No. 13-56454

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

EUGENE EVAN BAKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California (CV 10-3996-SVW (AJWx))

APPELLANT'S EXCERPTS OF RECORD VOLUME II OF II

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Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for the Ninth

Circuit, rule 30-1, Plaintiff-Appellant Eugene Baker, by and through

his attorney of record, hereby confirms to the contents and form of

Appellant's Excerpts of Record.

Date: February 16, 2016

MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

s/ C. D. Michel

C. D. Michel

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

Eugene Baker

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UNITED STATE	ES DISTRICT COURT
	DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UGENE EVAN BAKER,) CASE NO. CV 10-3996-SVW(AJWx)
Plaintiff,) PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL
VS.	AND REPRESENTATION STATEMENT
RIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official	
apacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;))
AMALA D. HARRIS, in her apacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL OR THE STATE OF ALIFORNIA; THE STATE OF	
ALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF USTICE; and DOES 1 through 100, aclusive,	
Defendants.)))
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NOTICE OF APPEAL NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Eugene Evan Baker, plaintiff in the above-named case, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from an order granting Defendant Eric. H. Holder, Jr.'s Motion to Dismiss, which order was entered in this action on the 31st day of July, 2013 (Docket No. 48), attached as Exhibit A. Plaintiff's Representation Statement is attached to this Notice as required by Ninth Circuit Rule 3-2(b). Dated: August 20, 2013 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. /s/ C. D. Michel Attorneys for Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker

REPRESENTATION STATEMENT

The undersigned represents Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker and no other party. Pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Circuit Rule 3-2(b), Plaintiff submits this Representation Statement. The following list identifies all parties to the action, and it identifies their respective counsel by name, firm, address, telephone number, and e-mail, where appropriate.

PARTIES	COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Defendants Kamala D. Harris and The State of California Department of Justice	Anthony R. Hakl, III Office of the Attorney General 1300 I Street, 16th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone:(916) 322-9041 Fax: (916) 324-8835 anthony.hakl@doj.ca.gov

Dated: August 20, 2013

MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

/s/ C. D. Michel
C. D. Michel
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eugene Evan Baker

EXHIBIT "A"

		CIVIL MINU	JTES - GENERAL		
Case No.	2:10-cv-3996	-SVW-AJW		Date	July 31, 2013
Title	Eugene Evan Baker v. Eric H. Hold		er, Jr., et al.		
			JS-6		
Present: Th	ne Honorable	STEPHEN V. WILSO	ON, U.S. DISTRICT JU	DGE	
]	Paul M. Cruz		N/A		_
]	Deputy Clerk		Court Reporter / Recorder	•	Tape No.
A	ttorneys Preser	nt for Plaintiffs:	Attorneys	Present	for Defendants:
	N/A	A		N/A	A
Proceedin	gs: IN	CHAMBERS ORDE	R Re MOTION TO DISI	MISS [3	36]
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for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commence.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Under the statute, a person who has been convicted of California Penal Code Section 273.5(a) is been convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." See 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(A) ("[T]he term 'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence' means an offense that is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; and has an element, the use or attempted use of physical force . . . committed against a current of former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse, parent or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim."); see also Enos v. Holder, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that a violation of Section 273.5(a) falls under the definition of misdemeanor crime of domestic violence).

Plaintiff completed his probation in 2002; at that time, he submitted an application to withdraw his plea and have the conviction set aside pursuant to California Penal Code § 1203.4.² On June 19, 2002, the Ventura County Superior Court granted his motion; however, the ten-year bar on owning a firearm remained in effect until October of 2007. FAC ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff has no criminal history other than his Section 273.5(a) conviction. FAC ¶ 16.

In May of 2009, Plaintiff attempted to purchase a firearm at Ojai Valley Surplus. FAC ¶17. Ojai Valley Surplus contacted the State of California's Department of Justice (Cal. DOJ) regarding Plaintiff's request; in response, Cal. DOJ sent a letter to Ojai Valley Surplus stating that Plaintiff is not a person eligible to possess a firearm," and ordered Ojai Valley Surplus that it was not to "release" the firearm to Plaintiff. Id.

Plaintiff then contacted Cal. DOJ directly, asking for an explanation as to why it had prevented Ojai Valley Surplus from selling him a firearm. FAC ¶18. In response, Cal. DOJ sent Plaintiff a letter explaining that it had "identified a record in a state or federal database which indicates that you are

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² Section 1203.4 permits a court to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea of *nolo contedre* after he or she has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation; upon doing so, the defendant is "released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted," with certain listed exceptions. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4(a).

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prohibited by state and/or federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms," namely, Section 922(g)(9). Id.

In his FAC, Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against both the Cal. DOJ and the federal Department of Justice: first, that Section 922(g)(9), as-applied to him,³ violates his Second Amendment rights under the Supreme Court's decision in <u>District of Columbia v. Heller</u>, 554, U.S. 570 (2008). Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denial of his request to own a gun violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.⁴

II. LEGAL STANDARD⁵

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

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³ In his opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff clarified that he was *only* alleging an as-applied, and not facial, challenge to Section 922(g)(9).

⁴ In his original complaint, Plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to possess a gun pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), which provides that a person is *not* considered to have been convicted of an offense of domestic violence for purposes of Section 922(g)(9) if the operative conviction has been "expunged or set aside." Plaintiff argued that the Ventura County Superior Court's ruling that his conviction was to be set aside pursuant to California Penal Code § 1203.4 meant that his conviction was "expunged" within the meaning of the federal statute; however, as this Court ruled, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, this argument is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Jennings v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[A]lthough Jennings obtained relief under section 1203.4 by the 1999 State court order, that relief did not expunge his conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)."). The Ninth Circuit specifically remanded this case to this Court to address Plaintiff's Second Amendment argument; upon remand, Plaintiff filed his FAC in which he alleges both Second Amendment and Equal Protection claims.

⁵ At this Court's October 15, 2012 status conference, this Court ordered the parties to file simultaneous opening briefs and simultaneous responding briefs. The Court construes Defendants' opening brief as a motion to dismiss. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.").

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face." <u>Ashcroft v. Iqbal</u>, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting <u>Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly</u>, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." <u>Id.</u> A complaint that offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." <u>Id.</u>; <u>see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service</u>, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing <u>Iqbal</u>, 129 S. Ct. at 1951).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. <u>Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara</u>, 288 F.3d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, while a court is not required to accept a pleader's legal conclusions as true, the court must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, accepting the complaint's [factual] allegations as true." <u>Knievel v. ESPN</u>, 393 F.3d 1068, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005).

The court may grant a plaintiff leave to amend a deficient claim "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "Five factors are frequently used to assess the propriety of a motion for leave to amend: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his Complaint." Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, "leave to amend should be granted 'unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency." <u>DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.</u>, 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting <u>Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co.</u>, 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. <u>See Desoto</u>, 957 F.2d at 658; <u>Schreiber</u>, 806 F.2d at 1401.

III. THE SECOND AMENDMENT

A. Legal Standard

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II. In <u>Heller</u>, "the Supreme Court struck down the District of

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Columbia's ban on handgun possession[.]" <u>United States v. Henry</u>, 688 F.3d 637, 639-40 (9th Cir. 2012). After conducting a thorough analysis of the Second Amendment's history, "the Court held 'that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms." <u>United States v. Vongxay</u>, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting <u>Heller</u>, 128 S.Ct. at 2799). Without articulating a level of scrutiny, 6 the Supreme Court found the two statues at issue "fail[ed] to pass constitutional muster." <u>Heller</u>, 554 U.S. at 629-630.

However, the Supreme Court noted that the Second Amendment

"leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for combating [the problem of handgun violence in this country], *including some measures regulating handguns*. But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the *absolute* prohibition of *handguns held and used for self-defense in the home*."

<u>Vongxay</u>, 594 F.3d at 1115 (quoting <u>Heller</u>, 554 U.S. at 636). The Court expanded upon the "policy choices" that the Second Amendment left on the table, noting that

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, *nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons* and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

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⁶ The Court noted only "'[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights," the statutes at issue failed to pass constitutional muster. <u>Heller</u> 554 U.S. at 628-629. In a footnote, the Court suggested that rational basis would *not* be the appropriate standard. <u>Id.</u> at 628 n. 27 ("Obviously, the [rational basis] test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.").

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<u>Vongxay</u>, 594 F.3d at 1115 (quoting <u>Heller</u>, 554 U.S. at 626-27). This list of "presumptively lawful regulatory measures" served only as examples; it "[did] not purport to be exhaustive." <u>Heller</u>, 554 U.S. at 627 n. 26.

Since Heller, courts have addressed Second Amendment challenges to federal laws in two ways. Both begin by assessing whether or not the law at issue is "presumptively lawful." For some courts, this question is the beginning and end of the constitutional inquiry: if the statute is "presumptively lawful," it cannot be struck down under the Second Amendment. See, e.g. Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115, 1116 (finding a federal statute making it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to possess, transport, or receive "any firearm or ammunition" presumptively constitutional under Heller, and upholding the constitutionality of the statute on that basis alone); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that Section 922(g)(9) was "presumptively lawful" under Heller, and upholding a conviction for violating that provision without engaging in further scrutiny). Other courts, however, have applied a second step. After finding that the law at issue fell within the "presumptively constitutional" category, these courts have applied an additional layer of scrutiny. As the Seventh Circuit explained, applying such scrutiny is required by

<u>Heller</u> itself. <u>Heller</u> referred to felon disarmament bans only as 'presumptively lawful,' which, by implication, means that there must exist the possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge. Therefore, putting the government through its paces in proving the constitutionality of [the statute at issue] is only proper.

<u>United States v. Williams</u>, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010). Those courts that have found that <u>Heller</u> requires a second step have applied "what some courts have called intermediate scrutiny." <u>Id.</u> "To pass constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny, the government has the burden of demonstrating that its objective is an important one and that its objective is advanced by means substantially related to that objective." <u>Id.</u>

B. Analysis

Turning to the statute at issue here—Section 922(g)(9)—this Court need not decide which of these two methodologies is correct: using *either* methodology, Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. *Every* single court that has ruled upon the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(9) has upheld it against Second Amendment challenges. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have found that the statute "presumptively constitutional," and rejected arguments that the statue should be found constitutional without further analysis. See White, 593 F.3d at 1206; In re U.S., 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009). Similarly, the only California district court to rule on Section 922(9)'s constitutionality upheld the

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statute as presumptively constitutional without engaging in further analysis. <u>See Enos v. Holder</u>, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2012).

The other three Court of Appeals which have ruled upon the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(9)—the First, Fourth, and Seventh circuits—have all upheld the statute, concluding that the law is "presumptively constitutional" and survives intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 168 (4th Cir. 2011) ("§ 922(g)(9) satisfies the intermediate scrutiny standard."); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 26 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[I]t is plain that § 922(g)(9) substantially promotes an important government interest in preventing domestic gun violence."); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) ("[N]o one doubts that the goal of § 922(g)(9), preventing armed mayhem, is an important governmental objective. Both logic and data establish a substantial relation between § 922(g)(9) and this objective.").

Plaintiff attempts to evade these precedents by arguing that he is different from the typical Section 922(g)(9) offender. According to Plaintiff, he has committed no crimes other than the 1997 charge of domestic violence (either before or since), and has maintained a "peaceful and amicable relationship" with the victim of that incident. In short, Plaintiff avers that the Second Amendment requires that Section 922(g)(9) be ruled unconstitutional as applied to him because of his law-abiding record.

However, every court to consider a similar argument has rejected it. See In re U.S., 578 F.3d at 1200 ("We have already rejected the notion that Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concerning felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1). Furthermore, we have rejected, albeit in a slightly different context, the idea that § 922(g)(9) allows for individual assessments of the risk of violence.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Booker, 644 F.3d at 25 (holding that Section 992(g)(9) survived a Second Amendment challenge where the challenger's act of domestic violence occurred ten years before his possession of a gun, and the record contained no other incidents of illegal behavior); see also Enos, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (holding that Section 922(9)(g) withstood constitutional scrutiny as-applied to seven plaintiffs, each of whom had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime more than ten years before their attempts to purchase a gun); United States v. Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 869 (S.D.W. Va. 2010) (upholding Section 922(g)(9) against an as-applied challenge where the defendant's domestic violence conviction occurred seven years before he was found in possession of a gun, and upholding the statute as constitutional "[e]ven assuming Defendant is permanently banned from future firearm possession"). As

⁷ In Skoein, the Seventh Circuit left open the possibility that a domesti "who has been law abiding for an extended period of time must be allowed to	
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the Tenth Circuit concluded, "a defendant whose background includes domestic violence which advances to a criminal conviction has a demonstrated propensity for the use of physical violence against others." In re United States, 578 F.3d at 1200. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Second Amendment claim must be dismissed.

IV. EQUAL PROTECTION

Plaintiff further argues that Section 922(g)(9) violates his equal protection right under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment by classifying him into a "class of firearms purchasers who have previously been convicted of a [misdemeanor crime of domestic violence] but have fulfilled the terms of their probation or have otherwise not been convicted of a crime for a period of ten years following their [conviction]." FAC ¶ 37.

The Ninth Circuit recently rejected a similar argument in <u>Vongxay</u>, 594 F.3d at 1118. There, a convicted felon argued that Section 922(g)(1)—which makes it unlawful for any person who has been "convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"—should be subject to strict scrutiny because the "right to bear arms is a fundamental right." <u>Id.</u> While acknowledging that an equal protection claim can arise where a statue "unequal[ly] burden[ed] a fundamental right," the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court "purposefully differentiated the right to bear arms generally from the more limited right held by felons." <u>Id.</u> As such, "whatever standard of review the Court implicitly applied to Heller's right to keep arms in his home is inapplicable to Vongxay, a felon who was explicitly excluded from <u>Heller</u>'s holding." <u>Id.</u> Accordingly, because the felon in <u>Vongxay</u> was not protected by <u>Heller</u>'s holding, the Ninth Circuit was "bound by pre-<u>Heller</u> case law involving equal protection challenges to § 922(g)[1]," which had upheld the statute against equal protection challenges. Id. at 1118-1119 (citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980)).

<u>Skoien</u>, 614 F.3d at 645. However, Plaintiff has not identified—nor has this Court found—any case that has adopted Plaintiff's argument that the Second Amendment demands that an individual who has been convicted of a crime of domestic violence be permitted to own a gun if he or she remains law abiding for a certain period of time thereafter. Rather, courts have routinely rejected this argument. <u>See Booker</u>, 644 F.3d at 25; <u>Enos</u>, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 1099; <u>Smith</u>, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 869; <u>see also In re U.S.</u>, 578 F.3d at 1200 (rejecting the "notion that <u>Heller</u> mandates an individualized inquiry concerning felons pursuant" to Section 922(g)(9)).

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Similarly, as discussed above, *every* court that has ruled upon the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(9) has found that domestic violence misdemeants are *not* protected by the Second Amendment's to bear arms. Accordingly, this Court is bound by the pre-Heller equal protection case law as to Section 922(g)(9)'s constitutionality, at least as applied to Plaintiff. In <u>U.S. v. Hancock</u>, the Ninth Circuit upheld Section 922(g)(9) against an equal protection challenge, concluding that the statute survived rational basis review. 231 F.3d 557, 565-566 (2000). Like the felon in <u>Vongxay</u>, because Plaintiff is "explicitly excluded from <u>Heller</u>'s holding," this Court is bound by <u>Hancock</u>'s holding.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons put forward in this Order, Plaintiff's FAC is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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PROOF OF SERVICE 1 2 IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT: I, C.D. Michel, the undersigned, am a citizen of the United States and am at 3 least eighteen years of age. My business address is 180 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, California, 90802. 4 5 I am not a party to the above-entitled action. I have caused service of: NOTICE OF APPEAL/REPRESENTATION STMT 6 on the following party by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the District Court using its ECF System, which electronically notifies them. 7 8 David A. DeJute Anthony R. Hakl, III
Office of the Attorney General 9 AUSA - Office of US Attorney 300 North Los Angeles Street, 1300 I Street. 10 16th Floor Room 7516 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Sacramento, CA 95814 11 david.dejute@usdoj.gov anthony.hakl@doj.ca.gov 12 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 13 Executed on August 20, 2013. 14 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 15 16 /s/ C. D. Michel 17 C. D. Michel Attorneys for Plaintiff 18 Eugene Evan Baker 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

NOTICE OF APPEAL/REPRESENTATION STMT CV 10-3996-SVW(AJWx)

FEDERAL DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

I.

Reiterating the arguments previously made, Plaintiff sets forth nothing in his Opposition which undermines the reasons set forth in Defendant's Opening Brief and Responding Brief that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is a constitutionally valid enactment of Congress. Every Circuit Court and the only California District Court to have considered this issue have upheld the statute. In the absence of any contrary authority, Plaintiff must argue that each case was decided wrongly¹.

Because amendment would be futile, this Court is respectfully requested to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

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The cases upholding the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(9) include decisions from the First Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Seventh Circuit (en banc), Tenth Circuit, Eleventh Circuit and the Eastern District of California. See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) ("We now explicitly hold that § 922(g)(9) is a presumptively lawful 'longstanding prohibition on the possession of firearms'"); In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2009) (order) ("Nothing suggests that the Heller dictum, which we must follow, is not inclusive of § 922(g)(9) involving those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence"); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Indeed, § 922(g)(9) fits comfortably among the categories of regulations that <u>Heller</u> suggested would be 'presumptively 554 U.S. at 627 n.26 Section 922(g)(9) is, historically and practically, a corollary outgrowth of the federal felon disqualification statute"); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 168 (4th Cir. 2011) ("§ 922(g)(9) satisfies the intermediate scrutiny standard"); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (concluding that Section 922(g)(9) withstands intermediate scrutiny); Enos v. Holder, 855 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1099 (E.D.Cal. 2012) ("§ 922(g)(9) is a presumptively lawful categorical ban on firearm possession. Keeping guns out of the hands of those convicted of domestic violence fits squarely into the prohibitions noted by Heller").

II.

THIS COURT CAN DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

As a procedural matter, Plaintiff misconstrues this Court's Order dated October 15, 2012 and the Ninth Circuit's Order dated June 6, 2012, neither of which preclude this Court from dismissing Plaintiff's complaint; indeed, each order contemplated just such a result.

The order from the Ninth Circuit, for example, upheld this Court's determination that previous Ninth Circuit precedent barred Plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to possess a firearm under California law. See Order dated June 6, 2012, 3 (attached as Exhibit A). That same order allowed Plaintiff's claim under the Second Amendment to proceed but, in doing so, the Ninth Circuit did not foreclose this Court's ability to determine whether such a claim was legally valid. See Id. Indeed, the very purpose of the remand was for this Court to determine this very question.

Plaintiff acknowledged as much at the hearing before this
Court on October 15, 2012. Addressing Plaintiff's counsel, this
Court asked:

What do you understand the issue to be, assuming that the amended complaint is in place? Is it whether the Supreme Court's recent <u>Heller</u> decision supports the defendant's argument that notwithstanding the state conviction, he's entitled to bear a firearm?

Transcript of October 15, 2012 Hearing, 4:12-16 (attached as Exhibit B). In response, Plaintiff's counsel stated:

Yes, that's correct. In <u>District of Columbia versus</u>

<u>Heller</u> in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court did declare that

there is a fundamental Second Amendment right to keep

and bear arms for self-defense purposes and
<u>Id.</u>, 4:17-20. After some discussion, the Court asked undersigned

counsel the following:

So now the question is, as [Plaintiff's counsel]

presented it, even if his conviction isn't expunged in

accordance with federal law, does Heller versus

<u>District of Columbia</u> - is that the case - give him the

right to bear a firearm? And what is your argument

there?

Id., 9:5-9. Undersigned counsel responded:

Well, at first, it's a procedural question. When <u>Jennings</u> was decided, <u>Heller</u> had not been decided, and so no court had ever considered the Second Amendment as applying a fundamental right to an individual. And so the Ninth Circuit said, We're going to punt - excuse the expression - and allow the district court to determine, first, the level of scrutiny to be determined and then secondly, whether or not using that level of scrutiny the statute passes constitutional muster. Our argument is one, that this court should do just that, determine the level of scrutiny, which has to be either rational basis or intermediate level, and then applying that level of scrutiny should find that the statute, as interpreted under federal law, does not violate Mr. Baker's constitutional rights.

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Id., 9:10-23. A little later, undersigned counsel continued:
     It's very clear that his conviction was not expunged,
     and in the absence of Heller, [Plaintiff] would not be
     allowed to have a firearm. The only question is does
     Heller change the constitutional makeup to such a
     degree that the federal law that prohibits his use of
     the handgun is found to be unconstitutional.
Id., 10:7-12 (emphasis added).
 This Court then observed:
     Well, then, it seems that the way to get this before
     [the] court is by briefing it, correct?
Id., 11:2-3. To which Plaintiff's counsel responded:
     That's correct.
Id., 11:4 (emphasis added). The Court then ordered Plaintiff's
counsel to serve all defendants, and the Court set forth a
briefing schedule where the parties were ordered to submit
opening and responding briefs on the issue. See Id., 11:5-16:17.
     The Department of Justice has followed this Court's
instructions; it has set forth in its briefs exactly what
undersigned counsel stated in open court; and, at the end of the
briefs, the Federal Defendant has made the non-controversial
observation that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice because a complaint cannot survive without a valid
legal claim, citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901
F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Dismissal can be based on the
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lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory").2

Accordingly, if this Court accepts the arguments advanced by the Department of Justice, then Plaintiff does not have a cognizable legal theory, and dismissal should result as a matter of course.

III.

THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION

This Court gave each party the opportunity to file two briefs on whether Section 922(g)(9) was constitutional, with the further opportunity to address the Court at a hearing on the matter. As this Court instructed, and as anticipated at the October 15th hearing, the Department of Justice has set forth the reasons why this Court should uphold that statute in its Opening and Responding Briefs.

As a substantive matter, those briefs address, and refute, each contrary assertion made in Plaintiff's opposition. The Federal Defendant respectfully refers the Court to the reasons advanced in those briefs, which are hereby incorporated, rather than reiterate those reasons here. In broad strokes, Plaintiff has failed to explain why this Court should disregard the reasoning set forth by its sister California District Court and

Plaintiff cannot maintain surprise or confusion, as undersigned counsel explained all of this in a letter dated January 14, 2013, before the responding briefs were due, in response to a letter from Plaintiff's counsel dated January 9, 2013 (attached respectively as Exhibits D and C).

C. D. Michel - Calif. SBN 144258 Joshua R. Dale - Calif. SBN 209942 Sean A. Brady - Calif. SBN 262007 Joseph A. Silvoso, III - Calif. SBN 248502 3 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802 4 Telephone: (562) 216-4444 Fax: (562) 216-4445 5 cmichel@michellawyers.com jdale@michellawyers.com 6 Attorneys for Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 EUGENE EVAN BAKER, CASE NO. CV 10-3996-SVW(AJWx) Plaintiff, 12 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO **DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO** 13 DISMISS VS. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official) 14 capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL 15 OF THE UNITED STATES; KAMALA D. HARRIS, in her capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL 16 FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; THE STATE OF 17 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 18 JUSTICE; and DOES 1 through 100, Inclusive, 19 Defendants. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS CV 10-3996-SVW(AJWx)

INTRODUCTION

Although Defendant United States Attorney General Eric Holder ("Federal Defendant") failed to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Central District Local Rules in bringing his purported "motion to dismiss" Plaintiff's complaint, by its order of February 1, 2013, rescheduling the hearing in this matter until February 25, 2013, the Court signaled that it intended to nonetheless treat that hearing as one for a motion to dismiss. Scheduling Notice, Feb. 1, 2013, (Doc. No. 43). In response to that February 1, 2013 order, Plaintiff hereby opposes Federal Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.²

ARGUMENT

In his Opening Brief / Motion to Dismiss ("Motion"), Federal Defendant misconstrues Plaintiff's claims on multiple levels. Mainly, he describes Plaintiff's claims as an attack on the facial validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). As made clear both in Plaintiff's amended complaint and in his opening brief, Plaintiff is solely challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) as applied to him.

And, Plaintiff prevails under the very standard Federal Defendant advances in his Motion for evaluating the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) as applied to

.

Federal Defendant failed to comply with Rules 6 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Central District Local Rules 6-1 and 7-3 by failing to include a notice of motion filed with the Clerk no later than twenty-eight days before the scheduled hearing, failed to serve said notice on each of the parties, failed to provide a concise statement of the relief sought, failed to contact opposing counsel to discuss his intent to file a FRCP Rule 12 motion, failed to meet and confer with opposing counsel in an effort to obtain an out-of-court resolution on the Rule 12 motion, and failed to include a statement in his motion confirming the conference of counsel pursuant to Local Rule 7-3.

Defendant California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris joins Federal Defendant's Motion. Opening Br. Def.'s Cal. Atty. Gen. Kamala D. Harris & Cal. Dept. of Justice, Jan. 1, 2013 (Doc. No. 37). This opposition applies equally to her brief, to the extent it is considered a motion.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	FOR THE CENTRAL D	S DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11	EUGENE EVAN BAKER,	CASE NO. CV 10-3996-SVW(AJWx)
12	Plaintiff,	PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO FEDERAL DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF
13	VS.	
141516	ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official) capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; KAMALA D. HARRIS, in her	
17	capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL) FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF	
18 19	JUSTICE; and DOES 1 through 100, Inclusive,	
20	Defendants.	
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	PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF RE ISSUES ON	N REMAND CV 10-3996-SVW(AJWx)

(1955); see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed.2d 341 (1974) (distinguishing claims under those clauses). Although Plaintiff's claims are similar, they are not identical. While this case could be seen as primarily an Equal Protection case, since it is about a restricted person rather than a restricted act, Plaintiff's fundamental Second Amendment rights are nevertheless directly violated in violation of his substantive due process rights, and his classification as someone who is not entitled to exercise fundamental rights violates his right to equal protection.

IV. PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO BRING HIS EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM

Contrary to Federal Defendant's assertion, Plaintiff is not bringing an Equal Protection claim on behalf of third parties. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) creates a class of people, which includes him, and impacts the class's fundamental rights, requiring strict scrutiny review. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985) (citations omitted). It is well settled that when fundamental rights are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, an individual member of that class can bring suit. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 633, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 1887, 23 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1969); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000) (holding that an individual can bring an Equal Protection claim).

V. THE COURT SHOULD NOT TREAT THIS BRIEFING AS A MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH BASIC PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS GOVERNING MOTIONS PRACTICE AND PLAINTIFF WOULD BE PREJUDICED

At the October 15, 2012 status conference, this Court ordered the parties to file opening and responsive briefs addressing issues on remand. On January 7, 2013, both parties filed their opening briefs in compliance with the Court's order. However, Defendant included with his brief a request that the complaint be

dismissed and a proposed order to that effect. Fed. Def.'s Br. 13-14; [Proposed] Order, Jan. 7, 2013 (Doc. No. 36-2). Defendant's request and the accompanying proposed order of dismissal attempt to transmute Defendant's court-ordered briefing into some form of Rule 12 motion. This is improper under the Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and as far as Plaintiff can tell, it was not expressly or impliedly within the ambit of the Court's requested briefing.

While Defendant may bring a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss or Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings at this stage, such motions must be made in conformance with Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with Local Rules 6-1 and 7-3. Raising the issue without proper notice to Plaintiff, and as part of an unrelated court-ordered brief, Defendant has ignored the procedural requirements of these rules and his "motion to dismiss" should be denied.

Pursuant to Local Rule 6-1, every motion, including Defendant's Rule 12 motion, "shall be presented by written notice of motion . . . filed with the Clerk not later than twenty-eight (28) days before the date set for hearing, and shall be served on each of the parties electronically" unless otherwise provided by rule or order of the Court. L.R. 6-1 (emphasis added). Defendant's brief is accompanied by no written notice of motion containing "a concise statement of the relief or Court action the movant seeks" as required by Local Rule 7-4. And Defendant's brief does not provide Plaintiff with the statutory basis for dismissal, which would unreasonably require Plaintiff to address all the permutations of a Rule 12 motion in his opposition.

Local Rule 7-3 further requires that "counsel contemplating the filing of [a] motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution. If the proposed motion is one which under the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] must be filed within a specified period of time (e.g., a motion to dismiss pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b) . . .), then this conference shall take place at least five (5) days

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prior to the last day for filing the motion." Defendant neither contacted opposing counsel to discuss his intent to file a Rule 12 motion, nor did Defendant make any effort to discuss the motion in an attempt to resolve the issue outside of court. As such, Defendant violated the Local Rules by failing to meet and confer with opposing counsel prior to filing his motion to dismiss. Moreover, "if the parties are unable to reach a resolution which eliminates the necessity for a hearing, counsel for the moving party shall include in the notice of motion a statement to the following effect: 'This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7-3 which took place on (date).' "L.R. 7-3 (emphasis added). Here again, Defendant ignored the mandate of the Local Rules and included no such statement with his motion to dismiss and accompanying proposed order. Almost nothing about Defendant's "motion to dismiss" comports with the local procedures governing motions practice in the Central District that provide for fair play and an equal playing field for the parties. Plaintiff thus requests that this court refuse consideration of Defendant's Rule 12 motion until Defendant complies with all notice and procedural requirements. **CONCLUSION** Based on the above, Plaintiff will be able to show that he is entitled to the relief he seeks in this action. Dated: January 16, 2013 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. nail:cmichel@michellawyers.com Attornevs for Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker

Case 2;10 Case3936564544-ALM 6/Doctomentes 69816-0001507/1329Page at ef31. oPage 1D #:215

Defendants California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris and California Department of Justice ("State Defendants") join in the argument advanced in the Federal Defendant's Opening Brief that this Court should uphold the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9) and dismiss Plaintiffs' entire amended complaint with prejudice.

The State Defendants relain this litigation has been limited. Plaintiffs

The State Defendants role in this litigation has been limited. Plaintiffs initiated their Second Amendment challenge to section 922(g)(9) by filing the original complaint on May 27, 2010. (Doc. no. 1.) The Court initially dismissed the complaint with prejudice (Doc. no. 14), but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with leave to amend (Doc. no. 20). On October 11, 2012, more than two years after filing suit, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming the State Defendants for the first time. (Doc. no. 23.)

According to the amended complaint, Plaintiffs have added the State Defendants as parties because the California Department of Justice is the state law enforcement agency that serves as the intermediary, or "Point of Contact," between a federal firearms licensee ("FFL") and the federal databases checked by the National Instant Criminal Background Check System ("NICS"), which an FFL must contact for information on whether receipt of a firearm by the person purchasing it would violate federal or state law. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 11-12 & 29.) See 28 C.F.R. §§ 25.1, 25.2 & 25.6 (describing role of Point of Contact); Cal. Penal Code § 28220(b) (state law authorizing California Department of Justice to be Point of Contact for background checks). The amended complaint prays that any order declaring section 922(g)(9) unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement encompass both the Federal and State Defendants. (First Am. Compl. at pp. 13-14.)

The amended complaint does not challenge any state law. Rather, only a federal statute, section 922(g)(9), is at issue. The United States Department of Justice is charged with defending the constitutionality that law. *See* 28 U.S.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name:	Baker, Eugene Evan v. Eric H. Holder	No.	CV 1 03996-SVW(AJWx)				
•	y that on <u>January 7, 2013</u> , I electronic ourt by using the CM/ECF system:	ically filed th	ne following documents with the				
	OPENING BRIEF BY DEFENDANTS CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA D. HARRIS AND CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE						
_	II participants in the case are register by the CM/ECF system.	red CM/ECF	users and that service will be				
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on <u>January 7, 2013</u> , at Sacramento, California.							
Bi	renda Apodaca		/s/ Brenda Apodaca				
	Declarant		Signature				

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name:	Baker, Eugene Evan v. Eric H. Holder	No.	CV 1 03996-SVW(AJWx)
I hereby certify that on <u>January 7, 2013</u> , I electronically filed the following documents with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system:			
OPENING BRIEF BY DEFENDANTS CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA D. HARRIS AND CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE			
I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.			
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on <u>January 7, 2013</u> , at Sacramento, California.			
Bi	renda Apodaca		/s/ Brenda Apodaca
	Declarant		Signature

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in California convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence are similarly banned under Section 922(g)(9). See Docket No. 23, \P 38. 5

Having failed to allege any distinguishing facts between himself and others similarly situated, Baker's "as-applied" challenge to the statute lacks merit.

IV.

THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED

Because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is a valid enactment of Congress, Plaintiff has no viable claim, and his complaint should be dismissed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory"). In addition, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring an equal protection claim on behalf of similarly situated third-party class members. See Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d. 874, 877 (9th. Cir 1986) ("The federal courts have historically been reluctant to recognize

In his complaint, for example, Baker alleges that:

all California citizens of the same class as Plaintiff, i.e., who have fulfilled the requirements of Section 29805 for the requisite ten-year period, are, *like Plaintiff*, prevented from receiving, owning or possessing firearms, and, *like Plaintiff*, are subject to arrest should they receive, own or possess a firearm.

Docket No. 23, ¶ 38 (emphases added). It should further be noted that alleging his similarity to all other Californians convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence is not only fatal to his asapplied challenge to the validity of Section 922(g)(9) under the Second Amendment, but it is also fatal to his Second Claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, for the gravamen of an Equal Protection claim is that similarly situated individuals are treated differently not similarly.

third-party standing"). Moreover, the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because amendment would be futile.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Federal Defendant respectfully requests this Court to uphold the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and, having done so, to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted,

DATED: January 7, 2012 ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney LEON W. WEIDMAN Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Civil Division

> /s/ David A. DeJute DAVID A. DeJUTE Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for Federal Defendant

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                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12
                             WESTERN DIVISION
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   EUGENE EVAN BAKER,
                                      NO. CV 10-3996 SVW (AJWx)
15
        Plaintiff,
16
        v.
                                      ANSWER
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   ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
   Attorney General of the
18
   United States, et al,
19
        Defendants.
                                      Hon. Stephen V. Wilson
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        Federal Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr., sued in his official
   capacity as the Attorney General of the United States, hereby
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   answers Plaintiff's Complaint and admits, denies and avers as
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   follows:
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

- 1. The allegations contained in paragraph 1 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.
- 2. The allegations contained in paragraph 2 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.
- 3. The allegations contained in paragraph 3 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.
- 4. Defendant admits that the California Department of Justice is a "Point of Contact" for the United States Department of Justice. All other allegations contained in paragraph 4 are denied.
 - 5. The allegations contained in paragraph 5 are denied.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 6. The allegations contained in paragraph 6 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.
- 7. The allegations contained in paragraph 7 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.

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8. The allegations contained in paragraph 8 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.

PARTIES

- 9. The allegations contained in paragraph 9 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.
- 10. Defendant admits that named defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. is the Attorney General of the United States. All other allegations contained in paragraph 10 are denied.
- 11. Defendant admits that named defendant Kamala D. Harris is the Attorney General of the State of California. All other allegations contained in paragraph 11 are denied.
- 12. Defendant admits that the California Department of Justice is a political subdivision of the State of California and that the California Department of Justice is a "Point of Contact" for the United States Department of Justice. All other allegations contained in paragraph 12 are denied.
- 13. The allegations contained in paragraph 13 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.

FACTS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS

14. The allegations contained in paragraph 14 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or

information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.

- 15. The allegations contained in paragraph 15 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied
- 16. The allegations contained in paragraph 16 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied
- 17. The allegations contained in paragraph 17 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.
- 18. The allegations contained in paragraph 18 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.
- 19. The allegations contained in paragraph 19 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.
- 20. The allegations contained in paragraph 20 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.
- 21. The allegations contained in paragraph 21 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or

information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.

RELEVANT CALIFORNIA PENAL STATUTES

- 22. The allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 18 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied. The remaining allegations constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.
- 23. The allegations contained in paragraph 23 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.
- 24. The allegations contained in paragraph 24 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.
- 25. The allegations contained in paragraph 25 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.

RELEVANT FEDERAL & STATE FIREARMS LAWS

26. The allegations contained in paragraph 26 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.

- 27. The allegations contained in paragraph 27 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.
- 28. The allegations contained in paragraph 28 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.
- 29. The allegations contained in paragraph 29 constitute plaintiff's characterization of his case or conclusions of law to which no response is required; to the extent that they may be deemed allegations of fact, they are denied.

FIRST CLAIM

- 30. The allegations contained in paragraph 30 merely incorporate by reference those matters alleged in paragraphs numbered 1 through 29, to which Defendant incorporates by reference all previous responses.
 - 31. The allegations contained in paragraph 31 are denied.
 - 32. The allegations contained in paragraph 32 are denied.
 - 33. The allegations contained in paragraph 33 are denied.
 - 34. The allegations contained in paragraph 34 are denied.
 - 35. The allegations contained in paragraph 35 are denied.

SECOND CLAIM

36. The allegations contained in paragraph 36 merely incorporate by reference those matters alleged in paragraphs numbered 1 through 29, to which Defendant incorporates by reference all previous responses.

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- 37. The allegations contained in paragraph 37 constitute facts about which the Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to their truth and, on that basis, are denied.
 - 38. The allegations contained in paragraph 38 are denied.
 - 39. The allegations contained in paragraph 39 are denied.
 - 40. The allegations contained in paragraph 40 are denied.
 - 41. The allegations contained in paragraph 41 are denied.
 - 42. The allegations contained in paragraph 42 are denied.
 - 43. The allegations contained in paragraph 43 are denied.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Defendant further denies that Plaintiff is entitled to the relief set forth in the prayer immediately following paragraph 43 or to any relief whatsoever. Defendant further denies each and every allegation not previously admitted.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

- 1. The Complaint, and each claim alleged, fails to set forth facts sufficient to state a cause of action.
- 2. Plaintiff lacks standing to assert any claim on behalf of unnamed third-party individuals.
- 3. Plaintiff has failed to set forth facts sufficient to assert a claim under the Second Amendment.
- 4. Plaintiff has failed to set forth facts sufficient to assert a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.
- 5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is presumptively lawful; or, in the alternative, passes constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny.

28 ///

1 WHEREFORE, the Federal Defendant prays for judgment as set forth below: 3 (1)That Plaintiff's Complaint and each claim contained therein be dismissed with prejudice; 4 5 That Plaintiff take nothing by his Complaint; That Defendant be awarded the costs incurred herein; 6 (3) 7 and, 8 That the Court order such other and further relief for (4)Defendant as the Court may deem just and proper. 10 DATED: December 13, 2012 ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney 11 LEON W. WEIDMAN Assistant United States Attorney 12 Chief, Civil Division 13 /s/ David A. DeJute David A. DeJute 14 Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for the Federal Defendant 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1	KAMALA D. HARRIS						
2	Attorney General of California PETER K. SOUTHWORTH						
3	Supervising Deputy Attorney General ANTHONY R. HAKL						
4	Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 197335 1300 I Street, Suite 125 P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Telephone: (916) 322-9041 Fax: (916) 324-8835 E-mail: Anthony.Hakl@doj.ca.gov						
5							
6							
7							
8	Attorneys for Defendants California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris and						
9	California Department of Justice						
10	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT						
11	FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA						
12							
13							
14							
15	EUGENE EVAN BAKER,	CV 1 03996-SVW(AJWx)					
16	Plaintiff, v. V. Plaintiff, ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANTS CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA D. HARRIS AND CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE						
17							
18							
19	capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. Defendants. Judge: Hon. Stephen V. Wilson Trial Date: None Action Filed: 10/12/2012						
20							
21							
22	Defendants California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris and California						
23	Department of Justice answer Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("complaint")						
24	as follows:						
25	ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' PRELIMINARY STATEMENT						
26	1. Answering paragraph 1, Defendants admit that the complaint speaks for						
27	itself. Defendants admit that federal law speaks for itself. Except as specifically						
28	admitted, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 1.						

- Department of Justice is a political subdivision of the State of California.
- Defendants admit that the California Department of Justice is a "Point of Contact"

10. Answering paragraph 12, Defendants admit that the California

26

27

1 for the United States Department of Justice. Except as specifically admitted, 2 Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 12. 3 11. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to 4 the truth of the allegations of paragraph 13, and on that basis deny the allegations of 5 paragraph 13. 6 ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' DESCRIPTION OF FACTS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS 7 12. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to 8 9 the truth of the allegations of paragraphs 14 through 21, and on that basis deny the 10 allegations of paragraphs 14 through 21. 11 ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' DESCRIPTION OF RELEVANT CALIFORNIA PENAL STATUTES 12 13 13. Answering the first sentence of paragraph 22, Defendants lack sufficient 14 knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of that 15 sentence, and on that basis deny the allegations of the sentence. Answering the 16 second sentence of paragraph 22, Defendants admit that the relevant state law 17 speaks for itself. Except as specifically admitted, Defendants deny the allegations 18 of the second sentence of paragraph 22. 19 14. Answering paragraphs 23 through 25, Defendants admit that the relevant 20 state laws speak for themselves. Except as specifically admitted, Defendants deny 21 the allegations of paragraphs 23 through 25. 22 ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS DESCRIPTION OF RELEVANT FEDERAL & STATE FIREARMS LAWS 23 24 15. Answering paragraphs 26 through 29, Defendants admit that the relevant 25 state and federal laws speak for themselves. Except as specifically admitted, 26 Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 26 through 29. 27

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CLAIM 1 16. Answering paragraph 30, Defendants incorporate by reference their 2 responses to paragraphs 1 through 29 of the complaint to the same extent Plaintiffs 3 have incorporated the allegations of those paragraphs into the first claim. 4 17. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 31 through 35. 5 ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CLAIM 6 18. Answering paragraph 36, Defendants incorporate by reference their 7 responses to paragraphs 1 through 29 of the complaint to the same extent Plaintiffs 8 have incorporated the allegations of those paragraphs into the second claim. 9 19. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to 10 the truth of the allegations of paragraph 37, and on that basis deny the allegations of 11 paragraph 37. 12 20. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 38 through 43. 13 14 **ADDITIONAL DEFENSES** 15 **ONE** The complaint, and each claim for relief therein, fails to state facts sufficient to 16 constitute a cause of action. 17 18 **TWO** The Defendants deny that they have subjected Plaintiffs to the deprivation of 19 any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the 20 United States or the State of California. 21 22 **THREE** Plaintiffs' claims in this action are barred in that they do not have standing to 23 assert them. 24 **FOUR** 25 There is no case or controversy in this action as required by Article III of the 26 United States Constitution. 27 28

FIVE 1 Defendants affirmatively state that any actions they have taken with respect to 2 Plaintiffs have been in good faith, have been reasonable and prudent, and have been 3 consistent with all applicable legal and constitutional standards. 4 SIX 5 Plaintiffs' claims in this action are barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver, 6 laches, unclean hand, and/or estoppel. 7 8 **SEVEN** Plaintiffs' claims in this action are uncertain, vague, ambiguous, improper, and 9 unintelligible. 10 11 **EIGHT** The Eleventh Amendment bars part or all of the relief requested by Plaintiffs. 12 13 PRAYER FOR RELIEF Accordingly, Defendants pray as follows: 14 1. That judgment be entered in favor of the Defendants and against Plaintiffs 15 on the complaint as a whole, and on each claim therein, and that Plaintiffs take 16 nothing by way of the complaint; 17 2. That the complaint, and each claim of relief therein, be dismissed with 18 prejudice; 19 3. That the Defendants be awarded the costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees 20 incurred in this action; and 21 /// 22 /// 23 24 25 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name:	Baker, Eugene Evan v. Eric H. Holder	No.	CV 1 03996-SVW(AJWx)
	fy that on November 9, 2012, I electron the Court by using the CM/ECF system:	•	d the following documents with
	O FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT GENERAL KAMALA D. HARRIS E		
•	all participants in the case are registered by the CM/ECF system.	d CM/ECF	users and that service will be
	er penalty of perjury under the laws of the that this declaration was executed on		5 5
В	renda Apodaca		/s/ Brenda Apodaca
	Declarant		Signature

10992588.doc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Paul M. Cruz Deborah Gackle Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: Tamara Rider David DeJute, AUSA Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 6, 20 Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 17, 20 Hearing			CIVIL	MINUTES - GENERAL		
Present: The Honorable Paul M. Cruz Deborah Gackle Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Tamara Rider David DeJute, AUSA Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 6, 20 Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 17, 20 Hearing January 7, 2013 at 1:30 p The Court further orders that plaintiff shall effectuate service of the amended complaint within	Case No.	2:10-cv-0399	6-SVW-AJW		Date	October 15, 2012
Paul M. Cruz Deborah Gackle Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: Tamara Rider David DeJute, AUSA Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 6, 20 Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 17, 20 Hearing January 7, 2013 at 1:30 p	Title	Eugene Evan Baker v. Eric H. Holder, Jr.				
Paul M. Cruz Deborah Gackle Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: Tamara Rider David DeJute, AUSA Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 6, 20 Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 17, 20 Hearing January 7, 2013 at 1:30 p						
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: Tamara Rider David DeJute, AUSA Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs December 6, 20 Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 17, 20 Hearing January 7, 2013 at 1:30 p The Court further orders that plaintiff shall effectuate service of the amended complaint within	Present: Tl	he Honorable	STEPHEN V. W	VILSON, U.S. DISTRICT JU	DGE	
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Tamara Rider David DeJute, AUSA Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs Hearing January 7, 2013 at 1:30 p The Court further orders that plaintiff shall effectuate service of the amended complaint within]	Paul M. Cruz		Deborah Gackle		
Tamara Rider David DeJute, AUSA Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs December 6, 20 Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 17, 20 Hearing January 7, 2013 at 1:30 p The Court further orders that plaintiff shall effectuate service of the amended complaint within]	Deputy Clerk		Court Reporter / Recorder	•	Tape No.
Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs	A	ttorneys Preser	nt for Plaintiffs:	Attorneys	Present	for Defendants:
Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs		Tamara	Rider	Davi	id DeJut	e, AUSA
Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs	Proceedin	gs: ST	TATUS CONFER	ENCE		
	Hear The	ring	rders that plaintif		Janu	ary 7, 2013 at 1:30 p.m

CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 1

Initials of Preparer

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PMC

UNITED	STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL	DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN	V. WILSON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING
EUGENE EVAN BAKER, Plaintiff,)))
VS.) No. CV 2010-3996-SVW)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,))
Defendant.))
REPORTER'S	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
LOS	ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
MONDA	AY, OCTOBER 15, 2012
Unite 312 North	H K. GACKLE, CSR, RPR ed States Courthouse Spring Street, Room 402A eeles, California 90012 (213) 620-1149

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1
     APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
 3
 4
          For the Plaintiff:
 5
 6
               MICHEL & ASSOCIATES
               BY: TAMARA M. RIDER
 7
               Los Angeles Office
               180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200
               Long Beach, California 90802
               trider@michellawyers.com
 9
10
11
12
               For the Defendant:
13
14
               U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
15
               BY: DAVID A. DeJUTE
               ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
16
               Federal Building, Suite 7516
               300 North Los Angeles Street
17
               Los Angeles, California 90012
18
19
20
21
22
2.3
24
25
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doesn't offend federal law, it seems like Ms. Rider is
 1
     presenting it as a constitutional question.
 3
              MR. DeJUTE: It is, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: When you mean "federal law," you mean the
 4
 5
     Constitution.
 6
               MR. DeJUTE: No, I meant the federal law which
 7
     interprets expungement. It's very clear that his conviction
 8
     was not expunged, and in the absence Heller, he would not be
 9
     allowed to have a firearm. The only question is does Heller
10
     change the constitutional makeup to such a degree that the
11
     federal law that prohibits his use of the handgun is found to
12
     be unconstitutional.
13
               THE COURT: Is there something -- I'm a little out of
14
     sync with Heller. What specifically was before the court in
15
     Heller, other than the issue of right to bear arms?
16
               MR. DeJUTE: In both Heller and -- I think it's
17
     McDermott -- one for Chicago and one for D.C. -- the court
18
     found that the state's absolute ban without distinction for
19
     everyone to possess a handqun was unconstitutional because
20
     there as a fundamental Second Amendment right for personal use
     of a handgun. But in doing so, they limited it to law-abiding
21
     citizens; they limited it by the very terms of the order to
22
23
     cases where there were no -- not a convicted felon. That's
     been held to be upheld -- and they have language in there that
24
25
     longstanding prohibitions on gun use and gun control are not
```

1 affected by the statute. 2 THE COURT: Well, then, it seems that the way to get 3 this before court is by briefing it, correct? MS. RIDER: That's correct. 4 5 THE COURT: So maybe the best way to brief it would to be have opening simultaneous briefs and then opposing 6 7 simultaneous briefs. In other words -- that way you're 8 opposing each other's arguments. It isn't someone going first, 9 second and third, and then at the hearing we can take up 10 whatever thoughts you have, you know, that relate to the mutual 11 or simultaneous oppositions. 12 When can you file the briefs? It sounds like an 13 interesting question. 14 MR. DeJUTE: It sounds like a very interesting 15 question. I just have two procedural points: One, we have not 16 been served, so the first time I've seen the complaint was in 17 the hallway and glancing over to. Secondly, this time, unlike 18 the first time, Baker is adding two new defendants: The California Department of Justice, and Kamala Harris as Attorney 19 20 General of California. So my suggestion is that the complaint 21 should be properly served, and everyone should appear and perhaps then a different --22 23 THE COURT: But what would the court's jurisdiction be over them? I mean, in other words, you're saying that they 24 25 are the -- what relief do you want from the Attorney General?

```
MS. RIDER: Our understanding is that California is a
 1
 2
     point-of-contact state where the California Department of
 3
     Justice is able to interpret and implement the laws -- the
     federal laws. As Kamala Harris is the Attorney General of
 4
 5
     California, she also is able to enforce those laws. Because
 6
     California is prohibiting Mr. Baker from obtaining a firearm --
 7
     or from purchasing a firearm, we also amended the complaint to
 8
     ensure that all of the adequate parties for defendants were
     included.
 9
10
               THE COURT: So the arguments -- the essential
11
     argument is the same or different with respect to the U.S.
12
     defendant and the California defendant.
13
               MS. RIDER: The complaint is against all of the
14
     defendants with the same arguments against all the defendants.
15
               THE COURT: So the complaint is against the Attorney
16
     General because the Attorney General has interpreted the Heller
17
     case in a way that prohibits your client from bearing a
18
     firearm.
19
               MS. RIDER:
                          That's correct.
20
               THE COURT: But -- I see.
21
               If Holder's actions were unconstitutional, would they
22
     automatically mean that the State Attorney General's actions
23
     are unconstitutional, too?
               MS. RIDER: We believe so, solely to the effect that
24
25
     to the extent Mr. Holder is acting unconstitutionally, so is
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the California Department of Justice in interpreting what he's
 1
     directing them to do as a point-of-contact state for firearms
 3
     dealers. And in addition to that, Ms. Kamala Harris is the
     Attorney General of California.
 4
 5
               THE COURT: How do you -- you have no position
 6
     regarding -- would your thinking be that, at least
 7
     preliminarily, that the decision regarding the United States
 8
     Attorney General would necessarily dictate the result as to the
     California Attorney General?
 9
10
               MR. DeJUTE: I appreciate the ability to wiggle out
11
     if we change our position --
12
               THE COURT: Yes.
13
              MR. DeJUTE: -- but I just saw the complaint, and I
14
     just learned about these two new defendants.
15
                      (Pause in the proceedings)
16
               THE COURT: In any event, the amended complaint does
17
     name the State Attorney General, right?
18
              MS. RIDER: Yes.
19
               THE COURT: And so in terms of service, have you gone
20
     about serving the government as you have to?
21
              MS. RIDER: Not at this point, no. The complaint we
22
     filed last week on the 11th, and we just received the conformed
23
     summons today. So we're planning on effectuating service.
               THE COURT: Then you have to do that by what?
24
25
     Sending a certified copy to the Attorney General in Washington?
```

```
1
               Are you with the Justice Department?
 2
              MR. DeJUTE: Yes, sir -- I'm with the U.S. Attorney's
 3
     Office across the street.
 4
               THE COURT: So you -- in order to serve the
 5
     government, you have to serve the U.S. attorney in the
 6
     district, and you have to send -- what -- a certified copy of
 7
     the complaint to the Attorney General in Washington?
 8
              MR. DeJUTE: That's correct. And in this instance,
 9
     only those two because you always have to serve the Attorney
10
     General and the agency. In this case, the agency and the
11
     Attorney General are the same.
12
               THE COURT: So all that the plaintiff has to do is
13
     send -- is send a certified copy to the Attorney General.
14
               MR. DeJUTE: And serve the U.S. Attorney's Office,
15
     which has not yet been done. I'm right here.
16
               THE COURT: But you can accept service?
17
              MR. DeJUTE: I what?
18
               THE COURT: You can accept service?
19
              MR. DeJUTE: I can't under federal statute.
20
               THE COURT: I see. How does she do it, then? Send a
21
     certified copy to you?
22
              MR. DeJUTE: Not to me personally -- it's in the
23
     rules -- to the mail processing clerk, I believe, or by
     personal service by walking across the street --
24
25
               THE COURT: What about the -- California? How do you
```

```
1
     plan to serve them?
 2
               MS. RIDER: I need to look at the rules and make sure
 3
     I do it right. I haven't --
               THE COURT: Well, I would like you to effectuate
 4
 5
     service within 20 days, and I'm going to set up a briefing
 6
     schedule on the assumption that that is accomplished, and the
 7
     opening briefs should be exchanged, and within 30 days of the
 8
     end of the 20-day period. So that means 50 days from today.
 9
               THE CLERK: Simultaneous opening briefs will be due
10
     December 3rd.
11
               THE COURT: And then I'll give you ten days to file
12
     simultaneous oppositions. It would helpful, Ms. Rider, if you
13
     could get going with service as soon as you can. Thank you.
14
               THE CLERK: I was wrong. Opening briefs will be due
15
     December 6th, and opposing briefs would then be due ten days
16
     later, which would be December 17th.
17
              Will there be a hearing?
18
               THE COURT: Yes, a hearing. Let's say the hearing
19
     will be -- first week in January.
20
               THE CLERK: Hearing will be January 7th at 1:30.
               THE COURT: Look forward to it.
21
22
              MR. DeJUTE: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
23
              MS. RIDER: One last point, just so I'm clear. On
     the briefs, you want us to specifically address the affect of
24
25
     the California Department of Justice and the State Attorney
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General of California being involved in this?
 1
               THE COURT: Excuse me?
 3
              MS. RIDER: I'm confused.
               THE COURT: I'm assuming that you're seeking relief
 4
 5
     against the Attorney General. My concern is assume you didn't
     name Holder, what jurisdiction would I have over a lawsuit
 6
 7
     against the Attorney General of the State of California?
 8
              MS. RIDER: I believe federal question as to whether
 9
     or not the state's --
10
               THE COURT: You mean the same issue? You're saying
11
     the same issue?
12
              MS. RIDER: Yes.
13
               THE COURT: Okay. So include the Attorney General in
14
     any argument you make as to them, or if it's an argument that
15
     just maintains that whatever relief is imposed on Holder
16
     follows to the Attorney General of California. Okay. Thank
17
     you.
18
              MR. DeJUTE: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
              MS. RIDER: Thank you.
20
                 (Proceedings concluded at 2:10 p.m.)
21
22
23
24
25
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1
                           C \ E \ R \ T \ I \ F \ I \ C \ A \ T \ E
 2
 3
                 I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and
 4
     correct transcript from the stenographic record of
     the proceedings in the foregoing matter.
 5
 6
 7
                                                    November 13, 2012
 8
 9
          Deborah K. Gackle
                                                          Date
          Official Court Reporter
10
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25
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C. D. Michel - Calif. SBN 144258 Joshua R. Dale - Calif. SBN 209942 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802 Telephone: (562) 216-4444 3 Fax: (562) 216-4445 cmichel@michellawyers.com idale@michellawyers.com 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff 6 Eugene Evan Baker 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 CASE NO. CV 10-3996-SVW(AJWx) EUGENE EVAN BAKER, 10 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff, 11 FOR: VS. 12 VIOLATION OF FEDERAL (1) ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AS 13 capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL TO APPLICATION OF OF THE UNITED STATES; FEDERAL STATUTE TO 14 DENY CORE RIGHT: KAMALA D. HARRIS, in her capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL 15 FOR THE STATE OF AND CALIFORNIA; THE STATE OF 16 VIOLATION OF FEDERAL **(2)** CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION JUSTICE; and DOES 1 through 100, 17 CLAUSE; Inclusive, 18 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Defendants. 19 20 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 21 This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in order that 1. 22 Plaintiff EUGENE EVAN BAKER (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Baker") may 23 lawfully receive, own and possess a firearm in the exercise of his rights under the 24 Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States although he was 25 convicted in the State of California of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence 26 ("MCDV"). 27 Plaintiff was convicted of an MCDV in 1997. In 2002, Plaintiff was 2. 28

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [#CV 10-3996-SVW(AJWx)]

- 3. Notwithstanding the effect of the state law restoring Plaintiff's right to receive, own and possess firearms, as well as an order of the state's judiciary affirming the restoration of Plaintiff's right to receive, own and possess firearms, the application of federal law, i.e., 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9), prevents Plaintiff from receiving or possessing firearms.
- 4. In furtherance of enforcing 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9), the State of California has expressly assumed the role of a "Point of Contact" of the U.S. Department of Justice for purposes of enforcing these sections against California firearms' purchasers. In this role, the state defendants have denied Plaintiff the opportunity to purchase firearms by these state defendants declaring Plaintiff a person prohibited to receive and possess firearms under Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9), and instructing California firearms dealers to not release firearms to Plaintiff.
- 5. The effect of the application of these federal statutes by the federal and state defendants to deny Plaintiff the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense violates Plaintiff's Second Amendment right to self-defense.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. Jurisdiction of this action is founded on 28 U.S.C. §1331 in that this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and under 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) in that this action seeks to redress the deprivation, under color of the laws, statute, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages of the United States,

the State of California, and political subdivisions thereof, of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and by Acts of Congress.

- Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§2201 & 2202. Plaintiffs' claims for a writ of mandate directed to Defendants are authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1651.
- 8. Venue in this judicial district is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(1)-(2), because Plaintiff Baker is a resident of this judicial district, all defendants have offices within this judicial district, and the deprivation of rights and other conduct alleged herein occurred within this judicial district.

PARTIES

- Plaintiff Baker is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the Somis, California.
- 10. Defendant Holder is the Attorney General of the United States, and as the chief law enforcement officer of the government of the United States would be responsible for the prosecution of Baker pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) should Baker be found to have received or possess a firearm in violation of Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9). On information and belief, were Baker to exercise his Second Amendment rights by receiving, owning or possessing a firearm, Defendant Holder, through his agents and employees, would arrest and prosecute Plaintiff. Holder is being sued in his official capacity as U.S. Attorney General.
- State of California. In her role as the Attorney General, Defendant Harris is responsible for interpreting, implementing and executing the policies and procedures of the California Department of Justice ("Cal. DOJ") including the Cal. DOJ's policies and procedures as a Point of Contact. As such, she is responsible for formulating, executing and administering the laws, customs and practices that Plaintiff challenges, and is in fact presently enforcing the challenged laws, customs, and practices against Plaintiff. Defendant Harris is sued in her official capacity as

California Attorney General.

- 12. Defendant The State of California Department of Justice is a political subdivision of the State of California, and is the designated Point of Contact for California Federal Firearms Licensees ("FFL") to determine whether California purchasers, including Plaintiff, are prohibited persons under 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9). Cal. DOJ is obligated under Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) and analogous California law to assess the criminal backgrounds of firearms purchasers, and is the final authority as to whether California FFLs can release purchased firearms to purchasers, including Plaintiff. As such, Cal. DOJ is responsible for formulating, executing and administering the laws, customs and practices that Plaintiff challenges, and is in fact presently enforcing the challenged laws, customs, and practices against Plaintiff.
- agents of defendants Holder, Harris, or Cal. DOJ, or of local governmental agencies, who are responsible for formulating, executing and administering the laws, customs and practices that Plaintiff challenges, and are in fact presently enforcing the challenged laws, customs, and practices against Plaintiff. On information and belief, Defendants DOES 1-100 have facilitated, participated in, or otherwise furthered the denial of the receipt of, ownership of, and possession of firearms by Plaintiff. Plaintiff is unaware of the identities of Defendants DOES 1-100 at the time of the filing of this complaint, and shall seek leave of court to substitute the true names of such defendants when their identities are ascertained.

FACTS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS

14. On September 29, 1997, in the Ventura County Municipal Court, Plaintiff was convicted upon his plea of *nolo contendere* of violating California Penal Code §273.5(a), Infliction of Corporal Injury on Current or Former Spouse or Cohabitant. Such conviction was a MCDV for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9). On October 20, 1997, Plaintiff was sentenced to a

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three-year probationary sentence with certain terms and conditions; among which was a condition that he "not own, possess, or have access to any firearm or dangerous weapon" for a period of ten years pursuant to former California Penal Code §12021(c)(1).

- Plaintiff successfully completed all of the terms of his probation, and 15. on February 24, 2002, submitted his application for expungement and set-aside pursuant to California Penal Code §1203.4. On June 19, 2002, the Ventura County Superior Court granted the motion under Section 1203.4 and signed an Order, thereby ordering Plaintiff's 1997 conviction be set aside, the nolo contendere plea be withdrawn, a plea of not guilty be entered, and the original criminal complaint be deemed dismissed. The 2002 Order did not contain any language that Plaintiff was thereafter uniquely prohibited from personally shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving firearms once the ten-year suspension of Plaintiff's firearms' ownership and possession rights pursuant to former Section 12021(c)(1) ended.
- The ten-year suspension of Plaintiff's firearm ownership and 16. possession rights remained in force until it expired on October 20, 2007. From the date of his 1997 arrest to the present, including his probationary term and the entire ten-year term of former Section 12021(c)(1), Plaintiff has never been convicted of any other criminal behavior, including any crime which would disqualify Plaintiff from receiving, owning or possessing a firearm under federal or state law.
- In or about May 2009, Plaintiff attempted to effect a firearms purchase 17. at Ojai Valley Surplus, a federal firearms licensee ("FFL") located in Ojai, California, Ojai Valley Surplus contacted Cal. DOJ to submit Plaintiff's purchase. On June 8, 2009, Defendant Cal. DOJ sent a letter to Ojai Valley Surplus which stated that Plaintiff "is a person not eligible to posses (sic) a firearm." Cal. DOJ further ordered Ojai Valley Surplus to not release the firearm to Plaintiff.
 - On August 25, 2010, in response to an inquiry from Plaintiff's 18.

attorney, Defendant Cal. DOJ sent Plaintiff a letter explaining why Plaintiff's attempted 2009 firearms purchase had been denied. The letter stated that Cal. DOJ has "identified a record in a state or federal database which indicates that you are prohibited by state and/or federal law from purchasing or possessing firearms." The letter further states that the disqualifying record is a conviction for "Misdemeanor domestic violence convictions (273.5PC, 243(E)(1)PC Convictions over 10 years old)-Federal Brady Act, effected November 30, 1998."

- 19. On information and belief, Cal. DOJ's denial of Plaintiff's 2009 firearms purchase was due to Cal. DOJ fulfilling its role as a Point of Contact, and adjudging that Plaintiff was prohibited receiving and possessing a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9). On information and belief, as a Point of Contact, as part of performing the above-mentioned check, Cal. DOJ submitted Plaintiff's name and other identifying information to the U.S. Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to check whether Plaintiff was prohibited from receiving or possessing a firearm based on information within the National Instant Criminal Background Check System ("NICS")¹.
- 20. On March 11, 2010, plaintiff appeared in the Ventura County Superior Court and moved for an order declaring that he was legally entitled under both state and federal law to purchase and own a firearm. The Hon. Judge Edward Brodie granted the order, declaring that Plaintiff "is entitled to purchase, own and possess firearms consistent with the laws of the State of California."
- 21. Plaintiff desires to purchase one or more firearms for his personal protection and the protection of his family and property but does not wish to run the risk of being arrested, charged, convicted and punished pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Operations 2011. See

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/2011-operations-report/operations-report-2011>

§922(g)(9) in the attempted exercise of his Second Amendment rights. 1 RELEVANT CALIFORNIA PENAL STATUTES 2 22. Plaintiff was convicted of violating California Penal Code §273.5(a) 3 on October 29, 1997. Section 273.5(a), in relevant part, provides: 4 Any person who willfully inflicts upon a person who is 5 his or her spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of his or her child, 6 corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished 7 by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not more than one year, or by 8 a fine of up to six thousand dollars (\$6,000.00) or by both that fine and imprisonment. 9 23. All persons convicted of violating Section 273.5(a) are subject to a 10 statutory ten-year ban on firearm possession pursuant to Penal Code §29805 11 (formerly Penal Code §12021(c)(1))²: 12 Except as provided in Section 29855 or subdivision (a) of 13 Section 29800, any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor violation of Section . . . 273.5, . . . and who, 14 within 10 years of the conviction, owns, purchases, receives, or has in possession or under custody or control, 15 any firearm is guilty of a public offense, which shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not 16 exceeding one year or in the state prison, by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars (\$1,000), or by both that 17 imprisonment and fine. 18 California Penal Code §1203.4 provides the means whereby those who 24. 19 have successfully completed a grant of probation after having been convicted of 20 certain penal offenses may petition the court to grant expungement and set-aside 21 relief. As to the effect of a Section 1203.4 motion on a firearms prohibition, 22 Section 1203.4 provides in relevant part: 23 (a)(2) Dismissal of an accusation or information pursuant to this section does not permit a person to own, possess, 24 or have in his or her custody or control any firearm or prevent his or her conviction under Chapter 2 25 26 Because prior to January 1, 2012, the text of Section 29805 was 27 contained in Penal Code §12021., all references in Plaintiff's sentencing order are 28

to former Section 12021. See Paragraph 14, supra.

(commencing with Section 29800) of Division 9 of Title 4 of Part 6.

25. An order granted under Section 1203.4 does not end or shorten the ten-year ban imposed under Section 29805. But an order granted under Section 1203.4 does not increase or make permanent the Section 29805 ban. Once the ten-year period under Section 29805 has ended, and assuming no further criminal behavior by the person during that period, by law California considers the MCDV convict to have been fully restored his or her rights under California law to receive, own or possess a firearm at the conclusion of the ten-year period.

RELEVANT FEDERAL & STATE FIREARMS LAWS

- 26. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution of the United States reads: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution incorporates the Second Amendment to the citizens of the states. The Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees states' citizens equal protection of the laws and that core rights of the citizens under the Constitution may not be infringed upon without, at a minimum, due process.
- 27. 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person.. .who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV), to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
- 28. 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(33)(A)(i) defines an "MCDV." The California crime for which Plaintiff was convicted in 1997 is a disqualifying MCDV for purposes of that statute and Section 922(g)(9).
- 29. The Gun Control Act and the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, of which 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) are a part, are implemented and interpreted by the U.S. Department of Justice through regulations

published at 28 C.F.R., Part 25. The U.S. Department of Justice has adopted

enforcement agencies to act as a Point of Contact for querying the federal NICS

possessing a firearm, in lieu of the FBI conducting such searches. California's

database to determine whether a firearm purchaser is prohibited from receiving or

legislature has agreed to have Cal. DOJ act as the Point of Contact for all purchases

and transfer of firearms by California residents, by its adoption of California Penal

regulations published at 28 C.F.R. §§25.1 & 25.6 which allow state law

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Code §28220(b).

FIRST CLAIM FOR

VIOLATION OF FEDERAL DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AS TO APPLICATION OF FEDERAL STATUTE TO DENY CORE RIGHT

(Against All Defendants)

 Plaintiff fully reincorporates Paragraphs 1-29, supra, as though fully alleged hereinafter.

- 31. Without due process of law, Defendants, in applying and enforcing 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) as to Plaintiff to proscribe him from receiving or possessing firearms, have denied Plaintiff the exercise of his right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to the Constitution, a core right.
- 32. On information and belief, Defendants, and each of them, have implemented and enforced 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) in the manner described herein for the governmental purpose of general crimefighting
- 33. The application and enforcement of 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) to proscribe Plaintiff from receiving or possessing a firearm does not comport with the historical scope of the Second Amendment at the time it was enacted. Alternatively, on information and belief the application and enforcement of 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) to proscribe Plaintiff from receiving or possessing a firearm does not further a compelling governmental interest,

insomuch as Defendants do not have a compelling interest in preventing Plaintiff, a person adjudged by California to be fit to own and possess a firearm, from receiving, owning or possessing a firearm. Alternatively, Defendants' proffered basis for implementing and enforcing Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means for achieving the government's general crimefighting interest.

- 34. Alternatively, on information and belief the application and enforcement of 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) to proscribe Plaintiff from receiving or possessing a firearm is not substantially related to achieving an important governmental interest, insomuch as Defendants do not have a important interest in preventing Plaintiff, a person adjudged by California to no longer be a danger such that California deems such person fit to receive, own and possess a firearm as a matter of law, from receiving, owning or possessing a firearm.
- 35. At all times, Defendants Holder, Harris and DOES 1-100 were acting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9). On information and belief, Defendants, and each of them, will continue to implement and enforce 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) in a manner that infringes upon Plaintiff's exercise of his Second Amendment rights, absent the grant of the relief requested.

SECOND CLAIM FOR

VIOLATION OF FEDERAL EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSE

(Against All Defendants)

- 36. Plaintiff fully reincorporates Paragraphs 1-29, *supra*, as though fully alleged hereinafter.
- 37. Plaintiff is of a class of firearms purchasers who have previously been convicted of an MCDV but have fulfilled the terms of their probation or have otherwise not been convicted of a crime for a period of ten years following their MCDV conviction.

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- 38. By Defendants, and each of them, implementing and enforcing 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) in a manner to deny Plaintiff the receipt, ownership or possession of firearms despite Plaintiff having been adjudged by California to be fit to receive, own and possess a firearm, Defendants have prevented Plaintiff, and all other California citizens of Plaintiff's class, from exercising their core right to keep and bear arms for self-defense under the Second Amendment. On information and belief, all California citizens of the same class as Plaintiff, i.e., who have fulfilled the requirements of Section 29805 for the requisite ten-year period, are, like Plaintiff, prevented from receiving, owning or possessing firearms, and, like Plaintiff, are subject to arrest should they receive, own or possess a firearm. As such, on information and belief, even if Plaintiff should be granted such relief as requested herein as to himself, unless Plaintiff is granted the relief requested as to the further implementation and enforcement of Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) against all California citizens by Defendants, the constitutional violations complained of herein are capable of repetition while evading review.
- 39. On information and belief, Defendants, and each of them, have implemented and enforced 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) in the manner described herein for the governmental purpose of general crimefighting. On information and belief, in no instance does Defendants' proffered basis for implementing and enforcing Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) in such manner comport with the historical scope of the Second Amendment, in that as implemented Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) unlawfully restrict the right to bear arms for self-defense as that right was understood by those who drafted and enacted both the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
- 40. Alternatively, on information and belief, in no instance does

 Defendants' proffered basis implementing and enforcing 18 U.S.C.

 §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) comply with the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, insomuch as Defendants' proffered basis for implementing and enforcing Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) in such manner does not further a compelling governmental interest. Alternatively, Defendants' proffered basis for implementing and enforcing Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means for achieving the government's general crimefighting interest.

- 41. Alternatively, on information and belief, in no instance does
 Defendants' proffered basis implementing and enforcing 18 U.S.C.
 §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) comply with the Fourteenth Amendment to the
 United States Constitution, insomuch as Defendants' proffered basis for
 implementing and enforcing Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) in such manner
 does not further an important governmental interest. Alternatively, Defendants'
 proffered basis for implementing and enforcing Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) &
 922(g)(9) is not substantially related to achieving the government's general
 crimefighting interest, insomuch as Defendants do not have a important interest in
 preventing Plaintiff, a person adjudged by California to no longer be a danger such
 that California deems fit to receive, own and possess a firearm as a matter of law,
 from receiving or and possessing a firearm.
- 42. By reason of the Defendants' interpretation and implementation of 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9), and the resultant denial to Plaintiff of the receipt, ownership or possession of firearms for self-defense, Defendants have unlawfully interfered with Plaintiff's exercise of his core self-defense right under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, thereby denying Plaintiff the equal protection of the Second Amendment as is afforded to other citizens.
- 43. At all times, Defendants Holder, Harris and DOES 1-100 were acting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9). On information and belief, Defendants, and each of them, will continue to implement and enforce Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) in a manner that infringes upon Plaintiff's exercise of

his Second Amendment rights, absent the grant of the relief requested.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court enter a judgment in his favor and against the Defendants as follows:

- For a declaration that Defendants' implementation and enforcement of Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9), as applied to Plaintiff, is unconstitutional;
- That a writ of mandate be issued from this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1651 directing Defendants to cease implementation and enforcement of Sections 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & 922(g)(9) in such manner as prevents Plaintiff, and all other California citizens who have fulfilled the requirements of California Penal Code §29805 and who do not otherwise labor under any other disqualifying circumstance, from receiving, owning or possessing firearms;
- For a judicial declaration that since October 20, 2007, Eugene Evan Baker has been entitled to exercise his rights under the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and that he is entitled under federal law to receive and possess firearms and ammunition without risk and threat of prosecution by Defendants and their representatives or agents;
- For an order enjoining Defendants, and their representatives and 3. agents, from arresting and prosecuting Eugene Evan Baker for any future alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) for so long as he remains free of any disqualifying conviction or circumstance;
- For an order that all computers and other records relied upon by 4. Defendants and their representatives or agents, concerning those persons allegedly prohibited from receiving, owning or possessing a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9), be purged of all information and content concerning the arrest, conviction and sentencing of Eugene Evan Baker, or, alternatively, for an order that all computers and other records relied upon by Defendants and their representatives or agents, concerning those persons allegedly prohibited from receiving, owning or

possessing a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9), include a notation that notwithstanding Plaintiff's arrest, conviction and sentencing in 1997 for an MCDV, 2 Plaintiff is not disqualified thereby from receiving, owning or possessing a firearm; 3 For attorney's fees and costs of suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2412; and 5. 4 Any further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 6. 5 6 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. Dated: October 11, 2012 7 8 -mail:cmichel@michellawyers.com 9 Attorneys for Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker 10 11 12 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 13 Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by a jury of his peers. 14 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. Dated: October 11, 2012 15 16 E-mail:cmichel@michellawyers.com 17 ttorneys for Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT



EUGENE EVAN BAKER,

v.

· •

Plaintiff - Appellant,

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 11-55067

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-03996-SVW-AJW

U.S. District Court for Central

California, Los Angeles RECEIVED

MANDATE

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

SEP 1 8 2012

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DEPUTY

The judgment of this Court, entered July 25, 2012, takes effect this date.

This constitutes the formal mandate of this Court issued pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FOR THE COURT: Molly C. Dwyer Clerk of Court

Lee-Ann Collins Deputy Clerk

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EUGENE EVAN BAKER,

V.

Plaintiff - Appellant,

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States,

Defendant - Appellee.,

No. 11-55067

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-03996-SVW-AJW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

> Argued and Submitted June 6, 2012 Pasadena, California

Before: B. FLETCHER, WARDLAW, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Eugene Baker appeals from the district court's order dismissing his complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

^{*} This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1), concluding that Baker's complaint fails to state facts sufficient to present a "case or controversy" under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. At the outset, we note a disparity between the complaint as filed on the district court's electronic docket and the complaint as it appears in Baker's excerpts of record. The complaint found in the electronic docket consists of only the first and last pages of the complaint in Baker's excerpts. It is not clear from the record whether the district court had the opportunity to review the complaint in its entirety. The two pages of the complaint available on the electronic docket clearly fail to assert facts sufficient to satisfy the justiciability requirements of Article III, as they do not allege that Baker has taken any steps to acquire a firearm. It is unclear whether the full complaint is adequate.

It is apparent, however, that Baker is capable of amending his complaint to include additional facts that would confer standing. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Baker attached a letter from the California Department of Justice ("CA DOJ") informing him that his application to purchase a firearm had been denied because his prior conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence barred him from purchasing or possessing firearms under federal law. Baker also attached a letter sent by the CA DOJ to a firearms dealer, ordering the dealer not to release

Second Amendment, and therefore does not control Baker's Second Amendment claim.

We therefore affirm the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal without prejudice, reverse the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and remand with leave to amend the complaint.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

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AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.

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                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                        CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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   EUGENE EVAN BAKER,
                                             NO. CV 10-3996-SVW (AJWx)
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                        Plaintiff,
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                   v.
                                             ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
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                                             MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
                                             WITH PREJUDICE [6]
   ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
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   ATTORNEY GENERAL
                                             JS6
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                        Defendants.
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        BACKGROUND
   I.
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        On May 27, 2010, Eugene Evan Baker ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint
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   seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the Attorney General so
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   he could purchase a firearm. Plaintiff was convicted of a misdemeanor
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   crime of domestic violence ("MCDV") in California in 1997. Compl. ¶ 1.
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   Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) ("The Gun Control Act"), Congress has made
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   it "unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of a
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   misdemeanor crime of domestic violence . . . to possess . . . any
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   firearm." Title 18, U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(ii) carves out an exception to
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   this general rule, stating, "A person shall not be considered to have
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been convicted of such an offense for purposes of this chapter if the conviction has been expunged or set aside . . . unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not . . .possess . . . firearms."

In 2002, that conviction was set aside, or "expunged" under Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4.¹ Compl. ¶ 1. The expungement order was silent as to Plaintiff's rights to possess firearms. Based solely on these facts alone in his Complaint, Plaintiff asks this Court to "Issue a judicial Declaration that since October 20th, 2007, [Plaintiff] has been entitled to exercise his rights under the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and that he is entitled under federal law to purchase . . . firearms . . . without risk and threat of prosecution . . ." Compl. ¶ 2.

The Attorney General ("Defendant") then filed a Motion to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(1), arguing Plaintiff had suffered no injury in fact and the case was not ripe. In addition, under FRCP 12(b)(6), Defendant argued that <u>Jennings v. Mukasey</u>, 511 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2007), squarely disposed of Plaintiff's Complaint.

In response, Plaintiff improperly supplemented the facts in his Complaint in his Opposition to Defendant's Motion. Plaintiff added that on June 8th, 2009, Plaintiff went to a gun show and attempted to

¹The Court notes that Plaintiff's briefs and complaint assert the position that the set aside was completed under California Penal Code Section 1203.4 subdivision (a), not Section 1203.4a. In relevant part, California Penal Code Section 1203.4(a) states:

[&]quot;In any case in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation . . . the court shall set aside the verdict of guilty . . and dismiss the accusations . . . against the defendant and . . . he or she shall thereafter be released formal penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted. . . "

purchase a firearm. Upon tendering the payment and applying for the weapon, Plaintiff was rejected because of his prior MCDV. After Plaintiff's counsel requested a response from the California Department of Justice, Plaintiff discovered that he was on a list of people prohibited from purchasing firearms under the Gun Control Act and state laws. Plaintiff then went to Superior Court, requested, and received, a declaration stating he was free to purchase firearms under the laws of the State of California under the terms of his expungement. However, he is currently still barred from purchasing a firearm under the Federal Gun Control Act.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

A challenge to the Court's jurisdiction is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be based on a facial challenge to the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint. "[W]hen this type of attack is mounted, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Nasoordeen v. FDIC, No. CV 08-05631 MMM (AJWx), 2010 WL 1135888 at *5 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 17, 2010) (citing Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000)).

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." <u>Id.</u> A complaint that offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." <u>Id.</u>; <u>see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service</u>, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Igbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951).

When a court grants a motion to dismiss, ordinarily "any dismissal[,] . . . except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19[,] operates as an adjudication on the merits." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). However, the court may specify that the dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the claim in a separate action. See, e.q., Swaida v. Gentiva Health Services, 238 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328 (D. Mass. 2002) ("dismissal [is] presumed to be with prejudice unless the order explicitly states otherwise"); Seaweed, Inc. v. DMA Product & Design & Marketing LLC, 219 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (when dismissal "does not operate on the merits" it "should not issue with prejudice"). In addition, the court may grant the plaintiff leave to amend a deficient claim "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

B. Standing and Ripeness as a Basis to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(1)

The Court finds that the Complaint, as currently pled, is insufficient in presenting a live controversy under Article III, §2.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To establish a "case or controversy," Plaintiff must show an "injury in fact" that is concrete and not conjectural. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Similarly, "A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated." Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff's Complaint only states that he was convicted of a prior misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and that this crime had been "expunged" by the State of California. As discussed above, Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege that he ever attempted to purchase a firearm or that he was ever denied. These facts are instead improperly included in Plaintiff's arguments in the Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. As discussed in Part II.A., a complaint must plead sufficient facts to establish the Court's jurisdiction to survive a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Here, Plaintiff's complaint does not establish Article III jurisdiction because he fails to allege that he faces any concrete injury in fact or that Defendant may ever attempt to hinder his rights to own a firearm.

Plaintiff has not sought to amend his Complaint. Thus, the Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice for this reason alone.

C. Jennings as a Basis to Dismiss With Prejudice Under FRCP 12(b)(6)

Defendant also argues that regardless of whether Plaintiff's additional facts in his Opposition are included in the Complaint, under the Ninth Circuit's recent interpretation of this very issue, Plaintiff's complaint cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted under FRCP 12(b)(6).

In <u>Jennings</u>, a petitioner sought a review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' ("ATF") denial of his application for a renewal of a firearms license. <u>Jennings</u>, 511 F.3d at 896. The petitioner had previously been convicted in California of a MCDV and had his conviction expunged by a 1999 expungement order, similar to the Plaintiff's expungement order in this case. <u>Id</u>. The petitioner argued that under 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(ii) and because of his expungement

pursuant to California Penal Code Section 1203.4 subd. (a), he was not prohibited by the Federal Gun Control Act in possessing firearms. <u>Id.</u>

Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found that a state court order under § 1203.4 subd. (a) did not "expunge" the petitioner's conviction for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits those convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing firearms.² <u>Id.</u> at 898-99.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff makes the same argument that the petitioner made in <u>Jennings</u>. Opp'n at 15-16. Instead, Plaintiff suggests that this court should not follow binding Ninth Circuit precedent because "the <u>Jennings</u> opinion is worthless as precedent."

Opp'n at 16. Plaintiff cites to Supreme Court cases and Ninth Circuit decisions predating <u>Jennings</u>, urging the Court to decide the issue differently. However, none of these cases change the fact that <u>Jennings</u> precisely controls this case. Plaintiff also cites to two Supreme Court cases after <u>Jennings</u>, <u>District of Columbia v. Heller</u>, 544 U.S. ___ (2008) and <u>McDonald v. City of Chicago</u>, 561 U.S. ___) (2010), which hold that rights under the Second Amendment are fully applicable to the states. Plaintiff claims these cases "evidence a growing acceptance and expansion of the right to bear arms." Opp'n 21.

Whether or not this is true, as Plaintiff himself admits, "neither case specifically addresses the issues brought forth herein." Opp'n 21.

 $^{^2}$ The Court notes that the <u>Jennings</u> court did not reach the issue of whether 1203.4a, rather than 1203.4 subd. (a), would require the same result. <u>Id.</u> at 899-900. However, it is undisputed in this case that Plaintiff received an "expungement" under 1203.4 subd. (a), which was in fact addressed by Jennings.

III. CONCLUSION Plaintiff's Complaint is initially deficient for failing to plead facts establishing a case or controversy under Article III, §2. However, even if the additional facts stated in Plaintiff's Opposition were pled in Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff's arguments are directly controlled by Jennings. Having cited no contravening authority on point after Jennings, Plaintiff cannot succeed in this case. The Court has no power to disregard binding precedent as the Plaintiff urges. Thus, Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: October 26, 2010 STEPHEN V. WILSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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2	State Bar Number: 056417 424 South Beverly Drive	
3	Beverly Hills, California 90212 Office: (310) 553-8533	
4	FAX: (310) 553-8237 E-Mail Address: FSAdlerLaw@aol.com	
5	Attorney for Plaintiff	
6	EUGENE EVAN BAKER	
7		
8	UNITED STATES DI	STRICT COURT
9	FOR THE CENTRAL DISTR	RICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	WESTERN DI	VISION
11		
12	EUGENE EVAN BAKER,	Case No: CV 10-3996-SVW(AJWx)
13	III	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
14		DEFENSE MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
15		Complaint Served On USAO:
16		5/27/10 Current Response Date:
17		10/4/10 Current Hearing Date:
18	Washington, D.C., 20530-0001 Defendant.	10/25/10
19		Hon. Stephen V. Wilson United States District Judge
20		
21	Plaintiff EUGENE EVAN BAKER he	erewith submits his Response to
22	the defense Motion to Dismiss the w	rithin Complaint.
23	Dated: September 25, 2010.	
24	Res	spectfully submitted,
25	LAV	OFFICES OF FRANKLIN S. ADLER
26		/s/
27		ANKLIN S. ADLER
28	Att	corney for Plaintiff EUGENE EVAN BAKER
	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENSE M	MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

SUPERIOR COURTS

-CENVEN	•		•
RECEIVED PER 2 4 2001		INTY MUNICIPAL COURT	JUN 1 9 2002
UKB 2 4 2001	Stat	te of California	Alimit to the
	VENTURA/SIM	IVALLEV DEDA DTALEJEVA	MICHAEL D. PLANET
Superior Court Cless	VENTORA/SIM	I VALLEY DEPARTME情神	
The people of the State of California,		- Contraction of the Contraction	, Deputy
		Case Number 9	7C008304
	Plaintiff,		
			•
vs.	·	DECLA	RATION AND
EUGENE RYAN BAKER	٠.	APPLICATION	BY DEFENDANT
	,	PENAL CODE SE	CTION 1203.4/1203.4a
\	Defendant.		
	Detellualit.		•
1. My date of birth is 10 - 5 -	61	my driver's license nu	mber is <u>x587794154</u> (
2. On the date of <u>September 2</u>	9. 1997	transportation of the second	<u> </u>
273.5(A) Penal	Code	was convicted of the misdemean	or offense(s) of violation of Section(s
3. I was:			
🔀 placed on probation, and I have for	AGII. J. H. A		
placed on probation, and I have for	Jitilied all the condition	ns of probation for the entire time	e required.
sentenced more than one year ago	, without probation, ar	nd I have fully complied with the	sentence.
this case, i have lived an honest and the	sentence for, or on provided life, have confe	obation for any offense. Since be	ing sentenced or placed on probation is
arrested, or given a citation (ticket) exc	PUBLIC HILL HAVE COLLIC	ormed to and obeyed the laws of	ing sentenced or placed on probation in the land, and have not been convicted
5. I request that the conviction be set as	ide, that a plea of not	guilty be entered, and that the	COURT dismiss this action pursuant to the
provisions of Section 1203.4/1203.4a o	of the Penal Code.	•	to the
I understand that the requested discuss			
5. I understand that the requested dismiss	sal: (a) will not affect.	any revocation or suspension of n	ny driving privilege, (b) will not preven
this conviction from being pleaded and the conviction in response to a direct local agency.	ouestion in any subsequ	uent prosecution, and (c) will not	relieve me of the obligation to disclose
local agency.	garante in any questi	ormane or application for bublic	office or for licensure by any state of
	•		0/01/11
I declare under penalty of perjury	that the foregoing is	true and correct. Signed on	x 2/24/01
1 X OM LS	, C	California,	(DATE)
			· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
1 Parken		EUGENE RYAN	BAKER
IGNATURE OF DEFENDANT		TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF	
	Ci I	9 1 1	11
DDRESS 76 Bristol	<u> </u>	vorcestor, M	H 0/606
	The state and the same three days done to		مينو عبد عبي هند عبد عبد عبد عبد عبد عبد عبد عبد عبد عب
I and DMV cleared on	L.		_ .
	D		

ORDER

Pursuant to Penal Code Section 1203.4/1203.4a, it is ordered that the conviction be set aside, a plea of not guilty be entered, and the complaint is dismissed.

1 | LAW OFFICES OF FRANKLIN S. ADLER State Bar Number: 056417 424 South Beverly Drive · MAR 1 0 2010 Beverly Hills, California 90212 3 (310) 553-8533 MICHAEL D. PLANET Executive Officet and Clerk Attorney for Defendant 4 EUGENE EVAN BAKER 5 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF VENTURA 10 11 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Case No: 97C008304 CALIFORNIA, 12 ORDER RESTORING SECOND Plaintiff, AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO EUGENE 13 EVAN BAKER VS. 14 EUGENE EVAN BAKER, 15 (Originally filed as EUGENE RYAN BAKER) 16 Defendant. 17 This matter came on regularly for hearing on 3-1/-1018 pursuant to a notice of motion filed herein by defendant. Counsel for the defendant and for the People both appeared. Counsel for the defendant moved in open court for an Order restoring the Second Amendment right to bear arms to defendant. 23 The Court, having read the moving papers submitted in this matter and having heard the arguments of counsel on the motion, and being advised in the premises; 25 26 / / / 27

GOOD CAUSE HAVING BEEN SHOWN, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. 2 EUGENE EVAN BAKER' Com r is entitled to purchase, own and possess firearms consistent with the laws of the State of California. A copy of this Order shall have the same force and effect as the original. Dated: MARCH 11, 2010 (Seal)

permanent restriction pursuant to California law, and said

111

by a competent California Court removes EUGENE EVAN BAKER from the stricture of 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(9).

- 2. Issue a judicial Declaration that since October 20th, 2007, EUGENE EVAN BAKER has been entitled to exercise his rights under the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and that he is entitled under federal law to purchase, own and possess firearms and ammunition without risk and threat of prosecution by Defendant and his representatives.
- 3. Enjoin the Defendant and his representatives from arresting and prosecuting EUGENE EVAN BAKER for any future alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) for so long as he remains free of any disqualifying conviction.
- 4. Order that all computers and other repositories of information relied upon by Defendant and his representatives concerning those allegedly prohibited from purchasing, owning and possessing a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) be purged of all information and content concerning the person, arrest, conviction and sentencing of EUGENE EVAN BAKER.
 - 5. Award Plaintiff costs and fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \$2412.
 - 6. Provide such other relief as may be proper.

Dated: May 25, 2010.

Respectfully submitted,

LAW OFFICES OF FRANKLIN S. ADLER



Attorney for Plaintiff EUGENE EVAN BAKER

Case 2:105a440199535AVA, SOUNDA ADTOCOMENT LOS SINCE DE SERVICE DE

8			CIVIL COVE	K SHEI	5.1					
I (a) PLAINTIFFS (Check b EUGENE EVAN BAK	ox if you are representing yoursel ER	lf □)		ERIC GENI		VITED S	fficial capacity as ATATES, with offic		/Ivania	
(b) Attorneys (Firm Name, A yourself, provide same.) LAW OFFICES OF FRA 424 South Beverly Drive Beverly Hills, CA 90212		f you are	erepresenting	Attorney	s (If Known)					
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTIO	ON (Place an X in one box only.)				PRINCIPAL PA		For Diversity Case defendant.)	es Only		
☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff	☐ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Part		Citizen of This S	tate	P?	r F DE I	Incorporated or of Business in the		PTF □ 4	DEI
✓ 2 U.S. Government Defendar	nt 4 Diversity (Indicate Cities of Parties in Item III)	izenship	Citizen of Anothe	er State		2 🗆 2	Incorporated and of Business in A		□ 5	□ 5
			Citizen or Subjec	t of a Fo	reign Country 🛚	3 🗆 3	Foreign Nation		□ 6	□ 6
Proceeding State C	ved from 3 Remanded from Court Appellate Court	Re	eopened				Dist	trict Jud	peal to lge fron gistrate	n
	LAINT: JURY DEMAND:	Yes 💆	No (Check 'Yes'							
CLASS ACTION under F.R.O	C.P. 23: □ Yes ☑ No		□ M	ONEY I	DEMANDED IN	COMPL	AINT: \$ 28 U.S.C	C. 2412 Costs	and Fe	es
	te the U.S. Civil Statute under wh)
	02 (Declaratory Relief). Eligibility	ty to own	firearms after stat	e convic	tion and set-aside	of Misde	meanor Crime of D	omestic Violence	e.	***************************************
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Pla	Te an X in one box only.)									
OTHER STATUTES	CONTRACT		TORTS		TORTS		PRISONER	STATE OF STREET STREET, STREET	BOR	
☐ 400 State Reapportionment ☐ 410 Antitrust	☐ 110 Insurance ☐ 120 Marine	A. T. S.	RSONAL INJURY Airplane		PERSONAL PROPERTY	□ 510	PETITIONS Motions to	□ 710 Fair La	abor Sta	indards
☐ 430 Banks and Banking	□ 130 Miller Act		Airplane Product		Other Fraud		Vacate Sentence	□ 720 Labor/		
☐ 450 Commerce/ICC Rates/etc.	☐ 140 Negotiable Instrument☐ 150 Recovery of	□ 320	Liability Assault, Libel &	1	Truth in Lending Other Personal	- 1	Habeas Corpus General	Relation Tabor/		
☐ 460 Deportation	Overpayment &		Slander		Property Damag	e □ 535	Death Penalty	Report	_	
☐ 470 Racketeer Influenced	Enforcement of	□ 330	Fed. Employers' Liability	□ 385	Property Damag		-		sure Ac	
and Corrupt Organizations	Judgment ☐ 151 Medicare Act		Marine	В	Product Liability ANKRUPTCY	050	Other Civil Rights	☐ 740 Railwa		r Act
☐ 480 Consumer Credit	☐ 152 Recovery of Defaulted	□ 345	Marine Product Liability	OCE-ORGANICAS	2 Appeal 28 USC	□ 555	Prison Condition	Litigat	ion	
☐ 490 Cable/Sat TV ☐ 810 Selective Service	Student Loan (Excl. Veterans)		Motor Vehicle	□ 423	158 Withdrawal 28	F)	ORFEITURE / PENALTY	☐ 791 Empl. Securit		i.
□ 850 Securities/Commodities/	☐ 153 Recovery of	□ 355	Motor Vehicle Product Liability	PORCHAGO 2010	USC 157	DE C	Agriculture	PROPERT	Y RIGH	ITS
Exchange ☐ 875 Customer Challenge 12	Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits	□ 360			Voting	620	Other Food & Drug	□ 820 Copyri □ 830 Patent	ghts	
USC 3410	☐ 160 Stockholders' Suits	□ 362	Injury Personal Injury-	□ 442	Employment	□ 625	Drug Related	□ 840 Traden		
■ 890 Other Statutory Actions □ 891 Agricultural Act	☐ 190 Other Contract ☐ 195 Contract Product	□ 365	Med Malpractice Personal Injury-	443	Housing/Acco- mmodations		Seizure of Property 21 USC	SOCIAL S		TY
□ 892 Economic Stabilization	Liability	L 303	Product Liability	□ 444	Welfare		881	□ 862 Black I		23)
Act ☐ 893 Environmental Matters	☐ 196 Franchise REAL PROPERTY	□ 368	Asbestos Personal Injury Product	□ 445	American with Disabilities -	1	Liquor Laws R.R. & Truck	863 DIWC		
□ 894 Energy Allocation Act	□ 210 Land Condemnation		Liability		Employment		Airline Regs	(405(g)		'I
□ 895 Freedom of Info. Act	☐ 220 Foreclosure ☐ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment		MIGRATION Naturalization	□ 446	American with Disabilities -	□ 660	Occupational	□ 865 RSI (40		HTC
☐ 900 Appeal of Fee Determi- nation Under Equal	□ 240 Torts to Land	1	Application		Other	□ 690	Safety /Health Other	FEDERAL 7		
Access to Justice 350 Constitutionality of	☐ 245 Tort Product Liability ☐ 290 All Other Real Property	463	Habeas Corpus- Alien Detainee	□ 440	Other Civil Rights			or Defe □ 871 IRS-Th		ty 26
State Statutes	250 All Other Real Property	□ 465	Other Immigration Actions		Aights			USC 76		y 20
			b	CV	10 3	99	16			
			- V	100	10					
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:	Case Number:						·			

AFTER COMPLETING THE FRONT SIDE OF FORM CV-71, COMPLETE THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW.

Case 2:10 CAN DEPOS CONTROL OF PROPERTY DESCRIPTION OF SHEET

VIII(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Ha If yes, list case number(s):	s this action been p	reviously filed in this court as	nd dismissed, remanded or closed? ≝No □ Yes
VIII(b). RELATED CASES: Hav If yes, list case number(s):	e any cases been pro	eviously filed in this court that	at are related to the present case? No Yes
□ C.	Arise from the sam Call for determinate For other reasons w	e or closely related transaction ion of the same or substantial could entail substantial duplic	ons, happenings, or events; or ly related or similar questions of law and fact; or eation of labor if heard by different judges; or , and one of the factors identified above in a, b or c also is present.
IX. VENUE: (When completing the (a) List the County in this District;	California County of	outside of this District; State i	if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named plaintiff resides.
	ts agencies or emplo	byees is a named plaintiff. If	this box is checked, go to item (b).
County in this District:* EUGENE EVAN BAKER - VE	NTURA COUNT	Y	California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country
			f other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named defendant resides. If this box is checked, go to item (c).
County in this District:*			California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country
(c) List the County in this District; Note: In land condemnation ca			f other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH claim arose.
County in this District:*			California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country
VENTURA COUNTY			
or other papers as required by lav	e the location of the OR PRO PER): e CV-71 (JS-44) Ci v. This form, approv	vil Cover Sheet and the informed by the Judicial Conference	mation contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings of the United States in September 1974, is required pursuant to Local Rule 3-1 is not filed ing the civil docket sheet. (For more detailed instructions, see separate instructions sheet.)
Key to Statistical codes relating to So Nature of Suit Code	Abbreviation	Substantive Statement of	Cause of Action
861	HIA		ance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amended. spitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under the FF(b))
862	BL	All claims for "Black Lung (30 U.S.C. 923)	" benefits under Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
863	DIWC		workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as led for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))
863	DIWW	All claims filed for widows Act, as amended. (42 U.S.	s or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security C. 405(g))
864	SSID	All claims for supplementa Act, as amended.	I security income payments based upon disability filed under Title 16 of the Social Security
865	RSI	All claims for retirement (o U.S.C. (g))	old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42

CV-71 (05/08) CIVIL COVER SHEET Page 2 of

Case 2:105@s@3995654544,-621446/2016@inten986 Name & Address:	619i0led D5 i127/11:10: 219a2geP5a.gole 638 108a.gol9 10 #:5
LAW OFFICES OF FRANKLIN S. ADLER	
State Bar Number: 056417	
424 S. Beverly Drive	
Beverly Hills, CA 90212	
(310) 553-8533	
UNITED STATES I CENTRAL DISTRIC	
EUGENE EVAN BAKER	CASE NUMBER
PLAINTIFF(S) V.	CV10 3996SVW AUW
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, with offices at 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C., 20530-0001	SUMMONS
DEFENDANT(S).	
Within 60 days after service of this summons must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached communication counterclaim cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 or motion must be served on the plaintiff's attorney, FRA 424 S. Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90212 judgment by default will be entered against you for the reyour answer or motion with the court.	of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer ANKLIN S. ADLER, whose address is If you fail to do so,
	Clerk, U.S. District Court
Dated: 27 MAY 2010	By: Deputy SEAL (Seal of the Court)
[Use 60 days if the defendant is the United States or a United States of 60 days by Rule 12(a)(3)].	agency, or is an officer or employee of the United States. Allowed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY

This case has been a	assigned to District	Judge Stephen	V. Wilson	n and the ass	signed
discovery Magistrate Judg	e is Andrew J. Wis	strich.			

The case number on all documents filed with the Court should read as follows:

CV10- 3996 SVW (AJWx)

Pursuant to General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hear discovery related motions.

All discovery related motions should be noticed on the calendar of the Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

A copy of this notice must be served with the summons and complaint on all defendants (if a removal action is filed, a copy of this notice must be served on all plaintiffs).

Subsequent documents must be filed at the following location:

[X]	Western Division 312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-8 Los Angeles, CA 90012		Southern Division 411 West Fourth St., Rm. 1-053 Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516	Eastern Division 3470 Twelfth St., Rm. 134 Riverside, CA 92501
Failu	re to file at the proper location will resu	ılt in yo	our documents being returned to you.	

Case: 13-56454, 02/16/2016, ID: 9866939, DktEntry: 29-2, Page 100 of 109

(AJWx), APPEAL, CLOSED, DISCOVERY, REOPENED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Western Division - Los Angeles) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:10-cv-03996-SVW-AJW

Eugene Evan Baker v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. Assigned to: Judge Stephen V. Wilson

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Wistrich

Case in other court: 9th CCA, 11-55067 9TH CCA, 13-56454

Cause: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

Date Filed: 05/27/2010
Date Terminated: 07/31/2013
Jury Demand: Plaintiff

Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory

Actions

Jurisdiction: U.S. Government Defendant

Plaintiff

Eugene Evan Baker

represented by Joshua R Dale

Michel & Associates PC 180 East Ocean Blvd Suite 200 Los Angeles, CA 90802 562-216-4444

Fax: 562-216-4445

Email: jdale@michellawyers.com

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Carl Dawson Michel

Michel and Associates PC 180 East Ocean Boulevard Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802 562-216-4444

Fax: 562-216-4445

Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Franklin S Adler

Law Offices of Franklin S Adler 424 South Beverly Drive Beverly Hills, CA 90212-4414 310-553-8533

Fax: 310-553-8237

Email: fsadlerlaw@aol.com TERMINATED: 10/15/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

1 of 9 2/16/201**5 R 3.05**M

Case: 13-56454, 02/16/2016, ID: 9866939, DktEntry: 29-2, Page 101 of 109

V.

Defendant

Eric H. Holder, Jr.

in his official capcity as Attorney General of the United States

represented by David A DeJute

AUSA - Office of US Attorney 300 North Los Angeles Street Room 7516 Los Angeles, CA 90012 213-894-2574 Fax: 213-894-7819 Email: USACAC.Civil@usdoj.gov

LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Ira A Daves, III

AUSA - Office of US Attorney
Federal Building - Civil Division
300 North Los Angeles Street Suite 7516
Los Angeles, CA 90012
213-894-2443
TERMINATED: 09/23/2010
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Kamala D Harris

in her capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

represented by Anthony R Hakl, III

Office of the Attorney General 1300 I Street, 16th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814 916-322-9041 Email: anthony.hakl@doj.ca.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

State of California Department of Justice

represented by Anthony R Hakl, III

(See above for address)

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Does

1 through 100, Inclusive

Date Filed	#	Docket Text
05/27/2010	1	COMPLAINT against Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. Case assigned to Judge Stephen V. Wilson for all further proceedings. Discovery referred to Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Wistrich.(Filing fee \$ 350: PAID), filed by plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker.(ghap) (mg). (Entered: 05/27/2010)

2 of 9

Case: 13-56454, 02/16/2016, ID: 9866939, DktEntry: 29-2, Page 102 of 109

05/27/2010		60 DAY Summons Issued re Complaint - (Discovery) <u>1</u> as to Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. (ghap) (Entered: 05/27/2010)
05/27/2010	2	CERTIFICATION AND NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. (ghap) (mg). (Entered: 05/27/2010)
05/28/2010	3	NEW CASE ORDER (See document for further details) by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (ir) (Entered: 05/28/2010)
06/24/2010	4	PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Eric H. Holder, Jr, upon Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr in his official capacity served on 5/27/2010, answer due 7/26/2010. Service of the Summons and Complaint Executed upon the Attorney Generals Office of the United States by delivering a copy to Flabia De La Rosa authorized person to receive service of process. Service was executed in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Due diligence declaration NOT attached. Registered or certified mail return receipt NOT attached. Original Summons NOT returned. (pj) (Entered: 06/28/2010)
07/20/2010	<u>5</u>	FIRST STIPULATION Extending Time to Answer the complaint as to Eric H. Holder, Jr answer now due 8/25/2010, filed by Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr.(Daves, Ira) (Entered: 07/20/2010)
08/20/2010	6	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case <i>Memorandum Of Points And Authorities</i> filed by Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. Motion set for hearing on 10/4/2010 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order) (Daves, Ira) (Entered: 08/20/2010)
09/15/2010	7	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Continue Response Date for Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Continue Hearing Date on Motion to Dismiss from Response Date: September 13, 2010; Hearing Date: October 4, 2010 to Response Date: October 4, 2010; Hearing Date: October 25, 2010 filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. Motion set for hearing on 10/4/2010 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Adler, Franklin) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
09/15/2010	8	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Order for Proposed Order Granting Plaintiff Continuance to File Response to Motion to Dismiss and Continuance of Hearing Date on Motion to Dismiss presently set 10/04/10 to date of 10/25/10 filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. Motion set for hearing on 10/4/2010 at 01:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. (Adler, Franklin) (Entered: 09/15/2010)
09/15/2010	9	ORDER Granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion to Continue Plaintiff's Response Date to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Continuance of Hearing Date 7 by Judge Stephen V. Wilson. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Response Date for Plaintiff to file his opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is continued from 9/13/2010 to 10/4/2010, and the within Hearing date is continued from 10/4/2010 to 10/25/2010 at 1:30 pm. (csi) (Entered: 09/17/2010)
09/23/2010	10	NOTICE of Change of Attorney Information for attorney David A DeJute counsel for Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. Adding David A. DeJute as attorney as counsel of record for Eric H. Holder, Jr. for the reason indicated in the G-06 Notice. Ira A. Daves will no longer receive service of documents from the Clerks Office for the reason indicated in the G-06 Notice.Ira A. Daves is no longer attorney of record for the aforementioned

3 of 9 2/16/201**5R\$107**M

Case: 13-56454, 02/16/2016, ID: 9866939, DktEntry: 29-2, Page 103 of 109

		party in this case for the reason indicated in the G-06 Notice. Filed by Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. (DeJute, David) (Entered: 09/23/2010)
09/29/2010	11	OPPOSITION To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss (without Exhibits 1-7 which could not be scanned into document - they will be faxed to all parties and submitted to Judge's Courtesy Box on 9/30/10) filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. (Adler, Franklin) (Entered: 09/29/2010)
10/08/2010	12	REPLY in support MOTION to Dismiss Case <i>Memorandum Of Points And Authorities</i> <u>6</u> filed by Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. (DeJute, David) (Entered: 10/08/2010)
10/25/2010	13	MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson: GRANTING MOTION to Dismiss Case <u>6</u> . Order to issue.Court Reporter: Margaret Babykin. (rrey) (Entered: 10/25/2010)
10/26/2010	14	ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: GRANTING Defendant's <u>6</u> Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice. (MD JS-6. Case Terminated) (mg) (Entered: 10/27/2010)
01/07/2011	15	NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th CCA filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. Appeal of Order on Motion to Dismiss Case 14 Filed On: 10/26/2010; Entered On: 10/27/2010; Filing fee \$455, Paid. receipt number LA007143. (lr) Modified on 1/10/2011 (lr). (Entered: 01/10/2011)
01/11/2011	<u>16</u>	NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 11-55067, 9th CCA regarding Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 15 as to Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. (lr) (Entered: 01/12/2011)
03/23/2011	17	ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 15 filed by Eugene Evan Baker CCA # 11-55067. The appellant's motion for an extension of time to file the transcript designation is granted. If the appellant has not already done so, the appellant shall designate the transcript on or before March 30, 2011. The transcript is due May 2, 2011. The opening brief is due June 13, 2011. The answering brief is due July 14, 2011. The optional reply brief is due 14 days after the service of the answering brief. Appellant shall provide a copy of this order to the court reporter(s0 at the district court. Within 7 days after the date of this order, the appellant shall file the Mediation Questionnaire with this court. Order received in this district on 3/23/2011. (dmap) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
03/24/2011	18	TRANSCRIPT DESIGNATION AND ORDERING FORM For Dates: 10/25/2010; Court Reporter: Margaret Babykin; Court of Appeals Case Number: 11-55067; Re: 15 (Landau, Karen) (Entered: 03/24/2011)
05/05/2011	19	TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on October 25, 2010 1:46 P.M. to 1:48 P.M. Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder: Margaret J. Babykin, phone number (626) 963-0566. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Electronic Court Recorder before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 5/26/2011. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/5/2011. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/3/2011. (Babykin, Margaret) (Entered: 05/05/2011)

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09/18/2012	<u>20</u>	MANDATE of 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 15, CCA # 11-55067. The Judgment of the district court is Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; Remanded. Mandate received in this district on 9/18/12. (car) (Entered: 09/20/2012)
09/21/2012	21	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: re: USCA Mandate 20: THE COURT REVIEWS the mandate (judgment or order) of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: Remanding. The plaintiff shall file his amended complaint, consistent with the Ninth Circuit Mandate, within twenty days from the date of this order. The matter is set for a status conference on October 15, 2012 at 1:30 p.m. (Case reopened. MD JS-5.) (pj) (Entered: 09/26/2012)
10/08/2012	22	REQUEST to Substitute attorney Joshua R. Dale in place of attorney Franklin S. Adler filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Dale, Joshua) (Entered: 10/08/2012)
10/11/2012	23	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against Defendants Eric H. Holder, Jr, Kamala D Harris, State of California Department of Justice, Does a) 1; JURY DEMAND, filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker (Attachments: # 1 21 day summons Issued as to first amended complaint)(pj) (Entered: 10/16/2012)
10/11/2012	<u>26</u>	CERTIFICATION AND NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker, (pj) (Entered: 10/18/2012)
10/15/2012	24	ORDER ON REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The Court hereby orders that the request of:Eugene Evan Baker Plaintiff to substitute Joshua R. Dale Retained Counsel as attorney of record instead of Franklin S. Adler 22. Attorney Franklin S Adler terminated (pj) (Entered: 10/16/2012)
10/15/2012	25	MINUTES OF Status Conference held before Judge Stephen V. Wilson:,Conference held. The Court sets the following schedule: Filing of Simultaneous Opening Briefs December 6, 2012; Filing of Simultaneous Responding Briefs December 17, 2012; Hearing January 7, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. The Court further orders that plaintiff shall effectuate service of the amended complaint withintwenty days of this hearing.Court Reporter: Deborah Gackle. (pj) (Entered: 10/18/2012)
11/02/2012	<u>27</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker, upon Defendant State of California Department of Justice served on 10/19/2012, answer due 11/9/2012. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon The State of California Department of Justice in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by substituted service at business address and by also mailing a copy. Original Summons returned. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 11/02/2012)
11/02/2012	28	PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker, upon Defendant Kamala D Harris served on 10/19/2012, answer due 11/9/2012. Service of the Summons and Complaint were executed upon Kamala D. Harris In Her Capacity as Attorney General for the State of California in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by substituted service at business address and by also mailing a copy. Original Summons returned. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 11/02/2012)

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11/02/2012	<u>29</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE Executed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker, upon Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr served on 10/16/2012, answer due 12/15/2012. Service of the Summons and Complaint were Executed upon the Attorney Generals Office of the United States by delivering a copy to Steffon Edmonds, Authroized Agent. The officer agency or corporation was NOT served. Service was executed in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Due diligence declaration attached. Registered or certified mail return receipt NOT attached. Original Summons returned. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 11/02/2012)	
11/09/2012	<u>30</u>	ANSWER to Amended Complaint, <u>23</u> filed by Defendants Kamala D Harris, State of California Department of Justice. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Certificate of Service)(Hakl, Anthony) (Entered: 11/09/2012)	
11/15/2012	31	TRANSCRIPT for proceedings held on 10/15/2012 1:30 pm. Court Reporter: Deborah K. Gackle, phone number (213) 620-1149. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through DEBORAHGACKLE.COM or PACER. Notice of Intent to Redact due within 7 days of this date. Redaction Request due 12/6/2012. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/16/2012. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/13/2013. (Gackle, Deborah) (Entered: 11/15/2012)	
11/15/2012	32	NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT filed for proceedings 10/15/2012 1:30 p.m. re Transcript 31 THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY (Gackle, Deborah) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 11/15/2012)	
11/30/2012	33	Joint STIPULATION for Extension of Time to File Simultaneous Opening and Responding Briefs and Resetting of Hearing filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 11/30/2012)	
11/30/2012	34	ORDER by Judge Stephen V. Wilson, re Stipulation for Extension of Time to File 33, The parties simultaneous Opening Briefs are due on January 7, 2013.2. The parties simultaneous Responding Briefs are due on January 16, 2013. 3. The hearing shall proceed on February 4, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. (pj) (Entered: 12/03/2012)	
12/13/2012	<u>35</u>	ANSWER to Amended Complaint, 23 filed by DEFENDANT Eric H. Holder, Jr.(DeJute, David) (Entered: 12/13/2012)	
01/07/2013	36	BRIEF filed by DEFENDANT Eric H. Holder, Jr. (<i>OPENING</i>) regarding Order, Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings,, <u>34</u> . (Attachments: # <u>1</u> EXHIBIT A, # <u>2</u> Proposed Order)(DeJute, David) (Entered: 01/07/2013)	
01/07/2013	<u>37</u>	BRIEF filed by Defendants Kamala D Harris, State of California Department of Justice regarding Order, Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings,, 34. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Hakl, Anthony) (Entered: 01/07/2013)	
01/07/2013	38	BRIEF filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. <i>Plaintiff's Brief Re Issues On Remand</i> (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 01/07/2013)	
01/16/2013	39	RESPONSE filed by Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jrto Brief (non-motion non-appeal) 38 (FEDERAL DEFENDANT'S RESPONDING BRIEF) (DeJute, David) (Entered:	

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		01/16/2013)		
01/16/2013	40	BRIEF filed by Defendants Kamala D Harris, State of California Department of Justice regarding Brief (non-motion non-appeal) 38. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service) (Hakl, Anthony) (Entered: 01/16/2013)		
01/16/2013	41	RESPONSE filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Bakerto Brief (non-motion non-appeal) 36 Plaintiff's Reply To Federal Defendant's Opening Brief (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 01/16/2013)		
01/24/2013	42	TRANSCRIPT ORDER as to Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr DCN number: M 8 0185. Court Reporter. Transcript portion requested: Other: 10/15/2012. Transcript preparatio will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter/recorder. (DeJut David) (Entered: 01/24/2013)		
02/01/2013	43	SCHEDULING NOTICE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The hearing on a motion to dismiss previously scheduled for 02/04/2013 1:30 PM has been rescheduled to 2/25/2013 at 1:30 PM before Judge Stephen V. Wilson. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY.(pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 02/01/2013)		
02/04/2013	44	MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Opposition <i>to Motion to Dismiss</i> Re: Brief (non-motion non-appeal) <u>36</u> (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 02/04/2013)		
02/11/2013	45	REPLY <i>BRIEF</i> filed by Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D)(DeJute, David) (Entered: 02/11/2013)		
02/21/2013	46	SCHEDULING NOTICE by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: The hearing previously scheduled for 02/25/13 at 1:30 PM has been rescheduled to 3/11/2013 at 1:30 PM. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY.(pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 02/21/2013)		
03/08/2013	47	IN CHAMBERS ORDER-TEXT ONLY ENTRY by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: Upon review of the parties' briefs, the Court concludes that the Motion is suitable for determination without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. The hearing scheduled for Monday, March 11, 2013, is VACATED. THERE IS NO PDF DOCUMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS ENTRY.(pc) TEXT ONLY ENTRY (Entered: 03/08/2013)		
07/31/2013	48	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS Re MOTION TO DISMISS <u>36</u> I. by Judge Stephen V. Wilson: For the reasons put forward in this Order, Plaintiffs FAC is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.) (pj) (Entered: 08/01/2013)		
08/20/2013	49	NOTICE OF APPEAL to the Federal Circuit filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. Appeal of Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive - no proceeding held, Terminated Case 48 (Appeal fee of \$455 receipt number 0973-12576609 paid.) (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 08/20/2013)		
08/20/2013	<u>50</u>	NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. correcting Notice of Appeal to Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 49 (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 08/20/2013)		

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08/20/2013	<u>51</u>	NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th CCA filed by Plaintff Eugene Evan Baker. Appeal of Minutes of In Chambers Order/Directive - no proceeding held, Terminated Case 48 (Appeal fee FEE NOT PAID.) (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 08/20/2013)	
08/21/2013	<u>52</u>	NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 13-56454, 9TH CCA regarding Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals <u>51</u> as to Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker. (car) (Entered: 08/21/2013)	
09/17/2013	53	TRANSCRIPT ORDER as to Plaintiff Eugene Evan Baker Court Reporter. Court will contact Joshua R. Dale at jdale@michellawyers.com with any questions regarding this order. Transcript portion requested: Other: transcript for proceedings held on 10/25/10; transcript for proceedings held on 10/15/12 Transcript preparation will not begin until payment has been satisfied with the court reporter/recorder. (Dale, Joshua) (Entered: 09/17/2013)	
05/06/2014	54	ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 51 filed by Eugene Evan Baker, CCA # 2:10-cv-03996. is The appellant's unopposed motion to further stay appellate proceedings 180 days pending the filing of the petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Chovan, Ninth Circuit Docket No. 11-50107, is granted. Appellate proceedings are stayed until November 3, 2014. At or prior to the expiration of the stay of appellate proceedings, theappellant shall file the opening brief or file a motion for appropriate relief. If theopening brief is filed, the answering brief is due December 3, 2014. The optional reply brief is due within 14 days after service of the answering brief. No. 13-56454In the absence of a motion, the stay of appellate proceedings will terminate without further notice (dmap) (Entered: 05/08/2014)	
10/10/2014	<u>55</u>	ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals <u>51</u> filed by Eugene Evan Baker, CCA # 13-56454. Appellant's unopposed motion to stay proceedings pending this Court's disposition of Enos v. Holder, Jr. appeal no. 12-15498 is granted in part. The brief schedules have been set. This case is stayed until January 2 2015. Order received in this district on 10/10/14. [See document for more details] (mat) (Entered: 10/15/2014)	
11/17/2014	<u>56</u>	ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals <u>51</u> filed by Eugene Evan Baker, CCA # 13-56454. The petitioners motion to stay appellate proceedings for 180 days pending Enos v. Holder, No. 12-15498, is granted. Appellate proceedings are stayed until July 2, 2015. The brief schedules have been set. Order received in this district on 11/17/14. [See document for details] (mat) (Entered: 11/18/2014)	
06/08/2015	<u>57</u>	ORDER from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 51 filed by Eugene Evan Baker. CCA # 13-56454. The petitioner's motion to further stay appellate proceedings for 90 days pending United States Suprem Courts disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari in Enos v. Holder, No. 14-1216, is granted. (car) (Entered: 06/10/2015)	
01/08/2016	<u>58</u>	ORDER from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals <u>51</u> filed by Eugene Evan Baker. CCA # 13-56454. Appellant's motion for full remand to the district court for further proceedings is denied without prejudice	

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to raising the arguments in the opening brief. (car) (Entered: 01/11/2016)

PACER Service Center Transaction Receipt							
PACER Login:	tm0137:2646583:0	Client Code:	1763				
Description:	Docket Report	Search Criteria:	2:10-cv-03996- SVW-AJW End date: 2/16/2016				
Billable Pages:	8	Cost:	0.80				

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 16, 2016, an electronic PDF of APPELLANT'S EXCERPTS OF RECORD was uploaded to the Court's CM/ECF system, which will automatically generate and send by electronic mail a Notice of Docket Activity to all registered attorneys participating in the case. Such notice constitutes service on those registered attorneys.

Date: February 16, 2016 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

s/ C. D. Michel

C. D. Michel

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Eugene Baker