



1 Plaintiffs' members recreate in the KNF and Grand Canyon National Park. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

2 KNF is also a popular hunting area for large game. (Id. at ¶ 33.)

3 Lead, including the lead used in ammunition, is a toxic substance with potentially  
4 deadly consequences when ingested. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendant's failure  
5 to use its authority to regulate the use and disposal of lead ammunition in the KNF endangers  
6 the environment. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs also contend that the ingestion of this discarded lead  
7 ammunition by California condors in the KNF has contributed to the decline of this species  
8 as well as others that are especially susceptible to lead poisoning. (Id. at ¶ 37.) The  
9 California condor is a near-extinct avian species, with only 73 free-flying birds in Northern  
10 Arizona and Southern Utah. (Id. at ¶ 36.) Lead poisoning is the leading cause of mortality  
11 in these birds. (Id. at ¶ 37.)

12 On September 5, 2012, Plaintiffs brought this citizen suit against Defendant under the  
13 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). (Doc. 1.) The RCRA provides that any  
14 person may commence a civil action:

15 against any person, including the United States and any other governmental  
16 instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment  
17 to the Constitution, and including any past or present generator, past or present  
18 transporter, or past or present operator or generator of a treatment, storage, or  
19 disposal facility, who has contributed to or is contributing to the past or present  
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid or  
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment  
to health or the environment.

20 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The RCRA further provides that any citizen suit shall be brought  
21 in the district court for the district in which the violation or harm occurred. 42 U.S.C. §  
22 6972(a). Plaintiffs specifically allege that Defendant, by failing to exercise its authority as  
23 manager of the KNF, has contributed to or is contributing to the past or present disposal of  
24 solid or hazardous waste, which may endanger the environment. (Doc. 1. at ¶ 45.)

25 Defendant moves to dismiss this suit for lack of Article III standing pursuant to Fed.  
26 R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or alternatively for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  
27 12(b)(6). (Doc. 46.)

28

## LEGAL STANDARD

### I. RCRA

By declaration of Congress, it is national policy of the United States that the generation of waste is to be reduced or eliminated, and that waste that is generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize future and present threats to human health and the environment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6902(b). To forward this policy, Congress passed the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 *et seq.* The RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that establishes a “cradle-to-grave” regulatory scheme whereby solid waste is governed from initial treatment through storage and disposal. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996); Connecticut Coastal Fisherman’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1313 (2d Cir. 1993).

### II. Article III Jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A party may file a motion asserting that a district court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A claim can be challenged under Rule 12(b)(1) both facially and factually. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial challenge occurs when the defendant contests the adequacy of the allegations in the pleading. See id. A factual challenge occurs when a defendant objects to the factual merits of the asserted federal jurisdiction. See id. When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s complaint is construed liberally, with allegations and reasonable inferences to be drawn in plaintiff’s favor. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). A court may also raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, *sua sponte*, at any time during the pendency of the action, even on appeal. United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 830 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Federal Court jurisdiction is limited to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST., art.

1 III, § 2. To satisfy Article III jurisdiction, at a minimum, the party asserting standing must  
2 prove 1) an injury that is concrete and particularized, 2) that the injury is traceable to the act  
3 or omission complained of, and 3) that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a  
4 favorable court decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). An  
5 organization has standing if it can demonstrate that one member would have standing  
6 individually to sue in their own right, the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the  
7 purpose of the organization, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief sought requires  
8 participation of the individual members. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432  
9 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977).

## 10 DISCUSSION

### 11 I. Injury

12 The diminished ability to view and experience animals in their natural habitat is a  
13 judicially cognizable injury. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562. A plaintiff can  
14 sufficiently establish injury when a defendant's actions cause reasonable concern of injury.  
15 Covington v. Jefferson Cnty., 358 F.3d 626, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). "It is within the trial court's  
16 power to allow or require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint or by  
17 affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's standing."  
18 Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422  
19 U.S.490, 501 (1975)). Moreover, at the pleading stage, general allegations of an injury are  
20 sufficient. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561.

21 Plaintiffs have provided at least one sworn declaration from a member of each Plaintiff  
22 organization detailing continued recreational use of the KNF area for the purposes of  
23 observing and experiencing wildlife. (Doc. 67-1 at ¶¶ 7-9; Doc. 67-2 at ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 67-3 at  
24 ¶ 7; Doc. 67-5 at ¶¶ 10-12.) These members also aver concrete plans to return to the KNF in  
25 the future as well as concern regarding the loss of the condor. (Doc. 67-1 at ¶ 9; Doc. 67-2  
26 at ¶ 5; Doc. 67-3 at ¶ 7; Doc. 67-5 at ¶ 12.) The Court finds that these affidavits are sufficient  
27 to establish the injury-in-fact of each individual and thus each organization for the purposes  
28 of Article III standing.

## 1 II. Causation

2 The plaintiff's injury-in-fact must be "fairly traceable" to the alleged activity of the  
3 defendant. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). An injury is  
4 fairly traceable to the conduct complained of when a causal chain exists but is not  
5 hypothetical or tenuous. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 849 (9th Cir. 2002).  
6 However, when that line of causation consists of numerous third parties whose independent  
7 decisions have a cumulative impact on the injuries, the line of causation may be deemed to  
8 be too weak. Maya, 658 F.3d 1060, 1070. Causation may be found when an actor is charged  
9 with oversight but is not solely responsible for correcting the action that contributes to a  
10 plaintiff's injury. See Covington, 358 F.3d 626, 639, *impliedly overruled on other grounds*  
11 *by Summers v. Earth Island Inst.*, 555 U.S. 488, 129 (2008). The Chief of the Forest Service  
12 may issue regulations prohibiting acts for the purpose of protecting threatened, endangered,  
13 rare, unique, or vanishing species of plants, animals, birds or fish, or special biological  
14 communities. 36 C.F.R. § 261.70(a)(4).

15 Defendant argues that the regulation of hunting is administered by the state and  
16 therefore it is the independent actions of third parties – the State of Arizona and the hunters  
17 that use lead ammunition – that are the cause of Plaintiffs' injuries. The Court disagrees.  
18 Defendant has authority to regulate activities in the National Forests. This broad authority  
19 includes the right to issue regulations that restrict actions that threaten endangered species of  
20 animals, such as the California condor. Defendant opts not to exercise this authority and  
21 instead allows the use and disposal of lead on the land which it administers. Although  
22 Defendant may choose not to ban certain types of ammunition in deference to Arizona's  
23 regulation of hunting, it is not thereby automatically relieved of its affirmative duty to stop  
24 the disposal of environmental contaminants in the KNF.

25 Lead is widely known to be toxic to humans and animals. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 45.) The  
26 substance is ingested by the California condor and other species when they feed on the  
27 remains of either animals shot with lead ammunition and then not retrieved, or the remains  
28 of animals that have been field dressed. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.) "But for" Defendant's decision to

1 allow toxic lead ammunition to be disposed of in the KNF, there would be no lead waste that  
2 could be consumed, and local animal species would not suffer from lead poisoning and  
3 contribute to Plaintiffs' aesthetic injury. Although there are multiple links in this causal chain,  
4 none are tenuous. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately proven the element  
5 of causation.

### 6 **III. Redressability**

7 It must be likely rather than speculative that the relief sought, if granted, will redress  
8 the injury. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 559. The Administrative Procedure Act  
9 ("APA") empowers a court only to compel an agency to perform a non-discretionary act.  
10 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (citing Attorney General's  
11 Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 108 (1947)). In the event that the court could  
12 compel an agency to exercise discretionary authority, it could not dictate the manner of action.  
13 See Norton, 542 U.S. at 65. National Forests must cooperate with state game officials in the  
14 planning and orderly removal of game in accordance with state laws. 36 C.F.R. § 241.2. In  
15 issuing regulations concerning protection of endangered species, *inter alia*, the Forest Service  
16 must follow the APA. 36 C.F.R. § 261.70(c). When engaged in rule-making pursuant to the  
17 APA, an agency must accept and consider written data, views, and arguments presented by  
18 interested persons. 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c).

19 Defendant argues that to redress Plaintiffs' alleged injury, it would have to preempt  
20 longstanding deference to the state in matters of hunting and wildlife regulation. It contends  
21 that what little authority it does have regarding hunting is limited to public safety and  
22 adherence to applicable law. Defendant further argues that because it must engage in rule  
23 making within the parameters of the APA, a process that would necessarily involve  
24 consultation with the Arizona Game and Fish Department in addition to compliance with the  
25 National Environmental Policy Act, redressability is speculative at best. The Court agrees.  
26 First, Plaintiffs wish the Court to order Defendant to perform a discretionary duty, an agency  
27 action which the Court is not empowered to compel. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 64. Second, even  
28 if Defendant could be ordered to initiate the rule making process necessary to prevent the

1 disposal of lead within the KNF, the outcome would be uncertain because Defendant would  
2 be required to consult with Arizona, accept public comments, balance competing interests,  
3 and consider a no action alternative. It is therefore speculative at best whether a favorable  
4 ruling would be likely to redress Plaintiffs injury.

5 The Court also notes that the behavior and feeding habits of the California condor and  
6 other avian species make it unlikely that even if Defendant were to ban lead from being  
7 discarded within the KNF, the condor would no longer suffer from the lead poisoning that  
8 causes Plaintiffs' alleged aesthetic injury. The California condor is know for long distance  
9 travel. (Doc. 22-2 at 14.) Their longer trips consist of arching loops that reach from eastern  
10 Nevada, through southwestern Arizona, to the New Mexico border. (*Id.*) They are also  
11 known to fly into Utah in pursuit of carrion. (*Id.*) The condors could easily fly and  
12 subsequently feed outside the borders of the KNF and therefore outside of the area managed  
13 by Defendant. Plaintiffs give no indication that any of these other states ban the use of lead  
14 ammunition. Because of the extensive range of the California condor, it is likely that those  
15 birds that inhabit KNF will travel to those areas in search of carrion and ingest lead  
16 ammunition in the same manner as lead ingested within KNF borders. Thus, redressability  
17 is speculative.

18 Plaintiffs have failed to establish sufficient likelihood of redressability. Consequently,  
19 the Court lacks Article III jurisdiction in this case and will grant Defendant's Motion to  
20 Dismiss. (Doc. 46.) Because the Court finds dismissal is appropriate based on jurisdictional  
21 grounds, the Court does not reach Defendant's additional argument for dismissal for failure  
22 to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

### 23 CONCLUSION

24 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

25 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting** Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 46.)

26 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing without prejudice** all of Plaintiffs' claims  
27 in this suit.

28 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying** as moot State of Arizona's Motion to

1 Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Filing a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 21.)

2 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying** as moot National Rifle Association of  
3 America's Motion to Intervene. (Doc. 28.)


4 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying** as moot National Shooting Sports Foundation  
5 Inc.'s Motion to Intervene. (Doc. 54.)

6 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing** the Clerk of the Court to terminate this  
7 action.

8 DATED this 1<sup>st</sup> day of July, 2013.

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Stephen M. McNamee  
Senior United States District Judge

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