like but the ruling invalidated his
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    conviction and so it was reduced -- it was changed to a
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    misdemeanor.
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THE COURT: The ruling invalidated his conviction
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    based on his facts or based on everybody?
             MR. KOLODZIEJ: No. It was a different case but it
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    affected all similar cases.
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             THE COURT: Similar, okay. So then he was
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    terminated probation, it says, on August 7th, 1996,
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    satisfactorily. But then April 8th, 2003, it says a special
    order, vacate felony conviction.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: Right.
             THE COURT: So vacate felony conviction on April 8,
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    2003, would have been based, according to your recollection,
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    on that change in the law?
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: On the Illinois Appellate Court
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    decision, correct.
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             THE COURT: Okay. So if there was a vacation of a
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    conviction -- vacate means vacation like to vacate, gone --
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    was he then convicted again?
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: No.
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             THE COURT: Well, how can you then have a statement
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    April 21, 2003, is reduced from felony to misdemeanor? I
    just don't understand. I'm reading -- I like -- I do
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    criminal cases in federal court and I sentence people, I
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    state this is the sentence, this is the judgment. I'm unable
    to read this.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: I understand, Judge, and I think
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that's simply that that record that you have there is confusing but I think what really happened was the felony was vacated and reduced to a misdemeanor.

THE COURT: No, no. It doesn't say that. It says special order on April 8, 2003, vacate felony conviction. He was convicted of felony in 1995. 2003, they vacated his felony conviction so that means there's no conviction right now. When your conviction has been vacated, then did the government charge him again? Did he have another trial? Was there another plea by him? Did he agree to plead to something else?

It just goes into next thing from April 8, there's a case assignment, there's a lawyer. And April 21, 2003, it says Attorney Peters in court, draft order entered, d-e space t, period, convicted. Then there's a judge's name. And then the next line says April 21, 2003, special order of 8-21, 1995, is reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor off call, so.

MR. KOLODZIEJ: Could I suggest something, Judge?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KOLODZIEJ: I have the criminal file documents in my office. I will be happy to file a short memorandum that attaches these documents and explains to you what my understanding is of what happened. And if there's any position from the defendants, you know, certainly --

THE COURT: I think it should be done jointly, it

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should be done jointly because I don't know what the state did in this case or what your position is but I need to make sure that we have the facts right about the conviction. MR. KOLODZIEJ: Okay. THE COURT: Maybe he's not convicted anymore. Maybe it was vacated. I don't know. MR. KOLODZIEJ: Okay. I'd be happy to do that. And if I could suggest, I do -- with respect to the discovery issue and I think it would make sense to get this nailed down first before we proceed with any discovery. THE COURT: Yes, definitely. MR. KOLODZIEJ: Okay. Because I do have objections to it and I would like to articulate those at the appropriate time, so. The what, objections? THE COURT: I do have objections to discovery. MR. KOLODZIEJ: The principal one being, Judge, that -- to get back to the question you initially asked is I have never heard what it is they're trying to discover that would be germane to -- I mean, they can depose my client but what does he have to tell them that they don't know that would -- I mean, he was convicted --THE COURT: Let me put it this way: I've been doing this for some time now and any time that the record is not fully developed and parties claim they were prejudiced, it

might come back. It only delays further and I am not going to take a guess how much further. For me to accommodate defendant's request to give them some period of discovery — and I might agree with you that whatever they discovered has nothing to do with the issue that you're raising but that would be on a summary judgment motion instead of judgment on the pleadings without the discovery and without giving a chance to brief the constitutional issues. There is this thing hanging in there that ordinance says if you've been convicted under any jurisdiction. Maybe their discovery might show that all jurisdictions are the same as Illinois. I don't know.

MR. KOLODZIEJ: Well, but it didn't matter to them I guess is my point. When they denied his application, none of the circumstances surrounding the conviction matter at all so why do they --

THE COURT: Then you'll be coming with summary judgment on that point and they might not be able to respond.

MR. KOLODZIEJ: No; I understand that. But I guess my point is, I think they're boot-strapping now because they're trying to --

THE COURT: I don't think so. I think like a short discovery is not boot-strapping. It just completes the record. It would be exhaustive. And, trust me, I am very,

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very knowledgeable about the history of the cases, the
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    Supreme Court decisions, I've read them and, you know, and
    Circuit Court decisions and I want to do a fully exhaustive
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    opinion when I do one.
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             MS. HIRSCH: Thank you, your Honor.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: What would you propose with this,
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    Judge, would you like us to --
             THE COURT: I think that it does not entail too much
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    discovery. It might not even be, you know, requiring the
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    plaintiff's deposition but, you know, if they want to depose
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    the plaintiff briefly, that's fine with me, but I don't think
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    that anything you get out of the plaintiff will be relevant
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    or material or, you know -- but, you know, I'll give that one
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    brief opportunity.
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             MS. HIRSCH: Thank you, your Honor.
             MR. KOLODZIEJ:
                             Well --
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             MS. HIRSCH: And putting aside the issue of
    discovery of the plaintiff, I think as your Honor recognizes,
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    these are very new constitutional --
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             THE COURT: No. I don't recognize as to the
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    plaintiff. I think plaintiff's deposition would be a useless
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    one.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ:
                             Okay. But --
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             THE COURT: But on the discovery issue on the other
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    aspects.
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MS. HIRSCH: We have a burden under the Supreme 1 2 Court and the Seventh Circuit -- I'm sorry, jurisprudence. 3 Excuse me, your Honor, I'm losing my voice -- and even if it's not discovery that we are going to be seeking from 4 5 plaintiff, I think that rather than a judgment on the 6 pleadings, we may be relying on the legislative record from 7 City Council. 8 THE COURT: That's well taken, legislative record. 9 Let me point this, unless I'm persuaded that something from the plaintiff is relevant, I don't think deposition of the 10 11 plaintiff, you know, has anything to do with the case right 12 now. 13 MR. KOLODZIEJ: Could I ask your Honor -- I mean, 14 our motion with respect to the administrative law claim, 15 however, it is clear that discovery is not permissible on 16 that. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. 18 MR. KOLODZIEJ: And I guess --19 THE COURT: I might find for you on that issue and 20 that might be over but I might not find for you on that issue 21 and then I have to go to the next step. And, you know, I 22 like to have one decision on all the points and right now I 23 think that it would be in your best interest also, as I told you, to have that sooner than later. 24 MR. KOLODZIEJ: Well, respectfully, Judge, as I 25

pointed out in my papers, if you did rule for the plaintiff on the administrative review claim, the constitutional claims have been moot. And I guess that was my point in doing it this way was that if the Court ruled for the plaintiff on that claim, we're done.

THE COURT: Right now, I'm not persuaded that you will succeed on that point, okay.

MR. KOLODZIEJ: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm not making a ruling but -- you know, but I do have serious concerns about the constitutional issue I could tell you right now, very serious concerns.

And, you know, read Heller. On regulations, government may continue to impose regulations that are traditional long-standing regulations in the United States and, you know, in McDonnell also they address that. They say that long-standing regulatory measures are permissible but they cited examples and they cited maybe, you know, laws about -- against concealed carry and laws prohibiting possession of guns by felons. You could look at that language carefully. Okay. And there has to be an analysis on -- that's why I'm giving the right to do a little discovery to brief this issue, you know, on whether gun regulations are permissible, they must be based on basically historical justifications that are long-standing so -- and maybe on its face, the regulations or the ordinance might not

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pass muster if, as counsel for the plaintiff has stated, that, you know, it doesn't define, it just talks about in any jurisdiction. What if Montana -- I think you cited another state, I'm not sure which state it was but I'm just saying what if another state --MR. KOLODZIEJ: We cited them all. THE COURT: -- says that, you know, unlawful use of a weapon is if you possess it at your house and you're convicted of a felony or misdemeanor. Those are issues that I'd like to do an exhaustive decision and give the parties to address them. And I think that because the ordinance was passed by the City of Chicago -- they're the masters of their ordinance, they should know why they passed it -- it shouldn't take too much discovery, even though they passed it the day after I think the Supreme Court decision came but, you know, it shouldn't

MR. KOLODZIEJ: Well, they --

shouldn't be hard to find.

MS. HIRSCH: They were anticipating the ruling and have been working on it for a while.

take that much discovery why they did what they did. Whether

there's legislative that took place within like one day, it

MR. KOLODZIEJ: And the defendants did produce all of those transcripts to me in their 26(a) packet --

MS. HIRSCH: So we would like to be able to use

that; right.

MR. KOLODZIEJ: -- although there's almost no discussion of this. But my question, Judge, is with -- are you allowing them then to take the plaintiff's deposition and no further because my concern is we're going to --

THE COURT: I want to know what you'll get out of the plaintiff's deposition, why would you need it because there is an ordinance. It talks — the ordinance doesn't talk about plaintiff. It talks about individuals that fall into a category. It has nothing to do with what the plaintiff's name is, what his other backgrounds are, what his skin color is, what his eye color is. It doesn't matter. It applies to everybody that falls into a category. And based on what the government had, they denied him the permit.

So you cannot now go expand beyond to say let me do a fishing expedition and find out, okay, did you murder somebody, ah-hah, I would have denied you because now you have admitted that you murdered somebody. It's not going to happen.

So unless you persuade me that plaintiff's deposition is necessary based on the facts and claims in this case, plaintiff's deposition is not going to take place, okay.

On the other issues, I will grant that to you. You could do your discovery.

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whatever, why --

MR. KOLODZIEJ: Well, your Honor, on the other issues, that's kind of broad. I mean, they've -- in their response to my motion, they talk about experts and studies. THE COURT: That's fine. Experts, they might need somebody who is the expert on the legislative history why Chicago did this. MR. KOLODZIEJ: Well, I guess procedurally, then I'm wondering how we're going to do this because I have a motion pending that -- I respect what you said, Judge, but I do have the position that discovery isn't necessary for it to be resolved. I understand what you said about wanting it for the record and everything but are we now going to open up discovery for all purposes, put my motion in abeyance and allow them to just go start disclosing experts that I have to go depose when I don't think any of this is relevant in the first place. I think it's incumbent on them to at least submit some kind of supplemental response or something to tell the Court what it is they want to do and why they need to do it. THE COURT: Okay, okay. Since you put it that way, on the constitutional issue --MS. HIRSCH: Yes. THE COURT: -- can you do it in two months? All it would take is to talk to your Chicago's ordinance experts and

MS. HIRSCH: I think that given -- I mean, it seems a little short given the fact that we may be talking to -- we know at least one expert study that we think relates directly to this issue and we might want to talk to him if he knows, if we're going to rely on him if he gets deposed, given the holidays, I think two months might be a little short. I don't think it's going to be extensive but I think that might be a little --

THE COURT: Three months?

MS. HIRSCH: We can try three months.

THE COURT: Okay. Three months discovery. And today is October 18th. By January 20. Of course, counsel, you could discover things from them too but January 20. And then plaintiff or defendant could file summary judgment motion by February 17th. Answer by March 2nd. Reply by March 9th. Two weeks; one week. And I will set a status hearing for April 18th and I will have a decision by then.

And as for the pending motion about whether the administrative hearing applied properly, I could tell you orally right now that I don't believe that you will succeed on that point. And if you like, I'll make a ruling right now on that.

MR. KOLODZIEJ: Well, I guess, your Honor, what -- and I appreciate that but I guess for purpose -- you know, for purposes of keeping our record in a good posture, I don't

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know at this point. You've said no plaintiff's deposition.
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             THE COURT: Correct.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: Okay. I don't know what other
    discovery they're going to --
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             THE COURT:
                         Whatever it is.
             MR. KOLODZIEJ: But -- I understand that but I guess
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    my point is, you know, I don't know what I'm going to -- what
    I would say right now in the summary judgment motion that
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    would be different than what I've already said unless --
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             THE COURT: Maybe you might -- well, you haven't
    said that the regulations are unconstitutional, period, not
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    only applied to your client but to anybody. Maybe you might
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    want to say that. I don't want to tell you what to say but,
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    you know, since they're going to do exhaustive on the
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    constitutionality arguments, you might want to do the same.
             MR. KOLODZIEJ: All right. Well, I guess my
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    confusion is procedurally going forward, you're -- are you
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    just opening discovery except for the plaintiff's deposition,
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    is that --
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             THE COURT: No. Discovery is open right now on your
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    claims on the constitutionality, okay --
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ:
                             Okay.
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             THE COURT: -- both as applied to your client and as
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    to anybody. And as far as the interpretation of the
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    administrative law judge, if the regulations are
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constitutional, I find that that interpretation was correct,
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    okay. So your motion on judgment on the pleadings as far as
    the interpretation is concerned is denied.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: Okay. And with respect --
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             THE COURT: Related to constitutionality, it's very,
    very wide open. And you might want to -- I'm not going to
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    put ideas in your head, but since it's open on the summary
    judgment, you are not precluded from claiming not only it
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    applied to your client is unconstitutional but it's
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    unconstitutional on its face, it's unconstitutional to apply
    as to anybody.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: I understand, your Honor, but I
    guess procedurally --
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             THE COURT: That's what you're saying in your briefs
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    but --
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: Right. I guess I'm in a quandary,
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    though.
             Are you denying that portion of the motion or are
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    you converting it? I guess I'm confused as to --
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             THE COURT: On that portion of the motion that
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    you're --
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                             The constitutionality.
             MR. KOLODZIEJ:
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             THE COURT: -- the constitutionality, I am holding
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    in abeyance at this time. I'll just strike it to give time
    for discovery and then you can basically renew and add to it
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    in your summary judgment motion so that there is nothing out
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there pending. Okay.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: All right.
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             MS. HIRSCH: Thank you.
             MR. KOLODZIEJ: And I'm sorry, the new status date
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    was April --
             THE COURT: April 18th.
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             MR. KOLODZIEJ: And that's at 9:00?
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             THE COURT:
                         9:00 o'clock.
 9
             MR. KOLODZIEJ: And the order will reflect, though,
10
    that the plaintiffs -- the defendants are not allowed to take
11
    the plaintiff's deposition?
12
             THE COURT: I'm just telling them that right now.
13
             MR. KOLODZIEJ:
                             Okay.
14
             THE COURT: It's in the record. It's on the
15
    record.
             MR. KOLODZIEJ: I appreciate that.
16
17
             MS. HIRSCH: Thank you, your Honor.
             MR. KOLODZIEJ: All right. Thank you very much.
18
19
             MS. HIRSCH: Thank you.
20
             THE COURT: And once again, on the issue of
21
    conviction, please jointly submit something to me in the next
22
    30 days or less. I need to know exactly what case vacated it
23
    or changed the law or whatever based on case law and then
24
    what's the procedure afterwards. I mean, when something is
25
    vacated, to me it's vacated. Did they then recharge the
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1	person or they revived the old arraignment or charges, what
2	happened.
3	You know, I know that the docket is like kind of
4	technical, you know, there's letters, dots, numbers. You
5	guys are the experts maybe or you could find out from your
6	systems what happened and then you could have a stipulated
7	joint order, joint document saying that these this is what
8	happened relating to the conviction.
9	MR. KOLODZIEJ: And you'd like that within 30 days?
10	THE COURT: If you can. I mean, right now we have
11	some time. Yeah.
12	MR. KOLODZIEJ: Okay. All right. Thank you.
13	MS. HIRSCH: Thank you, your Honor.
14	THE COURT: Thank you.
15	(Which concluded the proceedings in the above-entitled
16	matter.)
17	CERTIFICATE
18	I hereby certify that the foregoing is a transcript
19	of proceedings before the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on
20	October 18, 2011.
21	
22	/s/Laura LaCien
23	Laura LaCien April 27, 2012 Date
24	Official Court Reporter
25	