(Dkt. No. 41). The Court should deny the Motion because the supplemental declaration is untimely and does not address all of the standing and ripeness

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concerns raised in the Attorney General's opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

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ARGUMENT

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I. THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION IS UNTIMELY.

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More than one month after the Court took Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction under advisement—following briefing by the parties, the submission of evidence, and oral argument—Plaintiffs now seek leave of Court to file a supplemental declaration of plaintiff Dennis Martin ("Martin") in further support of

Martin's original declaration was filed with Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion on November 14, 2017 (Dkt. No. 24-5). On November 22, 2017,

Defendant filed an opposition to the preliminary injunction motion (Dkt. No. 27), which, *inter alia*, showed that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the registration

requirements of Penal Code § 30900(b)(3) and that their claims are not ripe for

adjudication. (Opp'n at 5:2-8:28.) In particular, Defendant pointed out that

Plaintiffs do not allege that Martin ever attempted to register his assault weapon.

(*Id.* at 6:9-15.) Defendant also described how a firearm owner can, through the

exercise of reasonable diligence, attempt obtain the date and source information to

register an assault weapon and that Martin's declaration failed to specify what

efforts, if any, he undertook to attempt to ascertain the date and source information

for his particular assault weapon. (*Id.* at 6:16-7:12.)

Upon the filing of Defendant's opposition on November 22, 2017, Plaintiffs were on notice of the deficiencies in their motion for a preliminary injunction, and yet they did not attempt to submit a supplemental declaration for Martin with their

¹ Martin is the only remaining individual plaintiff who is allegedly unable to register an assault weapon pursuant to Penal Code § 30900(b)(3). (See First Amended Complaint ¶ 56 (Dkt. No. 16).) The only other plaintiff identified in the First Amended Complaint who was allegedly unable to register an assault weapon, Douglas Grassey (see id. ¶ 55), was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to a stipulation of the parties (Dkt. No. 26). of the parties (Dkt. No. 26).

reply papers (filed on December 1, 2017) or in advance of the hearing on their motion (held on December 22, 2017). Plaintiffs explain that Martin attempted to register his firearms after the hearing because the Court "expressed concerned about Plaintiff Martin's standing based on the reasons Defendant raised." (Mot. at 4:9-10.) Those concerns were raised in Defendant's opposition, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, and Plaintiffs could have attempted to address those concerns before the hearing. Plaintiffs' delay is inexcusable, especially given the minimal effort and time required for Martin to attempt to register two firearms online, which is the only additional material discussed in his supplemental declaration. (*See id.* at 4:13-18.) The Court should deny the Motion on this basis alone.

II. THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION FAILS TO ADDRESS PLAINTIFFS' STANDING AND RIPENESS DEFICIENCIES.

Martin's supplemental declaration, even if deemed to be timely, addresses only one of Defendant's standing and ripeness deficiencies: the fact that Plaintiffs failed to allege that anyone tried and failed to register an assault weapon before filing suit and seeking injunctive relief. According to the supplemental declaration, after the hearing, Martin (i) unsuccessfully attempted to register the assault weapon discussed in his original declaration online (on January 9, 2018), and (ii) unsuccessfully attempted to register a *different* firearm—not discussed in the First Amended Complaint or his original declaration—online (on January 14, 2018). (Mot., Ex. A (Supp. Decl.) ¶¶ 7-10.)² The supplemental declaration does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the registration requirements or that their claims are ripe.

As a preliminary matter, with respect to the new firearm that Martin attempted to register on January 14, 2018, Martin does not explain what features, if any, render that firearm an "assault weapon." (*Compare* Mot., Ex. A ¶ 4 (describing

² For the first firearm, Martin did not input the estimated date of purchase in the required format (mm/dd/yyyy) and instead provided only the estimated year.

features of the firearm discussed in this original declaration), with id. ¶ 9 (stating that he attempted to "register another firearm as an 'assault weapon'").) Nor does Martin state that the firearm was acquired between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2016, and thus that it is even eligible for registration pursuant to Penal Code § 30900(b). If this firearm qualifies as an assault weapon eligible for registration, Martin does not explain why he neglected to mention it in this original declaration.

Even assuming that the firearms are eligible for registration and that Martin was unable to register them online, the supplemental declaration is silent on the remaining standing and ripeness deficiencies discussed in Defendant's opposition to the preliminary injunction motion. As explained in Defendant's opposition, a firearm owner can attempt to obtain date and source information through the exercise of reasonable diligence, even if the individual did not keep any records of the transaction and has no memory of the transaction. For example, the owner can contact the firearm manufacturer with the serial number of the firearm, contact the dealer to obtain a record of the transaction, or contact the Department of Justice's Bureau of Firearms to obtain any ownership information for the firearm maintained by the Bureau. (Opp'n at 6:16-12; Graham Decl. ¶¶ 19-23.)

In the supplemental declaration, Martin simply states that he reviewed his "files and electronic correspondence." (Mot., Ex. A $\P \P 7, 9$.) That is not enough. There is no indication that Martin ever attempted to contact the Department of Justice, Bureau of Firearms, to try to obtain firearm ownership information or resolve his registration problems.³ Aside from reviewing unspecified files and correspondence, it is not clear what efforts Martin undertook to attempt to obtain date and source information. Thus, even if the Court were to consider the supplemental declaration, there is still "no allegation that Martin took *any* steps to

³ Owners of firearms acquired through private-party transactions can contact the Bureau of Firearms to try to resolve registration problems. If the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to file the supplemental declaration, Defendant requests an opportunity to submit a declaration to address the issues raised in the supplemental declaration, including the issue of private-party transactions.

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obtain the information. Neither the [First Amended Complaint] nor Martin's declaration[s] state (1) what information he possesses relating to the circumstances of his acquisition of his assault weapon[s], (2) if he attempted to obtain the date and source information, (3) if so, how he did attempt to obtain that information, and (4) whether he could obtain the date and source information sufficient to register his assault weapon[s] with reasonable diligence." (Opp'n at 8:10-16.) Even if Martin had exercised due diligence in attempting obtain the date and source information for the two firearms discussed in his supplemental declaration, the purported registration problems of a single individual, lacking any records of his firearm purchases, and having no memory of the circumstances of those purchases (or, apparently, even of the existence of one of the firearms he wishes to register), should not serve as a basis for enjoining enforcement of the registration requirements in their entirety as to other firearm owners. CONCLUSION For the reasons provided above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Declaration of Dennis Martin in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction should be denied. Dated: February 16, 2018 Respectfully submitted, XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California MARK R. BECKINGTON Supervising Deputy Attorney General PETER H. CHANG Deputy Attorney General s/ John D. Echeverria JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Defendant Xavier Becerra

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name: Rupp, Steven, et al. v. Xavier Becerra No. 8:17-cv-00746-JLS-JDE

I hereby certify that on <u>February 16, 2018</u>, I electronically filed the following documents with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system:

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF DENNIS MARTIN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I certify that **all** participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on <u>February 16, 2018</u>, at San Francisco, California.

John D. Echeverria	/s/ John D. Echeverria
Declarant	Signature

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