IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Charles Nichols,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

Edmund Brown, Jr., in his official capacity as the Governor of California and Kamala Harris in her official capacity as the Attorney General of California

Defendants-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[DC 2:11-cv-09916-SJO-SS]

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NICHOLS' EXCERPTS OF RECORD VOLUME 2

Charles Nichols PO Box 1302 Redondo Beach, CA 90278 Tel. No. (424) 634-7381

e-mail: <u>CharlesNichols@Pykrete.info</u>
In Pro Per

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Case 2:11-cv-09916-SJO-SS Document 168 Filed 05/27/14 Page 1 of 16 Page ID #:2695 2014 MAY 27 AM 10: 56 Charles Nichols PO Box 1302 1 Redondo Beach, CA 90278 Voice: (424) 634-7381 2 E-Mail: Charles Nichols @Pykrete.info In Pro Per 3 4 5 6 7 **United States District Court** 8 Central District of California 9 10 CHARLES NICHOLS, Case No.: CV-11-9916 SJO (SS) 11 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF APPEAL 12 V. 13 14 EDMUND G. BROWN JR., in his 15 official capacity as Governor of 16 California, KAMALA D. HARRIS, in her official capacity as Attorney 17 General of California 18 PAID Defendants 19 20 MAY **2.7** 2014 21 NOTICE OF APPEAL Clerk, US District Court COURT 4612 22 23 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff Charles Nichols, pro se plaintiff 24 in the above named case, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for 25 the Ninth Circuit from the order and judgment denying plaintiff's motion for 26 partial summary judgment and granting Defendant Kamala D. Harris' motion for 27 judgment on the pleadings entered in this action on May 1, 2014 (Dkt. Nos. 166, 28 167) and all interlocutory orders including, but not limited to, those that gave rise Charles Nichols v. Edmund G Brown Jr et al Notice of Appeal ER148

Notice of Appeal

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Charles Nichols v. Edmund G Brown Jr et al

EXHIBIT A
Case No.: CV-11-9916 SJO (SS)

11 CHARLES NICHOLS,

KAMALA D. HARRIS, in her official capacity as Attorney General of California,

Defendant.

Plaintiff,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. CV 11-9916 SJO (SS)

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS,

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Second Amended Complaint, all the records and files herein, the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff's Objections, and Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Objections. After having made a de novo determination of the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which Objections were directed, the Court concurs with and accepts the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. In addition, the Court will address certain arguments raised by Plaintiff in his Objections.

Plaintiff asserts that the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in <u>Peruta v. County of San Diego</u>, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), has been "stayed" and is neither binding on this Court nor relevant to his claims. (Obj. at 8). Plaintiff is mistaken.

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On February 28, 2014, the Ninth Circuit stayed the issuance of the mandate in Peruta pending briefing and a decision on a motion for rehearing en banc. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 9th Cir. Case No. 10-56971 (Dkt. No. 126, entered Feb. 28, 2014) (order extending time for filing petition for rehearing en banc and staying mandate). However, entry of the mandate is merely a "ministerial act," White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 924 n.4 (9th 2002), that "formally marks the end of appellate jurisdiction." Northern California Power Agency v. Regulatory Com'n, 393 F.3d 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). A panel decision of the Ninth Circuit is binding on lower courts as soon as it is published, even before the mandate issues, and remains binding authority until the decision is withdrawn or reversed by the Supreme Court or an en banc court. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 389 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) ("[A] published decision of this court constitutes binding authority which 'must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so.'") (quoting Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Gomez-Lopez, 62 F.3d 304, 306 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The government first urges us to ignore Armstrong since we have stayed the mandate to allow filing of a petition for certiorari; this we will not do, as Armstrong is the law of this circuit.");

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Castillo v. Clark, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1122 n.17 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("Although the Ninth Circuit has granted a stay of the mandate in <u>Butler</u>, the panel decision remains the law of the Circuit."). Indeed, three weeks <u>after</u> the stay in <u>Peruta</u> issued, the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court decision in another matter and remanded the case "for further proceedings consistent with <u>Peruta</u>." <u>See Baker v. Kealoha</u>, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2014 WL 1087765 at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014). As of the date of this Order, Peruta remains binding precedent on this Court.

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Plaintiff further appears to misinterpret the import of the Peruta court's clarification in footnote 19 that it was not "ruling on the constitutionality of California statutes." at 2) (quoting Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1173 n.19). This footnote is part of the discussion in which the Ninth Circuit explained that because the Second Amendment does not protect any particular mode of carry, a claim that a state must permit a specific form of carry, such as open carry, fails as a matter of law. See id. at legislature has limited 1172-73 ("As the California permitting scheme to concealed carry -- and has thus expressed a preference for that manner of arms-bearing -- a narrow challenge to the San Diego County regulations on concealed carry, rather than a broad challenge to the state-wide ban on open carry, is permissible."). Accordingly, Peruta did not rule on the overall

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constitutionality of California statutes because it accepted the lawfulness of California's firearms regime, including the state's preference for concealed carry over open carry. Id. at 1172.

Plaintiff suggests that the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, F.3d ___, 2014 WL 1193434 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014), is helpful to his case as he opens his Objections with a lengthy quotation from that decision. (See Obj. at 1-2) (quoting Jackson, 2014 WL 1193434 at *4-5). However, Plaintiff does not explain why the passages he quotes support his claims. The Jackson court found that two San Francisco Police Code regulations that prohibit the unsecured storage of handguns in residences and the sale of "hollow point" ammunition passed constitutional muster. In the Id. at *1. passages quoted by Plaintiff, the court determined that plaintiff could bring a facial challenge to section 4512, which requires that handguns in residences be stored in a locked container, disabled with an approved trigger lock, or carried on the person over the age of 18, despite the Jackson plaintiff's appropriate in some concession that locked storage is Again, as Plaintiff has failed to circumstances. Id. at *5. articulate in his Objections why he believes Jackson changes the outcome here, the Objections do not alter the Court's ultimate resolution of Plaintiff's claims.

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fact Finally, Plaintiff asserts that he does in standing to assert an equal protection challenge to California Penal Code Section 25850 due to its allegedly racist origin and application because contrary to the criminal complaint on which the Magistrate Judge relied, he is not white but of "mixed race" Plaintiff's equal protection claim heritage. (Obj. at 16). still fails, however, because as the Magistrate Judge observed, Plaintiff did not squarely raise a race-based challenge to General. (Report Section 25850 against the Attorney and Recommendation at 26-27).

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To state an equal protection claim under section 1983, a plaintiff typically must allege that "'defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added)). liberally construed, the Second Amended Complaint fails to make any connection between Plaintiff's race and the allegedly racist design motivating the passage of the facially race-neutral predecessor to Section 25850. Indeed, the record in this case, including Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, is devoid of any allegation that Plaintiff is a member of a racial minority whose members were the intended target of the legislature's alleged racial animus in enacting the predecessor to Section 25850. three opportunities to state his claims, Plaintiff simply did not raise a race-based Fourteenth Amendment claim in this action.

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Assertion of a new claim on summary judgment is improper. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, even if Plaintiff is of "mixed race" heritage, he may not raise new claims at this late stage of the litigation. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED and that Judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Kamala D. Harris. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 5. Jame Otens DATED: May 1, 2014. S. JAMES OTERO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

EXHIBIT B
Case No.: CV-11-9916 SJO (SS)

ER157

S Document 168 Filed 05/27/14 Page 11 of 16 Page ID #:2705 Document 167 Filed 05/01/14 Fage 1 of 1 Page ID #:2694

EXHIBIT C
Case No.: CV-11-9916 SJO (SS)

ER159

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES NICHOLS,

Plaintiff,

V.

EDMUND G. BROWN, in his official capacity as Governor of California, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. CV 11-09916 SJO (SS)

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS,

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Complaint in the above-captioned matter, Plaintiff's Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, which the Court construes as Objections, Plaintiff's Notice of Errata, the Response of Defendants Gov. Edmund G. Brown, Jr. and Atty. Gen. Kamala D. Harris to Plaintiff's Objections, all the records and files herein, and the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. After having made a de novo determination of the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which Objections were directed, the Court accepts and adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, excluding the citation to Oklevueha Native American Church of Hawai'i,

<u>Inc. v. Holder</u>, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Hawaii 2010) on page 15, lines 15-23.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

- 1. Plaintiff's claims against Attorney General Kamala D. Harris are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
- 2. Plaintiff's claims against Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and the Eleventh Amendment.
- 3. Plaintiff's claims against the City of Redondo Beach and City of Redondo Beach Police Chief Leonardi are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
- 4. Plaintiff's claims against City of Redondo Beach Police Department are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
- 5. Plaintiff's Seventh Claim for Relief alleging a violation of state constitutional law is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

6. If Plaintiff desires to proceed with his claims against Attorney General Harris, City of Redondo Beach, and Police Chief Leonardi, Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.

The Clerk shall serve copies of this Order by United States mail on Plaintiff and on counsel for Defendants.

DATED: May 7, 2012.

S. Jame Otens

S. JAMES OTERO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of plaintiff's **NOTICE OF APPEAL** was served via United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this <u>27</u>, day of <u>May</u>, 2014 on the following:

Jonathan Michael Eisenberg
Office of the California Attorney General
Government Law Section
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
213-897-6505
213-897-5775 (fax)
jonathan.eisenberg@doj.ca.gov
Assigned: 01/30/2012
LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Representing Kamala D Harris (Defendant) and Edmund G Brown, Jr (Defendant)

Executed this the 27th Day of May, 2014 in Los Angeles County by:

Charles Nichols

Plaintiff, In Pro Per

Case No. CV-11-9916 SJO (SS)

I. STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 or prohibited area of an unincorporated 17 territory. Refusal to allow a peace 18 officer to inspect a firearm pursuant to 19 this section constitutes probable cause 20 for arrest for violation of this section. 21 There is no enumerated exemption 22 within this statute. 23 24 25

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Undisputed Fact 1. California law bans the Open Carry of loaded firearms in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city or in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area of unincorporated territory. In order to determine whether or not a firearm is loaded for the purpose of enforcing this section, peace officers are authorized to examine any firearm carried by anyone on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city

Support for Undisputed Fact

1. Cal. Penal Code § 25850. Exhibit A - Brief Of Respondent California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris - Nichols v. Brown 9th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-56203 -Appellate Dkt #13. pg 3.

Dkt., #96 pg 1, lines 22-23.

- 2. California law bans the Open Carry of unloaded handguns in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city or in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited
- 2. Cal. Penal Code § 26350. Exhibit B - Brief Of Respondent California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris - Nichols v. Brown 9th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-56203 -

area of unincorporated territory. There is no enumerated exemption within this statute. A violation of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars (\$1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, if both of the following conditions exist:

- (A) The handgun and unexpended ammunition capable of being discharged from that handgun are in the immediate possession of that person.
- (B) The person is not in lawful possession of that handgun.
 Otherwise, a violation of this section is a misdemeanor.
- 3. California law bans the Open Carry of unloaded firearms, other than handguns, in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city outside a vehicle while in the incorporated city or city and county. A violation is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not

Appellate Dkt #13. pg 5.
Dkt., #96 pg 1, lines 22-23.

3. Cal. Penal Code § 26400.

Exhibit B - Brief Of Respondent
California Attorney General Kamala D.
Harris – Nichols v. Brown 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals No. 13-56203 –
Appellate Dkt #13. pg 5.

1	exceeding one year, or by a fine not to	
2	exceed one thousand dollars (\$1,000),	
3	or by both that fine and imprisonment,	
4	if the firearm and unexpended	
5	ammunition capable of being	
6	discharged from that firearm are in the	
7	immediate possession of the person	
8	and the person is not in lawful	
9	possession of that firearm. Otherwise,	
10	a violation of this section is a	
11	misdemeanor. There is no enumerated	
12	exemption within this statute.	
13	4. California law bans the carrying of	4. Cal. Penal Code § 25400.
14	concealed firearms. There is no	
15	enumerated exemption within this	
16	statute.	
17	5. California law theoretically	5. Cal. Penal Code § 26150 through
18	provides for the entirely discretionary	26225, inclusive.
19	issuance of a license to carry loaded	
20	and exposed in only that county a	
21	pistol, revolver, or other firearm	. :
22	capable of being concealed upon the	
23	person where the population of the	
24	county is less than 200,000 persons	
25	according to the most recent federal	
26	decennial census.	
27	6. California law theoretically	6. Cal. Penal Code § 26150 through
28	provides for the entirely discretionary	26225, inclusive.
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1	issuance of a license to carry a pistol,	
2	revolver, or other firearm capable of	
3	being concealed upon the person,	
4	loaded or unloaded. A person must be	
5	a resident of the city, city and county,	
6	or county unless the applicant's	
7	principal place of employment or	
8	business is in the county or a city	
9	within the county and the applicant	
10	spends a substantial period of time in	
11	that place of employment or business.	
12	7. Absent permission, California law	7. Cal. Penal Code § 626.9
13	generally prohibits the possession of	
14	firearms within 1,000 feet of a K-12	
15	public or private school or on the	
16	grounds of a college or university.	
17	8. Absent permission, California law	8. Cal. Penal Code § 171c, 171d.
18	generally prohibits the possession of	
19	firearms within the State Capitol or	
20	grounds of the Governor's mansion.	
21	9. California law generally prohibits	9. Cal. Penal Code § 171.5
22	the possession of firearms within the	
23	sterile area of an airport or a passenger	
24	vessel terminal.	
25	10. Absent permission, California law	10. Cal. Penal Code § 171b.
26	generally prohibits the possession of	
27	firearms within any state or local	
28	public building or at any meeting	

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1		required to be open to the public	
2		pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing	
3		with Section 54950) of Part 1 of	
4		Division 2 of Title 5 of, or Article 9	
5		(commencing with Section 11120) of	
6		Chapter 1 of Part 1 of Division 3 of	
7		Title 2 of, the Government Code. This	
8		includes court houses and persons	
9		otherwise exempt if they are a party to	
10		an action pending before the court.	
11		11. A firearm shall be deemed loaded	11. Cal. Penal Code § 171e.
12		for the purposes of Sections 171c and	
13		171d whenever both the firearm and	
14		unexpended ammunition capable of	
15		being discharged from such firearm are	
16		in the immediate possession of the	
17		same person.	
18		12. California law generally prohibits	12. Cal. Penal Code § 171.7
19		the possession of firearms within the	
20		sterile area of a public transit facility.	
21		13. An act or omission that is	13. Cal. Penal Code § 654
22		punishable in different ways by	
23		different provisions of law shall be	·
24		punished under the provision that	
25	-	provides for the longest potential term	
26		of imprisonment, but in no case shall	
27		the act or omission be punished under	
28		more than one provision. An acquittal	
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1	or conviction and sentence under any	
2	one bars a prosecution for the same act	
3	or omission under any other.	
4	14. California law generally prohibits	14. Cal. Penal Code § 24510
5	the possession of firearms not	
6	immediately recognizable as a firearm.	. ,
7	15. California law generally prohibits	15. Cal. Penal Code § 24610
8	the possession of any undetectable	
9	firearm.	
10	16. A license to Carry A Pistol,	16. Cal. Penal Code § 26195
11	Revolver, or Other Firearm Capable of	<i>;</i>
12	Being Concealed Upon the Person	
13	shall not be issued if the Department of	
14	Justice determines that the person is	,
15	prohibited by state or federal law from	
16	possessing, receiving, owning, or	
17	purchasing a firearm.	
18	17. A license to carry loaded and	17. Cal. Penal Code § 26210
19	exposed a pistol, revolver, or other	
20	firearm capable of being concealed	
21	upon the person is revoked	
22	immediately upon a change of the	
23	licensee's place of residence to another	
24	county.	
25	18. California Penal Code section	18. Cal. Penal Code § 26405
26	26400 does not apply to, or affect, the	
27	carrying of an unloaded firearm that is	
28	not a handgun when the firearm is	
- 1	7	7

1	either in a locked container or encased	
2	and it is being transported directly	
3	between places where a person is not	
4	prohibited from possessing that firearm	
5	and the course of travel shall include	
6	only those deviations between	
7	authorized locations as are reasonably	
8	necessary under the circumstances.	
9	19. A minor shall not possess a pistol,	19. Cal. Penal Code § 29610
10	revolver, or other firearm capable of	
11	being concealed upon the person.	
12	20. The Attorney General maintains an	20. Cal. Penal Code § 30000
13	online database known as the	
14	Prohibited Armed Persons File. The	
15	purpose of the file is to cross-reference	
16	persons who have ownership or	
17	possession of a firearm on or after	
18	January 1, 1991, as indicated by a	
19	record in the Consolidated Firearms	
20	Information System, and who,	
21	subsequent to the date of that	
22	ownership or possession of a firearm,	
23	fall within a class of persons who are	
24	prohibited from owning or possessing a	
25	firearm.	
26	21. California law generally prohibits	21. Cal. Penal Code § 30605
27	the possession of "assault weapons"	
28	and .50 BMG rifles.	

1	22. California law generally prohibits	22. Cal. Penal Code § 32625
2	the possession of machineguns.	
3	23. California prohibits prisoners from	23. Cal. Penal Code § 4502
4	possessing firearms.	
5	24. The California Attorney General's	24. Exhibit C.
6	Department of Justice publication titled	
7	"FIREARMS PROHIBITING	
8	CATEGORIES" lists many categories	
9	of persons prohibited from possessing	
10	a firearm under state and Federal law	
11	including convicted felons and many	
12	categories of misdemeanor convictions.	
13	25. California law generally prohibits	25. Cal. Penal Code § 25300
14	possession of a firearm when the	
15	person carries a firearm in a public	
16	place or on any public street while	·
17	masked so as to hide the person's	
18	identity.	
19	26. California Penal Code section	26. Cal. Penal Code § 25640 & 25610
20	25400 does not apply to, or affect,	•
21	licensed hunters or fishermen carrying	
22	pistols, revolvers, or other firearms	
23	capable of being concealed upon the	
24	person while engaged in hunting or	
25	fishing, or transporting those firearms	
26	unloaded when going to or returning	
27	from the hunting or fishing expedition.	
28	However, the firearm must be within a	
- 1	_	

1	motor vehicle and locked in the	
2	vehicle's trunk or in a locked container	
3	in the vehicle or the firearm is carried	
4	by the person directly to or from any	
5	motor vehicle for any lawful purpose	
6	and, while carrying the firearm, the	
7	firearm is contained within a locked	
8	container.	
9	27. California Penal Code section	27. Cal. Penal Code § 26366
10	26350 does not apply to, or affect, the	
11	open carrying of an unloaded handgun	
12	by a licensed hunter while engaged in	
13	hunting or while transporting that	
14	handgun when going to or returning	
15	from that hunting expedition.	
16	28. According to California Penal	28. Cal. Penal Code § 26040
17	Code section 26040, nothing in	
18	California Penal Code section 25850	
19	shall prevent any person from carrying	
20	a loaded firearm in an area within an	
21	incorporated city while engaged in	
22	hunting, provided that the hunting at	
23	that place and time is not prohibited by	
24	the city council. PC 26040 does not	
25	require that one be a licensed hunter.	
26	29. Nothing in California Penal Code	29. Cal. Penal Code § 26060
27	section 25850 shall prevent any person	
28	from storing aboard any vessel or	
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1		aircraft any loaded or unloaded rocket,	
2		rocket propelled projectile launcher, or	
3		similar device designed primarily for	
4		emergency or distress signaling	
5		purposes, or from possessing that type	
6		of a device while in a permitted	
7		hunting area or traveling to or from a	
8		permitted hunting area and carrying a	!
¹ , 9		valid California permit or license to	
10		hunt.	
11		30. The text of California Penal Code	30. Dkt #88, Exhibits 1-18.
12		sections 25850, 26350, 26400, 26150,	
13		26165, 26155, 26160, 26175, 26180,	
14		26185, 26190, 26200, 26202, 26205,	
15		26210, 26215, 26220, 17030, were	
16		filed in this case.	
17		31. The first page of California Senate	31. Dkt #88, Exhibit 19-1
18		Bill 1080 "Deadly Weapons	
19		Recodification Act of 2010" states "SB	
20		1080, Committee on Public Safety.	
21		Deadly weapons. Existing law	
22		generally regulates deadly weapons.	
23		This bill would reorganize without	
24		substantive change the provisions of	
25		the Penal Code relating to deadly	
26		weapons, to be operative January 1,	
27		2012.	
28		32. A judicial decision determining the	32. Cal. Penal Code § 16025(a)
		1	1

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1	constitutionality of a previously	·
2	existing provision is relevant in	
3	determining the constitutionality of any	
4	provision of this part, of Title 2	
5	(commencing with Section 12001) of	
6	Part 4, or any other provision of the	
7	Deadly Weapons Recodification Act of	
8	2010, which restates and continues that	
9	previously existing provision.	
10	33. In enacting the Deadly Weapons	33. Cal. Penal Code § 16025(b)
11	Recodification Act of 2010, the	
12	Legislature has not evaluated the	
13	constitutionality of any provision	
14	affected by the act, or the correctness	
15	of any judicial decision determining	
16	the constitutionality of any provision	
17	affected by the act.	·
18	34. The Deadly Weapons	34. Cal. Penal Code § 16025(c)
19	Recodification Act of 2010 is not	
20	intended to, and does not, reflect any	
21	determination of the constitutionality	
22	of any provision affected by the act.	
23	35. Every person who carries a loaded	35. Cal. Penal Code § 12021.5(a)
24	or unloaded firearm on his or her	
25	person, or in a vehicle, during the	
26	commission or attempted commission	
27	of any street gang crimes described in	
28	subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 86.22,	
- 11	4.	_

shall, upon conviction of the felony or attempted felony, be punished by an 2 additional term of imprisonment in the 3 state prison for one, two, or three years in the court's discretion. The court shall 5 impose the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation or 7 mitigation. The court shall state the reasons for its enhancement choice on 9 the record at the time of sentence. 10 36. Every person who carries a loaded 11 or unloaded firearm together 12 13 detachable pistol magazine, a 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

36. Cal. Penal Code § 12021.5(b)

with a detachable shotgun magazine, a detachable magazine, or a belt-feeding device on his or her person, or in a vehicle, during the commission or attempted commission of any street gang crimes described in subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 186.22, shall, upon conviction of the felony or attempted felony, be punished by an additional term of imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years in the court's discretion. The court shall impose the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. The court shall state the

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1	reasons for its enhancement choice on)
2	the record at the time of sentence.	
3	37. Unless it is with the written	37. Cal. Penal Code § 30310(a).
4	permission of the school district	
5	superintendent, the superintendent's	
6	designee, or equivalent school	
7	authority, no person shall carry	
8	ammunition or reloaded ammunition	
9	onto school grounds, except sworn law	
10	enforcement officers acting within the	
11	scope of their duties or persons	
12	exempted under Section 25450.	
13	38. California Assembly Bill 144	38. Dkt #88 – Exhibit 20
14	(Effective date 1/1/2012) is filed in this	
15	case.	
16	39. California Assembly Bill 1527	39. Dkt #88 – Exhibit 21
17	(Effective date 1/1/2013) is filed in this	
18	case.	
19	40. California Attorney General's	40. Dkt #88 – Exhibit 25
20	Opinions Volume 51 – 1968 pgs 197-	
21	201 is filed in this case.	
22	41. Excerpts from the California State	41. Dkt #88 – Exhibits 26-1 through
23	Archives legislative file of Assembly	26-76.
24	Bill 1591 ("The Mulford Act of 1967")	
25	are filed in this case.	
26	42. California Penal Code section	42. Cal. Penal Code § 25850(a)
27	25850(a) was formerly codified as PC	Former Cal. Penal Code §
28	12031(a)(1).	12031(a)(1)
	1	4

1	43. California Penal Code section	43. Cal. Penal Code § 25850(b)
2	25850(b) was formerly codified as PC	Former Cal. Penal Code §
3	12031(e).	12031(e)
4	44. California Penal Code section	44. Cal. Penal Code § 25850(c)(6)
5	25850(c)(6) was formerly codified as	Former Cal. Penal Code §
6	PC 12031 (a)(2)(F).	(a)(2)(F)
7	45. In 2011, 80.8 percent of homicide	45. Exhibit D – Homicide in
8	victims were male, 19.2 percent were	California 2011 - Attorney General –
9	female.	Department of Justice Publication – pg
10		1 and Table 5 on pg 10.
11	46. In 2011, over half (54.5 percent) of	46. Exhibit D – Homicide in
12	white victims were aged "40 and over."	California 2011 - Attorney General –
13		Department of Justice Publication – pg
14		1 and Table 9 on pg 12.
15	47. In 2011, of the homicides where	47. Exhibit D – Homicide in
16	location was reported, 35.3 percent	California 2011 - Attorney General –
17	occurred on the street or sidewalk; 24.1	Department of Justice Publication – pg
18	percent in the victim's residence, and	1 and Table 19 on pg 25.
19	13.5 percent in a residence other than	
20	the victim's.	
21	48. In 2011, the largest proportion of	48. Exhibit D – Homicide in
22	male victims (40.4 percent) were killed	California 2011 - Attorney General –
23	on the street or sidewalk.	Department of Justice Publication – pg
24		1 and Table 19 on pg 25.
25	49. From 2002 to 2011, the	49. Exhibit D – Homicide in
26	overwhelming majority of homicide	California 2011 - Attorney General -
27	arrestees and victims were male.	Department of Justice Publication – pg
28		2.
-	1.	5

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- 50. In 2011, there were 136 justifiable homicides reported. Of these, 101 were committed by a peace officer and 35 were committed by a private citizen.
- 51. Prior to January 1, 2000, existing law generally provided that carrying a concealed or loaded firearm was punishable as a misdemeanor and, under certain circumstances, a felony. However, the Legislature determined that carrying a concealed or loaded firearm without being listed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) as the registered owner of the firearm is a serious crime and should be treated as such. Assembly Bill (AB) 491 (Scott, 1999) amended both Penal Code (PC) sections 12025 (carrying a concealed firearm) and 12031 (carrying a loaded firearm) to increase the number of circumstances when an offense could be charged. The following additional circumstances may be charged as either felonies or misdemeanors:
- When a person has both a firearm and unexpended ammunition in their immediate possession and that person is not listed with the DOJ as the

- 50. Exhibit D Homicide in
 California 2011 Attorney General –
 Department of Justice Publication pg
 2 and Table 39 on pg 43.
- 51. Exhibit E Concealable Firearms
 Charges in California 2000-2003 Attorney General Department of
 Justice Publication Introduction pg
 1.

registered owner of the firearm (former Penal Code section 12025).

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requirements.

- When a person carries a loaded firearm on his/her person or in a vehicle on any public street and that person is not listed with the DOJ as the registered owner of the firearm (former Penal Code section 12031).
- 52. AB 491 also amended PC sections 12025 and 12031 to require district attorneys to report specified information to the Attorney General about individuals charged with carrying a concealed or loaded firearm. This information includes the gender, race/ethnic group, and age of any person charged with a felony or misdemeanor under either PC sections 12025 or 12031 and any other offense charged in the same complaint or indictment. In addition, the Attorney General is required to compile these data and submit an annual report to the Legislature. In response to AB 491, the DOJ developed the Concealable Weapons Statistical System to meet the new data collection and reporting

52. Exhibit E – Concealable Firearms
Charges in California 2000-2003 Attorney General – Department of
Justice Publication – Introduction - pg
1.

Data collection and reporting began in 2000 after all district attorneys were notified by the DOJ of the reporting requirement.1 District attorneys submit data in either electronic format, via the Legal Net, or in manual format.

- 53. Prior to January 1, 2000, existing law generally provided that carrying a loaded firearm was punishable as a misdemeanor and, under certain circumstances, a felony. In 1999, PC section 12031 was amended to increase the number of circumstances when an offense could be charged. The following additional circumstance may be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor:
- When a person carries a loaded firearm on his/her person or in a vehicle on any public street and that person is not listed with the DOJ as the registered owner of the firearm.

Comparing 2000 to 2003:

■ The proportion of total charges for PC section 12031 resulting in felonylevel filings increased 6.4 percentage points (from 55.1 percent to 61.5 percent); misdemeanor-level filings

53. Exhibit E – Concealable Firearms Charges in California 2003 - Attorney General - Department of Justice Publication - pg 14.

1	decreased identically.		
2	54. The proportion of total charges for	54. Exhibit E – Concealable Firearms	
3	PC section 12031 resulting in	Charges in California 2003 - Attorney	
4	felony-level filings increased each	General – Department of Justice	
5	year since 2000.	Publication – pg 14.	
6	55. Comparing 2000 to 2003:	55. Exhibit E – Concealable Firearms	
7	■ The proportion of males charged	Charges in California 2003 - Attorney	
8	with PC section 12031 resulting in	General – Department of Justice	
9	felony-level filings increased 6.7	Publication – pg 15.	
10	percentage points (from 55.6 percent to		
11	62.3 percent); misdemeanor-level		
12	filings for males decreased identically.		
13	■ The proportion of females charged		
14	with PC section 12031 resulting in		
1.5	felony-level filings decreased 2.5		
16	percentage points (from 45.7 percent to		
17	43.2 percent); misdemeanor-level		
18	filings for females increased		
19	identically.		
20	56. From 2000 through 2003, the vast	56. Exhibit E – Concealable Firearms	
21	majority of persons charged with	Charges in California 2003 - Attorney	
22	PC section 12031 were male, and	General – Department of Justice	
23	males were proportionately more	Publication – pg 15.	
24	likely to be filed on at the felony		
25.	level than females.		
26	57. When charged with PC section	57. Exhibit E – Concealable Firearms	
27	12031, blacks were proportionately	Charges in California 2003 - Attorney	
28	most likely to be filed on at the felony	General – Department of Justice	
	19		

1	level, followed by Hispanics, other	Publication – pg 16.
2	race/ethnic groups, and whites. This	
3	pattern exists throughout the period	
4	shown.	
5	58. In 2003: Whites accounted for 488	58. Exhibit E – Concealable Firearms
6	of the 1,973 arrests for violation of PC	Charges in California 2003 - Attorney
7	12031, 190 of the 1,213 felony arrests	General – Department of Justice
8	for violation of PC 12031 and 288 of	Publication – pg 16, Table N-9.
9	the 760 misdemeanor arrests for	
10	violation of PC 12031.	
11	59. From 2011 to 2012, assaults	59. Exhibit F – Crime In California
12	against law enforcement officers	2012 - Attorney General – Department
13	decreased 4.0 percent, and the number	of Justice Publication – pg 1.
14	of assaults in 2012 was the lowest in 5	
1.5	years.	
16	60. In 2012, there were 20,521 felony	60. Exhibit F – Crime In California
17	weapons arrests in California. 19,049	2012 - Attorney General – Department
18	were male (92.8%), 1,472 were female	of Justice Publication – Table 31.
19	(7.2%). 5,160 were White (25.1%).	
20	10,182 were Hispanic (49.6%). 4,143	
21	were Black (20.2%). 1,036 were	
22	"Other" (5.0%).	
23	61. In 2012, there were 5,676	61. Exhibit F – Crime In California
24	misdemeanor weapons arrests in	2012 - Attorney General – Department
25	California. 5,136 were male (90.5%),	of Justice Publication – Table 35.
26	540 were female (9.5%). 1,933 were	
27	White (34.1%). 2,489 were Hispanic	
28	(43.9%). 885 were Black (15.6%).	
- 1	2	0

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1	369 were "Other" (6.5%).	
2	62. In 2012, there were 157,634	62. Exhibit F – Crime In California
3	Domestic Violence Related Calls for	2012 - Attorney General – Department
4	Assistance. 804 involved firearms.	of Justice Publication – Table 47.
5	63. In April 2002, law enforcement	63. Exhibit F – Crime In California
6	agencies were instructed to report	2012 - Attorney General – Department
7	personal weapons (hands, fists, or feet)	of Justice Publication – pg 65.
8	only if the assault resulted in an injury	
9	(aggravated assault). This instruction	
10	resulted in a notable decrease in the	
11	number of personal weapons reported.	
12	64. Felony level arrest offences in	64. Exhibit F – Crime In California
13	Exhibit F are: 171b(a)(1), 171b(a)(2),	2012 - Attorney General – Department
14	171b(a)(3), 171b(a)(4), 171b(a)(5),	of Justice Publication – pg 69, 71.
15	171b(a)(6)*, 171c, 171d(a)*, 171d(b)*,	•
16	186.28(a), 626.9(b)*, 626.9(d), 26.9(h),	
17	626.9(i), 626.95(a)*, 626.10(a)(1)*,	
18	626.10(b)*, 4502(a), 4502(b), 8101(a)	
19	WI, 8101(b) WI, 8103(a)(1) WI,	
20	8103(f)(1) WI, 12761 HS*, 18710(a)*,	
21	18720, 19200(a)*, 20310*, 20410*,	
22	20510*, 20610*, 20710*, 20910*,	
23	21110*, 21310*, 21810*, 22010*,	
24	22210*, 22410*, 23900, 24310*,	
25	24410*, 24510*, 24610*, 24710*,	
26	25100(a), 25300(a), 25400(a)(1)*,	
27	25400(a)(2)*, 25400(a)(3)*,	
28	25400(c)(1), 25400(c)(2), 25400(c)(3),	
)	1

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in Exhibit F are: 136.2(a)(7)(b)2,
                                               2012 - Attorney General - Department
 1
     171b(a)(6)*, 171d(a)*, 171d(b)*,
                                               of Justice Publication – pg 70, 71.
 2
     171.5(c)(1), 171.5(c)(2), 171.5(c)(3),
 3
     171.5(c)(4), 171.5(c)(5), 171.5(c)(6),
 4
     171.5(c)(7), 171.5(c)(8), 171.5(c)(9),
 5
     171.5(c)(10), 171.5(c)(11),
     171.5(c)(12), 468, 626.10(a)(1)*,
 7
     626.10(a)(2), 626.10(b)*, 626.10(i),
 8
     626.9(b)*, 626.95(a)*, 653k, 12761
 9
     HS*, 17500, 17510(a)(1), 17510(a)(2),
10
     17510(a)(3), 17512, 18710(a)*,
11
     19200(a)*, 19910, 19915, 20010,
12
     20150(a), 20155, 20310*, 20410*,
13
     20510*, 20610*, 20710*, 20810(a),
14
     20910*, 21110*, 21310*, 21510(a),
15
     21510(b), 21510(c), 21710, 21810*,
16
     22010*, 22210*, 22410*, 22610(a),
17
     22610(b), 22610(c)(1), 22610(d),
18
     22615(a), 22615(b), 22900, 23920,
19
     24310*, 24410*, 24510*, 24610*,
20
     24710*, 25100(b), 25200(a),
21
     25200(b)(3), 25400(a)(1)*,
22
     25400(a)(2)*, 25400(a)(3)*,
23
     25400(c)(5)*, 25400(c)(6)*,
24
     25800(a)*, 25850(a), 25850(c)(5)*,
25
     25850(c)(6)*, 26100(a), 26100(b)*,
26
     26100(d)*, 26180(a), 26350(a)(2),
27
     26500(a), 27500(b)*, 27505(a)*,
28
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1	27515*, 27520*, 27545*, 28050,	
2	28210(a)(1)*, 29650*, 29805*,	
3	29815(a)*, 29820(b)*, 29825(a)*,	
4	29825(b), 30210(a)*, 30210(b)*,	
5	30305(a)(1)*, 30605(a)*, 30610(a),	
6	31500*, 32310*, 32900*, 33215*,	
7	33600*	
8	66. The vast majority of persons	66. Exhibit E – Concealable Firearms
9	charged with either former PC section	Charges in California 2003 - Attorney
10	12025 or former PC section 12031	General – Department of Justice
11	were male.	Publication – pg 2.
12	67. When charged with either PC	67. Exhibit E – Concealable Firearms
13	section 12025 or PC section 12031,	Charges in California 2003 - Attorney
14	blacks were proportionately the most	General – Department of Justice
15	likely race/ethnic group to be filed on	Publication – pg 2.
16	at the felony level; whites were	
17	proportionately the least likely	
18	race/ethnic group to be filed on at the	
19	felony level.	
20	68. When charged with PC section	68. Exhibit E – Concealable
21	12025, blacks were proportionately	Firearms Charges in California 2003 -
22	most likely to be filed on at the felony	Attorney General – Department of
23	level, followed by Hispanics, other	Justice Publication – pg 6.
24	race/ethnic groups, and whites. This	
25	pattern exists throughout the period	
26	shown.	
27	69. In 2012, 39.4% of the estimated	69. United States Census Bureau ->
28	population of California is White (not	http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
	24	

1	Hispanic or Latino), 13.9% is Asian	06000.html
2	and 6.6% is Black or African-	
3	American and 3.6% is two or more	
4	races.	
5	70. As of the 2010 US Census, the	70. Exhibit G. US Census Bureau -
6	following counties in California had a	Annual Estimates of the Resident
7	population of fewer than 200,000	Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1,
8	people with a combined population of	2012
9	2,040,530:	
10	Alpine, Sierra, Modoc, Trinity, Mono,	
11	Mariposa, Inyo, Plumas, Colusa,	
12	Glenn, Del Norte, Lassen, Amador,	
13	Siskiyou, Calaveras, San Benito,	
14	Tuolumne, Tehama, Lake, Yuba,	
15	Mendocino, Sutter, Nevada, Humboldt,	
16	Napa, Madera, Kings, Imperial, Shasta,	
17	El Dorado	
18	71. As of the 2010 US Census, the	71. Exhibit G. US Census Bureau -
19	following counties in California had a	Annual Estimates of the Resident
20	population of 200,000 or more people	Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1,
21	with a combined population of	2012
22	35,213,426: Yolo, Butte, Marin,	
23	Merced, Santa Cruz, San Luis Obispo,	
24	Placer, Solano, Monterey, Santa	
25	Barbara, Tulare, Sonoma, Stanislaus,	
26	San Joaquin, San Mateo, San	
27	Francisco, Ventura, Kern, Fresno,	·
28	Contra Costa, Sacramento, Alameda,	
	2	5

1	Santa Clara, San Bernardino,	
2	Riverside, Orange, San Diego	
3	Los Angeles.	
4	72. California counties with a	72. California Department of Finance
5	population of fewer than 200,000	- 2010 Census Detailed Age by
6	people are predominantly White in	Race/Hispanic Origin by Gender -
7	race:	http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demog
8	White Population/Total Population:	raphic/state_census_data_center/census
9	Alpine County 881 / 1,175	_2010/documents/2010SF1_STCO_Ag
10	Amador County 33,149 / 38,091	eRaceSex-Web.zip
11	Calaveras County 40,522 / 45,578	
12	Colusa County 13,854 / 21,419	
13	Del Norte County 21,098 / 28,610	
14	Glenn County 19,990 / 28,122	
15	Humboldt County 109,920 / 134,623	
16	Imperial County 102,553 / 174,528	
17	Inyo County 13,741 / 18,546	
18	Kings County 83,027 / 152,982	
19	Lake County 52,033 / 64,665	
20	Lassen County 25,532 / 34,895	2
21	Madera County 94,456 / 150,865	
22	Mariposa County 16,103 / 18,251	
23	Mendocino County 67,218 / 87,841	
24.	Modoc County 8,084 / 9,686	
25	Mono County 9,686 / 14,202	
26	Napa County 97,525 / 136,484	
27	Nevada County 90,233 / 98,764	
28	Plumas County 17,797 / 20,007	
		26

1	the U.S. Supreme Court issued the	7.
2	decision known as District of	
3	Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 470	
4	(2008), which decision speaks for	
5	itself.	
6	77. The Attorney General admits that	77. Answer to Scnd. Am. Complaint ¶
7	Nichols is not challenging the	8.
8	constitutionality of, or the	
9	constitutionality of enforcement of,	
10	certain state or federal laws	
11	78. The Attorney General admits to	78. Answer to Scnd. Am. Complaint ¶
12	instructing all issuing authorities in	12.
13	California not to issue a license to	
14	openly carry a handgun to PLAINTIFF	
15	and similarly situated individuals on	
16	page 1 of her "STANDARD	
17	APPLICATION FOR LICENSE TO	
18	CARRY A CONCEALED WEAPON	
19	(CCW)" prepared by the Attorney	
20	General pursuant to California Penal	
21	Code section 26175 which also	
22	provides for her to revise the	
23	application form. DEFENDANT	
24	HARRIS has refused to either create or	
25	revise the application form to	
26	accommodate PLAINTIFF'S and	
27	similarly situated individuals Second	
28	Amendment right to openly carry a	

1	loaded firearm in public for the	
2	purpose of self-defense and other	
3	lawful purposes.	
4	79. The Attorney General admits that	79. Answer to Scnd. Am. Complaint
5	California Penal Code sections: 25850,	¶¶ 15-32.
6	26350, 26400, 26150, 26155, 26160,	
7	26165, 26175, 26180, 26185, 26190,	
8	26200, 26202, 26205, 26210, 26215,	
9	26220, 17030 speak for themselves.	
10	80. The Attorney General admits that	80. Answer to Scnd. Am. Complaint
11	the City of Redondo Beach local	¶¶ 33-34.
12	ordinances 4-35.01, 4-35.06, 4-35.20,	
13	5-8.01(a)(1) speak for themselves.	
14	81. The Attorney General admits that	81. Answer to Scnd. Am. Complaint ¶
15	the Office of the Attorney General	39.
16	publishes California crime statistics	
17	information, including a publication by	
18	the State of California's Office of	
19	Attorney General titled	
20	"CONCEALABLE FIREARMS	
21	CHARGES IN CALIFORNIA 2000-	
22	2003" and "Crime In California 2010"	
23	which publications she says speak for	
24	themselves.	·
25	82. The Attorney General admits that	82. Answer to Scnd. Am. Complaint ¶
26	the California Department of Justice	40.
27	has one database or more containing	
28	information about arrests made for	
	2.	9

1	weapons offenses.	
2	83. The Attorney General has admitted	83. Answer to Scnd. Am. Complaint
3	to enforcement of the laws enumerated	¶¶ 41-42, 47.
4	in Plaintiff's operative complaint,	
5	Second Amended Complaint (SAC), as	
6	well as to laws unspecified by code	
7	section in the SAC.	
8	84. The Attorney General admits that	84. Answer to Scnd. Am. Complaint ¶
9	Nichols obtained a Law Enforcement	48.
10	Gun Release letter from the Attorney	
11	General's California Department of	
12	Justice as required by California law.	
13	85. Any person who claims title to any	85. Cal. Penal Code § 33850.
14	firearm that is in the custody or control	
15	of a court or law enforcement agency	
16	and who wishes to have the firearm	
17	returned shall make application for a	
18	determination by the Department of	
19	Justice as to whether the applicant is	
20	eligible to possess a firearm.	
21	86. When the Department of Justice	86. Cal. Penal Code § 33865.
22	receives a completed application for a	
23	Law Enforcement Gun Release Letter	
24	pursuant to Section 33850	
25	accompanied by the fee required	
26	pursuant to Section 33860, it shall	
27	conduct an eligibility check of the	
28	applicant to determine whether the	
	20	1

1		applicant is eligible to possess a	
2		firearm.	
3		87. If the Department of Justice	87. Cal. Penal Code § 33865.
4		determines that the applicant is eligible	
5		to possess the firearm, the department	
6		shall provide the applicant with	
7		written notification that includes the	
8		following:	
9		(1) The identity of the applicant.	
10		(2) A statement that the applicant is	
11		eligible to possess a firearm.	
12		88. The Attorney General has issued a	88. Answer to Scnd. Am. Complaint ¶
13		letter stating that Plaintiff Nichols is	48.
14		eligible to possess a firearm.	
1.5		89. The "good cause" requirement of	89. Exhibit H. Decl., of Los Angeles
16		the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department	County UnderSheriff Paul Tanaka –
17		is intended to dramatically restrict the	Thomson v. Torrance Police
18		number of persons who are secretly	Department and the Los Angeles
19		armed within the county. In 2011,	County Sheriff's Department – Dkt
20		there was an average of approximately	#37-1, Case # CV 11-06154 (SJO)
21		400 existing concealed weapons	(JCx), Judge Otero Presiding - ¶¶10-11
22		permits that were issued by the LASD	
23		in a county of some 10 million people.	
24			
25	-	90. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's	90.
26		Department Concealed Weapon's	http://file.lacounty.gov/lasd/cms1_181
27		Licensing Policy, and Standard	452.pdf
28		Application to Carry a Concealed	
		3	1

1	Weapon is online at the LASD website.	
2	91. Plaintiff Nichols is a resident of	91. Nichols Decl., ¶ 1
3	Los Angeles County.	
4	92. Plaintiff Nichols resides in an	92. Nichols Decl., ¶ 2
5	incorporated city within Los Angeles	
6	County which does not have a chief of	
7	police.	
8	93. The front yard fence to Plaintiff	93. Nichols Decl., ¶ 3
9	Nichols' single-family residence facing	
10	the street is less than 3.5 feet in height.	
11	94. Plaintiff Nichols is a male.	94. Nichols Decl., ¶ 4
12	95. Plaintiff Nichols is 53 years of age.	95. Nichols Decl., ¶ 5
13	96. Since this action was first filed on	96. Nichols Decl., ¶ 6
14	November 30, 2011, Defendant Harris	
15	has issued to Plaintiff Nichols two Law	
16	Enforcement Gun Release letters	
17	authorizing the release of his single-	
18	shot shotgun then held by the City of	
19	Redondo Beach.	
20	97. Such letters authorizing the release	97. Nichols Decl., ¶ 7
21	of a firearm can only be issued to	•
22	persons who are not prohibited from	
23	possessing a firearm.	
24	98. Plaintiff Nichols is not prohibited	98. Nichols Decl., ¶ 8
25	under either California State or Federal	
26	law from purchasing or possessing a	
27	firearm.	
28	99. Plaintiff Nichols seeks to exercise	99. Nichols Decl., ¶ 9
	32	2

1	his Second Amendment right to openly	
2	carry handguns for the purpose of self-	
3	defense and for other lawful purposes,	
4	such handguns to be openly carried,	
5	not encased, both loaded and unloaded,	
6	in non-sensitive public places within	
7	incorporated cities and in non-sensitive	
8	places of unincorporated county	
9	territory where the Open Carry of	
10	handguns, both loaded and unloaded, is	
11	prohibited.	
12	100. Plaintiff Nichols seeks to exercise	100. Nichols Decl., ¶ 10
13	his Second Amendment right to openly	
14	carry long guns for the purpose of self-	
15	defense and for other lawful purposes,	
16	such long guns to be openly carried,	
17	not encased, both loaded and unloaded,	
18	in non-sensitive public places within	
19	incorporated cities and in non-sensitive	
20	places of unincorporated county	
21	territory where the Open Carry of	
22	handguns, both loaded and unloaded, is	
23	prohibited.	
24	101. Plaintiff Nichols seek to exercise	101. Nichols Decl., ¶ 11
25	his Second Amendment right to openly	
26	carry firearms for the purpose of self-	
27	defense and for other lawful purposes,	
28	such firearms to be openly carried, not	
- 1		,

			:
1		encased, both loaded and unloaded, in,	
2		within and on his motor vehicles,	
3		attached camper or trailer in non-	
4		sensitive public places within	
5		incorporated cities and in non-sensitive	
6		places of unincorporated county	
7		territory where the Open Carry of	
8		firearms, both loaded and unloaded, is	
9		prohibited in, within and on his motor	
10		vehicles, in non-sensitive public places	
11		within incorporated cities and in non-	
12		sensitive places of unincorporated	
13		counties.	
14		102. Plaintiff Nichols seeks to be free	102. Nichols Decl., ¶ 12
15		from warrantless searches and seizures	
16		of his person and property and to be	
17		free to refuse to voluntarily consent to	
18		unlawful searches and seizures of his	
19		person and property pursuant to the	
20		Fourth Amendment of the United	
21		States Constitution when in non-	
22		sensitive public places.	
23		103. Plaintiff Nichols seek to exercise	103. Nichols Decl., ¶ 13
24		his Second Amendment right to openly	
25.		carry firearms for the purpose of self-	
26		defense and for other lawful purposes,	
27		such firearms to be openly carried, not	
28		encased, both loaded and unloaded,	
1	1	21	

	_		
1		within the curtilage of his home.	
2		104. Plaintiff Nichols seeks to be free	104. Nichols Decl., ¶ 14
3		from warrantless searches and seizures	
4		of his person and property and to be	
5		free to refuse to voluntarily consent to	
6		unlawful searches and seizures of his	
7		person and property pursuant to the	
8		Fourth Amendment of the United	
9		States Constitution within the curtilage	
10		of his home.	
11		105. It takes several minutes to load a	105. Nichols Decl., ¶ 15
12		muzzle-loading revolver: to measure	
13		the charge, pour it into the chamber of	
14		the cylinder, properly seat the ball, ram	
15		the ball into the chamber, rotate the	
16		cylinder, repeat the process for each	
17		cylinder, seal each chamber with	
18		grease and cap each chamber.	
19		106. It takes many seconds to load a	106. Nichols Decl., ¶ 16
20		muzzle-loading long gun.	
21		107. It takes several seconds to load a	107. Nichols Decl., ¶ 17
22		modern semi-automatic firearm that	
23	.	uses metallic cartridges contained in a	
24		magazine.	
25.		108. It takes many seconds to load a	108. Nichols Decl., ¶ 18
26		modern single action revolver that uses	
27		metallic cartridges.	
28		109. It takes many seconds to retrieve	109. Nichols Decl., ¶ 19
		3	5

1		and load an unloaded modern firearm	
2		from a fully enclosed container. It	
3		takes many more seconds to unlock the	
4		container.	
5		110. Depending upon the distance one	110. Nichols Decl., ¶ 20
6		has ventured from his motor vehicle,	
7		retrieving a firearm from the motor	,
8		vehicle trunk, assuming the motor	
9		vehicle has a trunk, can take a	
10		substantial amount of time.	
11		111. An unloaded long gun, inside of a	111. Nichols Decl., ¶ 21
12		motor vehicle, substantially burdens	,
13		Plaintiff Nichols' right to self-defense.	
14		112. Plaintiff Nichols' motor vehicle	112. Nichols Decl., ¶ 22
15		does not have a trunk.	
16		113. An unloaded firearm, fully	113. Nichols Decl., ¶ 23
17		encased, in a locked or unlocked	
18		container, substantially burdens	
19		Plaintiff Nichols' right to self-defense.	
20		114. Prior to the enactment of the	114. Nichols Decl., ¶ 24
21		Mulford Act of 1967 which enacted, in	
22		part, former California Penal Code	
23		section 12031 which is now codified,	
24	ļ	in part, as California Penal Code	
25		section 25850 a firearm was considered	
26		to be loaded only if it had a live round	
27		in the firing chamber, or in the case of	
28		muzzle-loading firearms, if the firing	
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1	chamber was uncapped or unprimed.	
2	115. Firearms, which do not have	115. Nichols Decl., ¶ 25
3	mechanical safeties preventing the	
4	accidental discharge of a firearm, are	
5	best carried with the firing chamber	
6	empty and with live rounds in the	
7	cylinder or magazine.	
8	116. Plaintiff Nichols owns firearms	116. Nichols Decl., ¶ 26
9	which do not have firing pin safeties	
10	and seek to carry them with an	
11	unloaded firing chamber.	
12	117. Plaintiff Nichols seeks to openly	117. Nichols Decl., ¶ 27
13	carry modern firing reproductions of	
14	muzzle loading firearms, both loaded	
15	and unloaded, in the curtilage of his	
16	home, in non-sensitive public places of	
17	incorporated cities and in non-sensitive	
18	unincorporated county territory where	
19	it is prohibited, in and on his motor	
20	vehicles and in and on attached	
21	campers and trailers for the purpose of	
22	self-defense and for other lawful	
23	purposes.	
24	118. Plaintiff Nichols received a death	118. Nichols Decl., ¶ 28
25	threat via email which was reported to	
26	both the Attorney General and the Los	
27	Angeles Sheriff's department.	
28	119. Plaintiff Nichols attempted to file	119. Nichols Decl., ¶ 29
	3	7

1	the police report (Dkt. # 10) which was	
2	rejected by this court (Dkt. # 11).	
3	120. Plaintiff Nichols requested both	120. Nichols Decl., ¶ 30, FAC
4	an application and license from the	
5	Redondo Beach Chief of Police	
6	through his then attorney, the Redondo	
7	Beach City Attorney, to openly carry a	·
8	loaded handgun.	
9	121. The license was refused in an	121. Nichols Decl., ¶ 31, FAC
10	email from the City Attorney citing	
11	California law which precludes the	
12	issuance of a license to persons in	
13	counties with a population of 200,000	
14	or more people.	
15	122. Los Angeles County has a	122. Nichols Decl., ¶ 32
16	population of more than 200,000	
17	people.	
18	123. The conclusion of the Los	123. Nichols Decl., ¶ 33
19	Angeles Sheriff's Department Sergeant	
20	Inge was that someone who threatened	
21	to shoot Plaintiff Nichols and called	
22	upon others to track him down and do	
23	the same was not committing a	7
24	criminal offense because the email did	
25	not use the word "kill."	
26	124. The Attorney General refused to	124. Nichols Decl., ¶ 34
27	prosecute.	
28	125. Plaintiff Nichols fears arrest,	125. Nichols Decl., ¶ 35
Ì	38	8

1	prosecution, fine and imprisonment	
2	were Plaintiff Nichols to openly carry a	
3	firearm outside of his home. Plaintiff	
4	Nichols refrains from doing so but has	
5	not completely abstained from doing	
6	so.	
7	126. Beginning in January of 2015,	126. Nichols Decl., ¶ 36
8	Plaintiff Nichols plans on traveling	
9	through the state and to visit every	
10	incorporated city and every County	
11	within the State of California and to	
12	openly carry firearms, loaded and	
13	unloaded, in non-sensitive public	
14	places in those incorporated cities	
15	(including the city and county of San	
16	Francisco) and unincorporated county	
17	territory and to carry them in and on	
18	his motor vehicle and in and on an	
19	attached camper or trailer.	
20	127. Beginning in January of 2015,	127. Nichols Decl., ¶ 37
21	Plaintiff Nichols plans on openly	
22	carrying firearms, loaded and	
23	unloaded, in non-sensitive public	
24	places in non-sensitive unincorporated	
25	county territory (including the city and	
26	county of San Francisco) and to carry	
27	them in and on his motor vehicle and in	
28	and on an attached camper or trailer.	

1	128. Plaintiff Nichols plans on	128. Nichols Decl., ¶ 38
2	carrying loaded and unloaded firearms	
3	within the curtilage of his home for the	
4	purpose of self-defense and for other	
5	lawful purposes. It is impossible to	
6	predict when such a need will arise and	
7	therefore impossible to articulate a	
8	concrete plan.	
9	129. To Plaintiff Nichols' knowledge,	129. Nichols Decl., ¶ 39
10	there are no permits or licenses	
11	available to him to carry a loaded or	
12	unloaded firearm for the purpose of	
13	self-defense and police chiefs and	
14	county sheriffs are prevented by state	
15	law from issuing licenses to private	
16	citizens to openly carry a loaded or	
17	unloaded firearm in counties with a	
18	population of 200,000 or more persons	
19	and such licenses are only theoretically	
20	available for handguns and only in	
21	those counties with a population of	
22	fewer than 200,000 people and are only	
23	available in those counties to residents	
24	of those counties and are invalid	
25	outside of the county of issuance.	
26	130. To Plaintiff Nichols' knowledge,	130. Nichols Decl., ¶ 40
27	cities and counties are free to enact	
28	local regulations restricting where and	
- 1	11	n

1	when persons with a CCW license may	
2	carry a weapon pursuant to the license	
3	even if there is no restriction placed on	
4	the license by the county sheriff or	
5	police chief that issued the license.	
6	131. It is Plaintiff Nichols'	131. Nichols Decl., ¶ 41
7	understanding that except for certain	
8	exceptions, such as travelers while on a	
9	journey, carrying a concealed weapon	
10	falls outside the scope of the Second	
11	Amendment.	
12	132. It is Plaintiff Nichols'	132. Nichols Decl., ¶ 42
13	understanding that Plaintiff Nichols	
14	does not satisfy the Los Angeles	
15	Sheriff's Department "good cause"	
16	requirement for being issued a license	
17	to carry a loaded, concealable firearm	
18	and concealed carry substantially	
19	burdens Plaintiff Nichols' ability to	
20	defend himself even if he had a	
21	concealed carry license.	
22	133. Defendant Harris has never	133. Nichols Decl., ¶ 43
23	promised to not enforce the laws at	Dkt. #82, pg 6, lines 2-5.
24	issue.	
25	134. Justifiable Homicide: Self-	134. CALCRIM 505
26	Defense or Defense of Another. ("[A	
27	defendant is not required to retreat. He	
28	or she is entitled to stand his or her	
	,	<u>,</u>

1	ground and defend himself or herself	
2	and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue	
3	an assailant until the danger of	
4	death/great bodily injury/ {insert	
5	forcible and atrocious crime}) has	
6	passed. This is so even if safety could	
7	have been achieved by retreating.]")	
8	135. Right to Self-Defense or Defense	135. CALCRIM 3470
9	of Another (Non-Homicide). ("[A	·
10	defendant is not required to retreat. He	
11	or she is entitled to stand his or her	
12	ground and defend himself or herself	
13	and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue	
14	an assailant until the danger of	
15	(death/bodily injury/ {insert crime})	
16	has passed. This is so even if safety	
17	could have been achieved by	
18	retreating.]")	
19	136. 74% of homicides of White males	136. Exhibit D – Homicide in
20	occur outside of the victim's residence.	California 2011 - Attorney General –
21		Department of Justice Publication – pg
22		Table 19 on pg 25.
23		

Charles Nichols PO Box 1302 Redondo Beach, CA 90278 Voice: (424) 634-7381 E-Mail: CharlesNichols@Pykrete.info 2 In Pro Per 5 6 7 **United States District Court** 8 Central District of California 9 10 Charles Nichols, Case No.: CV-11-9916 SJO (SS) 11 PLAINTIFF, DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF 12 VS. 13 KAMALA D. HARRIS, Attorney 14 General, in her official capacity as 15 Attorney General of California 16 17 Defendant. 18 19 20 21 I, Plaintiff In Pro Per Charles Nichols, declare as follows based on my 22 personal knowledge: 23 24 1. I am a resident of Los Angeles County. 25 2. I reside in an incorporated city within Los Angeles County which does 26 not have a chief of police. 27 28 Declaration of Charles Nichols Case No.: CV-11-9916 SJO (SS)

- ?

- 3. The front yard fence to my single-family residence facing the street is less than 3.5 feet in height.
 - 4. I am a male.
 - 5. I am 53 years of age.
- 6. Since this action was first filed on November 30, 2011, Defendant Harris has issued to me two Law Enforcement Gun Release letters authorizing the release of my single-shot shotgun then held by the City of Redondo Beach.
- 7. Such letters authorizing the release of a firearm can only be issued to persons who are not prohibited from possessing a firearm.
- 8. I am not prohibited under either California State or Federal law from purchasing or possessing a firearm.
- 9. I seek to exercise my Second Amendment right to openly carry handguns for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes, such handguns to be openly carried, not encased, both loaded and unloaded, in non-sensitive public places within incorporated cities and in non-sensitive places of unincorporated county territory where the Open Carry of handguns, both loaded and unloaded, is prohibited.
- 10. I seek to exercise my Second Amendment right to openly carry long guns for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes, such long guns to be openly carried, not encased, both loaded and unloaded, in non-sensitive public places within incorporated cities and in non-sensitive places of unincorporated county territory where the Open Carry of handguns, both loaded and unloaded, is prohibited.
- 11. I seek to exercise my Second Amendment right to openly carry firearms for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes, such firearms to be openly carried, not encased, both loaded and unloaded, in, within and on my motor vehicles, attached camper or trailer in non-sensitive public places within incorporated cities and in non-sensitive places of unincorporated county

territory where the Open Carry of firearms, both loaded and unloaded, is prohibited in, within and on my motor vehicles, in non-sensitive public places within incorporated cities and in non-sensitive places of unincorporated county.

- 12. I seek to be free from warrantless searches and seizures of my person and property and to be free to refuse to voluntarily consent to unlawful searches and seizures of my person and property pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution when in a non-sensitive public place.
- 13. I seek to exercise my Second Amendment right to openly carry firearms for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes, such firearms to be openly carried, not encased, both loaded and unloaded, within the curtilage of my home.
- 14. I seek to be free from warrantless searches and seizures of my person and property and to be free to refuse to voluntarily consent to unlawful searches and seizures of my person and property pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution within the curtilage of my home.
- 15. It takes several minutes to load a muzzle-loading revolver: to measure the charge, pour it into the chamber of the cylinder, properly seat the ball, ram the ball into the chamber, rotate the cylinder, repeat the process for each cylinder, seal each chamber with grease and cap each chamber.
 - 16. It takes many seconds to load a muzzle-loading long gun.
- 17. It takes several seconds to load a modern semi-automatic firearm that uses metallic cartridges contained in a magazine.
- 18. It takes many seconds to load a modern single action revolver that uses metallic cartridges.
- 19. It takes many seconds to retrieve and load an unloaded modern firearm from a fully enclosed container. It takes many more seconds to unlock the container.

- 20. Depending upon the distance one has ventured from his motor vehicle, retrieving a firearm from the motor vehicle trunk, assuming the motor vehicle has a trunk, can take a substantial amount of time.
- 21. An unloaded long gun, inside of a motor vehicle, substantially burdens my right to self-defense.
 - 22. My motor vehicle does not have a trunk.
- 23. An unloaded firearm, fully encased, in a locked or unlocked container, substantially burdens my right to self-defense.
- 24. Prior to the enactment of the Mulford Act of 1967 which enacted, in part, former California Penal Code section 12031 which is now codified, in part, as California Penal Code section 25850 a firearm was considered to be loaded only if it had a live round in the firing chamber, or in the case of muzzle-loading firearms, if the firing chamber was uncapped or unprimed.
- 25. Firearms, which do not have mechanical safeties preventing the accidental discharge of a firearm, are best carried with the firing chamber empty and with live rounds in the cylinder or magazine.
- 26. I own firearms which do not have firing pin safeties and seek to carry them with an unloaded firing chamber.
- 27. I seek to openly carry modern firing reproductions of muzzle loading firearms, both loaded and unloaded, in the curtilage of my home, in non-sensitive public places of incorporated cities and in non-sensitive unincorporated county territory where it is prohibited, in and on my motor vehicles and in and on attached campers and trailers for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes.
- 28. I received a death threat via email which was reported to both the Attorney General and the Los Angeles Sheriff's department.
- 29. I attempted to file the police report (Dkt. # 10) which was rejected by this court (Dkt. # 11).

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- 30. I requested both an application and license from the Redondo Beach Chief of Police through his then attorney, the Redondo Beach City Attorney, to openly carry a loaded handgun.
- 31. The license was refused in an email from the City Attorney citing California law which precludes the issuance of a license to openly carry in counties with a population of 200,000 or more people.
 - 32. Los Angeles County has a population of more than 200,000 people.
- 33. The conclusion of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Sergeant Inge was that someone who threatened to shoot me and called upon others to track me down and do the same was not committing a criminal offense because the email did not use the word "kill."
 - 34. The Attorney General refused to prosecute.
- 35. I fear arrest, prosecution, fine and imprisonment were I to openly carry a firearm outside of my home. I refrain from doing so but have not completely abstained from doing so.
- 36. Beginning in January of 2015, I plan on traveling through the state and to visit every incorporated city and every County within the State of California and to openly carry firearms, loaded and unloaded, in non-sensitive public places in those incorporated cities (including the city and county of San Francisco) and unincorporated county territory and to carry them in and on my motor vehicle and in and on an attached camper or trailer.
- 37. Beginning in January of 2015, I plan on openly carrying firearms, loaded and unloaded, in non-sensitive public places in non-sensitive unincorporated county territory (including the city and county of San Francisco) and to carry them in and on my motor vehicle and in and on an attached camper or trailer.
- 38. I plan on carrying loaded and unloaded firearms within the curtilage of my home for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes. It is

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impossible to predict when such a need will arise and therefore impossible to articulate a concrete plan.

- 39. To my knowledge, there are no permits or licenses available to me to carry a loaded or unloaded firearm for the purpose of self-defense and police chiefs and county sheriffs are prevented by state law from issuing licenses to private citizens to openly carry a loaded or unloaded firearm in counties with a population of 200,000 or more persons and such licenses are only theoretically available for handguns and only in those counties with a population of fewer than 200,000 people and are only available in those counties to residents of those counties and are invalid outside of the county of issuance.
- 40. To my knowledge, cities and counties are free to enact local regulations restricting where and when persons with a CCW license may carry a weapon pursuant to the license even if there is no restriction placed on the license by the county sheriff or police chief that issued the license.
- 41. It is my understanding that except for certain exceptions, such as travelers while on a journey, carrying a concealed weapon falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment.
- 42. It is my understanding that I do not satisfy the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department "good cause" requirement for being issued a license to carry a loaded, concealable firearm and concealed carry substantially burdens my ability to defend myself even if I had a concealed carry license.
 - 43. Defendant Harris has never promised to not enforce the laws at issue.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 844 day of November, 2013.

Charles Nichols

Della

1	Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) Plaintiff, In Pro Per, Charles		
1	Nichols voluntarily dismisses his action, without prejudice, against Defendant		
2			
3	CITY OF REDONDO BEACH and Does 1 to 10.		
4			
5	Neither Defendant CITY OF REDONDO BEACH nor Does 1 to 10 has		
6	served either an Answer or a motion for summary judgment.		
7			
8	Accordingly, Plaintiff Nichols, In Pro Per, is free to refile his claims against		
9	CITY OF REDONDO BEACH and Does 1 to 10 at any time.		
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14	D (C11 1 24 1		
15	Dated: August 5, 2013 Respectfully submitted,		
16			
17			
18	Charl Non		
19	By: Charles Nichols PLAINTIFF in Pro Per		
20	PO Box 1302 Redondo Beach, CA 90278		
21	Redondo Beach, CA 90278 Voice: (424) 634-7381 E-Mail:		
22	Charles Nichols @Pykrete.info		
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	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal 2 Charles Nichols v. Edmund G Brown Jr et al		

DECLARATION OF CHARLES NICHOLS

|| f

- I, Charles Nichols, submit this declaration in support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. I make this declaration of my own personal knowledge and if called as a witness I could and would testify competently to the truth of the matters set forth herein.
- 1. I am a resident of Los Angeles County and a natural born citizen of the United States and I am fifty-three years of age.
- 2. I am not prohibited under Federal or California law from receiving or possessing firearms.
- 3. I have violated the laws at issue in the past and have articulated a concrete plan to violate them in the future.
- 4. I am presently being prosecuted for openly carrying a firearm in violation of a City of Redondo Beach municipal ordinance even though I was openly carrying the firearm in the beach zone of the city which is exempt from the ordinance (all coastal parklands are exempt by the city's own municipal ordinances) and despite the findings of Magistrate Judge Suzanne Segal and Federal District Court Judge Samuel James Otero that the State of California had preempted local regulations concerning the carrying of firearms. According to the City Attorney whose City Prosecutor reports to him, the city's ban applies to all weapons in all public places of the city.
- 5. On October 24, 2012 California Superior Court judge David Sotelo denied my demurrer to the criminal charge stating "Given the uniqueness of the

- 6. The black population of the City of Redondo Beach is 2.8%. Only 25.9% of Compton is white. Only 23.8% of Carson is white. The portions of the City of Los Angeles immediate east of Redondo Beach are similarly predominantly minority. The Cities of Torrance and Lomita which were not mentioned by judge Sotelo are also immediately to the east of the City of Redondo Beach. Torrance has a black population of 2.7%. Lomita has a black population of 5.3%. These figures were obtained from the U.S. Census website reflecting the 2010 Census.
- 7. On May 21, 2011 I was stopped against my will by Redondo Beach police officers who took my long gun against my clear and vocal refusal to consent to the search. Redondo Beach Police Officer Todd Heywood performed a "chamber check" to see if the firearm was unloaded pursuant to California Penal Code section 25850 and then subsequently confiscated my firearm, carrying case, padlock and key thereby depriving me of my only means of self-defense even though the City of Redondo Beach has been aware since at least December 6, 2011 that I have a documented death threat against me. The unloaded firearm was also seized during the course of a peaceful protest. The protest was coordinated with the Redondo Beach City Attorney and Police Chief in advance.
- 8. I sustained a severe back injury in a riding accident in August of 2002 leaving me partially disabled. I am not physically able to defend myself other than with a firearm. Current California law prevents me from openly carrying a firearm

in case of confrontation for the purpose of self-defense. This includes self-defense with a less-lethal Taser which California defines as a "firearm."

- 9. This leaves under California law the only means of self-defense; a knife openly carried. However, some California cities such as the City of Redondo Beach and the City of Los Angeles have made it a crime to openly carry a knife which leaves me completely defenseless in those communities even if I were physically able to defend myself with a knife.
- 10. California law prohibits the issuance of licenses to openly carry a handgun to counties with a population of fewer than 200,000 people. These licenses are only theoretically available to residents of those counties and are only valid within the county within which they are issued.
- 11. I asked for an application and license to openly carry a loaded handgun from the Redondo Beach police chief who denied my request citing California Penal Code section 26155 through his then attorney, the City Attorney for Redondo Beach.
- 12. My public defender has stated in open court that he cannot provide me with a competent defense. The presiding judge, "Chet" Taylor did not replace my public defender.
- 13. The only motion to dismiss the criminal case against me filed by my public defender referenced but a single sentence from Assembly Bill 1527, a 15 page bill which made it a crime to openly carry an unloaded long gun in incorporated cities. The motion is based on state preemption.

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- 14. The sections of the California Penal code alone regulating the possession, use and carrying of weapons is over 200 pages long. Given that the municipal ordinance I am being charged with violating bans all weapons, a proper preemption motion would have been significantly longer.
- 15. My public defender has thus far refused to file a motion based on the First and Second Amendments to the US Constitution saying that he and his office (the Los Angeles County Public Defenders Office) does not believe that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right despite the U.S. Supreme Court, Federal Courts and California's own state courts saying that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right. And despite the fact that prior to the Heller decision, the California Supreme court had recognized the carrying of firearms as a fundamental right, albeit one subject to rational review, since 1924.
- 16. My own personal experience has proven that California police, prosecutors and judges do not obey their own laws. I cannot receive a fair trial. My only recourse is through the Federal courts.
 - 17. To the best of my knowledge, the exhibits are true and correct.

Executed in the United States on April 8, 2013,

By: Charles Nichols PLAINTIFF in Pro Per

PO Box 1302

Redondo Beach, CA 90278 Voice: (424) 634-7381

E-Mail:

Charles Nichols @Pykrete.info

Charles Nichols
PO Box 1302
Redondo Beach, CA 90278
Voice: (424) 634-7381
E-Mail: CharlesNichols@Pykrete.info
In Pro Per

United States District Court Central District of California

Charles Nichols,

PLAINTIFF,

VS.

KAMALA D. HARRIS, Attorney

General, in her official capacity as

Attorney General of California, CITY

OF REDONDO BEACH and DOES 1

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Defendants.

Case No.:

CV-11-9916 SJO (SS)

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND/OR PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988

FIRST AMENDMENT

SECOND AMENDMENT

FOURTH AMENDMENT

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Second Amended Complaint

Charles Nichols v. Edmund G Brown Jr et al ER216

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988.
- 2. Venue lies in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

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PARTIES

- 3. PLAINTIFF CHARLES NICHOLS is a natural person and citizen of the United States and of the State of California and was at all material times a resident of Los Angeles County.
- At all relevant times, DEFENDANT KAMALA HARRIS (KAMALA HARRIS, HARRIS) was, and currently is, the Attorney General of the State of California and she is obligated to supervise her agency and comply with all statutory duties under California Law. She is charged with enforcing and interpreting California Statutes including, but not limited to, California Penal Code Sections 25850, 26350, 26400, 26150, 26155, 26165, 26175, 26180, 26185, 26190, 26200, 26202, 26205, 26210, and 26215. KAMALA HARRIS has concurrent prosecutorial jurisdiction with the state's 58 District Attorneys, and she is bound by a duty to seek substantial justice and avoid the filing of criminal charges in which she knows (or should know) are not supported by probable cause. HARRIS also has an independent duty to disclose information beneficial to the accused and by extension she has a duty to prevent wrongful arrests in the first place when she has the power to do so. When she deems it advisable or necessary in the public interest, or when directed to do so by the Governor, she shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of his duties, and may, where she deems it necessary, take full charge of any investigation or prosecution of violations of law of which the superior court has jurisdiction. In this respect she has all the powers of a district

- 5. At all relevant times, DEFENDANT CITY OF REDONDO BEACH ("CITY") is and was a duly organized public entity, form unknown, existing under the laws of the State of California. At all relevant times, CITY was the employer of the police officers, prosecutors and DOE defendants who injured PLAINTIFF.
- 6. PLAINTIFF is uncertain of the exact identity of any additional individual defendants who participated in the violation of his constitutionally protected rights. PLAINTIFF therefore names these individuals as DOE Defendants and reserves the right to amend this complaint when their true names are ascertained. Furthermore, if/when additional persons and entities are discovered to have assisted and/or lent support to the wrongful conduct of the DEFENDANTS named herein, PLAINTIFF reserves the right to amend this complaint to add those persons and/or entities as Defendants.

BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS

7. The United States Supreme Court in its landmark decision on the Second Amendment, *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2809 (2008), broadly confirmed the rights of Americans to keep and bear arms. While the opinion recognizes some limits to this right (i.e., prohibitions on concealed weapons in public, prohibitions on dangerous and unusual weapons, limitations on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, and laws forbidding carrying firearms in sensitive locations like schools and public buildings), the right itself is broad and occupies an important place in our constitutional history. The

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right to keep and bear arms is implicit in our understanding of ordered liberty and is deeply rooted in the traditions of our country. The Second Amendment right is not the only provision in the Bill of Rights that has controversial public safety implications. The provisions of the Bill of Rights have governed law enforcement practices, the prosecution of cases including criminal cases and the punishment of offenders. All of these have disputed public safety implications. Despite this, self-defense is the central component of the Second Amendment right and is enshrined in Article I, Section 1 our own State Constitution. The core lawful purpose of self-defense does not disappear the moment a private citizen steps outside his home. *Heller* has provided for a number of presumptively lawful regulatory measures noted above such as prohibitions on the carrying of concealed firearms in public, but neither the state nor local governments can prohibit private citizens from carrying firearms openly, except in sensitive places. *Heller* tells us "This [Open Carry] is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States..."

8. This case involves an important constitutional principle, that neither the state nor local governments may prohibit PLAINTIFF or similarly situated individuals from openly carrying a fully functional firearm (loaded and unloaded) for the purpose of self-defense (or for other lawful purposes) in non-sensitive public places such as public streets, sidewalks, parking lots, open public spaces, his residential property, within his motor vehicle including any attached camper or trailer regardless of whether or not the motor vehicle or attached camper or trailer is used as a primary or temporary residence or no residence at all. Places which are not sensitive places where the carrying of loaded firearms can be prohibited; such as in schools and government buildings and where there exists a State or Federal law which constitutionally prohibits the carrying of a loaded firearm in those sensitive places are not at issue. PLAINTIFF similarly does not challenge any state or Federal prohibition on the carrying of weapons concealed or in the

licensing of the carrying of a weapon concealed in a public place or any of the other presumptively lawful prohibitions stated in the *Heller* decision.

California law has expanded its ban on carrying a firearm in public to such a 9. great extent that PLAINTIFF, and tens of millions of similarly situated persons in California, violate the ban by merely stepping outside the door of his home onto his own residential property. In particular, California courts have construed the ban on carrying firearms in a public place to include private residential property. California courts have also construed that a loaded handgun, inside of a chest of drawers, inside of a trailer towed behind a motor vehicle is a public place even though the trailer was being used as a primary residence by the defendant. The California legislature has enacted two recent bans on the open carry of unloaded firearms in public. Assembly Bill 144 made it a crime to openly carry an unloaded handgun in a public place and Assembly Bill 1527 made it a crime to openly carry an unloaded firearm in a public place which is not a handgun (e.g., rifle shotgun) in an incorporated city or city and county. Neither bill provides for a self-defense exception. Both bills prohibit transport of an unloaded firearm except for directly between two places where it is legal to possess a firearm. Prior to the enactment of these two bills it was possible to openly carry an unloaded firearm in public places with ammunition at the ready and to load the firearm should one find himself in "grave, immediate danger," with an exception within 1,000 feet of a K-12 public or private school, where handguns had to be carried unloaded in a fully enclosed, locked container unless one had permission from the school (see Penal Code section 626.9). This prohibition did not apply to the Open Carry of unloaded long guns. However, the California courts are split on what constitutes a "loaded" firearm. One appellate court held (correctly) that a firearm is not loaded unless there is a live round in the firing chamber while another held that an unloaded

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firearm is "loaded" if it simply has a magazine or clip containing ammunition attached to the firearm and there is no ammunition in the firing chamber.

- 10. The theoretical ability to secure a license to openly carry a loaded firearm is meaningless in light of Penal Code sections 26150 and 26155 which prevent anyone living in a county with 200,000 or more people from securing a license to openly carry a loaded gun. Virtually everyone in the state of California lives in a place where state law prohibits the issuance of a license to openly carry a loaded firearm (i.e., anyone who lives in a county with 200,000 people or more people) including PLAINTIFF who lives in the County of Los Angeles.
- 11. Aside from the population limitation, an individual seeking a license to carry a loaded and exposed weapon or a concealed weapon is required to apply for a license from either the head of a municipal police department or county sheriff. PLAINTIFF'S city of residence does not have a police chief and the custom and policy of the Sheriff of Los Angeles County is to not issue permits absent showing of an extraordinary need which as a practical matter means almost no one can carry a loaded gun in Los Angeles County.
- 12. Indeed DEFENDANT HARRIS has instructed all issuing authorities in California not to issue a license to openly carry a handgun to PLAINTIFF and similarly situated individuals on page 1 of her "STANDARD APPLICATION FOR LICENSE TO CARRY A CONCEALED WEAPON (CCW)" prepared by the Attorney General pursuant to California Penal Code section 26175 which also provides for her to revise the application form. DEFENDANT HARRIS has refused to either create or revise the application form to accommodate PLAINTIFF'S and similarly situated individuals Second Amendment right to openly carry a loaded firearm in public for the purpose of self-defense and other

lawful purposes. Given the above, the constitutional right to bear arms as enshrined in the Second Amendment and as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court is being violated on a daily basis in California.

13. This case involves a second important constitutional principle that neither the state nor its local governments can deny a license to PLAINTIFF or similarly situated persons to openly carry a loaded firearm in non-sensitive public places based on the population of the county in which a person who is not prohibited from possessing a firearm resides or because he resides in a city or county within the state in which state law does not provide for the issuance of a license to openly carry a loaded firearm in non-sensitive public places.

STATE LAWS AND CITY ORDINANCES

- 14. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 15. Section 25850 states in pertinent part:

- 25850. (a) A person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city or in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area of unincorporated territory.
- (b) In order to determine whether or not a firearm is loaded for the purpose of enforcing this section, peace officers are authorized to examine any firearm carried by anyone on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city or prohibited area of an unincorporated territory. Refusal to allow a peace officer to inspect a firearm pursuant to this section constitutes probable cause for arrest for violation of this section. (Note that

California Penal Code section 25850 does not contain a self-defense exception as did prior section 12031.)

- 16. California Penal Code section 26350 states in pertinent part:
- 26350. (a) (1) A person is guilty of openly carrying an unloaded handgun when that person carries upon his or her person an exposed and unloaded handgun outside a vehicle while in or on any of the following:
 - (A) A public place or public street in an incorporated city or city and county.
- (B) A public street in a prohibited area of an unincorporated area of a county or city and county.
 - (C) A public place in a prohibited area of a county or city and county.
- (2) A person is guilty of openly carrying an unloaded handgun when that person carries an exposed and unloaded handgun inside or on a vehicle, whether or not on his or her person, while in or on any of the following:
 - (A) A public place or public street in an incorporated city or city and county.
- (B) A public street in a prohibited area of an unincorporated area of a county or city and county.
 - (C) A public place in a prohibited area of a county or city and county.
- 17. California Penal Code section 26400 states in pertinent part:
- 26400. (a) A person is guilty of carrying an unloaded firearm that is not a handgun in an incorporated city or city and county when that person carries upon his or her person an unloaded firearm that is not a handgun outside a vehicle while in the incorporated city or city and county.
- 18. California Penal Code section 26150 states in pertinent part:

- 26150. (a) When a person applies for a license to carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, the sheriff of a county may issue a license to that person upon proof of all of the following:
 - (1) The applicant is of good moral character.
 - (2) Good cause exists for issuance of the license.
- (3) The applicant is a resident of the county or a city within the county, or the applicant's principal place of employment or business is in the county or a city within the county and the applicant spends a substantial period of time in that place of employment or business.
- (4) The applicant has completed a course of training as described in Section 26165.
- (b) The sheriff may issue a license under subdivision (a) in either of the following formats:
- (1) A license to carry concealed a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.
- (2) Where the population of the county is less than 200,000 persons according to the most recent federal decennial census, a license to carry loaded and exposed in only that county a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.
- 19. California Penal Code **section 26155** is substantially identical to section 26150 except that "the chief or other head of a municipal police department of any city or city and county" is substituted for "the sheriff of a county" and:
- (c) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude the chief or other head of a municipal police department of any city from entering an agreement with the sheriff of the county in which the city is located for the sheriff to process all applications for

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licenses, renewals of licenses, and amendments to licenses, pursuant to this chapter.

California Penal Code section 26160 states in pertinent part: 20.

26160. Each licensing authority shall publish and make available a written policy summarizing the provisions of Section 26150 and subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 26155.

- California Penal Code section 26165 requires a course of training of up to 21. 24 hours before a license may be issued.
- California Penal Code section 26175 states in pertinent part: 22.

26175. (a) (1) Applications for licenses, applications for amendments to licenses, amendments to licenses, and licenses under this article shall be uniform throughout the state, upon forms to be prescribed by the Attorney General.

- (2) The Attorney General shall convene a committee composed of one representative of the California State Sheriffs' Association, one representative of the California Police Chiefs Association, and one representative of the Department of Justice to review, and as deemed appropriate, revise the standard application form for licenses. The committee shall meet for this purpose if two of the committee's members deem that necessary.
- (c) The standard application form for licenses described in subdivision (a) shall require information from the applicant, including, but not limited to, the name, occupation, residence, and business address of the applicant, the applicant's age, height, weight, color of eyes and hair, and reason for desiring a license to carry the weapon.
- (i) Any license issued upon the application shall set forth the licensee's name, occupation, residence and business address, the licensee's age, height, weight, color

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of eyes and hair, and the reason for desiring a license to carry the weapon, and shall, in addition, contain a description of the weapon or weapons authorized to be carried, giving the name of the manufacturer, the serial number, and the caliber.

- 23. California Penal Code section 26180 states in pertinent part:
- 26180. (a) Any person who files an application required by Section 26175 knowing that any statement contained therein is false is guilty of a misdemeanor.
- 24. California Penal Code section 26185 states in pertinent part:
- 26185. (a) (1) The fingerprints of each applicant shall be taken and two copies on forms prescribed by the Department of Justice shall be forwarded to the department.
- (2) Upon receipt of the fingerprints and the fee as prescribed in Section 26190, the department shall promptly furnish the forwarding licensing authority a report of all data and information pertaining to any applicant of which there is a record in its office, including information as to whether the person is prohibited by state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm.
- (3) No license shall be issued by any licensing authority until after receipt of the report from the department.
- (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if the license applicant has previously applied to the same licensing authority for a license to carry firearms pursuant to this article and the applicant's fingerprints and fee have been previously forwarded to the Department of Justice, as provided by this section, the licensing authority shall note the previous identification numbers and other data that would provide positive identification in the files of the Department of Justice on the copy of any subsequent license submitted to the department in conformance with Section 26225 and no additional application form or fingerprints shall be required.

- (c) If the license applicant has a license issued pursuant to this article and the applicant's fingerprints have been previously forwarded to the Department of Justice, as provided in this section, the licensing authority shall note the previous identification numbers and other data that would provide positive identification in the files of the Department of Justice on the copy of any subsequent license submitted to the department in conformance with Section 26225 and no additional fingerprints shall be required.
- 25. California Penal Code section 26190 requires fees and provides for additional testing costing applicant up to \$150 in addition to the required fees.
- 26. California Penal Code section 26200 states in pertinent part:
- 26200. (a) A license issued pursuant to this article may include any reasonable restrictions or conditions that the issuing authority deems warranted, including restrictions as to the time, place, manner, and circumstances under which the licensee may carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.
- 27. California Penal Code section 26202 states in pertinent part:
- 26202. Upon making the determination of good cause pursuant to Section 26150 or 26155, the licensing authority shall give written notice to the applicant of the licensing authority's determination. If the licensing authority determines that good cause exists, the notice shall inform the applicants to proceed with the training requirements specified in Section 26165. If the licensing authority determines that good cause does not exist, the notice shall inform the applicant that the request for a license has been denied and shall state the reason from the department's published policy, described in Section 26160, as to why the determination was made.

 28. California Penal Code section 26205 states in pertinent part:

26205. The licensing authority shall give written notice to the applicant indicating if the license under this article is approved or denied. The licensing authority shall give this notice within 90 days of the initial application for a new license or a license renewal, or 30 days after receipt of the applicant's criminal background check from the Department of Justice, whichever is later. If the license is denied, the notice shall state which requirement was not satisfied.

- 29. California Penal Code section 26210 states in pertinent part:
- (d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), if a licensee's place of residence was the basis for issuance of a license, any license issued pursuant to Section 26150 or 26155 shall expire 90 days after the licensee moves from the county of issuance.
- (e) If the license is one to carry loaded and exposed a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, the license shall be revoked immediately upon a change of the licensee's place of residence to another county.
- 30. California Penal Code section 26215 states in pertinent part:
- 26215. (a) A person issued a license pursuant to this article may apply to the licensing authority for an amendment to the license to do one or more of the following:
- (1) Add or delete authority to carry a particular pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.
- (2) Authorize the licensee to carry concealed a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.
- (3) If the population of the county is less than 200,000 persons according to the most recent federal decennial census, authorize the licensee to carry loaded and exposed in only that county a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.

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(4) Change any restrictions or conditions on the license, including restrictions as to the time, place, manner, and circumstances under which the person may carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.

- 31. California Penal Code section 26220 states in pertinent part:
- 26220. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in subdivision (c) of Section 26210, a license issued pursuant to Section 26150 or 26155 is valid for any period of time not to exceed two years from the date of the license.
- (b) If the licensee's place of employment or business was the basis for issuance of a license pursuant to Section 26150, the license is valid for any period of time not to exceed 90 days from the date of the license. The license shall be valid only in the county in which the license was originally issued. The licensee shall give a copy of this license to the licensing authority of the city, county, or city and county in which the licensee resides. The licensing authority that originally issued the license shall inform the licensee verbally and in writing in at least 16-point type of this obligation to give a copy of the license to the licensing authority of the city, county, or city and county of residence. Any application to renew or extend the validity of, or reissue, the license may be granted only upon the concurrence of the licensing authority that originally issued the license and the licensing authority of the city, county, or city and county in which the licensee resides.
- (c) A license issued pursuant to Section 26150 or 26155 is valid for any period of time not to exceed three years from the date of the license if the license is issued to any of the following individuals:
 - (1) A judge of a California court of record.
 - (2) A full-time court commissioner of a California court of record.
 - (3) A judge of a federal court.
 - (4) A magistrate of a federal court.
 - (d) A license issued pursuant to Section 26150 or 26155 is valid

(e) A license issued pursuant to Section 26170 to a peace officer appointed pursuant to Section 830.6 is valid for any period of time not to exceed four years from the date of the license, except that the license shall be invalid upon the conclusion of the person's appointment pursuant to Section 830.6 if the four-year period has not otherwise expired or any other condition imposed pursuant to this article does not limit the validity of the license to a shorter time period.

32. California Penal Code section 17030 states in full:

17030. As used in this part, "prohibited area" means any place where it is unlawful to discharge a weapon.

33. Defendant CITY OF REDONDO BEACH broadly defines "Park" to include all "open space." The Redondo Beach City ordinances state in pertinent part:

4-35.01 Definitions.

"Park" shall mean any publicly owned or leased property established, designated, maintained, or otherwise provided by the City for recreational use or enjoyment, including, but not limited to, any public areas located within or directly adjacent to such property such as picnic areas, playgrounds, sports fields, athletic fields, sports courts, trails, walkways, pathways, gardens, parking lots, parkettes, aquatic centers, skateboard parks, community centers, senior centers, land designated by the City as parkland or open space, landscaped or planted areas, and other buildings or

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structures. The term "park" shall not include the beach as defined in Section 5-8.01(a)(1) of this Code." Emphasis added.

4-35.06 Vehicles in parks.

No person shall drive any motorized vehicle within any portion of any park, excluding park parking lots. This section shall not apply to service vehicles used to maintain or operate the park, or to police or emergency vehicles. (§ 1, Ord. 3051 c.s., eff. June 18, 2010)

4-35.20 Weapons and explosives in parks.

- (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to use, carry, fire or discharge any firearm, air gun, paint gun, BB gun, slingshot, archery device of any kind, or any other form of weapon across, in or into a park. This subsection shall not apply to law enforcement officers.
- 34. Redondo Beach municipal ordinance 5-8.01(a)(1) states:

"Beach" means the public beach or shoreline area bordering the Pacific Ocean, owned, managed or controlled by the State of California, County of Los Angeles or the City of Redondo Beach or that is open to the general public and located within the City of Redondo Beach. For the purposes of this section, the beach shall include all indoor and outdoor areas of the land in the City that extends 1,000 feet seaward from the low mean tide line and landward to the following described lines: to the top of the seaward face of the coastal bluffs west of the Esplanade from the City's southerly border to the southerly edge of the first residential private property on the west side of the Esplanade and to the westerly edge of the private properties on the west side of the Esplanade from Avenue A to Ainsworth Court at George Freeth Way; to the westerly edge of the public sidewalk from Ainsworth Court to the extended line of the southerly edge of the Redondo Beach Pier; to the westerly

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foundation under the Pier from the southerly edge of the Pier to the southerly edge of the Harbor entrance break wall; from the westerly edge of the road, parking lot or buildings bordering the sandy area from the northerly edge of the Galveston Wall to the City's northern border.

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FACTS

- 35. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- California law and local City Of Redondo Beach ordinances prohibit 36. PLAINTIFF and similarly situated individuals from openly carrying a firearm in non-sensitive public places which is a violation of the United States Constitution and the fundamental right to openly carry a loaded firearm for the purpose of selfdefense and for other lawful purposes. California statutes require that PLAINTIFF and individuals similarly situated "voluntarily" give permission to an unconstitutional search and seizure of his property and person in order to exercise a fundamental constitutional right to openly carry a firearm in non-sensitive public places or risk arrest, prosecution, fine and imprisonment. Defendant City of Redondo Beach ordinances unconstitutionally prohibit the carrying of all weapons in all open spaces. Defendant City of Redondo Beach has interpreted its local ordinance, 4-35.20 to apply to all public, open spaces within the city including the costal parklands and public coastal property not zoned as parkland to which the prohibitions in 4-35.20 are statutorily excluded from its own city ordinances: 4-35.01, 4-35.06, and 5-8.01(a)(1). DEFENDANT HARRIS has taken no steps to correct the unlawful behavior of the CITY or to intervene PLAINTIFF'S behalf in his criminal prosecution. DEFENDANT HARRIS has done nothing to stop the unlawful conduct of the CITY.

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- Redondo Beach City ordinances prohibit PLAINTIFF and similarly situated 1 individuals from openly carrying a firearm; loaded and unloaded, openly or concealed and even unloaded within a fully enclosed locked container. Unloaded and in a fully enclosed locked container is the lawful manner of transporting a handgun through areas, such as school zones, where openly carrying a firearm is prohibited. DEFENDANT HARRIS has taken no steps to correct the unlawful behavior of the CITY or to intervene on PLAINTIFF'S behalf in his criminal prosecution.
 - The State of California has preempted local governments from enacting and 38. enforcing local ordinances regulating the carrying of firearms, loaded and unloaded, openly or concealed. Local governments are prohibited from issuing or denying licenses to openly carry loaded firearms except where provided by state law. DEFENDANT HARRIS has done nothing to stop the unlawful conduct of the CITY.
 - A publication by the State of California's Office of Attorney General titled "CONCEALABLE FIREARMS CHARGES IN CALIFORNIA 2000-2003" on page 14 in Table N-17 indicates that there were 7,775 charged offenses for violation of California Penal Code Section 12031 during that time period. This number does not reflect arrests which were not charged or searches conducted pursuant to the statute. The most recent publication by DEFENDANT HARRIS titled "Crime In California 2010" indicates that there were 22,216 felony arrests and 5,800 misdemeanor arrests for weapons violations on pages 34 and 43 respectively. The documents also contain breakdowns of arrests by race which shows that racial minorities are disproportionately arrested. Effective January 1, 2012 California Penal Code Section 12031 was renumbered. Former Penal Code Section 12031(a)(1) is now Penal Code Section 25850(a) and former section

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12031(e) is now 25850(b). The text of these two subsections was left unchanged when they were renumbered.

- 40. The Office of the Attorney General has one or more databases containing arrests made for violations of California Penal Code Section 25850 (formerly PC12031) and other weapons offenses from 1979 to the present.
- 41. Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 25850 et al the State of California has clearly and unequivocally set forth an unconstitutional policy of prohibiting firearms (loaded and unloaded) from being openly carried in non-sensitive public places for the purpose of self-defense and other lawful purposes in all incorporated cities and unincorporated county territory where the discharge of firearms is prohibited. DEFENDANT HARRIS has participated in its enforcement.
- 42. Pursuant to California Penal Code Sections 25850, 26350, 26150, 26155 et al, the State of California has clearly and unequivocally set forth an unconstitutional policy of rationing licenses to openly carry a loaded and unloaded handgun for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes. In addition to limiting the exercise of PLAINTIFF'S and similarly situated individuals Second Amendment right, the California licensing and prohibition on openly carrying loaded and unloaded firearms in public places is designed and intended to deny persons of color their Second Amendment right. DEFENDANT HARRIS has participated in their enforcement, promulgates the prohibitions, prepares the forms, conducts the background checks and a license may not be issued without her approval.
- 43. The intent of the California Legislature when it enacted California Penal Code Section 12031 (now PC 25850 in part) in July of 1967 was that it apply to

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openly carried firearms, which the legislative history clearly states. The Legislature did not intend for it to apply to the concealed carry of firearms. The legislation was intended to disarm members of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense while providing for the Open Carry of a loaded firearm when one reasonably believed himself to be in danger or while hunting within the city limits of an incorporated city, town or village. The self-defense threshold was raised to a grave and immediate danger in 1981. Under California case law, convicted felons and other prohibited persons still fall under the pre-1981 "reasonable fear" threshold whereas PLAINTIFF and all others who fall within the scope of the Second Amendment are subject to the much higher "grave, immediate danger" self-defense threshold.

44. In 1969, the California courts held that the statute (PC 12031 now renumbered in part as 25850(a) & (b)) could be applied as a separate offense to carrying a concealed firearm in public. In 2012, the California Supreme Court held that a person may not be punished for violating more than one law for the same act pursuant to Penal Code section 654. For example, a person may not presently be punished for both unlawfully carrying a concealed handgun and for a violation of PC 25850 for the same act.

45. California Penal Code Section 25850 and Redondo Beach City ordinances 4-35.01 and 4-35.20 were enforced on PLAINTIFF on May 21, 2012 when Redondo Beach police officer Heywood enforced subsection (b) of PC 25850 on PLAINTIFF by taking PLAINTIFF'S firearm over PLAINTIFF'S clearly communicated refusal to comply with subsection (b) of PC 25850. Officer Heywood then inspected the firearm to determine whether or not it was loaded pursuant to subsection (b) of PC 25850 which he referred to as a "Chamber Check." City of Redondo Beach Police Officer Heywood then seized

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PLAINTIFF'S openly carried firearm and other property and an unidentified Redondo Beach police officer informed PLAINTIFF that his firearm was being seized for violating the city ordinances. PLAINTIFF was then informed by this police officer that PLAINTIFF'S violation of the city ordinances had been referred to the Redondo Beach City Attorney and City Prosecutor for criminal prosecution. This police officer stated that PLAINTIFF was neither being cited nor arrested and that he did not have a warrant. PLAINTIFF submits that his person and property were unlawfully seized and searched against his will and that PLAINTIFF was unlawfully arrested and/or detained against his will while engaged in peaceful protest and openly carrying an unloaded firearm as part of his protest and as the only means then not prohibited by state law to defend PLAINTIFF with a firearm in public. PLAINTIFF'S protest of May 21, 2012 for which he was arrested and prosecuted was conducted entirely within the "Beach" zone to which the local ordinance he was charged with violating does not apply according to CITY'S own municipal code. At the time of his arrest, PLAINTIFF posed no threat, imminent or otherwise, of death, personal injury (serious or otherwise) to any police officer or to any other person. PLAINTIFF was arrested, searched and his property seized on a street with a posted 5MPH speed limit open to the public and posted as "PRIVATE PROPERTY." PLAINTIFF and fellow Open Carry activists were threatened with prosecution of Redondo Beach City ordinance 4-35.20 on August 7, 2010 at an Open Carry event which PLAINTIFF had scheduled in advance of the date with the CITY but was prohibited from taking place by CITY police officers at the direction of the CITY in retaliation for a member of the South Bay Open Carry movement not wanting to postpone the event until the following month. PLAINTIFF was injured and suffers and ongoing injury. PLAINTIFF'S constitutional rights were violated. PLAINTIFF suffered a personal injury as well. PLAINTIFF was prosecuted for his subsequent protest which was held and then broken up by CITY police officers on May 21, 2012. DEFENDANT HARRIS has

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not intervened in his prosecution which is her duty to do so. DEFENDANT HARRIS has done nothing to stop the unlawful conduct of the CITY.

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- 46. PLAINTIFF asked CITY OF REDONDO BEACH Police Chief Joseph Leonardi through his then attorney and through Redondo Beach Captain Jeff Hink for an application and a license to openly carry a loaded handgun on May 17, 2012. Captain Jeff Hink referred PLAINTIFF'S request for an application and a license to openly carry a loaded firearm to the City Attorney and informed PLAINTIFF of this via email.
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On May 21, 2012 after both California Penal Code Section 25850 and the 47. Redondo Beach city ordinances 4-35.20 and 4-35.01 had been enforced on PLAINTIFF and his firearm seized, the Redondo Beach Police Chief through his attorney, the Redondo Beach City Attorney, denied PLAINTIFF both an application and a license to openly carry a loaded firearm citing California Penal Code section 26155(b)(2) prohibiting the issuance of licenses in counties with a population of 200,000 or more people and California Penal Code section 26155(a)(3) limiting the issuance of licenses only to residents of the city. PLAINTIFF resides in a city adjacent to the City of Redondo Beach and receives his mail from a post office box in the City of Redondo Beach. The City of Redondo Beach is also where PLAINTIFF shops, travels through and frequents on a regular basis. There is no administrative appeal available for PLAINTIFF to appeal the denial of an application for a license to openly carry a loaded handgun in public. DEFENDANT HARRIS has told every police chief and county sheriff in the state that PLAINTIFF and similarly situated individuals may not be issued a license to openly carry a loaded firearm in the state. It is futile for PLAINTIFF to apply for a license to openly carry a loaded handgun from any issuing authority in the State of California.

- 48. PLAINTIFF obtained a Law Enforcement Gun Release Letter from DEFENDANT HARRIS' California Department of Justice and demanded the return of his firearm and other property seized by CITY as required by California law. PLAINTIFF'S property was not returned by CITY. PLAINTIFF has no other appeal or administrative remedy for return of his firearm and other property. DEFENDANT HARRIS has done nothing to stop the unlawful conduct of the CITY.
- PLAINTIFF has frequently and countless times violated California Penal 49. Code Section 25850, the Redondo Beach City Ordinances and other California statutes prohibiting firearms from being carried in non-sensitive public places. PLAINTIFF continues to violate California Penal Code Section 25850, the Redondo Beach City Ordinances and other California statutes prohibiting firearms from being carried in public places and will continue to violate California Penal Code Section 25850, the Redondo Beach City Ordinances and other California statutes prohibiting firearms from being carried in public places on the 7th day of every month by carrying a firearm (a holstered handgun, rifle or shotgun of a type in common use by the public) in a public place. PLAINTIFF will violate California Penal Code Sections 25850, 26350, 26400 and the Redondo Beach City Ordinances and other California statutes prohibiting firearms from being carried in public places on August 7, 2013 in the same location in the City of Redondo Beach where he was prevented from openly carrying a firearm under threat of arrest on August 7, 2010 and where California Penal Code Section 25850 and the Redondo Beach City Ordinances 4-35.20 and 4-35.01 prohibiting the carrying of firearms in public places were enforced against PLAINTIFF on May 21, 2012. PLAINTIFF will then proceed from the Redondo Beach Pier and environs to the South Bay Shopping Center in the City of Redondo Beach to do some shopping. PLAINTIFF will then travel outside of the City of Redondo Beach to visit relatives in Torrance,

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California where he will openly carry firearms along the public streets and on public sidewalks and on his relatives' residential property. PLAINTIFF will openly carry a loaded holstered handgun, loaded rifle and loaded shotgun of a type in common use by the public. PLAINTIFF will openly carry an unloaded holstered handgun, unloaded rifle and unloaded shotgun of a type in common use by the public. PLAINTIFF will openly carry, loaded and unloaded, a holstered handgun, rifle and shotgun of a type in common use by the public while travelling within the state of California within and without a motor vehicle. PLAINTIFF will openly carry a firearm when confronted by aggressors, it is impossible to know when such occasions will arise, if it were, PLAINTIFF would avoid them even though there is no "duty to retreat" in the State of California. At all times, PLAINTIFF will refuse to consent to the inspection of his firearm to see if it is loaded in violation of California Penal Code Section 25850.

50. Although both the state statutes (California Penal Code Section 25850 & 26155) and Redondo Beach City Ordinances (4-35.20 and 4-35.01) have already been enforced against PLAINTIFF and others. Each and every year, there are over 1,000 arrests for violating California Penal Code Section 25850 alone and Defendant HARRIS continues to prosecute the upholding of criminal convictions for violation of the statute which are appealed. PLAINTIFF personally knows two persons who are members of his California non-profit association of which he is the President (California Right To Carry – An Open Carry advocacy group) who were prosecuted for having a "loaded" handgun in their vehicles even though the handgun was unloaded. Charges in both cases were eventually dismissed after a year of prosecution. A third member was arrested for lawfully transporting an unloaded handgun in a fully enclosed locked container but not prosecuted. DEFENDANT HARRIS had been made aware of the first two cases by PLAINTIFF and yet she refused to exercise her authority under California law to

end those prosecutions and prevent current and future unconstitutional prosecutions of the statute. Neither has DEFENDANT HARRIS instructed the Redondo Beach Defendants that their city ordinances prohibiting the carrying of firearms in public places are preempted by state law and is unconstitutional under Federal law nor has she intervened on behalf of PLAINTIFF in the criminal prosecution by the DEFENDANT CITY OF REDONDO BEACH or in the two prosecutions mentioned previously despite her duty to do so. Given the history of zealous enforcement of California's laws prohibiting the carrying of firearms in non-sensitive public places by HARRIS and others including by members of her own Department of Justice, with arrests, prosecutions and imprisonments numbering in the tens of thousands; future enforcement of the statute on PLAINTIFF is far more than likely - It is a certainty. The active enforcement by CITY against PLAINTIFF and enforcement by others on similarly situated parties constitutes a real threat of enforcement against PLAINTIFF as both members of PLAINTIFF'S non-profit were openly carrying an unloaded handgun at the time of their arrest which is the manner PLAINTIFF usually carried a firearm in nonsensitive public places unless he reasonably believed he was in danger; an inadvertent violation of former penal code section 12031(a)(1). PLAINTIFF was not even aware that the threshold for carrying a loaded firearm had been raised to grave, immediate danger until relatively recently. There is no knowledge requirement to the statutes. PLAINTIFF'S ignorance of the change in the law would not have prevented his arrest, prosecution fine and imprisonment. DEFENDANT HARRIS has done nothing to stop the unlawful conduct of the CITY, or of law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges.

51. When officer Todd Heywood enforced California Penal Code Section 25850 against PLAINTIFF against his will and seized PLAINTIFF'S firearm and property against his will a definite and concrete dispute regarding the lawfulness of

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When officer Todd Heywood and others enforced Redondo Beach City 52. ordinances 4-35.01 and 4-35.20 against PLAINTIFF and seized PLAINTIFF'S firearm and property against his will a definite and concrete dispute regarding the lawfulness of that seizure and enforcement of those city ordinances came into existence. DEFENDANT HARRIS has done nothing to stop the unlawful conduct of the CITY and its employees.

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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a National Instant Criminal 53. Background Check System (NICS) which has been operational since 1998. The NICS Section is accessible via a toll-free telephone number or electronically on the Internet through the NICS E-Check System to request a background check with the descriptive information provided on the ATF Form 4473. NICS is customarily available 17 hours a day, seven days a week, including holidays (except for Christmas). The NICS can be used to instantly determine whether a prospective buyer is eligible to buy firearms.

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In this case, injuries to PLAINTIFF have already occurred and are ongoing, 54. thereby eliminating any concerns that PLAINTIFF'S fear of enforcement is purely speculative. PLAINTIFF'S injury is ongoing.

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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: SECOND AMENDMENT, FOURTH AMENDMENT, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 42 USC § 1983, 1988 - INJUNCTIVE/DECLARATORY RELIEF

PLAINTIFF vs DEFENDANT KAMALA HARRIS

- 55. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 56. The Second Amendment "guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) and was applied to all state and local governments in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010).
- California Penal Code Section 25850 is unconstitutional on its face and as 57. applied to firearms openly carried in non-sensitive public places. Mere possession or carrying of a loaded firearm, (i.e., exercising a fundamental right) when otherwise lawful under law cannot support the unlawful detention, arrest, prosecution, imprisonment or search of a person and seizure of a firearm when openly carried in non-sensitive public places (25850(a)). Mere possession of a firearm, (i.e., exercising a fundamental right) when otherwise lawful, cannot support a finding of probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, such that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement can be legislatively disregarded (25850(b)). Openly carrying a loaded firearm in non-sensitive public places such as public streets, sidewalks, shopping centers, parking lots, piers, open spaces; of a type in common use for the purpose of self-defense or for other lawful purposes is a right guaranteed by the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution and is a fundamental right which cannot be denied to PLAINTIFF or the People under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments because PLAINTIFF happens to be in a non-sensitive public place in ALL incorporated cities or in ANY unincorporated county territory where the discharge of a firearm is prohibited. PC25850 should be construed as a Loaded Open Carry ban, which is what the legislature intended and is clear in the legislative history.

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59. The Second Amendment invalidates California Statutes to the extent they prevent private citizens who are not otherwise barred from exercising their Second Amendment Right (examples of prohibited persons include convicted felons, mentally ill, etc) from openly carrying firearms in non-sensitive public places, loaded and unloaded, for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes.

60. California Penal Code Section 25850 is invalid as applied to prohibit, or infringe, a private citizen who is otherwise eligible to possess firearms from openly carrying a loaded and operable firearm in non-sensitive public places for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes.

61. California Penal Code Section 25850 is unconstitutionally vague. A reasonable person would not conclude that either his private residential property or the inside of his motor vehicle is a public place. Neither would a reasonable person conclude that an unloaded firearm is loaded simply by having a magazine or clip attached to his firearm unless there was also a live round in the firing

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chamber of the firearm. Prior to July of 1967 when former Penal Code section 12031 went into effect a revolver was considered to be unloaded if it did not have a live round in the firing chamber even though it had live rounds in the cylinder. The exceptions and numerous subsections to former Penal Code section 12031, of which PC 25850 is a part, have been scattered throughout the California Penal code to such an extent that PC 25850 is unconstitutionally vague. It subjects the exercise of the right of bear arms to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct. PC 25850 is also unconstitutionally vague because a reasonable person would have to spend days searching through the California statutes and case law and still be uncertain as to whether or not a particular act, or being in a particular place, is in violation of PC 25850. Most of the subsections of former Penal Code section 12031 are now to be found in 16750(b), 16840(b), 17030, 25850-26025 (inclusive), 26030(a)-(c), 26035-26055 (inclusive).

- 62. California Penal Code Section 26350 is facially invalid and as applied to prohibit, or infringe, PLAINTIFF and private citizens who are otherwise eligible to possess a firearm from openly carrying an unloaded and operable handgun for the purpose of self-defense in non-sensitive public places. Mere possession of matching ammunition cannot make an unloaded handgun "loaded."
- 63. California Penal Code Section 26400 is facially invalid and as applied to prohibit, or infringe, a private citizen who is otherwise eligible to possess an unloaded firearm that is not a handgun from openly carrying an unloaded and operable firearm that is not a handgun for the purpose of self-defense in non-sensitive public places. Mere possession of matching ammunition cannot make an unloaded firearm "loaded."

65. California Penal Code Sections 26150, 26155, 26160, 26165, 26175, 26180, 26185, 26190, 26200, 26202, 26205, 26210, 26215, 26220 are unconstitutional on their face and as applied in this case to the extent that they restrict licenses to openly carry a loaded handgun only to persons within counties of a population of fewer than 200,000 persons which is valid only in those counties, to only those residents who reside within those counties and leaves the issuance of such licenses solely to the discretion of the issuing authority and prohibiting the issuing authority from issuing a license to other that a resident of the city, county or city and county thereby prohibiting PLAINTIFF from obtaining a license to openly carry a loaded handgun for the purpose of self-defense in non-sensitive public places afforded to similarly situated persons which is a violation of PLAINTIFF'S rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.

66. The invalidities of the aforesaid statutes, and Defendants' application of same, infringe PLAINTIFF'S Second, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments right and damage PLAINTIFF in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

67. PLAINTIFF is proceeding pro-se. None of his challenges should be construed as challenging any California statute as it pertains to the carrying of a weapon concealed on one's person in a public place. For example, "good cause," "good moral character," "training," "fingerprinting," "residency," and the requirement for a license itself, etc., are only at issue in this case as they pertain to

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68. PLAINTIFF'S injuries are irreparable because PLAINTIFF is entitled to enjoy his Constitutional rights in fact.

PLAINTIFF requests declaratory and/or prospective injunctive relief under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DEFENDANT HARRIS to prevent future violations of his Second Amendment right to openly carry a loaded firearm in non-sensitive public places for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes, his Fourth Amendment Right, and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law and to due process. PLAINTIFF submits that no license is required to openly carry a firearm for the purpose of self-defense but if a license is required then PLAINTIFF and persons not prohibited from possessing a firearm have a liberty and/or property interest in a license and must be issued one. It is futile for PLAINTIFF and similarly situated individuals to apply for a license from any and all police chiefs, county sheriffs or other issuing authorities. ALL of the laws at issue in this case fail to survive even rational review. There is no rational basis to uphold them even absent the Constitution. Similarly, they cannot survive facial, as applied, and vagueness challenges and PLAINTIFF makes these

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

challenges against all laws at issue in this complaint.

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND DUE PROCESS AND FIRST, SECOND, FOURTH. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL CUSTOM OR

Second Amended Complaint

POLICY PLAINTIFF vs DEFENDANT CITY OF REDONDO BEACH & DOES 1-8

- 70. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. PLAINTIFF realizes that this court has indicated that this count will likely be dismissed pursuant to the Younger Abstention just as his count against the CITY ordinances were but given that the condition for the Younger Abstention may be lifted, PLAINTIFF is keeping this claim in for now but is not seeking to move it forward until the Abstention is lifted.
- 71. DEFENDANT CITY OF REDONDO BEACH ongoing and unjustified violation of PLAINTIFF'S First, Second, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights deprived PLAINTIFF of his right to peaceful protest and assembly under the First Amendment, his right to openly carry a firearm under the Second Amendment, his right against unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, all applied to states, local governments, state actors and agents of the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to due process. The deprivation began on August 7, 2010 and continues to the present date. PLAINTIFF brought his initial suit on November 30, 2011 and amended his suit for damages on May 30, 2012 (within the statute of limitations). The criminal prosecution of his injuries sustained on May 21, 2012 has tolled the statute of limitations for that part of his damages claim.
- 72. As a result of the conduct of the CITY and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-8, PLAINTIFF suffered and is suffering extreme pain and suffering and loss of earning either because they were integral participants or failed to intervene to prevent these violations. They acted with gross negligence and with reckless and deliberate indifference to the rights and liberties of the public in general, and of

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PLAINTIFF, and of persons in their class, situation and comparable position in particular, knowingly maintained, enforced, and applied an official recognized custom policy and practice of:

- (a) Employing and retaining as police officers and other personnel who at all times material herein knew or reasonably should have known had dangerous propensities for abusing their authority and for mistreating citizens by failing to follow Federal law, state law, and CITY's own municipal ordinances and policies.
- (b) Of inadequately supervising, training, controlling, assigning, and disciplining CITY police officers and other personnel including DEFENDANTS DOES 1-8 who CITY knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known had the mentioned propensities and character traits.
- (c) By maintaining grossly inadequate procedures for reporting, supervising, investigating, reviewing, disciplining and controlling the intentional misconduct by DEFENDANTS DOES 1-8.
- (d) By failing to discipline CITY police officers' conduct, including but not limited to unlawful detention, arrest, search and seizure of PLAINTIFF'S person and property.
- (e) By ratifying the intentional misconduct of police officers of CITY.
- (f) By having and maintaining an unconstitutional policy, custom, and practice of detaining and/or arresting individuals without probable cause or reasonable suspicion which also is demonstrated by inadequate training regarding these subjects. The policies, customs and practices of DOES 1-8, were done with a deliberate indifference to individuals' rights.
- 73. DEFENDANT CITY and DOES 1-8, together with various other officials whether named or unnamed, had either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of the deficient policies, practices and customs alleged. Despite having

- 74. By perpetrating, sanctioning, tolerating and ratifying the outrageous conduct and other wrongful acts, CITY and DOES 1-8 acted with an intentional, reckless, and callous disregard for the safety, life and Constitutional rights of PLAINTIFF. Each of their actions was willful, wanton, oppressive, malicious, fraudulent, and extremely offensive and unconscionable to any person of normal sensibilities.

- 75. Furthermore, the policies, customs and practices implemented and maintained and still tolerated by CITY and DOES 1-7, were affirmatively applied to and were a significantly influential force behind the injuries of PLAINTIFF.

- 76. By reason of the mentioned acts and omissions of CITY and DOES 1-8, PLAINTIFF was caused to incur legal expenses, loss of earning and health problems.

- 77. Accordingly, CITY and DOES 1-8 are each liable for to PLAINTIFF for compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

- 78. The conduct of CITY and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-8 was willful, wanton, malicious, oppressive and done with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of PLAINTIFF and thereby warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive damages as to DEFENDANT CITY OF REDONDO BEACH and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-8.

79. PLAINTIFF seeks damages against the DEFENDANT CITY OF REDONDO BEACH and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-8 in an amount according to proof for losses incurred as a result of their ongoing violations of PLAINTIFF'S rights since August 7, 2010, for the warrantless search of PLAINTIFF'S firearm, his detention, seizure, search and the subsequent illegal seizure of his valuable property (firearm, firearm's case, padlock and key) on May 21, 2012 and for expenditures (fees/costs) associated with the defense of criminal charges due to its officially promulgated policy, custom and/or persistent practice and/or deliberately indifferent training.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

FIRST AMENDMENT, SECOND AMENDMENT, FOURTH AMENDMENT, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

42 USC § 1983, 1988 - INJUNCTIVE/DECLARATORY RELIEF PLAINTIFF vs DEFENDANT CITY OF REDONDO BEACH

- 80. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. PLAINTIFF realizes that this count has been temporarily dismissed but given that the condition for the Younger Abstention may be lifted, PLAINTIFF is keeping the claim in for now but is not seeking to move it forward until the Abstention is lifted.
- 81. Redondo Beach City ordinances 4-35.01 AND 4-35.20 are unconstitutional on their face, and as applied in this case. Mere possession or carrying of a firearm, (i.e., exercising a fundamental right) when otherwise lawful cannot support the unlawful detention, search, arrest, prosecution, and seizure of a firearm and other property which is lawfully possessed and carried under both state and Federal law. California law preempts local governments from regulating the possession and

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carrying of firearms. The Second Amendment guarantees the right to carry a firearm for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes. The First Amendment guarantees the right to engage in peaceful protest with an unloaded firearm. The Fourth Amendment guarantees PLAINTIFF the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. CITY'S ongoing and unjustified violation of PLAINTIFF'S First, Second, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights deprived PLAINTIFF of his right to peaceful protest and assembly under the First Amendment, his right to openly carry a firearm under the Second Amendment, his right against unreasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, all applied to states, local governments, state actors and agents of the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to due process. The deprivation began on August 7, 2010 and continues to the present date.

82. PLAINTIFF requests declaratory and/or prospective injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Redondo Beach City ordinances 4-35.01 AND 4-35.20 are unconstitutional on their face and as applied in this case and are a violation of his Second Amendment Right to Openly Carry a firearm for the purpose of self-defense and for other lawful purposes, a violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights from unlawful search and seizure and Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection due to DEFENDANT'S officially promulgated policy, custom and/or persistent practice and/or deliberately indifferent training..

SCOPE OF REQUESTED INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

- 83. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.
- 84. An injunction against California Penal Code Sections 25850, 26350 and 26400 would enable PLAINTIFF and persons not prohibited from possessing

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firearms to openly carry a firearm, loaded and unloaded, in places not otherwise prohibited by state or Federal law. For example, an injunction against 25850 would enable Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals to openly carry a loaded firearm in many places where it is now legal to openly carry a sheath knife with the notable exception of within 1,000 feet of a K-12 public or private school (see Penal Code section 626.9) wherein firearms must be unloaded and handguns unloaded and in a fully enclosed lock container (other than the vehicle's glove compartment). An injunction against 26350 & 26400 would restore the status quo which existed when this action was first filed (Nov. 30, 2011).

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85. An injunction against California Penal Code Sections 26150, 26155, 26160, 26165, 26175, 26180, 26185, 26190, 26200, 26202, 26205, 26210, 26215, 26220 would enable PLAINTIFF and persons not prohibited from possessing firearms to obtain a license to openly carry a loaded handgun in the same places in which a person with an unrestricted license can carry a loaded handgun concealed. Unlike the numerous and burdensome licensing provisions for licenses to carry a concealed handgun, PLAINTIFF and persons not prohibited from possessing firearms would not have to provide any identifying information beyond that which is required to undergo a background check through the FBI National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The issuance of a license is PLAINTIFF'S alternate position. PLAINTIFF submits that no license is required for a private citizen to exercise his Second Amendment right to self-defense.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for the following relief:

A. Declaratory judgment that Penal Code section 25850 is invalid in that and to the extent that it is applied to prohibit private citizens who are otherwise qualified to possess firearms from openly carrying loaded firearms

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for the purpose of self-defense on their own property, in their vehicles and in non-sensitive public places;

- Injunctive relief restraining Defendants and their officers, agents, Β. servants, employees, and all persons in concert or participation with them who receive notice of this injunction, from enforcing PC 25850 against private citizens who are otherwise qualified to possess firearms from openly carrying loaded firearms for the purpose of self-defense on their own property, in their vehicles and in non-sensitive public places;
- Declaratory judgment that Penal Code section 26350 is invalid in that C. and to the extent that it is applied to prohibit private citizens who are otherwise qualified to possess firearms from openly carrying unloaded handguns for the purpose of self-defense on their own property, in their vehicles and in non-sensitive public places;
- Injunctive relief restraining Defendants and their officers, agents, D. servants, employees, and all persons in concert or participation with them who receive notice of this injunction, from enforcing PC 26350 against private citizens who are otherwise qualified to possess firearms from openly carrying unloaded firearms for the purpose of self-defense on their own property, in their vehicles and in non-sensitive public places;
- Declaratory judgment that Penal Code section 26400 is invalid in that E. and to the extent that it is applied to prohibit private citizens who are otherwise qualified to possess firearms from openly carrying unloaded firearms that are not handguns for the purpose of self-defense on their own property, in their vehicles and in non-sensitive public places;
- Injunctive relief restraining Defendants and their officers, agents, F. servants, employees, and all persons in concert or participation with them who receive notice of this injunction, from enforcing PC 26400 against private citizens who are otherwise qualified to possess firearms from openly

carrying firearms for the purpose of self-defense on their own property, in their vehicles and in non-sensitive public places;

- G. Declaratory judgment that Penal Code sections 26150, 26155, 26165, 26175, 26180, 26185, 26190, 26200, 26202, 26205, 26210, 26215, and 26220 are invalid in that and to the extent that it is applied to prohibit or infringe private citizens, beyond that which is required to conduct an FBI instant background check, who are otherwise qualified to possess firearms, from being issued a license to openly carry firearms, loaded and unloaded, for the purpose of self-defense on their own property, in their vehicles and in non-sensitive public places;
- H. Injunctive relief restraining Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in concert or participation with them who receive notice of this injunction, from enforcing Penal Code sections 26150, 26155, 26165, 26175, 26180, 26185, 26190, 26200, 26202, 26205, 26210, 26215, and 26220 to the extent that it is applied to prohibit or infringe private citizens, beyond that which is required to conduct an FBI instant background check, who are otherwise qualified to possess firearms, from being issued a license to openly carry firearms, loaded and unloaded, for the purpose of self-defense on their own property, in their vehicles and in non-sensitive public places;
- I. General damages in the amount to be proven at trial (excluding DEFENDANT HARRIS);
- J. Special damages according to proof; including medical expenses and loss of earnings (excluding DEFENDANT HARRIS);
- K. For punitive damages against the individual defendants (excluding DEFENDANT HARRIS) in an amount to be proven at trial;
- L. For interest (excluding DEFENDANT HARRIS);
- M. Award costs of this action to PLAINTIFF;

- N. Award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the PLAINTIFF on all Claims of the complaint, including but not limited to fee/cost awards under 42 USC § 1983, 1988 and California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5;
- O. Compel the immediate return of PLAINTIFF'S property;
- P. A Declaration that Open Carry is the right guaranteed by the Constitution in non-sensitive public-places;
- Q. A Declaration that firearms openly carried which do not have live ammunition in the firing chamber are unloaded and that possession of matching ammunition with an openly carried unloaded firearm does not make the firearm "loaded" regardless of whether or not the ammunition is attached in any way to the firearm;
- R. A Declaration that no license is required to openly carry a firearm for the purpose of self-defense;
- S. A Declaration that private residential property is not a public place regardless of whether or not it is fully enclosed by a fence or barrier.
- T. A Declaration that a private motor vehicle and any attached campers or trailers are not public places and firearms may be carried therein.
- U. Damages and/or Declaratory relief under 28 USC §§ 2201, 2202;
- V. Declaratory judgment that Redondo Beach Municipal Code section 4-35.20 is invalid in that and to the extent that it is applied to prohibit private citizens who are otherwise qualified to possess weapons from openly carrying weapons for the purpose of self-defense;
- W. Injunctive relief restraining Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in concert or participation with them who receive notice of this injunction, from enforcing Redondo Beach Municipal Code section 4-35.20 against private citizens who are otherwise qualified to possess weapons for the purpose of self-defense;
- X. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem appropriate.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

PLAINTIFF hereby requests a jury trial on all issues raised in this complaint.

Dated: March 12, 2013

Respectfully submitted,

INTIFF in Pro Per

PO Box 1302

Redondo Beach, CA 90278 Voice: (424) 634-7381

Charles Nichols @Pykrete.info

Second Amended Complaint

Charles Nichols v. Edmund G Brown Jr et al

ER256



OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Opinion No. 68-175

1968 Cal. AG LEXIS 59; 51 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 197

October 3, 1968

SYLLABUS:

[*1]

FIREARMS -- The term "firearm" includes rifles and shotguns; firearms may be carried in areas where no regulations exist; "every public road or highway" is a "prohibited area"; "public street" is not synonymous with "public road or highway"; and "safety zone" is a "prohibited area" only when it coincides with a "public place."

REQUESTBY:

DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME

QUESTION:

The Honorable Walter T. Shannon, Director, Department of Fish and Game, has requested an opinion on the following questions:

- 1. Does the term "firearm" as used in Penal Code section 12031\$= > include rifles and shotguns?
- 2. Does Penal Code section 12031 prohibit the carrying of a rifle or shotgun with unexpended shells or cartridges in the magazine on a public road in an unincorporated area where there are no local ordinances or other laws or regulations prohibiting the discharge of firearms?
- 3. Does Penal Code section 374c make every "public road or highway" a "prohibited area," as defined in section 12031?
- 4. Is the term "public street" as used in section 12031 synonymous with "public road or highway" as used [*2] in Penal Code section 374c?
- 5. Would the "safety zone" described in Fish and Game Code section 3004 be considered a "prohibited area" as defined in section 12031(d)?

The conclusions are:

1. The term "firearm" as used in Penal Code section 12031 includes rifles and shotguns.

- 2. Penal Code section 12031 does not prohibit the carrying of a rifle or shotgun with unexpended shells or cartridges in the magazine on a public road in an unincorporated area where there are no local ordinances or other laws or regulations prohibiting the discharge of firearms.
- 3. Penal Code section 374c does make every "public road or highway" a "prohibited area" as defined in section 12031.
- 4. The term "public street" as used in section 12031 is not synonymous with "public road or highway" as used in Penal Code section 374c.
- 5. The "safety zone" described in Fish and Game Code section 3004 is a "prohibited area" as defined in section 12031, but carrying [*3] of loaded weapons is proscribed therein only when it coincides with a "public place."

OPINIONBY:

THOMAS C. LYNCH, Attorney General; Edward W. Bergtholdt, Deputy

OPINION:

[**198] ANALYSIS

Penal Code section 12031 was enacted by the 1967 Legislature as an urgency measure and provides in part as follows:

"(a) . . . every person who carries a loaded firearm on his person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city or *in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area of unincorporated territory* is guilty of a misdemeanor.

. . .

- "(d) As used in this section *prohibited area*' means any place where it is unlawful to discharge a weapon.
- "(e) A firearm shall be deemed to be loaded for the purposes of this section when there is an unexpended cartridge or shell, consisting of a case which holds a charge of powder and a bullet or shot, in, or attached in any manner to, the firearm, including, but not limited to, in the firing chamber, magazine, or clip thereof attached to the firearm; except that a muzzle-loader firearm shall be deemed to be loaded when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and [*4] ball or shot in the barrel or cylinder." (Emphasis added.)

In order to respond properly to the questions raised, it is necessary to look at the circumstances surrounding the enactment of section 12031 and the attitude of the Legislature to these circumstances.

In April 1967 Assembly Bill 1591 was introduced and included the addition of 1 section 12031 to the Penal Code. At this time it prohibited the carrying of a loaded firearm on a public street or in a public place in an incorporated city. On May 2, 1967, members of the Black Panther organization entered the Assembly Chambers armed with "pistols, rifles and at least one sawed-off shotgun," all to the great alarm of the members of the Assembly. The Sacramento Bee, May 2, 1967, at 1. A.B. 1591 was then made an urgency measure. The provisions of the proposed section 12031 were expanded to extend the application of the section to certain parts of unincorporated areas. The revised bill also proposed the addition of sections 171c, 171d, and 171e to the Penal Code. These sections prohibited the carrying of loaded firearms at the State Capitol, at public schools, [*5] including state colleges and the University of California, and at the Governor's Mansion or residence of any elected state officials.

The urgency clause first appended to A.B. 1591 referred to organized bands of men "armed with loaded firearms" entering the Assembly Chambers. This was a clear reference to the appearance of members of the Black Panther organization referred to above. A.B. 1591 was subsequently enacted into law (Stats. 1967, ch. 960, p. 2459) as an urgency measure. The urgency clause of the bill as enacted reads as follows:

"The State of California has witnessed, in recent years, the increasing [**199] incidence of organized groups and individuals publicly arming themselves for purposes inimical to the peace and safety of the people of California.

"Existing laws are not adequate to protect the people of this state from either the use of such weapons or from violent incidents arising from the mere presence of such armed individuals in public places. Therefore, in order to prevent the potentially tragic consequences of such activities, it is imperative that this statute take effect immediately."

Although this final version of the clause is broader than its earlier [*6] versions, it remains clear that the Legislature did not direct the provisions of section 12031 against all uses of firearms but only at uses of firearms which are "inimical to the peace and safety of the people of California."

Question No. 1 represents an opinion whether the word "firearm" in section 12031 includes rifles and shotguns. *The word "firearm" includes rifles and shotguns*.

The fact that this section is a part of this state's Dangerous Weapons Control Law (Penal Code Part IV, Title 2, Chapter 1, commencing with section 12000), dealing with *concealed* weapons, might suggest its limitation to such weapons. Reading Penal Code section 12031 in its entirety suggests, however, that "firearm" includes rifles and shotguns. Subdivision (b), subparagraph (4) talks of "hunting," an activity which more often involves rifles or shotguns than pistols or revolvers, and subparagraph (8) uses the word "weapon" without any restriction such as "concealed." In subdivisions (d) and (j) the word "weapon" appears again without any restriction.

The inclusion of rifles and shotguns within the definition of "firearm" is also suggested by the circumstances [*7] surrounding its enactment and the wording of the urgency clause. There can, therefore, be little doubt that the word "firearm," as it appears in section 12031, is not limited in meaning to "concealed weapons," as defined in Penal Code section 12001. We must conclude that the word "firearm" as used in section 12031 embraces, among other weapons, rifles and shotguns. n1

n1 For a comprehensive discussion of all the laws of this state relating to firearms see Assem. Int. Comm. on Crim. Proc., *Regulation and Control of Firearms*, 22 Assembly Reports 1963-1965, No. 6 (1965).

Question No. 2 requests an opinion whether section 12031 prohibits the carrying of a loaded firearm on a public road in an unincorporated area. We conclude that section 12031 does not prohibit the carrying of loaded firearms on such public ways. For the reasons set forth in our answer to question No. 4, the term "public streets" in section 12031 (a) must be given a narrow construction. There is a distinction between [*8] "public roads" and "public streets" which is discussed more fully below. The proscriptions of section 12031 are therefore not applicable to "public roads" because they are not "public streets" as that term is used in section 12031. n2

n2 The carrying of a rifle or shotgun in a vehicle with an unexpended round in the chamber is prohibited on "public highways" by Fish and Game Code section 2006, which provides in part:

"It is unlawful to possess a loaded rifle or shotgun in any vehicle . . . which is standing on or along or is being driven on or along any public highway or other way open to the public.

"A rifle or shotgun shall be deemed loaded . . . when there is an unexpended cartridge or shell in the firing chamber but not when the only cartridges or shells are in the magazine."

[**200] Question No. 3 requests an opinion whether Penal Code section 374c n3 makes every "public road" a "prohibited area" as defined by section 12031. Because [*9] the discharge of firearms is prohibited on "public roads and highways," these public ways are by definition "prohibited areas" (section 12031 (d)). This does not, however, alter our conclusion that the proscriptions of section 12031 are not applicable to such public ways because, as set forth in our response to your question No. 4, the term "public road or highway" is not synonymous with the term "public street."

n3 Penal Code section 374c provides: "Every person who shoots any firearm from or upon a *public road or highway* is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.)

Question No. 4 requests an opinion whether the term "public street" in section 12031 is synonymous with the term "public road or highway" used in Penal Code section 374c. Our response is that the terms "public road or highway" are not synonymous with the term "public street."

The discussion above regarding the Legislature's purpose in enacting section 12031 suggests that the [*10] term "public street" is to be given a narrow meaning. The thrust of the section is not against the use of all firearms but only against use "inimical to the peace and safety of the people of California." Further, the application of the section's prohibition to unincorporated areas is modified by the injection of the concept, "prohibited area." It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature intended that there be a recognizable distinction in applying the prohibition of section 12031 as between incorporated areas and unincorporated areas. To make "public streets" synonymous with "public roads and highways" would leave little meaningful difference between incorporated and unincorporated areas.

Additionally, earlier versions of A.B. 1591 would have amended Fish and Game Code section 2006. Such amendment was designed to conform the definition of a loaded rifle or shotgun in Fish and Game Code section 2006 to the definition of a loaded firearm in Penal Code section 12031. Section 2006 applies on all "public highway [s] or other way[s] open to the public." The failure of the [*11] Legislature to enact such an amendment to section 2006 suggests that it did not intend that section 2006 be superseded by section 12031. Had it desired section 2006 to be superseded, it would have either amended its definition of a loaded weapon to conform to section 12031 or repealed it entirely.

For these reasons we must conclude that the Legislature intended the term "public streets" be given a narrow meaning. It is not synonymous, then, with "public roads and highways," but includes only the public ways of towns and villages and not the "open roads" in rural sections of unincorporated areas.

Attention should also be called to the effect of Penal Code section 415 which provides: "Every person who . . . fire[s] any gun or pistol in . . . [an] unincorporated [**201] town . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor" Section 12031 (d) defines a "prohibited area" as "any place where it is unlawful to discharge a weapon." An unincorporated town thereby becomes a "prohibited area." The proscription of section 12031 is applicable to the "public streets" of such towns and to all "public places" therein. We have therefore "public places" and "public streets" [*12] in the narrow sense where the discharge of firearms is prohibited and thus the concurrence of the necessary factors to bring the proscriptions into play.

Question No. 5 requests an opinion whether the term "safety zone" in Fish and Game Code section 3004 n4 is a "prohibited area." The answer is in the affirmative, subject to the qualifications given below.

n4 Fish and Game Code section 3004 states:

"It is unlawful for any person, other than the owner, person in possession of the premises, or a person having the express permission of the owner or person in possession of the premises, to hunt or to discharge while hunting, any firearm . . . within 150 yards of any occupied dwelling house, residence, or other building or any barn or other outbuilding used in connection therewith. The 150-yard area is a safety zone."

The "safety zone" described in Fish and Game Code section 3004 which lies in uninco rporated [*13] areas is a "prohibited area" as that term is defined by section 12031 (d). Again, however, for the proscriptions of section 12031 to be applicable, there must be a concurrence of a "prohibited area" and a "public place." Further, "public places" which do not have a building located thereon (*e.g.*, a park) would not be "prohibited areas" and, thus, the proscription of section 12031 would not be applicable. The same would be true for those areas of "public places" more than 150 yards from any building.

It should also be noted that certain persons are excepted from the operation of Fish and Game Code section 3004. Because this exception is not in conflict with the intent of the Legislature these persons would be exempt in any case from the proscriptions of 12031.

Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics: Criminal Law & ProcedureCriminal OffensesWeaponsPossessionElementsCriminal Law & ProcedureCriminal OffensesWeaponsUseSimple UseElementsTransportation LawCommercial VehiclesMaintenance & Safety

Case 2:11-cv-09916-SJO-SSNI POSUSTANT & DISTRICT COUR Page 1 of Prioringe ID #:441 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

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TITLE:	Charles Nichols v. Edmund G B	rown Jr et al	
	THE HONORABLE S. JAMES OT		ISTRICT JUDGE
Victor Paul C Courtroom C		Not Present Court Reporter	
COUNSEL F	PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF(S):	COUNSEL PRESENT F	FOR DEFENDANT(S)
Not Present		Not Present	
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PROCEEDINGS: IN CHAMBERS

The Court deems the Plaintiff's MOTION for Review of Magistrate Judges report and recommendation [41] as an objection. Accordingly, the Court takes the hearing off its calendar.

ER262

MINUTES FORM 11 CIVIL GEN

Page 1 of 1

Initials of Preparer _____

North Carolina State Highway Patrol, among other agencies primarily tasked with restoring and maintaining public order during states of emergency. Young is sued in his official and individual capacities."

Plaintiff Nichols, on the other hand, alleges that Defendant Brown has statutory, and factual, direct supervisory control over his appointees who are actively enforcing the statute at issue, which includes the California Highway Patrol (the California State Police was subsumed into the CHP in 1995). In Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to Defendant Brown's motion to dismiss he makes it quite clear that Plaintiff's allegations are not based simply on a "...generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power..."

Her Honor misconstrues the injury caused by Defendant Brown when he signed into law Assembly Bill 144 (AB 144) on October 9, 2011 which bans the Open Carry of unloaded handguns. The "...absolute immunity for the act of signing a bill into law." might be applicable were Plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of AB 144. That statute is not at issue in this case. Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a law enacted in July of 1967 which was not signed into law by Defendant Brown.

Defendant Brown by signing Assembly Bill 144 into law, and enforcement of the statute at issue, set into motion a series of acts by others which he knew, or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injuries on Plaintiff. This was explained in one of Plaintiff's three memorandi which leads Plaintiff to believe that her Honor never read them.

Unloaded Open Carry of Handguns is not at issue in this case. Plaintiff seeks to openly carry a LOADED firearm, particularly a loaded handgun, in nonsensitive public places for the purpose of self-defense.

Respectfully, her Honor erred in prematurely recommending a dismissal against Defendant Brown and grievously erred in recommending a dismissal with prejudice against Defendants Brown and the Redondo Beach Police Department. Neither are immune from a 1983 lawsuit, especially not one which doesn't seek any money from any defendant.

The "requisite enforcement connection" to Brown exists under California law and Plaintiff has had no opportunity to engage in discovery to augment the factual evidence.

Also, her Honor does not explain how favorable relief against Defendant Harris would prevent Defendant Brown from enforcing the statute against Plaintiff. Under California law, the Office of the Attorney General is subordinate to the Office of the Governor. The law enforcement officers under the direct control and supervision of the Governor are not answerable to the Attorney General. Favorable relief against Defendant Harris would certainly be substantial but it would not be complete.

D. Plaintiff's Seventh Claim for Relief

In his Complaint, Plaintiff refers to provisions in the California Constitution that parallel the applicable provisions in the United States Constitutions where it is legitimate to do so, e.g., where there is a state-created liberty or property interest at stake. Indeed, the Complaint alleges at ¶ 79 that the statute at issue violates the 15 PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF P&A

ER264

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Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Seventh Claim for Relief in the Complaint fully incorporated all of the previously stated Equal Protection and Due Process allegations under the United States Constitution. See ¶ 83 of the Complaint.

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None of Plaintiff's claims are retrospective in nature. Every state law claim (and Federal, for that matter) in the complaint seeks purely declaratory, and/or prospective injunctive relief. The Complaint makes no demands on the State Treasury, neither is money sought from any of the Defendants; directly or indirectly. Neither does the Complaint seek compulsory relief from any of the Defendants. The relief sought in the Complaint does not ask of any defendant to do anything. There is no Eleventh Amendment bar.

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Neither is the Complaint even close to being a purely (or even predominantly) state law complaint. The lone claim for relief for violation of the California Constitution arises out of the fully incorporated Federal claims which included the Second, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See \P 83 of the Complaint. Neither would a denial of the Seventh Claim for Relief under the California Constitution affect the Request for Relief which Plaintiff seeks as the relief is sought under the Constitution and Laws of the United States "and/or" Article 1, Sections 1 and 13 of the California Constitution. See page 24, lines 19-26 of the Complaint. (Emphasis added).

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Plaintiff's state law claims arise out of the same causes of action as the Federal claims and are inextricably intertwined with the Federal claims. The state law claims are neither novel nor complex. The state law claims are not more important, more complex or more time-consuming to resolve as their Federal counterparts. Given the nature of the state law claims, they would clearly succeed 16

As her Honor did not address any of these arguments made by Plaintiff in his memorandum in opposition to dismiss or the Due Process claims which were fully incorporated in the Seventh Claim for Relief but instead concluded that the claim was made "...based solely on state law.;" all that Plaintiff can do is to observe that her Honor misconstrued the Complaint and the applicable case law.

CONCLUSION

For any and/or all of the reasons given above, Plaintiff strongly objects to the Report and Recommendation filed By Honorable Suzanne H. Segal, U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Dated: April 17, 2012

Respectfully Submitted,

By: Charles Nichols Plaintiff in Pro Per PO Box 1302 Redondo Beach, CA 90278

Voice: (424) 634-7381

CharlesNichols@Pykrete

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CV-11-9916 SJO (SS)

DECLARATION OF CHARLES NICHOLS

I, Charles Nichols, declare as follows:

- 1. I am a 52 year old male currently residing in Lawndale California, Los Angeles County, California. I am single and have no children.
- 2. I am presently self-employed as a writer. I was previously employed as an Engineer in Washington, Oregon and California.
- 3. While residing in Oregon, I was licensed to carry handguns concealed in both the states of Oregon and Washington. A license to carry a concealed handgun was necessary to be able to Openly Carry a loaded handgun in the few Oregon cities which required openly carried handguns to be unloaded within their city limits.
- 4. In, or around, August of 2002 I was in a riding accident which left me virtually bedridden with a severe back injury until September of 2007. In the winter of 2008, I suffered another injury to my back. I have never fully recovered and do not expect that I will ever fully recover from the injuries.
- 5. In the summer of 2002, shortly before my riding accident. I would often go hiking in the Oregon mountains. As I would occasionally pass by a fellow hiker, I carried my handgun concealed, even though I was free to openly carry a loaded handgun without a license. On one occasion, I encountered a cougar while hiking through tall brush. I instinctively went for the gun on my hip, which was not there. I wasted precious seconds retrieving my concealed handgun. Fortunately, the cougar was as surprised as I was and did not attack. I have learned from personal Declaration of Charles Nichols in Opposition to MTD by Defendant Brown 2 CV-11-9916 SJO (SS)

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- 6. I believe that an unloaded rifle or shotgun presents more than a substantial burden to my ability to defend myself. Nor am I able to physically defend myself from other than the weakest of attackers.
- 7. As I understand it, California law prevents me from openly carrying a loaded firearm in all incorporated cities and unincorporated areas where the discharge of a firearm is prohibited. As I understand it, the discharge of a firearm is prohibited throughout Los Angeles County except in certain limited locations such as firing ranges and in certain remote areas of the county while hunting.
- 8. As I understand it, California law prevents me from openly carrying a handgun, loaded or unloaded, in all incorporated cities and prevents me from openly carrying an unloaded handgun in unincorporated county areas where the discharge of a firearm is prohibited.
- 9. I have openly carried an unloaded handgun in incorporated cities and in unincorporated county territory before California law made it a crime to do so.
- 10. I have openly carried a loaded handgun in unincorporated county territory where, and when, it was legal.
- 11. I would openly carry a loaded handgun for the purpose of self-defense if confronted but would not seek out confrontation and would avoid confrontation if reasonably afforded the opportunity to do so.

Declaration of Charles Nichols in Opposition to MTD by Defendant Brown 3

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- 12. I refrain from openly carry a loaded handgun or long gun in non-sensitive public places because I would in all certainty be arrested, prosecuted, fined and imprisoned for doing so. I will violate the statute at issue, specifically the subsection prohibiting the open carry of a loaded firearm until one is in immediate, grave danger; a point at which it is very likely too late to defend oneself from harm.
- 13. I am certain that I would be arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned for openly carrying a loaded firearm in non-sensitive public places for the purpose of self-defense.
- 14. I fear that I would be arrested by Defendant Brown and/or his subordinates and that he, or they, would participate in my arrest and/or prosecution. I fear that Defendant Brown would not employ his authority and power to release me from my certain conviction and imprisonment.
- 15. I attempted to submit a document under seal in support of my complaint in this lawsuit. It was rejected because, among other reasons, "Plaintiff is advised that at this stage in the litigation, he is not required to produce evidence in support of his allegations." The document was an Incident Report filed with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's department reporting threats made against my person in violation of California Penal Code section 422 Criminal Threats.

I affirm all of the foregoing statements under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America.

Dated: March 12, 2012

Charles Nichols

Declaration of Charles Nichols in Opposition to MTD by Defendant Brown 4
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under his command. Indeed, Defendant Brown's relationship to his officers is more tightly coupled inasmuch as his officers serve at the pleasure of Defendant Brown and can be dismissed by him at will, whereas a ranking police officer, or even the lowest level patrolman; have many protections against dismissal and discipline.

California Government Code section 12010. "The Governor shall supervise the official conduct of all executive and ministerial officers." and 12011. "The Governor shall see that all offices are filled and their duties performed. If default occurs, he shall apply such remedy as the law allows. If the remedy is imperfect, he shall so advise the Legislature at its next session."

Under Article 5, Section 13 of the California Constitution even the Attorney General is "Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor."

Although the Attorney General has all of the powers of a district attorney, has direct supervision of every district attorney in the state and can take over the prosecution of ANY case; the Attorney General has no supervisory role over any of Defendant Brown's officers who enforce the statute at issue in this case. There may be a point in this litigation (e.g., Summary Judgment) where this Court may conclude that a Declaratory Judgment and/or prospective injunctive relief against the Attorney General would redress Plaintiff's alleged injuries caused by Defendant Brown but none of the defendants in this case has made that argument. Defendant Brown certainly has not in his instant motion.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant Brown's role in the ongoing deprivation of Plaintiff's Federal Rights is more than merely that of supervisory authority over departments. Defendant Brown has direct responsibility for

Charles Nichols v. Edmund G Brown Jr et al – Memorandum of P&A in opposition to MTD by Brown

must...threaten or be about to commence civil or criminal proceedings to enforce an unconstitutional act").

In the present case, the Governor has an insufficient connection to the enforcement of Section 25850 -- nothing more than being the Governor of California, which has this law -- and, consequently, has not attempted to enforce that statute. He should be dismissed from this action.

A. The Governor Lacks A Sufficient Connection to Enforcement of the Statute in Question

"Claims under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 are limited by the scope of the Eleventh Amendment." *Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab.*, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). "In the absence of a waiver by the state or a valid congressional override, '[u]nder the Eleventh Amendment, agencies of the state are immune from private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court." *Dittman v. California*, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). "The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court" and "the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity." *Id.* at 1025-1026.

This immunity extends to a California state official, such as the Governor, sued in his official capacity: "A suit against a state official in his official capacity is no different from a suit against the State itself." *Lawrence Livermore*, 131 F.3d at 839.

Federal courts have recognized one exception to the general rule treating state officials the same as the State: "When sued for prospective injunctive relief, a state official in his official capacity is considered a 'person' for § 1983 purposes" and potentially subject to suit. *Lawrence Livermore*, 131 F.3d at 839. However, "the state officer sued 'must have some connection with the enforcement of the [allegedly unconstitutional] act." *Los Angeles Cty. Bar Assn. v. Eu*, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992) (original brackets). Indeed, "this connection must be fairly

DECLARATION OF CHARLES NICHOLS

I, Charles Nichols, declare as follows:

- 1. I am a 51 year old male currently residing in Lawndale California, Los Angeles County, California. I am single and have no children.
- 2. I am presently self-employed as a writer. I was previously employed as an Engineer in Washington, Oregon and California.
- 3. While residing in Oregon, I was licensed to carry handguns concealed in both the states of Oregon and Washington. A license to carry a concealed handgun was necessary to be able to Openly Carry a loaded handgun in the few Oregon cities which required openly carried handguns to be unloaded within their city limits.
- 4. In, or around, August of 2002 I was in a riding accident which left me virtually bedridden with a severe back injury until September of 2007. In the winter of 2008, I suffered another injury to my back. I have never fully recovered and do not expect that I will ever fully recover.
- 5. In the summer of 2002, shortly before my riding accident. I would often go hiking in the Oregon mountains. As I would occasionally pass by a fellow hiker, I carried my handgun concealed, even though I was free to openly carry a loaded handgun without a license. On one occasion, I encountered a cougar while hiking through tall brush. I instinctively went for the gun on my hip, which was not there. I wasted precious seconds retrieving my concealed handgun. Fortunately, the cougar was as surprised as I was and did not attack. I have learned from personal

experience that a concealed handgun provides a false sense of security and presents a substantial burden to the bearer in a life or death situation.

- 6. I believe that an unloaded rifle or shotgun presents more than a substantial burden to my ability to defend myself. Nor am I able to physically defend myself from other than the weakest of aggressors.
- 7. As I understand it, California law prevents me from openly carrying a loaded firearm in all incorporated cities and unincorporated areas where the discharge of a firearm is prohibited. As I understand it, the discharge of a firearm is prohibited throughout Los Angeles County except in certain limited locations such as firing ranges and in certain remote areas of the county while hunting.
- 8. As I understand it, California law prevents me from openly carrying a handgun, loaded or unloaded, in all incorporated cities and prevents me from openly carrying an unloaded handgun in unincorporated county areas where the discharge of a firearm is prohibited.
- 9. I have openly carried an unloaded handgun in incorporated cities and in unincorporated county territory before California law made it a crime to do so.
- 10. I have openly carried a loaded handgun in unincorporated county territory where, and when, it was legal.
- 11. I would openly carry a loaded handgun for the purpose of self-defense if confronted but would not seek out confrontation and would avoid confrontation if reasonably afforded the opportunity to do so.

- 12. I do not openly carry a loaded handgun or long gun in non-sensitive public places because I would in all certainty be arrested, prosecuted, fined and imprisoned for doing so.
- 13. In particular, I am certain that I would be arrested by Redondo Beach police officers as that is where I shop, do my banking and often travel through to visit family and for other reasons.
- 14. In particular, I fear that I would be prosecuted by the City of Redondo Beach or by Attorney General Harris, or their subordinates, or that either or both of these parties or their subordinates may participate in my arrest and/or prosecution. Attorney General Harris, or her subordinate, would certainly prosecute the appeal of my conviction as she has done with so many others who have violated the statute at issue in this case.
- 15. I attempted to submit a document under seal in support of my complaint in this lawsuit. It was rejected because, among other reasons, "Plaintiff is advised that at this stage in the litigation, he is not required to produce evidence in support of his allegations." The document was an Incident Report filed with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's department reporting threats made against my person in violation of California Penal Code section 422 Criminal Threats.

I affirm all of the foregoing statements under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America.

Dated: February 6, 2012

Charles Nichols

		Filed 02/02/12	2 Page 1 of 1 Page ID #:133 FILED CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No.	CV 11-09916 S	JO (SS)		Date: January 19, 2012 Page 1 of 1
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Jaco	ob Yerke	None		None
	uty Clerk	Court Re	porter/Recorder	Tape No.
ATTORNEY	S PRESENT FOR PLA	INTIFF:	ATTORNEYS	S PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
Non	e Present		None	e Present
PROCEED	OINGS: (IN CHAN	MBERS)		
Application Pursuant to Angeles Co DENIED . I that would j yet answere governing e litigation, h	L.R. 7-19 (the "Appunty Sheriff's Dep Plaintiff fails to explusify filing the Reped the Complaint. ex parte application is not required to	ent Under Seal and oplication"). Pla artment Incident lain his purpose it out under seal. The Furthermore, the s. See, e.g., L.F. produce evidence.	nd Request for Wa sintiff seeks to "su t Report (the "Rep in filing the Report There is no pending e Application fails R. 7-19. Plaintiff is ce in support of his	vil rights action filed an Ex Parte aiver of Notice and Memorandum abmit" under seal a copy of a Los port"). Plaintiff's Application is cor provide any compelling reason g motion and Defendants have not set to comply with the Local Rules is advised that at this stage in the seallegations. Order upon Plaintiff at his address

Initials of Deputy Clerk ____

MINUTES FORM 11 CIVIL-GEN

	Case 2:11-cv-09916-SJO-SS Document 10	Filed 01/17/12 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:84 Lodged FILED
1	PO Box 1302	
2	Redondo Beach, CA 90278 Voice: (424) 634-7381 E-Mail: CharlesNichols@Pykrete.info	2012 JAN 17 PM 3: 39
3	E-Mail: CharlesNichols@Pykrete.info In Pro Per	CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DIST. OF CALIF. LOS ANGEXES
4		BY
5		
6		•
7		
8	United States	District Court
9	Central Distric	et of California
10	·	
11	Charles Nichols,	Case No.:
12	Plaintiff,	CV-11-9916 SJO (SS)
13	vs.	
14	EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., in his	
15	official capacity as Governor of	PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE
16	California, KAMALA D. HARRIS,	APPLICATION TO SUMBIT DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL AND
17	Attorney General, in her official	REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF
18	capacity as Attorney General of	NOTICE AND MEMORANDUM PURSANT TO L.R. 7-19
19	California, CITY OF REDONDO	
20	BEACH, CITY OF REDONDO	
21	BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT,	
22	CITY OF REDONDO BEACH	
23	POLICE CHIEF JOSEPH LEONARDI	
24	and DOES 1 to 10,	
25	Defendants.	}
26		
27		
28		

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, by submission to the Honorable Suzanne H. Segal of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division 312 N. Spring St. Rm. G-8 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Plaintiff Charles Nichols hereby applies ex parte to submit a document under seal. Specifically, a copy of an INCIDENT REPORT filed by Plaintiff with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department reporting a Criminal Threat (California Penal Code section 422) made against Plaintiff which is referenced in paragraph 15 of the Complaint.

Plaintiff requests that the copy of the INCIDENT REPORT be kept under seal and not be made part of the public record nor be provided to Defendant's, their attorneys, nor to any other persons beyond those the Court deems essential.

None of the Defendant's are mentioned in the INCIDENT REPORT. This suit does not seek any monetary relief and the only relief requested is equitable relief. Were the contents of this document to become publicly known it would place Plaintiff in even greater danger.

In the interests of justice, plaintiff requests that memorandum and notice of counsel be waived. Defendant's attorneys are unknown to Plaintiff despite repeated requests. All Defendants were requested to waive service of summons, which was sent to all Defendants on December 3rd, the only reply from any Defendant was a form letter from the Attorney General's Office dated December 16th, with an "X" next to a line which reads "4. Other: Service is improper."

A request for waiver of service is not "service," neither is it "improper." Defendants were not even formally served with a summons until January 9th. The

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City of Redondo Beach held a closed session meeting to discuss Plaintiff's lawsuit on December 6th. Defendant Brown received his request for waiver of service on December 5th. Given the press coverage of this lawsuit and their actions, Defendants can hardly claim that they are unaware of the complaint and their attorneys should have contacted Plaintiff who is represented In Pro Per.

Plaintiff does not know who the counsel for all other parties is pursuant to L.R. 7-19.1 Despite his repeated attempts to ascertain their identities from Defendants. Plaintiff cannot compel Defendants to reveal the identity of their attorneys and therefore a waiver under L.R. 7-19 and submission of the requested document under seal is proper particularly because no harm comes to the Defendants by this Court granting permission to submit the document under seal and to waive notice and memorandum, while at the same time there is potentially great and even deadly harm to the Plaintiff were the contents of the document to become public knowledge.

Respectfully submitted this 16th day of January, 2012.

Charles Nichols edondo Beach, CA 278 oice: (424) 634-7381

harlesNichols@Pykrete

194,APPEAL,CLOSED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL DISTRICT OF **CALIFORNIA** (Western Division – Los Angeles) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:11-cv-09916-SJO-SS

Charles Nichols v. Edmund G Brown Jr et al

Assigned to: Judge S. James Otero

Referred to: Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal

Related Case: 2:14-cv-07411-SJO-SS Case in other court: 9th CCA, 13-56203

9th CCA, 14-55873

Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

Plaintiff

Charles Nichols

Date Filed: 11/30/2011 Date Terminated: 05/01/2014 Jury Demand: Plaintiff

Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

represented by Charles Nichols

P O Box 1302

Redondo Beach, CA 90278

424-634-7381 PRO SE

Michael F Sisson

Michael F Sisson Law Offices 3655 Torrance Boulevard 3rd Floor

Torrance, CA 90503 310-318-0970 Fax: 310-318-0948

Email: sissonlaw@aol.com TERMINATED: 12/21/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

V.

Defendant

Edmund G Brown, Jr

in his official capacity as Governor of

California

represented by Jonathan Michael Eisenberg

Office of the California Attorney General

Government Law Section

300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702

Los Angeles, CA 90013

213-897-6505 Fax: 213-897-5775

Email: jonathan.eisenberg@doj.ca.gov

LEAD ATTORNEY

Defendant

Kamala D Harris

Attorney General in her official capacity

as Attorney General of California

represented by Jonathan Michael Eisenberg

(See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

City of Redondo Beach

TERMINATED: 08/05/2013

represented by Lisa M Bond

Richards Watson & Gershon

355 S Grand Ave, 40th Fl

Los Angeles, CA 90071-3101

213-626-8484

Fax: 213-626-0078

Email: lbond@rwglaw.com

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

ER280

Michael W Webb

City of Redondo Beach 415 Diamond Street PO Box 270

Redondo Beach, CA 90277-0270

310-318-0655 Fax: 310-372-3886

Email: michael.webb@redondo.org TERMINATED: 07/02/2012 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas Peter Pierce

Richards Watson and Gershon 355 S Grand Avenue 40th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071–3101 213–626–8484

Fax: 213–626–0078

Email: ppierce@rwglaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

City of Redondo Beach Police Department represented by Michael W Webb

(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 07/02/2012
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Joseph Leonardi City of Redondo Beach Police Chief represented by Lisa M Bond

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Michael W Webb

(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 07/02/2012
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant

Does

1 to 10

TERMINATED: 08/05/2013

Defendant

Officer Todd Heywood

represented by Lisa M Bond

(See above for address)

LEAD ATTORNEY

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

]	Date Filed	#	Docket Text
(07/22/2016	<u>174</u>	ORDER from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 168 filed by Charles Nichols. CCA # 14–55873. Appellant's unopposed motion (docket entry 23) to further stay appellate proceedings pending disposition of the petitions for full court rehearing in Peruta v. County of San Diego, case no. 10–56971, and Richards v. Prieto, case no. 11–16255, is granted. This case is stayed until November 17, 2016. [See document for further information] (car) (Entered: 07/26/2016)
(04/13/2015	<u>173</u>	ORDER from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 168 filed by Charles Nichols. CCA # 14–55873. Appellant's unopposed motion to stay appellate proceedings pending disposition of two en banc

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		cases, Peruta v. County of San Diego, case no. 10–56791, and Richards v. Prieto, case no. 11–16255, is granted. [See document for details] (mat) (Entered: 04/14/2015)
01/21/2015	172	ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 168 filed by Charles Nichols, CCA # 14–55873. Appellant's motion to file sur–reply in opposition to appellees motion to stay proceedings is granted. Appellees opposed motion to stay proceedings pending the courts ruling whether to grant the petition for en banc review in Richards v. Prieto, No. 11–16255 is granted. Within 90 days after the date of this order or within 14 daysafter the court rules on the petition for en banc review in Richards, whicheveroccurs first, appellees shall file an appropriate motion addressing the status of thisappeal and requesting a further stay or other relief. Appellant's unopposed motion for an extension to file a shortened opening brief is granted. Order received in this district on 1/21/15. [See document for details] (mat) (Entered: 01/22/2015)
07/03/2014	<u>171</u>	MANDATE of 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 10, CCA # 13–56203. On May 1, 2014, the district court entered a final order dismissing the underlying action. Consequently, this preliminary injunction appeal is dismissed as moot. Appellant's appeal from the district court's final judgment is proceeding in this court as appeal number 14–55873. Mandate received in this district on 7/3/2014. (car) (Entered: 07/08/2014)
06/10/2014	170	ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 109 filed by Charles Nichols CCA # 13–56203. On May 1, 2014, the district court entered a final order dismissing the underlying action. Consequently, this preliminary injunction appeal is dismissed as moot. See SEC v. Mount Vernon Meml Park, 664 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1982) (district courts entry of final judgment renders pending appeal from preliminary injunction moot). Appellant's appeal from the district court's final judgment is proceeding in this court as appeal number 14–55873. All pending motions are denied as moot. Order received in this district on 6/10/2014. (dmap) (Entered: 06/16/2014)
05/29/2014	<u>169</u>	NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 14–55873, 9th CCA regarding Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals <u>168</u> as to Petitioner Charles Nichols. (ja) (Entered: 05/30/2014)
05/27/2014	<u>168</u>	NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th CCA filed by Petitioner Charles Nichols. Appeal of Judgment <u>167</u> Filed On: 5/1/14; Entered On: 5/1/14; Filing fee \$505 PAID, receipt number LA096419. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Appeal Fee receipt) (mat) (Entered: 05/28/2014)
05/01/2014	<u>167</u>	JUDGMENT by Judge S. James Otero, Related to: R&R – ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE, 166. IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED that the above–captione action is dismissed with prejudice. (MD JS–6, Case Terminated). (mr) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
05/01/2014	<u>166</u>	ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE by Judge S. James Otero. IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED and that Judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Kamala D. Harris. (mr) (Entered: 05/01/2014)
04/14/2014	<u>164</u>	REPLY TO OBJECTION to Report and Recommendation (Issued) <u>162</u> filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/14/2014)
04/11/2014	<u>165</u>	NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY AND ORDER: by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal ORDERING Request for Ruling on Submitted Matter (2) submitted by Plaintiff Charles Nichols received on 4/09/14 is not to be filed but instead rejected. Denial based on: Both parties have not signed the document. (mr) (Entered: 04/16/2014)
03/31/2014	<u>163</u>	OBJECTION to Report and Recommendation (Issued) <u>162</u> filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols.(mr) (Entered: 04/02/2014)
03/18/2014	<u>162</u>	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION issued by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segar Re Complaint, 1, MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment, 131, MOTION for ER282

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		Judgment on the Pleadings, 129. (mr) (Entered: 03/18/2014)
03/18/2014	<u>161</u>	NOTICE OF FILING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. Objections to R&R due by 4/1/2014. (mr) (Entered: 03/18/2014)
02/05/2014	<u>160</u>	DECLARATION of Plaintiff Charles Nichols Regarding Notice of Supplemental Authority 159 filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (es) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
02/05/2014	<u>159</u>	NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY <u>131</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (es) (Entered: 02/06/2014)
02/03/2014	<u>158</u>	Plaintiff's RESPONSE to Defendant Harris' Objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Supplemental Authority <u>157</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols (es) (Entered: 02/05/2014)
01/28/2014	<u>157</u>	Objection re: MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 131, MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Pleadings of Charles Nichols, 129 Four Supplemental Filings filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/28/2014)
01/13/2014	<u>156</u>	DECLARATION re Notice of Supplemental Authority <u>155</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 01/16/2014)
01/13/2014	<u>155</u>	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 01/16/2014)
01/10/2014	<u>154</u>	DECLARATION re Notice (Other) <u>153</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 01/13/2014)
01/10/2014	<u>153</u>	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 01/13/2014)
01/06/2014	<u>152</u>	DECLARATION re Notice of Supplemental Authority <u>150</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
01/06/2014	<u>151</u>	RESPONSE to Objections – non–motion <u>149</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
01/06/2014	<u>150</u>	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 01/09/2014)
12/27/2013	<u>149</u>	OBJECTIONS to Supplemental Filing filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/27/2013)
12/13/2013	148	DECLARATION of Plaintiff Charles Nichols Regarding Notice of Supplemental Authority, <u>147</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) Modified on 12/16/2013 (mr). (Entered: 12/16/2013)
12/13/2013	<u>147</u>	NOTICE of Supplemental Authority filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 12/16/2013)
12/09/2013	<u>146</u>	Plaintiff's Objections to Declaration of Jonathan M. Eisenberg filed in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, <u>131</u> . (lmh) Modified on 12/13/2013 (mr). (Entered: 12/12/2013)
12/09/2013	<u>145</u>	Plaintiff's Objections to Defendant's Notice of Errata filed in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, <u>131</u> . (lmh) Modified on 12/13/2013 (mr). (Entered: 12/12/2013)
12/09/2013	144	Reply to Defendant's State of Genuine Disputes re Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 131 filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) Modified on 12/13/2013 (mr). (Entered: 12/12/2013)
12/09/2013	<u>143</u>	Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment <u>131</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) Modified on 12/13/2013 (mr). (Entered: 12/12/2013)
12/03/2013	142	REPLY in Support of MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Pleadings of Charles Nichols, 129 filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Service)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/03/2013)

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12/03/2013	141	NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. correcting Objection/Opposition (Motion related) 140 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of P's and A's in Opp'n to MSJ, # 2 Affidavit of Service)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/03/2013)
12/02/2013	<u>140</u>	Opposition re: MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 131 filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix of Genuine Disputes, # 2 Affidavit of Jonathan M. Eisenberg, # 3 Affidavit of Service)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
11/26/2013	<u>139</u>	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings <u>129</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (mr) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
11/26/2013	<u>138</u>	Plaintiff Nichols' Objection to Evidence re: MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Pleadings <i>of Charles Nichols</i> , <u>129</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (mr) (Entered: 12/02/2013)
11/18/2013	<u>137</u>	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal, On November 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which was entered on the Courts docket on November 15, 2013. (Dkt. No. 131). The Court sets the following briefing schedule: Defendants Opposition shall be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiffs Reply, if necessary, shall be filed within seven (7) days of service of the Opposition. Thereafter, the Motion will be taken under submission without a hearing unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Accordingly, the hearing date currently set for December 17, 2013 is VACATED. re: MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 131. (lmh) (Entered: 11/18/2013)
11/13/2013	130	MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER: (1) SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND (2) VACATING HEARING DATE (Dkt. No. 129) by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: The Court sets the following briefing schedule: Plaintiff's Opposition shall be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. Defendant's Reply, if necessary, shall be filed within seven (7) days of service of the Opposition. Thereafter, the Motion will be taken under submission without a hearing unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Accordingly, the hearing date currently set for December 17, 2013 is VACATED. If Plaintiff does not intend to oppose the Motion, he may request a voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). A Notice of Dismissal form is attached for Plaintiff's convenience. (Attachments: # 1 Notice of Dismissal Form) (mr) (Entered: 11/13/2013)
11/12/2013	<u>129</u>	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Pleadings of Charles Nichols, filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. Motion set for hearing on 12/17/2013 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of P's and A's, # 2 Appendix (RFJN), # 3 Declaration of Service)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 11/12/2013)
11/08/2013	<u>136</u>	NOTICE OF LODGING of Proposed Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law; Evidence in Support filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols re MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 131 (lmh) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
11/08/2013	<u>135</u>	NOTICE OF LODGING of Proposed Order filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols re MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 131 (lmh) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
11/08/2013	<u>134</u>	EXHIBIT A through H to MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 131 filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits Part 2)(lmh) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
11/08/2013	133	DECLARATION of Charles Nichols in Support MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 131 filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
11/08/2013	<u>132</u>	MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 131 filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lmh) (Entered: 11/15/2013)
11/08/2013	<u>131</u>	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. Motion set for hearing on 12/17/2013 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. (Lodged Proposed Order) (lmh) (Entered: 11/15/2013)

Case: 2:11-cv-09916-SJO-SS As of: 08/30/2016 02:08 AM PDT 6 of 14

10/15/2013	<u>128</u>	ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 109 filed by Charles Nichols, CCA # 13–56203. The court stays proceedings in this appeal pending this court's decisions in Richards v. Prieto, 11–16255, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 10–56971, and Baker v. Kealoha, 12–16258 (arg. & sub. SF 12/6/12 DFO SRT CMC). Order received in this district on 10/15/13. (car) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
08/08/2013	126	MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER DENYING CITY OF REDONDO BEACH'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND AND THIRD CLAIMS IN THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AS MOOT (Dkt. No. 89) by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: On August 5, 2013, Plaintiff in the above–referenced pro se civil rights action filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) dismissing his claims against Defendant City of Redondo Beach and Does 1 to 10 without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 125). Accordingly, City of Redondo Beach's pending Motion to Dismiss the Second and Third Claims in the Second Amended Complaint is DENIED as MOOT. (Dkt. No. 89). (mr) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
08/07/2013	<u>127</u>	STATUS REPORT filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 08/08/2013)
08/05/2013	<u>125</u>	NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL without prejudice against defendant City of Redondo Beach and Does 1 to 10 pursuant to FRCP 41a(1) filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 08/07/2013)
08/02/2013	<u>124</u>	ORDER from 9th CCA filed, CCA # 13–56203. Appellant's emergency motion to stay district court proceedings pending appeal is denied. Appellant's motion to expedite this preliminary injunction appeal is denied as unnecessary. Order received in this district on 8/2/13. (car) (Entered: 08/05/2013)
07/29/2013	<u>123</u>	STATUS REPORT filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/29/2013)
07/22/2013	<u>122</u>	STATUS REPORT filed by Defendant City of Redondo Beach. (Pierce, Thomas) (Entered: 07/22/2013)
07/18/2013	<u>121</u>	MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge S. James Otero: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL 116. (lc) (Entered: 07/18/2013)
07/17/2013	<u>120</u>	Opposition re: EX PARTE APPLICATION to Stay Case pending Pending Appeal 116 filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/17/2013)
07/16/2013	<u>119</u>	Opposition of Defendant City of Redondo Beach re: EX PARTE APPLICATION to Stay Case pending Pending Appeal 116 (Pierce, Thomas) (Entered: 07/16/2013)
07/12/2013	118	MEMORANDUM, Reasons and Points and Authorities in Support Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application to Stay Case Pending Appeal <u>116</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (dmap) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
07/12/2013	<u>117</u>	PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF LODGING (Proposed) Order Staying Further District Court Proceedings filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols re EX PARTE APPLICATION to Stay Case pending Pending Appeal 116. (dmap) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
07/12/2013	<u>116</u>	PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION to Stay Pending Appeal filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols.(dmap) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
07/12/2013	115	Plaintiff's Notice Of Potential Partial Mootness Against Defendant City of Redondo Beach filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (dmap) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
07/10/2013	114	NOTICE OF CLERICAL ERROR: Due to clerical error the Order denying the Certificate of Appealability 113 for CV 12–2558 GAF, Rranklin Ross Knisley was mistakenly docketed into this case. The order will be docketed in the correct case CV 12–2558 GAF. (dmap) (Entered: 07/10/2013)
07/09/2013	<u>111</u>	NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 13–56203 9th CCA regarding Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 109 as to Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (dmap) (Entered: 07/09/2013)
07/09/2013	<u>110</u>	FILING FEE LETTER issued as to Plaintiff Charles Nichols re Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 109. (dmap) (Entered: 07/09/2013)

Case: 2:11-cv-09916-SJO-SS As of: 08/30/2016 02:08 AM PDT 7 of 14

07/08/2013	<u>112</u>	APPEAL FEE PAID: re Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals <u>109</u> as to Plaintiff Charles Nichols; Receipt Number: LA074294 in the amount of \$455. (dmap) (Entered: 07/10/2013)
07/08/2013	<u>109</u>	PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th CCA filed by plainitff Charles Nichols. Appeal of Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction 108. Filed On: 7/3/2013; Entered On: 7/3/2013; Filing fee \$455.00 billed. (dmap) (Entered: 07/09/2013)
07/06/2013	<u>113</u>	Order by Judge S. James Otero denying certificate of appealability. (dmap) (Entered: 07/10/2013)
07/03/2013	<u>108</u>	MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER by Judge S. James Otero:ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION <u>58</u> . The Court refers this matter to Magistrate Judge Segal for further proceedings. (lc) (Entered: 07/03/2013)
06/12/2013	107	SCHEDULING ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. This Order governs discovery and pretrial motions. All discovery shall be completed on or before October 31, 2013. All discovery motions shall be filed and served on or before October 31, 2013. All other motions, including but not limited to motions for summary judgment, shall be filed and served on or before November 13, 2013. The deadline for amending pleadings and/or adding parties is June 28, 2013. Each party shall file and serve a Status Report on or before August 12, 2013. (See document for further details). (mr) (Entered: 06/12/2013)
06/03/2013	<u>106</u>	PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST for Judicial Notice and REPLY to defendant Kamala D. Harris's Evidentiary Objections <u>96</u> to declaration of Charles Nichols filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
06/03/2013	<u>105</u>	PLAINTIFF'S REPLY to defendant Kamala D. Harri's Opposition to Plaintiff Charles Nichols's Motion for Preliminary Injuction <u>96</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 06/04/2013)
05/28/2013	<u>104</u>	Opposition re: MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motion <u>85</u> filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix Request for Judicial Notice, # 2 Affidavit Jonathan Eisenberg Declaration, # 3 Exhibit Exh. A, # 4 Exhibit Exh. B, # 5 Appendix Evidentiary Objections, # 6 Declaration Certificate of Service)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/28/2013)
05/16/2013	<u>103</u>	Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant City of Redondo Beach's Evidentiary Objections to Plaintiff's Declaration Submitted in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss <u>99</u> . (mr) (Entered: 05/17/2013)
05/16/2013	102	MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge S. James Otero: ORDER STRIKING DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 96; STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FORPRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 100. Defendant shall re–file her Opposition in accordance with this Court's Initial Standing Order on or before May 28, 2013. Plaintiff shall re–file his Reply in accordance with this Court'sInitial Standing Order on or before June 3, 2013. The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument 85, and thus no appearances are necessary. See Fed. R. Civ. P.78(b). (lc) (Entered: 05/16/2013)
05/07/2013	<u>101</u>	PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND REPLY TO DEFENDANT KAMALA D. HARRIS'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF CHARLES NICHOLS filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lc) (Entered: 05/08/2013)
05/07/2013	100	PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT KAMALA D. HARRIS'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF CHARLES NICHOLS'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 85 filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lc) (Entered: 05/08/2013)
05/07/2013	99	Evidentiary Objections in support of re: MOTION to Dismiss Case <u>89</u> the Second and Third Claims in the Second Amended Complaint filed by Defendant City of Redondo Beach. (Pierce, Thomas) (Entered: 05/07/2013)

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05/07/2013	<u>98</u>	REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re MOTION to Dismiss Case <u>89</u> the Second and Third Claims in the Second Amended Complaint; Declaration of T. Peter Pierce in Support filed by Defendant City of Redondo Beach. (Pierce, Thomas) (Entered: 05/07/2013)
05/07/2013	<u>97</u>	REPLY in support of a motion MOTION to Dismiss Case <u>89</u> the Second and Third Claims in the Second Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative, in Support of Motion for More Definite Statement filed by Defendant City of Redondo Beach. (Pierce, Thomas) (Entered: 05/07/2013)
05/02/2013	<u>96</u>	Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motion Opposition to Mtn. for Preliminary Injunction re: MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motion <u>85</u> filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Attachments: # 1 Request for Judicial Notice, # 2 Declaration of Jonathan M. Eisenberg, # 3 Exhibit A to JME Decl., # 4 Exhibit B to JME Decl., # 5 Evidentiary Objections, # 6 Proof of Service)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/02/2013)
04/30/2013	<u>95</u>	Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion By Defendant City of Redondo Beach to Dismiss the Second and Third Claims in the Second Amended Complaint or, In the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement 89. Etc.; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Charles Nichols filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (mr) (Entered: 05/01/2013)
04/19/2013	94	MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) SCHEDULING ORDER RE DEFENDANT CITY OF REDONDO BEACH'S MOTION TO DISMISS (Dkt. No. 89) by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: On April 15, 2013, Defendant City of Redondo Beach filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second and Third Claims in the Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 89). Plaintiff shall have until May 3, 2013 to file and serve an Opposition to the Motion. Defendant shall have seven (7) days from service of the Opposition to file and serve a Reply, if necessary. Thereafter, the Motion will be deemed submitted without oral argument. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the hearing set for May 21, 2013 be taken off calendar. (See document for further details). (mr) (Entered: 04/19/2013)
04/19/2013	93	MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER VACATING HEARING DATE ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (Dkt. No. <u>85</u>) by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: On April 10, 2013, Plaintiff in the above–referenced pro se civil rights action filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. No. <u>85</u>). Plaintiff set May 20, 2013 as the hearing date on the Motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7–15, the hearing date of May 20, 2013 is VACATED and no appearance is necessary, unless otherwise advised by the Court. (mr) (Entered: 04/19/2013)
04/18/2013	92	MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) SCHEDULING ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (Dkt. No. <u>85</u>) by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: On April 10, 2013, Plaintiff in the above–referenced pro se civil rights action filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Defendants' Opposition, if any, is due fourteen (14) days from the date of this order, i.e., by May 2, 2013. Plaintiff's Reply is due seven (7) days from the date of service of the Opposition. (mr) (Entered: 04/18/2013)
04/16/2013	<u>91</u>	ANSWER to Amended Complaint <u>83</u> filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris.(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 04/16/2013)
04/15/2013	90	MEMORANDUM in Support of Defendant City of Redondo Beach's Motion to Dismiss the Second and third Claims in the Second Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, in Support of Motion for More Definite Statement filed by Defendant City of Redondo Beach. (Pierce, Thomas) (Entered: 04/15/2013)
04/15/2013	<u>89</u>	NOTICE of Motion and Motion by Defendant City of Redondo Beach to Dismiss the Second and Third Claims in the Second Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement filed by Defendant City of Redondo Beach. (Pierce, Thomas) Modified on 4/16/2013 (mr). (Entered: 04/15/2013)
04/10/2013	<u>88</u>	REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE re MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motion 85 filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lc) (Entered: 04/12/2013)

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04/10/2013	<u>87</u>	DECLARATION of Charles Nichols in support MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motion <u>85</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lc) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
04/10/2013	<u>86</u>	MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motion <u>85</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lc) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
04/10/2013	<u>85</u>	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Preliminary Injunction. Motion filed by plaintiff: Charles Nichols. Motion set for hearing on 5/20/2013 at 10:00 AM before Judge S. James Otero. (lc) (Entered: 04/12/2013)
04/02/2013	<u>84</u>	MINUTE ORDER (IN CHAMBERS) SCHEDULING ORDER RE RESPONSE DEADLINE TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (Dkt. No. <u>83</u>) by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff in the above–referenced pro se civil rights action filed a Second Amended Complaint. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(3), Defendants shall file a response to the Second Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. (mr) (Entered: 04/02/2013)
03/29/2013	<u>83</u>	SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT amending First Amended Complaint <u>47</u> , filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 04/01/2013)
03/03/2013	<u>82</u>	ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE by Judge S. James Otero. The Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint 54 filed by the Redondo Beach Defendants is GRANTED. The Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint 58 filed by Attorney General Kamala D. Harris is DENIED. The First Amended Complaint 47 is DISMISSED with leave to amend. If Plaintiff desires to proceed with his claims against Attorney General Harris and City of Redondo Beach, Plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. (See Order for details) (afe) (Entered: 03/05/2013)
02/28/2013	<u>81</u>	NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 03/04/2013)
02/25/2013	<u>80</u>	NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 02/27/2013)
01/11/2013	<u>79</u>	NOTICE of Related Case [Local Rule 83–1.3(b)] filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 01/11/2013)
01/11/2013	<u>78</u>	SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY Moore, et al. and Shepard, et al.v. Madigan, Nos 12–1269, 12–1788 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 01/11/2013)
01/11/2013	<u>77</u>	SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 01/11/2013)
12/21/2012	<u>76</u>	ORDER ON REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. granting <u>75</u> Motion to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Michael F Sisson terminated. (afe) (Entered: 12/26/2012)
12/20/2012	<u>75</u>	Request for Approval of Substitution of Attorney filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (jy) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
12/20/2012	74	NOTICE OF DOCUMENT DISCREPANCIES AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal ORDERING Request for Approval of Substitution of Attorney submitted by Plaintiff Charles Nichols received on 12/20/12 to be filed and processed; filed date to be the date the document was stamped Received but not Filed with the Clerk. (jy) (Entered: 12/21/2012)
12/17/2012	<u>73</u>	PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE to defendant Kamala D. Harris's Objections <u>72</u> to November 20, 2012 Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 12/17/2012)
12/04/2012	<u>72</u>	OBJECTION to Report and Recommendation (Issued) <u>71</u> filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris.(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 12/04/2012)
11/20/2012	71	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION issued by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. Re MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint 54 and Second MOTION to ER288

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		Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction <u>58</u> (jy) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
11/20/2012	<u>70</u>	NOTICE OF FILING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. Objections to R&R due by 12/4/2012 (jy) (Entered: 11/20/2012)
07/23/2012	<u>69</u>	REPLY in Support of Second MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction <i>per FRCP 12(b)(1)</i> Second MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction <i>per FRCP 12(b)(1)</i> <u>58</u> filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Declaration of Service)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 07/23/2012)
07/20/2012	<u>68</u>	REDONDO BEACH DEFENDANTS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF NICHOLS DECLARATION FILED IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT – IN SUPPORT OF re: MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint , or, in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement 54 filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, Todd Heywood, Joseph Leonardi. (Bond, Lisa) (Entered: 07/20/2012)
07/20/2012	<u>67</u>	REPLY REDONDO BEACH DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement 54 filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, Todd Heywood, Joseph Leonardi. (Bond, Lisa) (Entered: 07/20/2012)
07/16/2012	<u>66</u>	MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement 54, Second MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction per FRCP 12(b)(1)Second MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction per FRCP 12(b)(1) 58 Request for Judicial Notice filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (Sisson, Michael) (Entered: 07/16/2012)
07/16/2012	<u>65</u>	MEMORANDUM in Opposition to Second MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction <i>per FRCP 12(b)(1)</i> Second MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction <i>per FRCP 12(b)(1)</i> 58 by Defendant Kamala Harris filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (Sisson, Michael) (Entered: 07/16/2012)
07/16/2012	<u>64</u>	MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement <u>54</u> by Defendant Redondo Beach et al filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (Sisson, Michael) (Entered: 07/16/2012)
07/13/2012	<u>63</u>	ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: granting <u>62</u> Request to Substitute Attorney. (jy) (Entered: 07/13/2012)
07/12/2012	<u>62</u>	REQUEST to Substitute attorney Michael F. Sisson in place of attorney Charles Nichols filed by Attorney Charles Nichols. Request set for hearing on 7/13/2012 at 01:30 PM before Judge S. James Otero. (Sisson, Michael) (Entered: 07/12/2012)
07/05/2012	<u>61</u>	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: On June 29, 2012, in the above–entitled civil rights action, Motions to Dismiss were filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, Joseph Leonardi, Todd Heywood and California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris. Plaintiff shall have until July 16, 2012 to serve and file Oppositions to the Motions. Defendants shall have seven (7) days from service of the Oppositions to serve and file Replies, if necessary. Thereafter, the Motions will be deemed submitted without oral argument. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the hearings set for July 31, 2012 be taken off calendar. See minute order for details. (jy) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
07/02/2012	<u>60</u>	PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION to substitution of attorney <u>53</u> filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 07/05/2012)
07/02/2012	<u>59</u>	ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: granting <u>53</u> Request to Substitute Attorney. Attorney Michael W Webb terminated (jy) (Entered: 07/02/2012)
06/29/2012	<u>58</u>	NOTICE OF MOTION AND Second MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction per FRCP 12(b)(1) filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. Motion set for hearing on 7/31/2012 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of P's and A's Supporting Dismissal, # 2 Supplement Request for Judicial Notice)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 06/29/2012)

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06/29/2012	<u>57</u>	SUPPLEMENT to MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement 54 ([Proposed] Order) filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, Todd Heywood, Joseph Leonardi. (Bond, Lisa) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
06/29/2012	<u>56</u>	DECLARATION of Lisa Bond in support of MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint , <i>or</i> , <i>in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement</i> <u>54</u> filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, Todd Heywood, Joseph Leonardi. (Attachments: # <u>1</u> Exhibit 1, # <u>2</u> Exhibit 2, # <u>3</u> Exhibit 3)(Bond, Lisa) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
06/29/2012	<u>55</u>	MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement 54 filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, Todd Heywood, Joseph Leonardi. (Bond, Lisa) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
06/29/2012	<u>54</u>	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, Todd Heywood, Joseph Leonardi. Motion set for hearing on 7/31/2012 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. (Bond, Lisa) (Entered: 06/29/2012)
06/28/2012	<u>53</u>	REQUEST to Substitute attorney Lisa Bond in place of attorney Michael W. Webb filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, Joseph Leonardi. (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Order Order on Request for Approval of Substitution of Attorney)(Bond, Lisa) (Entered: 06/28/2012)
06/27/2012	<u>52</u>	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: ORDER CLARIFYING DEADLINE FOR RESPONSE TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; the Court extends the deadline by one day and ORDERS Harris, Leonardi and City of Redondo Beach to file a response to the First Amended Complaint by Friday, June 29, 2012. See order for further details. (jy) (Entered: 06/27/2012)
06/19/2012	<u>51</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols, re Summons Issued, Amended Complaint <u>47</u> served on 06/07/12. (afe) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
06/19/2012	<u>50</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols, re Summons Issued, Amended Complaint <u>47</u> served on 06/07/12. (afe) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
06/19/2012	<u>49</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols, re Summons Issued, Amended Complaint <u>47</u> served on 06/07/12. (afe) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
06/19/2012	<u>48</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols, re Summons Issued, Amended Complaint <u>47</u> served on 06/07/12. (afe) (Entered: 06/20/2012)
05/30/2012		60 DAY AMENDED Summons Issued re Amended Complaint <u>47</u> as to defendant City of Redondo Beach, City of Redondo Beach Police Department, Kamala D Harris (Attorney General in her official capacity as Attorney General of California), Officer Todd Heywood. (afe) (Entered: 06/18/2012)
05/30/2012	<u>47</u>	FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT amending Complaint 1 filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (jy) (Additional attachment(s): # 2 Amended Summons) (Entered: 05/30/2012)
05/07/2012	<u>46</u>	ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE by Judge S. James Otero; Plaintiffs claims against Attorney General Kamala D. Harris are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See order for further details. (jy) (Entered: 05/08/2012)
05/07/2012	<u>45</u>	MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge S. James Otero: The Court deems the Plaintiff's MOTION for Review of Magistrate Judges report and recommendation 41 as an objection. Accordingly, the Court takes the hearing off its calendar. (lc) (Entered: 05/07/2012)
05/02/2012	<u>44</u>	NOTICE OF ERRATA filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. correcting MOTION for Review of Magistrate Judges report and recommendation re Report and Recommendation (Issued) 40 41 (jy) (Entered: 05/03/2012)

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05/01/2012	43	REPLY TO OBJECTION to Report and Recommendation (Issued) <u>40</u> filed by Defendant Edmund G Brown, Jr. <i>and Defendant Kamala D. Harris</i> (Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 05/01/2012)
04/17/2012	<u>42</u>	MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION for Review of Magistrate Judges report and recommendation re Report and Recommendation 41 filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (lc) (Main Document 42 replaced on 8/8/2014) (tad). (Entered: 04/17/2012)
04/17/2012	41	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION for Review of Magistrate Judges report and recommendation <u>40</u> filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. Motion set for hearing on 5/24/2012 at 10:00 AM before Judge S. James Otero. (lc) (Entered: 04/17/2012)
04/05/2012	<u>40</u>	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION issued by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. Re Complaint <u>1</u> (jy) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
04/05/2012	<u>39</u>	NOTICE OF FILING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. Objections to R&R due by 4/19/2012 (jy) (Entered: 04/05/2012)
03/19/2012	<u>38</u>	REPLY in Support of MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction <u>34</u> filed by Defendant Edmund G Brown, Jr. (Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/19/2012)
03/12/2012	<u>37</u>	DECLARATION of Charles Nichols re Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 36 filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 03/13/2012)
03/12/2012	<u>36</u>	PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 34 by defendant Edmund G. Brown, Jr., in his official capacity as governor of California, filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 03/13/2012)
03/09/2012	<u>35</u>	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal re: MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 34. On March 8, 2012, in the above–entitled civil rights action, a Motion to Dismiss was filed by Defendant Gov. Edmund G. Brown, Jr. Plaintiff shall have until March 23, 2012 to serve and file an Opposition to the Motion. Defendants shall have seven (7) days from service of the Opposition to serve and file a Reply, if necessary. Thereafter, the Motion will be deemed submitted without oral argument. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the hearing set for April 10, 2012 be taken off calendar. See minute order for further details. (jy) (Entered: 03/09/2012)
03/08/2012	<u>34</u>	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Defendant Edmund G Brown, Jr. Motion set for hearing on 4/10/2012 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 03/08/2012)
02/24/2012	<u>33</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols, Complaint – (Referred) 1, Notice of Reference to a U S Magistrate Judge (CV–25) 3 served on 02/16/12. (afe) (Entered: 02/27/2012)
02/21/2012	<u>32</u>	Reply to Order Directing Plaintiff to File Response Regarding Application for Entry of Default filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (jy) (Entered: 02/21/2012)
02/17/2012	<u>31</u>	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: DENYING THE REDONDO BEACH DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR A HEARING (Dkt. Nos. <u>25</u> – <u>26</u>); See minute order for details. (jy) (Entered: 02/17/2012)
02/16/2012	<u>30</u>	NOTICE of Error in Submission of Application for Default Judgment Against Defendant Brown filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (jy) (Entered: 02/16/2012)
02/15/2012	<u>29</u>	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: the Court directs Plaintiff to file a response within seven (7) days (February 22, 2012) of the date of this Order stating whether he wishes to withdraw his Application. See minute order for further details. (jy) (Entered: 02/15/2012)
02/14/2012	<u>28</u>	REPLY Support MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction <u>13</u> filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
02/14/2012	<u>27</u>	REPLY Reply MOTION to Dismiss Case 12 Reply filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, City of Redondo Beach Police Department, Joseph Leonardi. (Webb, ER291

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		Michael) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
02/14/2012	<u>26</u>	Objection Support re: MOTION to Dismiss Case 12 Objections To Plaintiff's Notice of Lodging filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, City of Redondo Beach Police Department, Joseph Leonardi. (Webb, Michael) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
02/14/2012	<u>25</u>	Objection Support re: MOTION to Dismiss Case 12 Redondo Beach Defendants' Objections To Plaintiff's Two Requests For Judicial Notice; Request for Hearing filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, City of Redondo Beach Police Department, Joseph Leonardi. (Webb, Michael) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
02/13/2012	<u>23</u>	Application for Entry of Default Opposition re: APPLICATION for Clerk to Enter Default against defendant Edmund G Brown, Jr <u>22</u> filed by Defendant Edmund G Brown, Jr. (Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/13/2012)
02/10/2012	<u>24</u>	REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE of recently decided 9TH CIRCUIT opinion in support of plaintiff's opposition to motions to dismiss by Redondo Beach defendants and Motion to dismiss by defendant Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General in her official capacity as Attorney General of California, re MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 13, filed by Plainfiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 02/14/2012)
02/08/2012	<u>22</u>	APPLICATION for Entry of Default against defendant Edmund G Brown, Jr filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. (jy) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
02/08/2012	<u>21</u>	DECLARATION of Charles Nichols, filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (afe) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
02/08/2012	<u>20</u>	PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF LODGING OF COMPUTER DISC CONTAINING VIDEOS REFERENCED AS EXHIBIT 1–1 TO 1–4 IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS BY REDONDO BEACH DEFENDANTS, filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols. re Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition (non–motion) 19 (afe) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
02/08/2012	<u>19</u>	PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TODISMISS BY REDONDO BEACH DEFENDANTS, filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. Re: MOTION to Dismiss Case 12 (afe) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
02/08/2012	<u>18</u>	PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT KAMALA HARRIS' MOTION TO DISMISS, filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. Re: MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 13 (afe) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
02/08/2012	17	REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS BY REDONDO BEACH DEFENDANTS AND MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANT KAMALA D. HARRIS ATTORNEY GENERAL IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA. re MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 13, filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols.(afe) (Entered: 02/10/2012)
02/02/2012	<u>16</u>	CONSENT TO PROCEED before a U. S. Magistrate Judge in accordance with Title 28 Section 636(c) and F.R.CIV.P 73(b), consent is hereby DECLINED by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (jy) (Entered: 02/02/2012)
02/01/2012	<u>15</u>	NOTICE of Errata filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. (Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 02/01/2012)
01/31/2012	<u>14</u>	MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: re: MOTION to Dismiss Case 12 and MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 13. On January 30, 2012, in the above–entitled civil rights action, Motions to Dismiss were filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach and City of Redondo Beach Police Department and by Defendant Kamala D. Harris. Plaintiff shall have until February 14, 2012 to serve and file an Opposition to the Motions. Defendants shall have seven (7) days from service of the Opposition to serve and file a Reply, if necessary. Thereafter, the Motions will be deemed submitted without oral argument. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the hearings set for March 6, 2012 be taken off calendar. (jy) (Entered: 01/31/2012)

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01/30/2012	<u>13</u>	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by Defendant Kamala D Harris. Motion set for hearing on 3/6/2012 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum Supporting P's and A's)(Eisenberg, Jonathan) (Entered: 01/30/2012)		
01/30/2012	<u>12</u>	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Defendants City of Redondo Beach, City of Redondo Beach Police Department, Joseph Leonardi. Motion set for hearing on 3/6/2012 at 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, # 2 Proposed Order)(Webb, Michael) (Entered: 01/30/2012)		
01/19/2012	11	MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal: denying 10 Ex Parte Application to Seal; Plaintiffs Application is DENIED. Plaintiff fails to explain his purpose in filing the Report or provide any compelling reason that would justify filing the Report under seal. There is no pending motion and Defendants have not yet answered the Complaint. Furthermore, the Application fails to comply with the Local Rules governing ex parte applications. See minute order for further details. (jy) (Entered: 01/19/2012)		
01/17/2012	<u>10</u>	EX PARTE APPLICATION to Submit Document Under Seal and Request for Waiver of Notice filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols.(jy) (Entered: 01/19/2012)		
01/12/2012	<u>9</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by PLAINTIFF Charles Nichols, re Complaint 1, Notice of Reference to a U S Magistrate Judge (CV–25) 3 served on 01/09/12. (afe) (Entered: 01/17/2012)		
01/12/2012	8	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by PLAINTIFF Charles Nichols, Complaint 1, Notice of Reference to a U S Magistrate Judge (CV–25) 3 served on 01/09/12. (afe) (Entered: 01/17/2012)		
01/12/2012	7	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by PLAINTIFF Charles Nichols, re Complaint – 1, Notice of Reference to a U S Magistrate Judge (CV–25) 3 served on 01/09/12. (afe) (Entered: 01/17/2012)		
01/12/2012	<u>6</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by PLAINTIFF Charles Nichols, re Complaint 1, Notice of Reference to a U S Magistrate Judge (CV–25) 3 served on 01/09/12. (afe) (Entered: 01/17/2012)		
01/12/2012	<u>5</u>	PROOF OF SERVICE filed by plaintiff Charles Nichols, re Complaint 1, Notice of Reference to a U S Magistrate Judge (CV–25) 3 served on 01/09/12. (afe) (Entered: 01/17/2012)		
12/07/2011	4	STANDING ORDER GOVERNING PRE-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal, See order for details. (jy) (Entered: 12/07/2011)		
11/30/2011	3	NOTICE OF REFERENCE to United States Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. (et) (Entered: 12/01/2011)		
11/30/2011	2	CERTIFICATION AND NOTICE of Interested Parties filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. (et) (Entered: 12/01/2011)		
11/30/2011	1	COMPLAINT filed against Defendants Edmund G Brown, Jr, City of Redondo Beach, City of Redondo Beach Police Department, Does 1 to 10, Kamala D Harris, Joseph Leonardi. Case assigned to Judge S. James Otero and referred to Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal.(Filing fee\$350 Paid.), filed by Plaintiff Charles Nichols. [Summons not issued on 11/30/2011] (et) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/10/2012: # 1 Summons) (afe). (Entered: 12/01/2011)		