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7	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
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10	SIGITAS RAULINAITIS,	) CASE NO. CV 13-2605MAN			
11	Plaintiff,	) ) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR			
12		) SUMMARY JUDGMENT			
13	VS.				
14	VENTURA COUNTY SHERIFFS	<ul> <li>) Filed concurrently with Declaration of</li> <li>) Sigitas Raulinaitis and Separate</li> </ul>			
15	DEPARTMENT,	) Statement of Facts and Law			
	Defendants.	)			
16		) June 24th, 2014, at 10:00 a.m.			
17		, )			
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## I. INTRODUCTION

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The Second Amendment protects the fundamental right of law abiding citizens to bear arms for self-defense, and in California, the only way Plaintiff can exercise that right is with a permit issued by the Sheriff. To date, the Sheriff refuses to issue Plaintiff a permit stating that Plaintiff is not a resident of Ventura. This very simple legal and factual issue is the entirety of this case- can Defendant exercise unfettered discretion to deny Plaintiff his ability to exercise a Fundamental Right.

There are essentially three pre-requisites to a permit, residency, good moral character and good cause. The last two are not issues because Plaintiffs good moral character has already been established by the California Supreme court when it

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admitted him to practice law, and regardless, defendant has twice conducted State and
Federal background checks, the most recent after requesting a continuance of the
TRO hearing to process Plaintiffs' application again and then advising the Court that
more time was needed to resolve the residency issue. The Good Cause is also not an
issue as Defendant has changed his policy to accept self-defense, leaving residency as
the only issue.

# II. <u>LEGAL STANDARD</u>

8 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings and materials demonstrate
9 "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to
10 judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
11 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material issue of fact is a question a trier of fact must
12 answer to determine the rights of the parties under the applicable substantive law.
13 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

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# III. PLAINTIFF HAS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENSE AND THE ONLY WAY TO EXERCISE THAT RIGHT IN CALIFORNIA IS WITH A CCW PERMIT

The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated, with regard to the Second Amendment, that:

"Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation."

<u>District of Columbia v. Heller</u>, 128 S. Ct. 2783, at 2798 (2008).

Again reiterated just two years later:

"Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is
"the central component" of the Second Amendment right". <u>McDonald v. City</u>
<u>of Chicago</u> (2010) 130 S. Ct. 3020, at 3037.

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This Principal likewise has already been followed in the Central District
 wherein Magistrate John E. McDermott found no legal basis for even bringing a
 motion to dismiss on an almost identical Complaint:

4 In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia's "absolute prohibition of handguns held and used 5 for self defense in the home" clearly violated the Second Amendment.1 Id. at 6 7 628-636. In so holding, the Supreme Court explained that the Second 8 Amendment protects an individual right to "keep and carry arms," and further 9 noted that "the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second 10 Amendment right." Id. at 627-629. Thus, the Supreme Court identified in 11 Heller an unequivocal Second Amendment "individual right to possess and 12 carry weapons in case of confrontation." 554 U.S. at 592. In Mcdonald v. City 13 of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010), the Court held that "the Second 14 Amendment right is fully applicable to the States."

Ruling Denying Motion to Dismiss, Case 5:13-cv-00673-VAP-JEM.

Plaintiff is a law abiding citizen unable to exercise his Fundamental Right to
Self-Defense because Defendant refuses to issue him a permit necessary to exercise
such right based solely upon an unlawful exercise of discretion. When a fundamental
right is recognized, substantive due process forbids infringement of that right "at all,
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) at 301-02
(citations omitted).

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The 9th Circuit Court has adopted an intermediate scrutiny approach to Second 1 Amendment challenges, not a rational basis approach<sup>1</sup> as previously used by this Court:

After considering the approaches taken by other circuits that considered the constitutionality of \$ 922(g)(9), we hold as follows. We adopt the two-step Second Amendment inquiry undertaken by the Third Circuit in Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89, and the Fourth Circuit in Chester, 628 F.3d at 680, among other circuits. Applying that inquiry, we hold that 922(g)(9) burdens conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee and that intermediate scrutiny applies to Chovan's Second Amendment challenge. Finally, like the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, we apply intermediate scrutiny....

U.S. v. Chovan (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3d 1127, 1136

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#### IV. **ABUSE OF DISCRETION**

16 It is repugnant to Constitutional Jurisprudence to suggest that an elected 17 official could supplant his own wisdom for that clearly stated by the legislature and then exercise that discretion to deny Plaintiff the ability to exercise a Fundamental 18 Right in any lawful manner outside of his home. Under Cantwell v. Connecticut 19 20 (1940) 310 U.S. 296, and its progeny, States and localities may not condition a license necessary to engage in constitutionally protected conduct on the grant of a 21 license officials have discretion to withhold. Further, a host of prior restraint cases 22 23 establish that "the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees" may not be made "contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official." 24 Staub v. Baxley (1958) 355 U.S. 313, 322. 25

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The *Heller* Court did, however, indicate that rational basis review is not appropriate. U.S. v. Chovan (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3d 1127, 1137

# V. <u>RESIDENCY</u>

2 Whether the definition is residency or domicile, Plaintiffs' declaration attached hereto clearly establishes either standard and all of this information was provided to 3 4 Defendant previously in this case, under oath and was in his possession when he 5 requested permission to process a second application and then advised the parties that he still could not decide residency. Ironically, the Sheriff changed his good cause 6 7 policy in response to the Peruta decision which is not yet final, but Mr. Peruta was in fact domiciled in Connecticut and travelled to San Diego in his RV staying in a camp 8 ground at the time he sought his permit. 9

Plaintiffs' permanent and primary residence and domicile is Ventura. When
away from his Ventura home it is the place he plans on returning and when he is not
there he is travelling, at his vacation home, or staying in Santa Clarita as required for
work before returning home to Ventura. Plaintiffs official residence with the State of
California is Ventura, where he is also registered to vote.

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# VI. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Under any standard, Plaintiff is a resident of Ventura and entitled to a
concealed weapons permit necessary to exercise his fundamental right and the actions
of an elected official to deny his exercise of those rights without any justification are
violation of his Constitutional Rights.

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 May 12, 2014
 /s/

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 Jonathan W. Birdt

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 Jonathan W. Birdt

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