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8	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT (OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
9	FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO		
10	DANNY VILLANUEVA, NIALL STALLARD, RUBEN BARRIOS,	Case No.: 17CECG03093	
11	CHARLIE COX, MARK STROH, ANTHONY MENDOZA, and	[Assigned for All Purposes to the Honorable Judge Mark Snauffer; Dept.: 501]	
12	CALIFORNIA RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND	
13	Plaintiffs,	AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR	
14 15	v.	PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [Filed concurrently with Plaintiffs' Notice of	
16	XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of	Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Declarations of Sean A. Brady, Danny Villanueva, Niall	
17	California, STEPHEN LINDLEY, in his official capacity as Chief of the California	Stallard, Ruben Barrios, Charlie Cox, Mark Stroh, Anthony Mendoza, and Michael	
18	Department of Justice, Bureau of Firearms; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, and DOES 1-10,	Barranco; Request for Judicial Notice; and Proposed Order]	
19	Defendants.	Hearing Date: January 30, 2018 Hearing Time: 3:30 PM	
20	2010110011	Judge: Mark Snauffer Department: 501	
21		Action Filed: September 7, 2017	
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

California recently enacted new laws amending the definition of "assault weapon" thereby bringing numerous firearms within that term's scope that had previously not been. Those new laws require any owner of such firearms, if lawfully acquired between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2016, to register them with the California Department of Justice ("DOJ") by July 1, 2018, in order to maintain their possession. The legislature tasked DOJ with formulating regulations to implement the registration scheme and exempted DOJ from California's otherwise mandatory procedures for making regulations in doing so under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").

DOJ, however, interpreted that very narrow exemption as an invitation for it to bypass the formal rulemaking process in adopting a whole slew of regulations for "assault weapons" that had tenuous, if any, connections to registration procedures. Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed by being forced to comply with illegal regulations to simply maintain lawful possession of their property. Because these regulations were not adopted lawfully, they are void and Plaintiffs bring this motion to enjoin their enforcement before the fast approaching registration window closes forever. To be clear, Plaintiffs do not dispute DOJ's authority to make regulations concerning "assault weapons" per se. In fact, Plaintiffs do not challenge many of the related regulations DOJ adopted. Rather, they contend that the regulations DOJ adopted without adhering to the APA are not within the scope of the APA exemption the legislature conferred on DOJ. Moreover, DOJ adopted regulations that, even if they were exempt from the formal rulemaking process, are void because they unlawfully expand or restrict the scope of a statute.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The APA provides a detailed statutory scheme for state agencies when proposing and adopting regulations. (See Gov. Code, §§ 11340 et seq.) Mandatory procedures under the APA include providing adequate notice of proposed regulations to the public and an opportunity for public comment before their adoption. (Gov. Code, §§ 11346.2, 11346.4, 11346.5, 11346.8.)

On July 1, 2016, Governor Brown signed into law Senate Bill 880 ("SB 880") and

Assembly Bill 1135 ("AB 1135"). (Sen. Bill. No. 880 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.); Ass. Bill. No. 1135 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.).) These bills are identical and amended the definition of "assault weapon" under Penal Code section 30515. *Id.* Specifically, they changed the definition of a semiautomatic, centerfire rifle with certain features as being an "assault weapon" if it had a "detachable magazine" to one if it "does not have a fixed magazine." (Pen. Code, § 30515, subd. (a)(1).) They made the same definitional change for semiautomatic pistols with certain features. (Pen. Code, § 30515, subd. (a)(4).) But they left the definitions for various shotguns deemed "assault weapons" untouched. *See* (Pen. Code, § 30515, subds. (a)(6)-(8).)

SB 880 and AB 1135 also added Subdivision (b) to Penal Code § 30900, which requires that any person who lawfully possesses a newly classified "assault weapon" register it before July 1, 2018, "pursuant to those procedures that the [DOJ] may establish by regulation" (Pen. Code, § 30900, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (b) further requires registrations to be submitted via the internet, that they contain a "description" of the firearm and information regarding from whom the firearm was acquired, and "the registrant's full name, address, telephone number, date of birth, sex, height, weight, eye color, hair color, and California driver's license or identification card number." (Pen. Code, §§ 30900, subd. (b)(2-3).) Additionally, it allows DOJ to charge a fee for the registration. (Pen. Code, § 30900, subd. (b)(4).) No other requirements or restrictions for the registration of newly classified "assault weapons" are mentioned in Subdivision (b).

DOJ is exempt from the APA in "adopt[ing] regulations for the purpose of implementing this subdivision [Subdivision (b)]." (Pen. Code, § 30900, subd. (b)(5).) On December 30, 2016 DOJ first submitted proposed regulations purporting to implement Subdivision (b) to the Office of Administrative Law ("OAL") as "File and Print"—meaning exempt from the APA. (Req. for Jud. Not. ¶ 2.) The proposal included, among other provisions, over 40 new definitions¹ (the majority of which are not related to the changes of the definition of an "assault weapon" under AB 1135 or SB 880), the repeal and replacement of existing definitions for terms relating to "assault weapons" that were lawfully adopted pursuant to APA rulemaking requirements,² expansion of

¹ Cal. Code Regs, tit. 11, § 5471.

² Cal. Code Regs, tit. 11, § 5469.

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the definition of an "assault weapon" to apply to certain shotguns not classified as an "assault weapon" by California law,³ requirements that certain firearms first have a DOJ-approved serial number inscribed on them as a condition of registration,⁴ requirements that individuals provide personal information beyond what is called for by statute (including U.S. citizenship documentation and "clear digital photograph" of the firearms to be registered),⁵ restrictions on joint-registration,⁶ and a requirement that registrants agree to hold DOJ harmless "for any indirect, incidental, special, or consequential damages" suffered as a result of registering a firearm.⁷

Because these provisions either have nothing to do with procedures for "assault weapon" registration, and thus do not qualify for Subdivision (b)'s APA exemption, or improperly expand or curtail statutes, counsel for Plaintiff CRPA submitted a letter to DOJ demanding that they be withdrawn from OAL's consideration. (RFJN, Exh. "C".) While DOJ did just that, on May 15, 2017, it resubmitted a second set of proposed "File and Print" regulations to OAL, which were substantively identical to the first set along with a cover letter purporting to justify their file and print status. (RFJN, Exhs. "D" & "E".) CRPA's counsel again objected. (RFJN, Exh. "F".) This time, on June 26, 2016, OAL rejected DOJ's proposal. (RFJN, Exh. "G".) DOJ then submitted a third set of proposed "File and Print" regulations to OAL, on July 21, 2017, which were again substantively identical to the original proposals, with the only change being a clarification that DOJ considered its proposed definitions for "assault weapons" terms to only apply for the purposes of registration. (RFJN, Exh. "H".) Without explanation, OAL approved this third set of regulations without explanation, which are now in effect. (RFJN, Exh. "I".)

Plaintiffs are individuals who either own firearms deemed "assault weapons" under SB 880 and AB 1135 and wish to register them, but do not wish to be forced to comply with DOJ's illegal regulations or who own shotguns that DOJ is improperly deeming "assault weapons" and

^{26 3} Cal. Code Regs, tit. 11, § 5471, subd. (d).

⁴ Cal. Code Regs, tit. 11, §§ 5472, subds. (f)-(g); 5474.2.

⁵ Cal. Code Regs, tit. 11, §§ 5474, subds (a) & (c); 5478, subd. (a)(2).

⁶ Cal. Code Regs, tit. 11, § 5474.1, subds (b)-(c).

⁷ Cal. Code Regs, tit. 11, § 5473, subd. (b)(1).

do not want to register them, (Villanueva Decl. in support of MPI, ¶5; Stallard Decl. in support of MPI, ¶5 -6; Barrios Decl. in support of MPI, ¶5; Cox Decl. in support of MPI, ¶5; Stroh Decl. in support of MPI, ¶5; Mendoza Decl. in support of MPI, ¶¶ 5-6.), and an organization representing countless members in the same situations. (Travis Decl. in support of MPI.) Plaintiffs wish to protect their rights under the APA, as this is not an isolated incident. DOJ's Bureau of Firearms "BOF" has demonstrated a pattern of APA abuses over the years by failing to adopt necessary regulations, exceeding its regulatory authority, or otherwise directly contradicting California law on multiple occasions. (Brady Decl. in support of MPI.) Plaintiffs fear it will only get worse.

And, Plaintiffs have been vindicated in their concerns by DOJ itself. On November 24, 2017, DOJ published a notice of proposed rulemaking to adopt a new regulation for definitions of terms for identifying "assault weapons" as described in Penal Code section 30515. The proposal would simply apply the definitions of terms included in Cal. Code Regs, tit. 11, § 5471—which was adopted on a File and Print basis—to the identification of "assault weapons" for all purposes under Penal Code section 30515. In other words, DOJ will be imposing definitions on Plaintiffs that were not adopted in compliance with the APA for law enforcement purposes, not just for registration, as DOJ misleadingly asserts.

For these reasons, Plaintiffs bring this action to prevent more of BOF's regulatory abuses. And, they specifically bring this motion because time is running out. Come July 1, 2018, BOF will have gotten away with it, again.

Plaintiffs bring this action seeking review of these regulations adopted by DOJ. Here, as shown above, subdivision (b)'s APA exemption only applies to regulations implementing its provisions, which are restricted to: (1) registration procedures; (2) the process requiring registration submissions via the internet; (3) the requirements for providing description and source information of the firearm as well as personal information of the individual registrant; and (4) the registration fee.

⁸ California Department of Justice, *Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/firearms/regs/notice-proposed-rulemaking-11-17.pdf? (Nov. 17, 2017).

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None of these challenge regulations reasonably relate to any of these four provisions, or to the extent that they do, they *illegally* expand or contract the scope of the statutes they purport to implement. In short, DOJ is overreaching its authority and placing Plaintiffs in the untenable position of having to decide whether to give up their rights and their property or place themselves in criminal jeopardy. DOJ should be stopped.

ARGUMENT

I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

"The general purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a determination on the merits of the action." SB Liberty, LLC v. Isla Vista Ass'n, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 272, 280. In evaluating whether a preliminary injunction should be granted, the Court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that plaintiffs will succeed on the merits of the claims; and (2) the harm that plaintiffs are likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction does not issue, balanced against the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if it does. (Cohen v. Bd. of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286.) While plaintiffs must prove the likelihood that they will suffer immediate and irreparable harm due to the inadequacy of other remedies, (Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. California (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 131, 138), the Court should be guided by a "mix" of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 668, 678; King v. Meese (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 1217, 1226-1228). Accordingly, the court has discretion to issue a preliminary injunction where a plaintiff demonstrates a high likelihood of success on the merits, even if the plaintiff is unable to show that the balance of harm tips in his or her favor. SB Liberty, LLC v. Isla Vista Ass'n, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 272, 280.

II. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS

Plaintiffs assert prima facie claims that regulations adopted by DOJ without adhering to the APA's mandates do not qualify for the limited exemption from the APA that the legislature conferred on it or improperly expand or conflict with existing state laws and are thus void. The APA prohibits state agencies from enforcing any regulation that is not adopted in compliance

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with its mandates, unless the agency is specifically exempted from having to do so by the legislature. (Winzler & Kelly v. Dept. of Indus. Relations (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 120, 126-127; see also United Sys. of Ark. v. Stamhon (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1010 ["When the Legislature has intended to exempt regulations from the APA, it has done so by clear, unequivocal language."].) Agencies have "only as much rulemaking power as is invested" to them "by statute." (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 287, 299.) And any doubts as to the APA's applicability should be resolved in favor of the APA applying. (Engelmann v. State Board of Education (1991) 2 Cal. App. 4th 47, 59.) Additionally, any regulation that is inconsistent with, alters or amends, or enlarges or impairs a statute's scope is void. (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist., supra, at p. 300.)

Any person may seek a judicial declaration as to the validity of any regulation by bringing an action for declaratory relief. (Gov. Code, §11350, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs bring this action seeking review of these regulations adopted by DOJ. Here, as shown above, subdivision (b)'s APA exemption only applies to regulations implementing its provisions, which are restricted to: (1) registration procedures; (2) the process requiring registration submissions via the internet; (3) the requirements for providing description and source information of the firearm as well as personal information of the individual registrant; and (4) the registration fee.

None of these challenge regulations reasonably relate to any of these four provisions, or to the extent that they do, they *illegally* expand or contract the scope of the statutes they purport to implement. In short, DOJ is overreaching its authority and placing Plaintiffs in the untenable position of having to decide whether to give up their rights and their property or place themselves in criminal jeopardy. DOJ should be stopped.

A. Improper Deletion of Prior Lawfully Enacted Regulations

11 CCR section 5469 deleted existing regulations that were previously lawfully adopted in compliance with the APA. These regulations provided definitions for the terms "detachable magazine," "flash suppressor," "forward pistol grip," "pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon," and "thumbhole stock." They were subjected to APA

rulemaking proceedings and underwent extensive revisions prior to being officially adopted.⁹ More importantly, they were not limited to mere registration. (11 C.C.R. § 5469 (repealed).)

Former Section 5469 applied these definitions "to terms used in the identification of assault weapons pursuant to Penal Code section 30515." (Ibid.) Nevertheless, Defendants deleted these definitions without going through the APA by relying on Subdivision (b). But Subdivision (b) only concerns regulations for the purposes of registration. As such, its exception does not extend to repealing definitions for another statute, Section 30515.

B. New Definitions

Included with DOJ's regulations are over 44 definitions for various terms relating to firearms. (11 C.C.R. § 5471.) Subdivision (b)'s APA exception, however, only applies to the registration procedures for assault weapons as defined in Penal Code section 30515. And the enacted definitions are neither relevant to, nor reasonably necessary for, the implementation of the registration scheme delineated in Subdivision (b). For this reason, the definitions exceed the scope of DOJ's APA exemption, and thus cannot be implemented without adhering to the formal APA rulemaking requirements.

Because the APA exception only applies to the registration of "an assault weapon that does not have a fixed magazine, *as defined in Section 30515*," Penal Code section 30515 *already* provides the definitions needed for registration. (Pen. Code, § 30900, subd. (b)(1) (emphasis added).) And because the only firearms that do "not have a fixed magazine" are those specific *rifles* and *pistols* reference in subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(4) of Penal Code section 30515, there is no need to provide definitions for terms used to identify firearms that cannot be registered—as Defendants have done here.

Except for the term "fixed magazine" (now *statutorily* defined), the Legislature did not change any of the definitions for terms within the AWCA. In fact, the definitions of terms found in the AWCA have remained unchanged and in use for nearly twenty years, nor is there any

⁹ A copy of the "Final Statement of Reasons," which summarizes the rulemaking proceedings for each of these definitions, is available on the California Attorney General's website at https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/firearms/regs/fsor.pdf.

indication that they are insufficient to identify "assault weapons" that can be registered pursuant to Subdivision (b). The Legislature simply modified the language of the phrase "capacity to accept a detachable magazine" to now read "does not have a fixed magazine." (Pen. Code, §§ 30515, subd. (a)(1), 30515, subd. (a)(4).)

Defendants' unnecessary definitions also make previously legal firearms now illegal to possess without *any* notice to California gun owners. This means that provisions of the AWCA are being applied *retroactively*, in contrast to Defendants own statements and what the AWCA allows with regards to the "grandfathering in [of] the possession of previously-owned weapons." (Req. for Jud. Not. ¶ 5.) If the Legislature intended to allow DOJ free reign to amend every possible term relating to "assault weapons," especially those completely unaffected by AB 1135 and SB 880, it would have expressly stated as much. It did not, and as a result DOJ cannot shoehorn these definitions into the APA exception.

What's more, many of these definitions are wholly irrelevant to the newly-classified "assault weapons" that must be registered pursuant to Subdivision (b). For example, the definition for the term "barrel length" has no impact on whether or not a firearm is classified as an "assault weapon" pursuant to Penal Code section 30515, subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(4). Rather, it appears DOJ is attempting to define the term for the purposes of California's restrictions on "short-barreled" rifles and shotguns. (See Pen. Code, §§ 33210-33320.) Even so, definitions for terms not found in subdivision (a)(1) and (a)(4) concern firearms which *cannot* be registered as "assault weapons," and are being enacted purely for law enforcement purposes only. Not the registration scheme contemplated by Subdvision (b). And as explained below, DOJ's definitions illegally expand the definition of "assault weapon" to apply to certain shotguns.

As a result, the regulations providing new definitions for terms relating to "assault weapons" expand the scope of DOJ's APA exception, nor are they relevant to or reasonably necessary for the implementation of Subdivision (b)'s registration scheme, and are therefore void and unenforceable.

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i. Illegal Expansion of New "Assault Weapon" Definition to Include Shotguns

11 C.C.R. § 5470, subd. (a) states that a "semiautomatic shotgun with an ammunition feeding device that can be readily removed from the firearm with the use of a tool . . . is included in the category of firearms that must be registered," and 11 C.C.R. § 5471, subd. (a) defines the term "[a]bility to accept a detachable magazine" as "with respect to a semiautomatic shotgun, it does not have a fixed magazine." The effect of these regulations is to require certain shotguns to be registered as "assault weapons" that do not need to be under the AWCA. What's more, only by Defendant's regulations, not California law, are such firearms now considered "assault weapons" prohibited from being sold, transferred, and possessed in the state of California.

Since 2001, certain semiautomatic centerfire rifles and semiautomatic pistols that have "the capacity to accept a detachable magazine" and any one of several specified features are considered "assault weapons" under California law. (Pen. Code, §§ 30515, subd. (a)(1), 30515, subd. (a)(4).) Likewise, any semiautomatic shotgun with "the ability to accept a detachable magazine" is also considered an "assault weapon." (Pen. Code, § 30515, subd. (a)(7).) SB 880 and AB 1135 only changed these definitions with respect to rifles and pistols, but not shotguns. As stated in the legislative history of SB 880, the bill revised the definition of an "assault weapon" to mean "a semiautomatic centerfire rifle, or semiautomatic pistol that does not have a fixed magazine" but has any one of several specified features. ¹⁰

In other words, DOJ seeks to classify shotguns equipped with "bullet-buttons" as "assault weapons" not be legislative change, but by DOJ's whim alone. Because the expansion of the definition of an "assault weapon" to apply to certain shotguns is in direct conflict with the provisions of AB 1135 and SB 880, and because the regulations expand the scope of the Penal Code as it relates to "assault weapon" registration and DOJ's APA exception, the regulations are void and unenforceable.

¹⁰ See Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 880 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) (June 25, 2016); See also Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 880 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) (June 13, 2016).

ii. Serialization Requirements

11 CCR section 5472, subdivision (f) prohibits individuals from registering firearms manufactured by federally-licensed manufacturers if the firearm does not have a serial number engraved on the firearm. And 11 CCR section 5472, subdivision (g) prohibits individuals from registering lawful homebuilt firearms that lack a DOJ-approved serial number. Such restrictions unlawfully expand the scope of California law and are thus void for several reasons.

First, there is a patent difference between regulations implementing the registration procedures of Subdivision (b) and regulations requiring individuals to generate the content to be submitted as part of the registration application. Subdivision (b) does not require one to *create* or inscribe identification marks onto a firearm, but only requires that individuals *provide* "a description of the firearm that identifies it uniquely, including all identification marks," i.e., ones that already exist. Nor does Subdivision (b) require the firearm to have a serial number at all, let alone one specifically "pre-approved" by DOJ.

Second, Californians have long been allowed to—and still can—legally make their own firearms without inscribing a DOJ-approved serial number on the firearm. What restrictions California does have were only recently enacted, and won't take effect until January 1, 2019—a full six months *after* the period to register a firearm as an "assault weapon" has ended. (See Pen. Code, § 29180, subd. (c).) These new restrictions will also require additional regulations that are not afforded an APA exemption. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 29182, subd. (f).)

Yet DOJ directly usurps legislative authority by advancing the effective date of Penal Code section 29180, subdivision (c). What's more, DOJ is in effect claiming that Subdivision (b) somehow grants DOJ an exception from the APA rulemaking requirements to do so when it does not have that authority to make regulations via an APA exception.

As a result, because the regulations requiring individuals to inscribe DOJ-approved serial numbers onto homemade firearms expand the scope of the Penal Code as it relates to the

¹¹ Serial numbers on all firearms produced by licensed manufacturers were not required until enactment of the Gun Control Act of 1968. (P.L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1223.) Federal law has never required serial numbers on firearms made by persons other than licensed manufacturers and importers engaged in the business of firearms.

registration of "assault weapons," DOJ's APA exception, and otherwise directly conflicts with other provisions of California firearm laws, the regulations are void and unenforceable.

iii. Required Registration Information

DOJ's regulations also require individuals to provide their military ID number, U.S. citizenship status, place of birth, country of citizenship, and alien registration number for use in conducting a background check, as well as clear digital photographs of the firearms to be registered. (11 C.C.R. §§ 5474, 5478, subd. (a)(2).) These requirements, however, are not found anywhere in the Penal Code, let alone Subdivision (b), and serve as another example of DOJ requiring individuals to generate additional content not called for in the application. As such, they improperly expand the scope of Subdivision (b).

With regards to the requirement that individuals provide clear digital photographs of their firearms, Subdivision (b) states that the registration must contain a "description" of the firearm—not an *actual depiction*. Identical language can be found elsewhere in California law regarding firearm registration. For example, Penal Code section 27560 requires anyone moving into California with a firearm to report their ownership to DOJ on a form that contains "a description of the firearm in question." (Pen. Code, § 27560, subd. (a)(1).) Notably, this form—which has been used by DOJ for years—has never required individuals to provide photographs of the firearm to be registered.

The same is true of past "assault weapon" registrations. Penal Code section 30900, subdivision (a) had the identical requirement as Subdivision (b). Yet, DOJ did not require individuals to provide photographs of those registered "assault weapons." (Pen. Code, § 30900, subd. (a); See also 11 C.C.R., § 978.30 (repealed) (requiring individuals to only provide the firearm's serial number, make, model, type, caliber, and date of acquisition [if known]).)

iv. Joint-Registration Restrictions

Penal Code section 30955 requires DOJ to accept joint registrations for any "assault weapon" owned by "family members residing in the same household." Defendants limit the scope of this provision by narrowly defining the term "family members residing in the same household," thereby again defining a term as opposed to implementing the registration procedures of

Subdivision (b). (11 C.C.R. § 5474.1, subd. (b).) They also require joint registrants to provide "proof of address." (11 C.C.R. § 5474.1, subd. (c).) These regulations unlawfully expand the scope of the AWCA's requirements for "assault weapon" registration and do not qualify for DOJ's APA exception.

First, DOJ's APA exception is limited to the implementation of Subdivision (b). But the term "family member" is not found in Subdivision (b), meaning DOJ is once again attempting to define a term found in an entirely different Penal Code section and attempting to shoehorn the definition into DOJ's APA exception. What's more, the regulation does not merely address the procedures for registering a newly classified "assault weapon," but instead addresses the content of the registration itself by limiting who may register a firearm.

Tellingly, DOJ has been subjected to the joint registration requirement since 1989, and yet in every past instance requiring individuals to register "assault weapons" DOJ has never limited its scope. If Defendants wish to limit the term, they may be able to do so through typical APA rulemaking procedures. In fact, DOJ attempted to do just that in 2000, but after receiving public comments, admitted that had the Legislature intended to limit the scope of the term, it "should have been statutorily stated in a much clearer manner." But it cannot do so without following the typical APA rulemaking procedures.

With regard to the "proof of address" requirement for joint registrants, the regulation does not address the procedures for registering a newly classified "assault weapon," rather the content to be submitted. Subdivision (b)(3) provides the specific content that must be included with registration. What's more, individual and primary registrants are not required to provide the same documentation. So requiring it from joint registrants is not only unnecessary, but unreasonable.

v. Illegally Compelled Non-Liability Clause

11 C.C.R. § 5473, subdivision (b)(1) requires registrants to agree to hold DOJ harmless for "any hardware, software, information, or other items" associated with the registration process as a condition of registering their firearms. This provision is patently unrelated to implementing

¹² Department of Justice Regulations for Assault Weapons and Large Capacity Magazines: Final Statement of Reasons, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/firearms/regs/fsor.pdf.

registration procedures in Subdivision (b).

But even if DOJ sought to adopt such a requirement in compliance with the APA, it could not. Such a provision directly conflicts with Article 1 of the California Constitution and the Information Practices Act ("IPA"). Both specifically protect an individual's right to privacy, limit DOJ's ability to disclose personal information, and provide statutory remedies for violations. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; Civ. Code, §§ 1798 et seq.) Defendants simply cannot unilaterally grant themselves an exception to statutory restrictions.

In sum, the regulations either do not qualify for APA exemptions or they illegally expand or contract the relevant statutes. On the basis of both the record and the argument above, there is little doubt that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits. Accordingly, these regulations are void and unenforceable and Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction should be granted.

III. THE BALANCE OF HARMS TIPS SHARPLY IN PLAINTIFFS' FAVOR

The Court must next balance the harm that Plaintiffs are likely to suffer if injunctive relief does not issue against the harm Defendants are likely to suffer if it does. (*Cohen, supra*, 40 Cal.3d at p. 286.) "To qualify for . . . injunctive relief plaintiffs must show irreparable injury, either existing or threatened." (*City of Torrance v. Transitional Living Ctrs. for L.A., Inc.* (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 516, 526, citing 7978 Corp. v. Pitchess (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 42, 46; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(2).) Evaluating the irreparable harm factor requires courts to consider such things as "the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo." (*Take Me Home Rescue v. Luri* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1350.) Irreparable harm is usually present where plaintiff will suffer an injury for which adequate compensation is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. (*Pellissier v. Whittier Water Co.* (1922) 59 Cal.App. 1, 6; *Wind v. Herbert* (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 276, 285; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(5).)

A. If an Injunction Prohibiting Defendants from Enforcing the Challenged Regulations Does Not Issue, Plaintiffs and the Public Will Suffer Irreparable Harm, But No Harm Will Come to Defendants if it Does Issue

By submitting their regulations as "file and print only," Defendants have prohibited

Plaintiffs and others similarly situated from having any input. But, the purpose of the APA's comprehensive scheme is to ensure that "those persons or entities whom a regulation will affect have a voice in its creation." (*Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 556 at pp. 568-569, citing *Armistead v. State Personnel Bd.* (1978) 22 Cal.3d 198, 204-205.) The notice, comment and review procedures of the Act were enacted to secure the public benefits of openness, accessibility, and accountability in the formulation of rules that implement legislative enactments. (*Id.* at p. 569 ["public participation in the regulatory process directs the attention of agency policymakers to the public they serve"].) The moment Defendants adopted and began enforcing the challenged regulations in violation of the APA, they brought irreparable injury to the important, democratic values the Act was designed to serve. If injunctive relief does not issue, Defendants will be permitted to continue subverting those very values at the expense of the public generally and Plaintiffs specifically.

Plaintiffs particularly will be irreparably harmed because Defendants' unlawful conduct has denied them their *statutory right to be heard* under the APA regarding the implementation of DOJ's regulations that directly affect them. Perhaps more importantly, however, is that the APA is designed to protect against "bureaucratic tyranny." (*Cal. Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Bonta* (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 498, 507-508.) DOJ is now forcing Plaintiffs to either comply with an invalid regulatory scheme or face significant penalties for unlawfully possessing an "assault weapon" should they not register. For such an injury, there is no adequate remedy at law to make them whole.

DOJ has processed the registration of newly classified "assault weapons" on multiple occasions in the past. And on those prior occasions, the regulations challenged here were unnecessary. There is no reason this registration system should be any different. In any event, any turmoil Defendants experience in the meantime is the product of Defendants' own unlawful conduct, which Plaintiffs clearly warned Defendants about on multiple occasions in their opposition letters to DOJ and OAL. Given that Defendants had well over 5 months to revise their proposal when it was first challenged, and that their most recent proposal remains substantially the same, they should not per permitted to flout the requirements of the APA and then rely on any

administrative problems cause by their clear malfeasance, which has developed into a pattern, as a shield against those seeking injunctive relief from invalid regulations.

In sum, public policy compels that DOJ be enjoined to maintain the integrity of the regulatory system under the APA; otherwise, BOF, and all agencies for that matter, would feel emboldened to ignore they APA's mandates when they believe they can run out the clock. For these reasons, the balance of harms clearly tips in Plaintiff's favor. But, even if the Court does not find the harm to Plaintiffs particularly irreparable, it may, and should nevertheless grant their motion, due to the extremely strong likelihood that they will prevail on the merits. (*King v. Meese* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1227 ["the more likely it is that plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, the less severe must be the harm that they allege will occur if the injunction does not issue."].)

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant their motion for a preliminary injunction mandating Defendants, their employees, agents, and persons acting with them on their behalf, immediately cease enforcing the regulations indicated herein pending litigation on the merits of this matter.

Dated: January 5, 2018

MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Sean A. Brady

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF FRESNO 3 I, Laura Palmerin, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, 4 California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My 5 business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802. 6 On January 5, 2018, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: 7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 8 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 9 on the interested parties in this action by placing 10 [] the original [X] a true and correct copy 11 thereof by the following means, addressed as follows: 12 13 P. Patty Li Attorneys for Defendants patty.li@doj.ca.gov 14 Deputy Attorney General California Department of Justice 15 Office of the Attorney General 455 Golden Gate Ave., Suite 11000 16 San Francisco, CA 94102 17 (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) As follows: I served a true and correct copy by 18 electronic transmission through OneLegal. Said transmission was reported and completed without error. 19 20 (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of X California that the foregoing is true and correct. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28