Golden, Dominic Nardone, Jacob Perkio, and the California Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. ("CRPA").<sup>1</sup>

## RELEVANT LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that the prevailing party in litigation should be allowed to recover costs of suit from the losing party. Costs are presumptively awarded to prevailing parties; the losing party must show why costs should <u>not</u> be awarded. *Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit*, 335 F.2d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). A "district court deviates from normal practice when it refuses to tax costs to the losing party. . ." *Id.* Accordingly, a district court must specify reasons for refusing to do so—although that court would <u>not</u> have to specify reasons for allowing the prevailing party to recover costs. *Id.* 

Appropriate reasons for denying costs of suit to the prevailing party include the following: (1) the substantial importance of the case; (2) the closeness and difficulty of the issues; (3) the chilling effect on future similar actions; (4) the plaintiff's limited financial resources; and (5) the economic disparity between the parties. *Draper v. Rosario*, 836 F.2d 1027, 1087 (9th Cir. 2016).

## **ARGUMENT**

Plaintiffs have established that only one *Draper* factor out of five total resolves in favor of overturning the presumption that Defendant, the undisputed prevailing party here, should recover costs of suit. Hence the Court should abide by the presumption and allow Defendant to recover such costs.

- 1. Defendant concedes that the <u>first Draper</u> factor, substantial importance, applies in Plaintiffs' favor here. But that first factor is the only one that resolves against the presumption that costs of suit should be awarded to Defendant.
- 2. Regarding the <u>second</u> factor, closeness or difficulty, Plaintiffs make a faulty argument. Plaintiffs assert that, in *Peruta v. County of San Diego*, 824 F.3d

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Note that Defendant has not yet submitted a bill of costs.

919 (9th Cir. 2016), the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, "expressly reserved the question of 'whether the Second Amendment protects some ability to carry firearms in public," which "is an unmistakable affirmation of the significance of the issues in this litigation." (Plfs.' Obj. to Def. Proposed J., Dkt. 82 ("Flanagan Obj."), at 3.) The flaw is that this Court ruled that "this question [left open by Peruta] need not be addressed to resolve the issues presented by the present [cross-] motions" for summary judgment (In Chambers] Ord. Re Plfs.' Mtn. for Summ. J., Dkt. 81 ("MSJ Ord."), at 7 (emphasis added)), undercutting Plaintiffs' argument that the "Peruta open question" has bearing on this case.

It must also be remembered that, throughout this case, Plaintiffs took the position that "[a]lthough firearm regulation cases can be complex, this one is not." (Memo. of P's and A's in Support of Plfs.' Mtn. for Summ. J., Dkt. 48, at 1:13-1:14.) Consequently, Plaintiffs did not designate any affirmative expert witnesses. Plaintiffs' current position, that the case presented close and difficult issues, such that Plaintiffs should not have to cover Defendants' costs of suit, contrasts directly with Plaintiffs' prior, long-held position about the case on the merits.

Furthermore, in granting summary judgment for the defense here, this Court indicated that the case was neither close nor difficult. The Court rejected as "unpersuasive" Plaintiffs' preliminary argument, that the open-carry firearm statutes in question are presumptively unconstitutional. *Id.* In the first part of the second stage of the analysis, there was no dispute that the State of California had an important governmental objective in enacting the open-carry laws. *Id.* at 8. And, per the second part of the second stage of the analysis, in evaluating whether there was a "reasonable fit" between that objective and those laws, the Court recognized its obligation to show "substantial deference to the predictive judgment of the" California Legislature (*id.* at 10 (quoting two cases including *Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n*, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)), thereby simplifying the Court's role and making adjudication easier.

- 3. Plaintiffs have made no attempt to show that the <u>third</u> factor, regarding chilling effect, resolves in Plaintiffs' favor.
- 4, 5. Regarding the <u>fourth</u> and <u>fifth</u> factors, concerning financial resources, despite the onus being on Plaintiffs, they have not offered any evidence, e.g., declarations (deemed pertinent in, e.g., *Knox v. City of Fresno*, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1114, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2016)). Instead, Plaintiffs offer vague, unsupported statements about the "regular" circumstances of the individual-person plaintiffs and the non-profit status of CRPA. (Flanagan Obj. at 3.) Plaintiffs also make the unclear, unexplained assertion that Defendant is the "executive branch" of "the fifth largest economy in the world." (Flanagan Obj. at 3.) In sum, Plaintiffs have not made a substantive showing as to either the fourth or fifth factors.

Moreover, Defendant has located Plaintiffs' admissions that contradict their claims of modest means. As the attached report written by Plaintiffs' counsel shows, CRPA and the National Rifle Association of America (the "NRA") jointly "invest enormous amounts of resources in" California firearms-related litigation—including, specifically, this case. (Supporting Decl. of Jonathan M. Eisenberg ("Eisenberg Decl."), filed herewith, Exh. A (Michel & Assocs., P.C., NRA-CRPA California Legal Affairs (Feb. 2017) at i, 3 (listing this case first among dozens of such cases) (emphasis added)).)<sup>2</sup> According to the NRA's 2015 federal tax return (the most recent such return that Defendant was able to locate), attached here, the NRA generates \$337 million in annual revenues and has assets totaling \$215 million. (Eisenberg Decl., Exh. B.) Those two items of evidence establish that "[t]he amount in controversy here" is actually not "significant to Plaintiffs." (Flanagan Obj. at 3.) It certainly appears that Plaintiffs can easily afford to pay

(CRPA), are heavily involved in a number of important legal battles in California

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The report is freely available online at the Internet site for NRA-ILA, the NRA's Institute for Legislative Action, at <a href="https://www.nraila.org/articles/20170208/california-2017-february-litigation-report">https://www.nraila.org/articles/20170208/california-2017-february-litigation-report</a>. The webpage containing the hyperlink to the report reiterates, in part, as follows: "The NRA and its state affiliate, the California Rifle and Pistol Association."

Defendant's costs of suit, and that there is no disparity in resources as between 1 2 Plaintiffs and Defendant that would justify cost-shifting here. 3 In sum, of the five *Draper* factors, only one factor—by Defendant's concession—resolves in favor of Plaintiffs' contention that the Court should deny 4 5 Defendant an award of costs of suit. All the other factors indicate that Defendant should recover costs, as is presumptively the case for a prevailing litigant. 6 7 **CONCLUSION** 8 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court 9 overrule Plaintiffs' objections to having to pay Defendants' costs of suit here. 10 Dated: May 17, 2018 Respectfully submitted, 11 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California 12 STEPAN'A. HAYTAYAN Supervising Deputy Attorney General 13 P. Patty Li Deputy Attorney General 14 15 /s/ Jonathan M. Eisenberg 16 JONATHAN M. EISENBERG Deputy Attorney General 17 Attorneys for Defendant Xavier Becerrá, Attornéy General of 18 California 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28