# IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DAVID GENTRY; JAMES PARKER;
MARK MIDLAM; JAMES BASS; AND CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, V.

XAVIER BECERRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STEPHEN LINDLEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS Acting Chief of the California DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; BETTY T. YEE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS State Controller; and DOES 1-10,

DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS.

Case No. C089655

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Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento
Case No. 34-2013-80001667
Honorable Judge Richard K. Sueyoshi
C. D. Michel - SBN 144258

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| (Set Four) |  |  |  |

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# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners, v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, BETTY YEE, in Her Official Capacity as State Controller, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 34-2013-80001667

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION AS TO THE FIFTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION
[Filed Concurrently with Plaintiffs' Separate Statement in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication and Plaintiffs' Evidence in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication]

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Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 31
Judge: Hon. Michael P. Kenny
Action Filed: October 16, 2013

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## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

## I. INTRODUCTION

Here, the law and the facts are plainly in Plaintiffs' favor. Faced with this reality, Defendants offer this Court a position based on legal arguments that ignore the determinative statutory language. Under any standard, Defendants' motion ${ }^{1}$ is legally unsound and fails to meet Defendants' burden as the moving party. Accordingly, the motion should be denied.

## II. ARGUMENT

## A. The Department's Claims of Untimeliness are without Merit: It Cannot Chose to Ignore the Continuous Accrual Doctrine, the Impact of SB 819, and the Abandonment of the 2010 Rulemaking

Defendants allege that the Fifth Cause of Action is barred either by a three-year statute of limitations (per Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a)(1)) or laches. (Defs.' Mot. at § 2.) But this claim is based on a false predicate, i.e., that the action being challenged here is the 2004 decision to increase the amount charged for the Dealers' Record of Sale ("DROS") fee ("Fee") from $\$ 14.00$ to $\$ 19.00$. (Id. at 17.) Conspicuously, the argument fails to cite the operative complaint-which does not include any allegation that the 2004 change was improper. Here is what the operative complaint actually says:

The DROS Fee is currently imposed by DOJ Defendants on Plaintiffs and other firearm purchasers at $\$ 19$ per firearm transaction, plus $\$ 15$ per each additional handgun.

Since the year 2004, the DROS Special Account, despite expenditures therefrom having been made on unauthorized activities, has accumulated an approximately $\$ 35$ million surplus.

Most, if not all, of the approximately $\$ 35$ million in surplus revenues in the DROS Special Account was generated by payers, including Plaintiffs, of the DROS Fee.

[^0]Despite amassing a multi-million-dollar surplus, DOJ Defendants have failed to properly review the amount of the DROS Fee to ensure that the amount is "no more than is necessary to fund" the activities enumerated at Penal Code section 28225(b)(1)-(11) [12076(e)(1)-(10)].

DOJ Defendants are not complying with their duty to tailor the amount of the DROS Fee to DOJ's actual costs in administering the DROS program.

PLAINTIFFS have been and continuously are irreparably injured by DOJ Defendants' imposing the DROS Fee at an amount that accrues a multi-million-dollar surplus without tying such amount to DOJ's actual costs for administering the DROS program. ${ }^{2}$
(FAC at IIII 92-98, emphasis added.) Plaintiffs allege an ongoing duty, and a current and ongoing violation of that duty. Even assuming arguendo that the 2004 decision to raise the Fee was justified (and it was not, due to the use of the "Macro Review Process" discussed extensively in Plaintiffs' contemporaneously filed Motion for Adjudication), that would not be determinative as to claims of an ongoing failure to properly review the amount of the Fee. Clearly, Defendants would rather rely on a manufactured gravamen-which, not coincidentally, occurred many years ago-than deal with the actual gravamen of the Fifth Cause of Action. But Defendants cannot change what the Fifth Cause of Action alleges, and the relevant facts are fatal to Defendants' time-bar defenses.

## 1. The Continuous Accrual Doctrine Bars Any Time-Based Argument

"The common law theory of continuous accrual posits that a cause of action challenging a recurring wrong may accrue not once but each time a new wrong is committed." Aryeh v. Cannon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1189 (2013). The doctrine is really just the normal application of the general rules of accrual in a specific type of factual scenario, e.g., where repeated or ongoing actions result in accruals related to such actions occurring on a continuous basis. Id. The doctrine is broadly applicable, and has been applied in cases concerning ongoing

[^1]collection of allegedly illegal taxes and fees. See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of La Habra, 25 Cal. 4th 809, 821 (2001), as modified (July 18, 2001) ("we conclude that if, as alleged, the tax is illegal, its continued imposition and collection is an ongoing violation, upon which the limitations period begins anew with each collection."); see also Andal v. City of Stockton, 137 Cal. App. 4th 86, 93 (2006) (applying La Habra regarding a dispute over ongoing collection of a fee, and noting that equitable and writ relief is available "to prevent further illegal tax collection."); Aryeh, 55 Cal. 4th at 1198-99 (stating that, in La Habra, even where "the limitations has run on any direct challenge to the validity of the ordinance imposing the tax," the California Supreme Court nonetheless "concluded suit was still permissible because the continuing monthly collection of the tax represented an alleged ongoing breach of state law"). ${ }^{3}$

The application of the continuous accrual doctrine is simple here, and based on undisputed facts. Within the year prior of this action being filed, Plaintiffs paid, and expect to continue paying, the Fee. (FAC IIII 20-24.) Because accrual of a challenge to the Fee occurs when it is collected, and not when the amount of the Fee was last set, accrual of the Plaintiffs' claims happened well within the three-year period prescribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a)(1). See La Habra, 25 Cal. 4th at 821. Thus, Defendants' statute of limitations claim fails.

## 2. The Department Admits SB 819 Changes the Way the Fee Is Calculated, a Material Change that Shows Why the Gravamen of the Fifth Cause of Action Is Not the 2004 Rulemaking

Defendants' time-based defenses also ignore that that the accrual of claims based on the impact of SB 819 could not have accrued until after SB 819 became law on October 9, 2011. 2010 Cal. Stat. Ch. 743. "A cause of action accrues 'when [it] is complete with all of its elements'-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation." Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 51 Cal. 4th 788, 797 (2011). Notwithstanding the Department's express pre-adoption assertions that SB 819 would not result in the Fee being increased (AMF \# 2), the Department
${ }^{3}$ For the purpose of responding to Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs only discuss the continuous accrual doctrine, and not the continuing violation doctrine. See Aryeh, at 55 Cal. 4th at 1197-99 (explaining the distinction between the two "main branches" of "continuing-wrong accrual analysis [.]") The distinction is not relevant at this stage of the proceedings, but should it become relevant in establishing the proper scope of relief, Plaintiffs note that they do not currently concede that the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable.
now contends that it can raise the Fee based on costs related to APPS-based law enforcement activities (AMF \# 3.) Thus, because section $28225^{4}$ requires the Fee be set on an ongoing basis in only the amount "necessary" to fund the activities listed in section 28225(b), and because the Department itself states that, post SB 819, there is a new activity to be considered as part of that list (i.e., APPS-based law enforcement activities) (AMF \# 3), the accrual of a claim based on this change could not have been brought prior to SB 819's enactment. That is, the wrongdoing element could not have been met prior to the passage of SB 819. Paragraph 99 of the operative complaint, concerning the Departments' failure to reassess the amount being charged for the Fee in light of the passage of SB 819, did not exist prior to SB 819's adoption. Considering that SB 819 became law on October 9, 2011, and that this action was filed less than three years later (on October 16, 2013), the three-year limitations period Defendants attempt to rely on does not bar Plaintiffs' claims.

## 3. The Complaint Was Filed within Three Years of the Date the Department (Secretly) Abandoned the 2010 Rulemaking

The Department's claim that the Fifth Cause of Action accrued in 2004 fails for another reason: if the completion of rulemaking to raise the Fee triggers an accrual date, it logically follows that the abandonment of a similar Fee-adjustment rulemaking would also trigger an accrual date. Thus, even setting aside the continuous accrual here, the Department specifically abandoned the 2010 rulemaking in October 2011, and Plaintiffs' action was filed less than three years later. So even if the Fifth Cause of Action is framed as a challenge to the abandonment of the 2010 rulemaking, that challenge is still timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a)(1).

## 4. Defendants Fail to Articulate the "Unusual Circumstances" Required for their Laches Defense

Finally, as to Defendants' laches claim, it is grounded in an alleged "prejudice" that is not an improper prejudice at all. When reviewing the applicable burden and Defendants' claimed "prejudice," it becomes obvious that Defendants' laches argument falls woefully short.

[^2]"[T]he affirmative defense of laches requires unreasonable delay in bringing suit 'plus either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.' [citation] Prejudice is never presumed; rather it must be affirmatively demonstrated by the defendant in order to sustain his burdens of proof and the production of evidence on the issue." Miller v. Eisenhower Med. Ctr., 27 Cal. 3d 614, 624 (1980). And as is relevant hereto, "absent unusual circumstances," a delay that does not violate the applicable statute of limitations does justify the application of the doctrine of laches. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio, 250 Cal. App. 2d 538, 543 (1967); Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1994) ("if action is brought before end of analogous limitations period, delay is presumptively reasonable and '[o]nly rarely should laches bar a case before the analogous statute has run'").

Defendants do not discuss the issue of acquiescence at all, focusing only on a claimed prejudice. But Defendants' prejudice claim fails on its face: in determining whether laches bars a claim, the courts consider "prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay" (Miller, 27 Cal . 3d at 624 [emphasis added]-not the "prejudice" that results from a Plaintiff obtaining the relief prayed for. See In re Marriage of Park, 27 Cal. 3d 337, 345 (1980) (holding that "no claim of prejudice ha[d] been articulated" notwithstanding the additional costs that would be incurred if the moving party's motion was granted). The only "prejudice" Defendants claim is the "considerable amount of time, money, and other resources defendants will have to expend if they are directed to 'review' the amount of the . . Fee-" i.e., that Defendants will be "prejudiced" if Plaintiffs are granted the relief sought. (Defs.' Mot. at 17:11-28.) Because "no claim of prejudices has been articulated" by Defendants (Park, 27 Cal. 3d at 345), and especially as they have not shown "unusual circumstances" (Utica, 250 Cal. App. 2d at 543), Defendants cannot meet their burden and their laches defense fails.

## B. Section 28225 Creates a Ministerial Duty as to How the Fee "Shall" Be Set, and only Provides Discretion as to Line-item Cost Estimates-Estimates the Department Never Made

To establish a right to relief under section 1085, a petitioner must show "(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent . . . ; and (2) a clear, present and
beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty[.]" Santa Clara Cnty. Counsel Attys. Ass'n v. Woodside, 7 Cal. 4th 525, 539-40 (1994). "'A ministerial duty is one that is required to be performed in a prescribed manner under the mandate of legal authority without the exercise of discretion or judgment.'" Cape Concord Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Escondido, 7 Cal. App. 5th 180, 189, 212 (2017) (italics added). "Thus, ‘[w]here a statute or ordinance clearly defines the specific duties or course of conduct that a governing body must take, that course of conduct becomes mandatory and eliminates any element of discretion.'" Id.

Distinguishing between matters of discretion and ministerial duty is not an inquiry subject to rigid and formulaic standards. The California Supreme Court has expressed its position on this topic as follows:

> We follow . . . sound precedent . . . in rejecting the [defendant's] invitation to enmesh ourselves deeply in the semantic thicket of attempting to determine, as a purely literal matter, "where the ministerial and imperative duties end and the discretionary powers begin. (I)t would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving of a nail."

Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 788 (1968). "A mandatory duty . . . is mandated . . . to the extent of the enactment's precise formulation." State Dep't of State Hosps. v. Super. Ct., 61 Cal. 4th 339, 350 (2015), reh'g denied (July 22, 2015). In the context of fee setting authority, the Courts look to the text of the authorization itself to determine what elements of the authorization are mandatory, and what elements entail discretion. See Cal. Pub. Records Research, Inc. v. Cnty. of Yolo, 4 Cal. App. 5th 150, 174, 178 (2016) (noting that, even where a statute provides broad discretion as to how a fee can be set by a county, compliance with the terms of the statute itself is still "required[,]" i.e., compliance with the limitations of the statute is a mandatory duty.); accord Cal. Pub. Records Research, Inc. v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 246 Cal. App. 4th 1432 (2016) (holding that although Government Code section 27366 "grants . . . some discretionary authority when setting a particular] fee[, t]hat discretion, however, is limited by the" restrictions stated in the statute). ${ }^{5}$

[^3]"Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts." Guzman v. Cty. of Monterey, 46 Cal. 4th 887, 898 (2009). The courts "examine the 'language, function and apparent purpose' of each cited enactment to determine if any or each creates a mandatory duty designed to protect against the injury allegedly suffered by plaintiff." Id.

And lastly, it must be noted that agency discretion does not extend to the interpretation of the scope of such discretion: an agency's belief as to the scope of its discretion has little, if any, relevance. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cal. Dep't of Fish \& Wildlife, 62 Cal. 4th 204, 236 (2015), as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 17, 2016) ("deference to an agency's statutory interpretation is limited; determining statutes' meaning and effect is a matter 'lying within the constitutional domain of the courts'"); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal. 4th 1, 7 (1998); San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City \& County of San Francisco, 38 Cal. 4th 653, 671 (2006) (stating, in dicta, that " $[I] f$ it can be discerned that the[law] gives . very little discretion to determine what is necessary. . ., then some kind of more rigorous independent review would be required . . . to prevent the circumventi[on of] what was intended to be a strict limitation").

## 1. No Matter How Much the Department Tries to Prop Up the Results of the Macro Review Process, the Process Is Unauthorized, and the Results Are Insufficient

The Department claims that "Section 28225 does not impose a ministerial duty on defendants" based primarily on three arguments. First, the Department states that section 28225 does not "speak in terms of any 'reassessment' being required upon any kind of change in circumstances, or a 'review' of whether the use of DROS fee revenues on an authorized program amounts to a 'tax.'" (Defs.' Mot. at 19:1-3.) ${ }^{6}$ Second, that "[s]ection 28225 does not even require
however, distinguishable from the instant matter is one important respect. The Cal. Pub. cases both concern Government Code section 27366, and the grant of authority therein is broad and simple, expressed in a single sentence. Here, section 28225 has multiple subsections, includes eleven specifically described cost categories, and even specifies cost estimates must nonetheless be "reasonable." Penal Code § 28225. The level of detail provided by the legislature in section 28225 indicates that, unlike Government Code section 27366, the legislature was very concerned about setting forth the method used to set the Fee. (See also discussion infra at § II.B.1.iii.)
${ }^{6}$ If the Fee is being unreasonably overcharged to obtain revenue, then the analysis of what is
the imposition of a fee in the first instance[.]" (Id. 19:4-6.) And third, the Department's main argument—although it is never succinctly stated—is that section 28225 grants the Department the ability to set the Fee based on the condition of the DROS Special Account and its estimated total revenue and expenditures, without any consideration of the specific actual and estimated costs listed in section 28225. (Id. at 19:4-20:10.)

## i. Section 28225 Reflects a Legislative Intent that the Department Periodically Review the Amount Being Charged for the Fee

In raising the first argument, the Department is speaking out of both side of its mouth. The Department's motion dedicates pages to the "reassessment" and "review" of the amount being charged for the Fee. (Id. at 9:18-12:4.) For example, the Department specifically alleges " $[\mathrm{t}] \mathrm{he}$ Legislature . . . allowed the Department to increase the fee by regulation to account for inflation. ${ }^{.7}$ (Id. at 11:3-4.) It is disingenuous for the Department to argue that that section 28225 does not contemplate "reassessment" and "review" of the amount of the Fee being reduced, while in the very same brief admitting that, when it comes to raising the amount of the Fee, the Department has "adopted regulations adjusting the" Fee. (Id. at 11:23-24.) Unless the Department is willing to admit that it "adjusts" the Fee without "reassessment" and "review," the Department's conduct proves that section 28225 is properly interpreted as including a requirement that the amount charged for the Fee should be subject to ongoing monitoring by the Department. Cal. Penal Code § 28225.

The need for reassessment is obvious based on the statute itself, which refers to "actual" and "estimated" costs in the present tense. Id. Costs can and do change. The Department's interpretation would ignore that reality and lead to absurd results, e.g., that the Fee would be based on cost data from a fixed point in time in the past, notwithstanding what costs are currently
"necessary" is substantially the same as the analysis used to determine whether an alleged regulatory fee is actually a disguised tax. See, e.g., Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 15 Cal. 4th 866, 878 (1997) ("to show a fee is a regulatory fee and not a special tax, the government should prove[,inter alia,] that charges allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor's burdens on or benefits from the regulatory activity.")
${ }^{7}$ Plaintiffs do not concede that the purpose of the relevant authority was to "account for inflation."
being incurred. Adopting the Department's interpretation would be inconsistent with longstanding principles of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Birtwhistle, 21 Cal. 4th 973, 977-78 (1999) ("we must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences"); accord In re Oliverez, 21 Cal. 415, 418 (1863). Because section 28225 plainly includes a reassessment aspect in the setting of the Fee, the Department's argument here should be ignored.

## ii. The Department Cannot Selectively Decide Which Portions of Section 28225 Affect the Scope of Its Fee-setting Authority

The Department's second argument can be disposed of quickly. It is often the case that a particular decision by a governmental entity is discretionary, but the implementation of such decision is ministerial. See e.g., Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 788-90 (1968) (holding that, notwithstanding the initial discretionary decision to place minor on parole, a ministerial duty was violated in the implementation of that decision when the minor was placed in foster home without giving a warning that minor was potentially dangerous). And regardless, adopting the Department's position would, once again, go against a well-established maxim of statutory interpretation; i.e., "courts should give meaning to every word of a statute and should avoid constructions that would render any word or provision surplusage." Tuolumne Jobs \& Small Bus. All. v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. 4th 1029, 1038 (2014). The fact that the decision to charge the Fee is within the Department's discretion does not somehow erase all of the instructions the legislature provided for the Department in section 28225 as to how the Fee shall be set. Accordingly, although section 28225 does include some discretionary authority, that authority is part of a statutory scheme that also includes mandatory limits, and this Court should not accept the Department's attempt to ignore the impact of the mandatory restrictions at the heart of this action.

## iii. The Department Incorrectly Conflates Its Discretionary Authority as to Estimating Costs with Its Ministerial Duty to Set the Fee Based on Specific Cost Categories

Defendants are simply wrong in claiming " $[\mathrm{t}]$ he precise manner in which the amount of the DROS fee is settled upon is not stated" in section 28225. (Defs.' Mot. at 19:9.) Section 28225
states the "manner" of how the Fee shall be set, including the specific requirements (e.g., "actual" or "estimated reasonable") for each of the eleven cost categories referred to in that section. That the Department has discretion in how it determines reasonable estimates for certain cost categories under section 28225(c) does not, and cannot, change the manner in which the amount of the Fee is actually calculated. In mathematical terms, the Department has discretion as to what some of the variables will be, but it has no discretion to change the equation set by the Legislature.

The Department cites case law concerning judicial review of actions taken pursuant to a clear and simple grant of discretionary authority, ${ }^{8}$ but those cases are not particularly helpful here, where the scope of the authority granted is itself what is in dispute. The issue here is, first and foremost, "whether the agency exercised its . . . authority within the bounds of the statutory mandate." Yamaha, 19 Cal. 4th at 16 (J. Mosk, concurring) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he [authorizing] provision may define the scope of the [authorized entity]'s discretion, and this in turn shapes . . . what is to be reviewed[.]" S.F. Fire Fighters, 38 Cal. 4th at 670. Here, the scope of the discretion is set by section 28225, which plainly shows the Department does not have discretion in the manner the Fee is assessed beyond the Department's completion of the required reasonable estimates. Cal. Penal Code § 28225.

Plaintiffs contend section 28225 includes a mandatory duty whereby the Department must set the Fee based on specific cost calculations, and the Department contends-relatively obliquely-that that the entirety of the Fee setting process is discretionary, irrespective of the specific cost categories listed in section 28225. The Department claims:

Section 28225 does not impose a ministerial duty to calculate, review, or reassess the amount of the DROS fee at the time, in the manner, or under the circumstances that plaintiffs contend. On the contrary, the Legislature left those

[^4]particulars to the discretion of the Department and other public agencies mentioned in the statute.

Defs.' Mot. at 20:1-4 (citing and quoting Women Organized for Employment v. Stein, 114 Cal. App. 3d 133, 140 (1980) ["The Legislature's silence as to method necessarily imports that each of these officers is invested with discretion in selecting and taking administrative action pursuant to the statutes reaching him."] and Brandt v. Bd. of Supervisors 84 Cal. App. 3d 598, 601 (1978) ["the writ will not be issued to compel the performance of a duty in a particular way"]).) In making the forgoing contention, the Department does not cite the most important source of authority: section 28225 . Section 28225 states what is mandatory ("[t]he fee . . . shall be no more than is necessary to fund the following"), and it lists eleven specific cost categories and then provides instructions in the instances where discretion is to be employed, e.g.: "the estimated reasonable costs of department firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale, purchase, possession, loan, or transfer of firearms[.]" Cal. Penal Code § 28225(c).

Furthermore, the cases cited by the Department do not support its position. For example, the Department's selective quotation of Women Organized omits the sentence prior to the quoted material, a sentence that confirms a legally relevant distinction between the instant matter and Women Organized. In that case, the court noted that, as to certain statutory duties stated in Government Code section 13979, "[t]he 'duties' are nevertheless defined in the broadest of terms, and the Legislature has not specified any procedures to be employed in their performance." Women Organized, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 139-40. When the grant of discretionary authority discussed in Women Organized is compared to section 28225-where the legislature has "specified . . . procedures to be employed in" the setting of the Fee-it further proves section 28225 's "no more than necessary" provision creates a mandatory and ministerial duty, not a broad discretionary power. The Department's citation of Brandt is also not helpful to the Department. It is undisputed that, as Brandt holds, the courts cannot compel performance of a discretionary duty in a particular way. Brandt, 84 Cal . App. 3d at 601 . But this proposition has no relevance to the salient issue of whether setting the Fee is at least in part a ministerial duty.

The Department's attempt to expand its very narrow ambit of discretion falls flat in light of the detailed limitations stated in section 28225. Interestingly, the Department is claiming a wide discretionary berth while at the same time refusing to exercise the discretion actually granted as to calculating the estimates required under section 28225(c). (Defs.' Mot. at 17:12-21.) Because section 28225 requires that the Department set and monitor the Fee by using a specific, non-discretionary method, the Fee-setting process at issue is a ministerial duty and the Court should disregard claims to the contrary.

## iv. Even If the Department's Fee-Setting Authority Is Not Ministerial, the Use of the Macro Review Process Is an Abuse of Discretion Justifying a Writ

Defendants claim they have discharged any ministerial duty created by section 28225. (Defs. Mot. at 20:13-14; 21:17-18.) Importantly, however, the Department never actually opines as to what that duty entails. (Id. 20:13-21:18.) The Department avoids doing so because it would highlight that the process actually used has little in common with what the legislature requires. The Department's presumes, without analysis, that a macro analysis of the DROS Fund can be sufficient to meet the Department's duty under section 28225, which then allows the Department to claim its Macro Review Process was sufficient under the manufactured standard. (Id.) But it is not. The legislature plainly wanted the Department to calculate actual and reasonable estimates, as the use of the terms "necessary" and "estimated reasonable costs" show. Cal. Penal Code § 28225. The Macro Review Process does the exact opposite; it makes it impossible to tell if: (1) the cost of listed activities are inflated, and (2) whether the Department is using the DROS Fund to address costs not listed in section 28225. Because the insufficiency of the Macro Review Process is fully discussed in Section III.B.2.a. of Plaintiffs Motion for Adjudication, Plaintiffs will not repeat that discussion here. But it suffices to say that the Macro Review Process is insufficient to meet the Department's section 28225 duty because it can—and does-prevent outside review of whether the Fee is being charged beyond what is statutorily authorized.

## C. The Department's Interpretation of Section 28225's Use of the Word "Possession" Is Not Only Wrong, It Is Troubling

SB 819 plainly states the legislature's intention that SB 819 be limited to authorizing the use of the DROS Fund for the "limited purpose of funding enforcement of" APPS. 2011 Cal . Stat., ch. 743 § 1(g); see also Carter v. Cal. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 38 Cal. 4th 914, 925-26 (2006) ("[a]n uncodified section is part of the statutory law"). Undaunted, the Department claims that, even though the legislature expressly stated its intent, that the legislature's real intent was to fund activities concerning "the illegal possession of firearms in general, not just APPS." (Defs.' Mot. at 23:1-13). But of course, this interpretation violates yet another maxim of statutory interpretation, i.e., "[i]f the statutory language is clear and unambiguous [the] inquiry ends." Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc. 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1103 (2007).

The Department offers various statements in SB 819 and its legislative history that refer to concerns over illegal possession of firearms in general as support for its interpretation. (Defs.' Mot. 23:3-26.) But none of the statements offered are inconsistent with SB 819 being limited as described in Section $1(\mathrm{~g})$ thereof. The Department is basically arguing that, because the problem of illegal possession of firearms is greater than just what APPS-based law enforcement can cover, the Legislature's express limitation language should be ignored so the scope of funding authorized by SB 819 matches the scope of "the Legislature's overarching concern[.]" (Defs.' Mot. at 23:6-9.) There is no basis for that position in logic or the law. See Tuolumne Jobs, 59 Cal . 4th 1029; Wilcox, 21 Cal. 4th at 977-78.

Defendants tread on very thin ice here: they know that, while SB 819 was under consideration by the Legislature, its author "added declarations and findings to make it clear that [SB 819 wa]s intended to address the APPS enforcement issue." (AMF \# 4.) SB 819's author literally changed SB 819 so that it would not mean what Defendants now claims it does, a fact Defendants outright ignore. Defendants even go so far to claim that "adhering to plaintiffs' reading of the word 'possession' defeats the general purpose of [SB 819]" (Defs. Mot. at 23:2728) even though SB 819 and its legislative history say otherwise. SB 819 is clear, as is its
legislative history: the bill was only intended to provide a funding source for APPS-based law enforcement activities. The term "possession" in section 28225 is a limited one, and the Department's machinations to create an argument to the contrary should be ignored.

## D. The Department's "Duty for Public Safety" Argument Is an Unfounded and Impermissible Assertion that the Ends Justify Statutorily Unauthorized Means

The Department, after various less-than-forthright discovery responses, finally admitted during a recent deposition that it is funding non-APPS based law enforcement activities based on the contention that SB 819's revision of section 28225 authorized such expenditures. (AMF \# 5.) Forced to explain this unauthorized usage, the Department offers little more than a claim that the ends justify the means. That is, the Department claims it "has a duty for public safety to follow up on" information it gets about any illegal firearm possession, which supposedly then nullifies the limitation explicitly placed in SB 819. (Defs.' Mot. at 24:3-9.) Similarly, rather than admitting it is section 28225 that limits the Department's access to DROS Fund money, the Department deflects and tries to blame Plaintiffs for seeking to enforce the limits the legislature set. (Id.)

Even assuming arguendo the Department has a public safety duty, ${ }^{9}$ that duty does not trump other express provisions of law: "[t]he odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not prevail in our system for the administration of justice." In re Buchman's Estate, 123 Cal. App. 2d 546, 560 (1954); see also Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 505, 193 P.2d 470, 474 (1948) ("acts of executive and administrative officials are not given validity on the theory that 'the end justifies the means'"); City of Bellflower v. Cohen, 245 Cal. App. 4th 438, 454 (2016). Further, the Department implies that its duty is to actually investigate illegal firearm possession tips, as opposed to simply turning the information over to the appropriate local law enforcement agency. (Defs.' Mot. at 24:5-12). Interestingly, in the course of sponsoring SB 819, the Department made repeated representations that SB 819 money was needed to pay for APPS-based law enforcement activities performed by both the Department and local law enforcement

[^5]agencies. (AMF \# 6.) For example, in one communication from the Department to a member of Senator Leno's staff dated February 16, 2011, the department claimed would use \$1.5-2.5 million of money obtained via (what would later be named) SB 819 to reimburse local law enforcement, and $\$ 1$ million a year to pay for the Department's employees to perform APPS-based law enforcement activities. (AMF \# 6.) As of 2017, local law enforcement has not been paid any money related to its APPS-based law enforcement work (AMF \# 7), whereas the Department has spent tens of millions of dollars pursuant to SB 819 in the last six years. (AMF \# 8.)

The Department has not used any SB 819 money to fund local law enforcement; SB 819 money is being used to increase the size of the Department's Bureau of Firearms. If SB 819 itself withstands legal challenge, then that expansion-to the extent it is used for APPS-based law enforcement activities-is at least arguably authorized. But what the Department proposes herein is a bridge too far: neither SB 819 , nor any other law, made the Department a state-wide law enforcement agency with a duty to respond to all firearms-related complaints or tips. This Court should reject the Department's thinly veiled ends-based contentions and confirm that section 28225 's reference to "possession" refers only to possession by those on the APPS list.

## III. CONCLUSION

SB 819 was enacted for a specific purpose, a purpose the Department was well aware of as the sponsor and primary proponent of SB 819. Defendants should not now be allowed to ignore the specific limitations that were included in SB 819 , limitations specifically added because of concerns that the Department's original version of SB 819 was too vague and broad. Both law and equity weigh heavily against Defendant's motion from being granted. Thus, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court deny Defendants' motion in full.

Dated: June 30, 2017
MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.
$\qquad$

## PROOF OF SERVICE

## STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I, Laura Palmerin, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802.

On June 30, 2017, I served the foregoing document(s) described as

## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION AS TO THE FIFTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION

on the interested parties in this action by placing
[ ] the original
[X] a true and correct copy
thereof by the following means, addressed as follows:
Office of the Attorney General
Anthony Hakl, Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 1101
Sacramento, CA 95814
Anthony.Hakl@doj.ca.gov
X (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery by UPS/FED-EX. Under the practice it would be deposited with a facility regularly maintained by UPS/FED-EX for receipt on the same day in the ordinary course of business. Such envelope was sealed and placed for collection and delivery by UPS/FED-EX with delivery fees paid or provided for in accordance with ordinary business practices. Executed on June 30, 2017, at Long Beach, California.

X (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) As follows: I served a true and correct copy by electronic transmission. Said transmission was reported and completed without error.
Executed on June 30, 2017, at Long Beach, California.
X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

C.D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258

Scott M. Franklin - S.B. N. 240254
MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.
180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200
Long Beach, CA 90802
Telephone: (562) 216-4444
Facsimile: (562) 216-4445
Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

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GOSSC COURTHOUSS
SLPERIOR COURT
of CALIFORNIA
SACRAAEANTO COUMTY

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, BETTY YEE, in Her Official Capacity as State Controller, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 34-2013-80001667

## PLAINTIFFS' SEPARATE STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

[Filed concurrently with the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof; Plaintiffs' Evidence in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication: Declaration of Scott M. Franklin in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication]

Date: $\quad$ August 4, 2017
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 31
Judge: Hon. Michael P. Kenny
Action Filed: October 16, 2013

Plaintiffs David Gentry, James Parker, Mark Midlam, James Bass, and CalGuns Shooting Sports Association hereby submit this Separate Statement in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication.

| Defendants' Undisputed Material Facts <br> and Supporting Evidence | Plaintiffs' Responses |
| :--- | :--- |
| No. 1: The Legislature first authorized DOJ <br> to charge a DROS fee in 1982 and DOJ first <br> set the DROS fee at \$2.25. <br> Evidence: Stats. 1982, ch. 327, § 129, p. <br> 1473; Hakl Decl., Ex. B [Bates no. <br> AGIC007]. | Undisputed. |
| No. 2: In 1991 the Department set the <br> DROS fee at \$14.00. | Undisputed. <br> Evidence: Hakl Decl., Ex. B [Bates no. <br> AGIC007]. |
| No. 3: In 1995 the Legislature capped the <br> DROS fee at \$14.00 subject to increases to <br> account for inflation. | Undisputed that there was a \$14.00 limit <br> included in the relevant statutory change, <br> disputed as to the immaterial legal allegations <br> that the \$14.00 limit was solely meant to account <br> for inflation, or that the statutory change allowed <br> the relevant fee to be charged pursuant to the <br> consumer price index in an amount more than <br> necessary to fund the relevant costs. |
| Evidence: Stats. 1995, ch. 901, § 1, pp. <br> 6883-6884. | Undisputed that a \$19.00 limit was included in <br> the relevant regulatory change, disputed as to the <br> immaterial factual allegation that the fee amount <br> was changed from \$14.00 to \$19.00 to account <br> for inflation. |
| No. 4: In 2004 DOJ raised the DROS fee to <br> \$19.00 - its current amount - to account for <br> inflation. <br> Evidence: Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 11, § 4001; <br> Hak1 Decl., Ex. E [Bauer Bates no. AG- <br> 00250]. | Undisputed. <br> No. 5: Plaintiffs filed this suit on October, <br> 16, 2013. <br> Evidence: Complaint for Declaratory and <br> Injunctive Relief and Petition <br> for Writ of Mandamus. |

## Defendants' Undisputed Material Facts and Supporting Evidence

No. 6: If the DROS fee were to be calculated in the manner plaintiffs contend, "it would cost a whole lot more money in order to operate that program which would be passed along to the DROS fee."

Evidence: Depo. of Stephen Lindley ("Lindley Depo.") at 64:22-25.

No. 7: In 2004, the Department engaged in a lengthy rulemaking process, as required by the law, resulting in the regulation setting the DROS fee at $\$ 19.00$, where it remains today.

Evidence: Hakl Decl., Ex. E.

No. 8: Without the 2004 cost of living adjustment the Dealer's Record of Sale Special Account was projected to run out of the cash needed to support the firearms regulatory and enforcement programs mandated by law.

Evidence: Hakl Decl., Ex. E [Bauer Bates no. AG-00250].)

No. 9: A series of 2004 reports (and draft reports) prepared by the Department's Budget Office reflect further analysis by the Department supporting the increase of the DROS fee to \$19.00.

Evidence: Hakl Decl., Ex. B.

## Plaintiffs' Responses

Disputed, but immaterial. There is no foundation laid for this vague claim or as to how the deponent is qualified to give either the legal and factual opinions herein. Further, even if it was true that calculating the Fee as required by law-as opposed to how it is calculated now-would cost more, that would have no bearing on the issues currently before the Court.

Undisputed that the Department engaged in a rulemaking process in 2014 to increase the Fee to $\$ 19.00$, its current amount, disputed as the irrelevant and immaterial issues of whether the process was "lengthy" (i.e., it was emergency rulemaking) or the legal assertion that the process performed was that which is "required by the law[.]"

Disputed but immaterial. It is undisputed that the Department believed the DROS Fund was likely to run out of money in the near future in 2004. But the Department's own internal analysis shows that cost cutting was proposed, but rejected, as a way to deal with the dwindling amount of money in the DROS Fund. That is, increasing the Fee was not the sole way to address the problem under discussion, which is what Defendants imply. Further, it is disputed that the 2004 adjustment was a "cost of living adjustment[,]" the document cited provides no comparative data wherein the same specific operations were costing more due to inflation.

Disputed but immaterial; the documents cited do not "support[] the increase of the DROS fee to \$19.00[.]" More accurately, the documents cited reflect that raising the fee to $\$ 19.00$ was one option to deal with the anticipated shortfall, and option that was not recommended by the specific entity that authored the reports.
$\left.\begin{array}{|l|l|}\begin{array}{l}\text { Defendants' Undisputed Material Facts } \\ \text { and Supporting Evidence }\end{array} & \text { Plaintiffs' Responses } \\ \hline \begin{array}{l}\text { No. 10: The number of programs funded } \\ \text { from DROS fee revenues (i.e., the costs } \\ \text { specified in the statute) had grown before } \\ \text { the Department revised the DROS fee rate } \\ \text { in 2004 and has grown further since then. } \\ \text { Evidence: Compare Stats. 1995, ch. 901, § }\end{array} & \text { Undisputed but immaterial. } \\ \begin{array}{l}\text { 1, pp. 6883-6884 [the law in 1995] with } \\ \text { former § 12076, as amended (Stats. 2003, } \\ \text { ch. 754, § 2 [the law in effect as of the 2004 } \\ \text { fee setting] and with § 28225 [effective } \\ \text { today]. }\end{array} & \\ \hline \begin{array}{l}\text { No. 11: In 1995 the Legislature enacted } \\ \text { Senate Bill 670 and codified the \$14.00 } \\ \text { figure that was later adjusted to \$19 in 2004. } \\ \text { At that time (i.e., in 1995) the Legislature } \\ \text { recognized the Department's explanation } \\ \text { that \$14.00 was "sufficient to fund the } \\ \text { existing authorized programs." }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { Sentence 1: undisputed. Sentence 2: disputed } \\ \text { and immaterial. (1) Whether or not the } \\ \text { legislature recognize a particular fee amount as } \\ \text { "sufficient" does not provide a factual basis that } \\ \text { the fee amount was proper, and the Department } \\ \text { has produced no direct evidence as to that issue, } \\ \text { (2) this case is not about whether a decision over } \\ \text { twenty years ago was financially justified, and }\end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l}\text { Evidence: Assem. Com. on Appropriations, } \\ \text { (3) this case is not about whether the amount of a }\end{array} \\ \text { fnalysis of Senate Bill No. 670 (1995-1996 "sufficient[," it is about whether the fee } \\ \text { Reg. Sess.) Aug. 23, 1995; Sen. Third } \\ \text { Rearrently being charged is excessive, and "proof" } \\ \text { (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 29, 1995. } \\ \text { that it sufficient sheds no light on whether it was } \\ \text { excessive in 1995. }\end{array}\right\}$

## Defendants' Undisputed Material Facts and Supporting Evidence

No. 12: The Department regularly monitors the number of firearms transactions in California; the amount of DROS fee revenues being generated; the condition of the Dealer's Record of Sale Special Account; the annual state budget process, particularly as it impacts the Department, and the resulting appropriations by the Legislature; each and every expenditure by the Department to ensure that it is authorized by law; and the anticipated future needs of the Department based on myriad policy and legal considerations.

Evidence: See, e.g., Lindley Depo. at pp. 64:9-65:65-10; 72:3-73:15; 74:2-79:25 [Hakl Decl., Ex M]; Depo. of David Harper at pp. 54:14-55:17; 58:24-59:20; 60:661:24; 63:5-64:8; 65:2-67:23 [Hakl Decl., Ex N].

No. 13: Chief Lindley has testified regarding APPS that " $95 \%$ of the of the cases that we work would be systemgenerated cases," meaning that " $[t]$ he APPS system generated the hit . . . identifying the person as being armed prohibited. Analysts confirm that, agents confirm that, and they go out into the field and investigate that individual."

Evidence: Lindley Depo. at pp. 26:2327:10.

## Plaintiffs' Responses

Disputed as to the claim that the Department "regularly monitors . . . each and every expenditure by the Department to ensure that it is authorized by law[;]" the documents cited do not support this, and as was confirmed during the deposition of Stephen Lindley, the Department does not consider the "nitty gritty" specific cost classes identified in Penal Code section 28225, which means the Department is not actually considering whether "each and every" cost within those categories are appropriately being funded pursuant to section 28225. Undisputed as to the remainder, which is immaterial.

Though Plaintiffs have no independent verification of the claim that approximately $95 \%$ of the relevant investigations are based on information obtained from "hits" generated by the APPS system, in light of Defendants' steadfast claim that information related to specific "APPS cases" is confidential.
Nonetheless, it is Undisputed that the 95\% estimate is the estimate made by Stephen Lindley in this action, and that Plaintiffs assume it to be true for the purpose of Defendants' Motion.

## Defendants' Undisputed Material Facts and Supporting Evidence

No. 14: The "vast majority" of APPS enforcement efforts by the Department fall within a category of enforcement with which plaintiffs take no issue.

Evidence: Lindley Depo. at p. 17:25.

No. 15: With respect to the five percent of APPS cases plaintiffs challenge (i.e., cases that are not "true" APPS-list cases), Chief Lindley testified about a typical example. He explained that on occasion the Department might "get a call from a citizen, an ex-wife, sometimes, you know, family members about an individual who is now prohibited for one reason or another and that they have firearms that the department might not necessarily know about." In that instance the Department has "a duty for public safety" to follow up on that call.

Evidence: Lindley Depo. at p. 18:9-18.

## Plaintiffs' Responses

Disputed. Even if Mr. Lindley's approximation is correct that approximately $95 \%$ of the relevant cases are based on data generated by APPS, there is no evidence presented that there APPSbased and non-APPS cases, on average, require the same level of "enforcement efforts[.]" For example, it is reasonable to assume that information taken from the APPS list will include contact information, whereas, in matters where the Department is following up on a vague tip, finding the relevant individual may require an exponential amount of work.

Undisputed that the example provided is an example of a non-APPS case the Department is funding with DROS Fund money. Disputed as to whether it is "typical" because the Department refuses to provide information about its investigations based on, inter alia, a law enforcement privilege claim. Also disputed as to the claim that the Department has a duty for public safety to investigate non-APPS matters within the jurisdiction of local law enforcement. No statute or other law is cited by the Department for this proposition, and the deponent's speculation is insufficient evidence to support the claim.

| Plaintiffs' Additional Material Facts | Defendants' Response |
| :--- | :--- |
| Al |  |

Additional Material Fact ("AMF") No. 1: The relevant emergency rulemaking was effectively complete in 2004, but it was not finalized until 2005.

Evidence: Declaration of Scott M. Franklin in Support of Plaintiffs' Separate Statement in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication ("Franklin Decl. ISO Opp.") at Exhibit 1 (AGRFP000380, AGRFP000390).

AMF No. 2: Prior to the adoption of SB 819 the Department expressly asserted that SB 819 would not result in the DROS Fee being increased.

Evidence: GENT124 (Part of Exhibit 14 to the Declaration of Scott M. Franklin in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Adjudication of Plaintiffs' Fifth and Ninth Causes of Action Pursuant to the Bifurcation Order of November 4, 2016 ["Franklin Decl."])

AMF No. 3: The Department now contends that it can raise the Fee based on costs related to APPS-based law enforcement activities.

Evidence: Franklin Decl. ISO Opp. at Exhibits 2 \& 3 (GENT157-62).

AMF No. 4: The Department was involved in the revision of SB 819 when it the new Section 1 was added, so the Department knew SB 819 was being revised to include a specific limitation on SB 819's scope.

Evidence: GENT125-27 (part of Exhibit 15 to the Franklin Decl.)

| Plaintiffs' Additional Material Facts | Defendants' Response |
| :--- | :--- |
| AMF |  |

AMF No. 5: During a recent deposition, the Department, for the first time, clearly admitted that it is funding non-APPS based law enforcement activities out of the DROS Fund based on the contention that SB 819's revision of section 28225 authorized such expenditures.

Evidence: GENT069-71; GENT077 (part of Exhibit 9 to the Franklin Decl.)

AMF No. 6: In the course of sponsoring SB 819, the Department made repeated representations that SB 819 money was needed to pay for APPS-based law enforcement activities performed by both the Department and local law enforcement agencies. For example, in one communication from the Department to a member of Senator Leno's staff dated February 16, 2011, the department claimed would use \$1.5-2.5 million of money obtained via (what would later be named) SB 819 to reimburse local law enforcement, and \$1 million a year to pay for the Department's employees to perform APPS-based law enforcement activities.

Evidence: GENT124 (Exhibit 14 to the Franklin Decl.); see also GENT 128-130 (Exhibit 16 to the Franklin Decl.), Franklin Decl. ISO Opp. at Exhibit 4 (GENT163-64).

AMF No. 7: As of 2017, the Department has not paid local law enforcement any money out of the DROS Fund to local law enforcement regarding its APPS-based law enforcement work.

Evidence: GENT072 (part of Exhibit 9 to the Franklin Decl.)

| Plaintiffs' Additional Material Facts | Defendants' Response |
| :--- | :--- |
| AMF No. 8: The Department has spent tens of <br> millions of dollars pursuant to SB 819 in the <br> last six years. |  |
| Evidence: Franklin Decl. ISO Opp. at Exhibit <br> 5 (GENT165-167). |  |

Dated: June 30, 2017

MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.


## PROOF OF SERVICE

## STATE OF CALIFORNIA

## COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I, Laura Palmerin, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802.

On June 30, 2017, I served the foregoing document(s) described as

## PLAINTIFFS' SEPARATE STATEMENT IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

on the interested parties in this action by placing
[ ] the original
[X] a true and correct copy
thereof by the following means, addressed as follows:
Office of the Attorney General
Anthony Hakl, Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 1101
Sacramento, CA 95814
Anthony.Hakl@doj.ca.gov
X (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery by UPS/FED-EX. Under the practice it would be deposited with a facility regularly maintained by UPS/FED-EX for receipt on the same day in the ordinary course of business. Such envelope was sealed and placed for collection and delivery by UPS/FED-EX with delivery fees paid or provided for in accordance with ordinary business practices.
Executed on June 30, 2017, at Long Beach, California.
X (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) As follows: I served a true and correct copy by electronic transmission. Said transmission was reported and completed without error. Executed on June 30, 2017, at Long Beach, California.

X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258

Scott M. Franklin - S.B.N. 240254
MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.
180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200
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Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,

## vs.

XAVIER BECCERA, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, BETTY YEE, in her official capacity as State Controller for the State of California, and DOES 1-10.

Defendants and Respondents.

CASE NO. 34-2013-80001667

## PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION: DECLARATION OF SCOTT M. FRANKLIN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

[Filed concurrently with the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof; and Plaintiffs' Separate Statement in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication]

Date: $\quad$ August 4, 2017
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 31
Judge: Hon. Michael P. Kenny
Action filed: 10/16/13

## DECLARATION OF SCOTT M. FRANKLIN

I, Scott M. Franklin, declare:

1. I am an attorney at law admitted to practice before all courts of the state of California. I have personal knowledge of each matter and the facts stated herein as a result of my employment with Michel \& Associates, P.C., attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners ("Plaintiffs"), and if called upon and sworn as a witness, I could and would testify competently thereto.
2. Exhibit 1 (AGRFP000380, AGFRP00390) is a true and correct copy of excerpts of the rulemaking file produced by Defendants herein concerning the increase of the Dealers' Record of Sale Fee from $\$ 14.00$ to $\$ 19.00$.
3. Exhibit 2 (GENT157-GENT159) is a true and correct copy of excerpts of the transcript of the Deposition of Stephen Lindley, such deposition being taken in this matter.
4. Exhibit 3 (GENT160-GENT162) is a true and correct copy of excerpts of the transcript of the Deposition of David S. Harper, such deposition being taken in this matter.
5. Exhibit 4 (GENT163-GENT164) is a true and correct copy of a memo found in Senator Mark Leno's unrestricted files regarding Senate Bill ("SB") 819 (Leno, 2011).
6. Exhibit 5 (GENT165-GENT167) is a true and correct copy of a publicly available letter that then-Attorney General Kamala Harris sent to the legislature concerning the fact that the $\$ 24$ million allocation of DROS Special Account funds obtained as a result of SB 819 was not sufficient to support the Department's ongoing law enforcement activities performed and funded pursuant to SB 819 (or the Department's interpretation thereof).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this Declaration was executed on June 30, 2017, at Long Beach, California.


## EXHIBIT 1

## STATE OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

In re:

## DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

REGULATORY ACTION:

Adopt sections $\quad 4001,4002,4003,4004,4005,4006$
Amend sections 984.1

NOTICE OF APPROVAL OF CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Government Code Section 11349.6

OAL File No. 05-0301-04 C

This Certificate of Compliance adopts and amends fees for the Dealer Record of Sale (DROS) account. (Previous OAL file \# 04-1025-01E)
OAL approves this regulatory action pursuant to section 11349.1 of the Government Code.

DATE: 04/11/05

for: WILLIAM L. GAUSEWITZ
Director

Original : Bill Lockyer, Attorney General
cc: Mike Small

$\frac{\text { NOTICE }}{\text { AGENCY WITH RULEMAKING AUTHORITY }}$

AGENCY WITHRULEMAKING AUTHORITY
Department of Justice Rivivion

## A. PUBLICATION OF NOTICE (Complete for publication in Notice Register)

| 1. SUBJECT OF NOTICE |  |  | TTTE(S) | FIRST SECTION AFFECTED | 2. REQUESTED PUBLICATION DATE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 3. NOTICE TYPE Notice re Proposed <br> Requlatory Action Other |  | 4. AGENCY CONTACT PERSON |  | TELEPHONE NUMBER $1(1)$ | FAX NUMBER (Optional) ( ${ }^{\circ}$ ) |
| 0ALUSE ORNLY $\qquad$ |  |  |  |  |  |

B. SUBMISSION OF REGULATIONS (Complete when submitting regulations)

| 1a. SUBJECT OF REGULATION(S) Firearms Division Fees |  | 1b. ALL PREVIOUS RELATED OAL REGULATORY ACTION NUMBER(S) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2. SPECIFY CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS TITLE(S) AND SECTION(S) (Including title 26, if toxics-related) |  |  |
| SECTION(S) AFFECTED <br> (List all section number(s) individually) | Division 5, Chapter 1, sections 4001, 4002, 4003, 4004, 4005 and 4006 |  |
|  | AMEND <br> Division 1, Chapter 13, section 984.1 |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { TiTLE(S) } \\ & 11 \end{aligned}$ | REPEAL |  |
| 3. TYPE OF FILING |  |  |
| $\left.\square \begin{array}{l}\text { Regular Ruiemaking } \\ \text { (Gov. Code, § 11346) }\end{array} \quad \square \begin{array}{l}\text { Resubmittal of disapproved or with- } \\ \text { drawn nonemergency filing } \\ \text { (Gov. Code, } \S \S 11349.3,11349.4)\end{array} \quad \square\right]$Emergency (Gov, <br> Code, $\S 11346.1(\mathrm{~b}))$$\quad \square$Emergency Readopt <br> (Gov. Code, $\S 11346.1(\mathrm{~h}))$$\quad$Resubmittal of disapproved or |  |  |
| Certificate of Compliance: The agency officer named below certifies that this agency complied with the provisions of Govermment Code §§ 11346.2-11346.9 prior to, or within 120 days of, the effective date of the regulations listed above. |  |  |
| Print Only | Changes Without Regulatory Effect (Cal. Code Regs., title 1, § 100) | $\square$ Other (specify) |

4. ALL BEGINNING AND ENDING DATES OF AVAILABILITY OF MODIFIED REGULATIONS AND/OR MATERIAL ADDED TO THE RULEMAKING FILE (Cal. COde Regs. itle 1 , $\S \leqslant 44$ and 45 )
 B.

I certify that the attached copy of the regulation(s) Is a true and correct copy of the regulation(s) Identified on thls form, that the information specified on this form is true and correct, and that I am the head of the agency faking this action, or a designee of the head of the agency, and am authorized to make this certification.


## EXHIBIT 2

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
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                                    --000--
    DAVID GENTRY, JAMES
PARKER, MARK MIDLAM,
JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS
SHOOTING SPORTS
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs and
Petitioners,
vs.
Case No. 34-2013-80001667
KAMALA HARRIS, in Her
Official Capacity as
Attorney General for the
State of California;
STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His
Official Capacity as
Acting Chief for the
California Department of
Justice, BETTY YEE, in
Her Official Capacity as
State Controller for the
State of California and
DOES 1-10,
Defendants and
Respondents.
DEPOSITION OF
STEPHEN J. LINDLEY
May 24, 2017
9:52 a.m.
1300 I Street
Sacramento, California
LAAURIE D. LERDA, CSR NO. 3649

BY MR. FRANKLIN:
Q. After Senate Bill 819 became law, did the way in which the amount of the DROS fee is analyzed by the department change in any way?
A. I think you have to talk about time frame.

Initially, no, it did not.
Q. And then after initially?
A. Yes. Because there's now a cost associated from the Armed Prohibitive Person System that are being paid for out of the DROS fee.
Q. And as of yet that hasn't led to an increase in the DROS fee?
A. Not as of yet, no.
Q. Based on your understanding of how the DROS fee is to be calculated at this point in time, is it possible that the DROS fee could be increased due to the costs of APPS-based law enforcement?
A. I would say it a different way.

I wouldn't just blame it on the cost of APPS enforcement, but the last time it was -- the DROS fee was raised was, you know, 13 years ago. So, costs have increased since then over the department including the bureau.

So, unless there's another revenue source that comes in, eventually all fees will be increased
including the DROS fee.
When that happens I have no idea.
Q. So, is it fair to state that the amount of the money being spent on APPS-based law enforcement activities is a consideration when the department analyzes the propriety of the DROS fee being charged?
A. I would use a different word than propriety.

But is that a calculation in the costs that is covered by the DROS fee, yes.
Q. And that's new at some point after Senate Bill 819 became law, correct?
A. Not necessarily.

So we had an APPS program before 819.
819 just allowed the expansion of that fee to cover possession that deals a lot with the APPS program. And, yes, it's covered under that.

Some of that change in the budget was done at the Governor's level not at the department level.

And then recently other parts of the APPS program had been moved in part to other funding sources besides DROS. Q. Well, since SB 819 became law, does the department consider anything about the specific individuals paying the DROS fee when looking at what

## EXHIBIT 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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DAVID GENTRY, JAMES
PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners, vs.

Case No. 34-2013-80001667
KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official Capacity as
Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, BETTY YEE, in Her Official Capacity as State Controller for the State of California and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

```
            DEPOSITION OF
            DAVID SCOTT HARPER
                    January 30, 2017
            8:46 a.m.
            1300 I Street
                Sacramento, California
            LAURIE D. LERDA, CSR NO. 3649
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going to raise the fee $\$ 5$, provide all that money for more enforcement. That's not something we would do.

We could raise the fee theoretically.
That doesn't mean we're going to get additional spending authority to spend that extra revenue. So, the two kind of are hand-in-hand.

Conversely, if there's an initiative to expand enforcement in the APPS program say an internal initiative by the Attorney General, we may be able to redirect agents from other programs into the APPS program provided we can create the savings elsewhere in the DROS Fund from our existing appropriation to fund those expanded enforcement activities.

So, there's no one answer to your question.
It's simply what do you want to achieve, and then knowing what you want to achieve, what is the I'm not going to say what is the best, what are the options to achieve that.

And the options may be what are the quickest options. What are the best long-term options. It's -- so there's a lot of factors that go into determining something like that like what you asked. BY MR. FRANKLIN:
Q. So, I'll try and make a more simple
question. Assuming all other revenue and expenditure amounts are consistent, if the department has an increase in costs related to APPS-based law enforcement, is it your understanding that the department could increase the amount of the fee because of that increase in APPS-based law enforcement costs?

MR. HAKL: Objection. Vague as to APPS-based law enforcement costs, but you can answer. THE WITNESS: So my understanding would be yes. If the department chose to expand the APPS unit, the enforcement unit, that they could choose to increase the fee to pay for that expansion provided the legislature provided the additional spending authority to go along with the fee increase. BY MR. FRANKLIN:
Q. And the spending authority would be in the Budget Act?
A. Correct.
Q. And I think you've already answered this question. Looking at total revenue and expenditures going in and out of the DROS Special Account, is that the method used for monitoring the amount of reserve in that account?
A.
That's a component of it, yes.

## EXHIBIT 4

To: ML
From: London
Date: February 23, 2011
Re: Update and Talking Points on the AG's Firearms Proposal

I have spoken with Deputy Attorney General Jessica Devencenzi on their efforts to obtain a Republican author for the Armed Prohibited Persons System (APPS) enforcement proposal. So far, they have approached Senators Blakeslee and Huff who have both turned down the proposal. They have also approached Assemblyman Cook and are still awaiting a decision.

The AG's office would very much appreciate any assistance you could provide in getting the proposal in front of Senator Canella for consideration. Below you will find a short summary and some of the 'republican friendly' talking points provided to our office by the deputy:

## Problem

The Armed Prohibited Person System (APPS) operated by the California Department of Justice has identified more than 18,000 individuals, including convicted felons who are illegally in possession of over 34,000 handguns and as many as 1,590 assault weapons. Unfortunately, the California Penal Code does not provide funding to the department or local agencies to confiscate these unlawfully possessed firearms.

## Solution

Attorney General Harris would like to introduce legislation to allow DOJ to use the Dealer Record of Sale (DROS) account to partner with local agencies to provide training on the APPS computer-based program, conduct sweeps of individuals on the APPS list, compensate local jurisdictions on a per transaction basis for firearms confiscated from individuals on the APPS list, and fund additional positions within the department to ensure the investigation of individuals currently in violation.

## Highlights

- This legislation will not increase the gun fees, expand the number of people who are subject to having their firearms confiscated, or place any additional limitations on an individual's right to own firearms.
- DOJ has discussed the issue with prominent gun rights advocates including the National Rifle Association, gun dealers, and the Gun Owners of California.
- These gưn rights advocates agree that APPS enforcement should be funded. They believe the Legislature should avoid additional gun laws, and instead, enforce those laws already on the books.

Note: There is resistance from the gun lobby on how to fund enforcement efforts and specifically to using the DROS fund for this purpose. Nonetheless, all parties the AG has consulted have committed to a good faith dialogue on the issue.

- The AG is confident the bill will be strongly supported by law enforcement.


## EXHIBIT 5

State of California Office of the Attorney General

Kamala D. Harris
Attorney General

January 21, 2016

Members of the California Legislature
State Capitol
10th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
RE: Armed and Prohibited Persons System (APPS)
Dear Colleagues:
California has some of the strongest gun safety laws and initiatives in the nation. One of the state's most important initiatives is the Department of Justice's ("Department") Armed and Prohibited Persons System ("APPS"), which keeps firearms out of the hands of those prohibited from possessing them due to their criminal history, mental health status, or existence of a restraining order.

At my request, the Governor and Legislature three years ago made a significant but temporary - investment in APPS (SB 140, Ch. 2, Statutes of 2013). As a result of that investment, my office has made historic reductions in the number of individuals in the APPS database. Over the last 30 months, our APPS enforcement efforts have taken 335 assault weapons, 4,549 handguns, 4,848 long-guns, and 943,246 rounds of ammunition off the streets from those who illegally possessed them.

However, that temporary infusion of financial support expires May 1, 2016. Due to subsequent changes in law that will substantially increase the number of prohibited persons and the real and present danger these individuals pose to public safety, I strongly urge you to make permanent the increased APPS funding you approved three years ago.

Until recently, the APPS database, which went into effect in December of 2006, was based almost exclusively on handgun transaction records, despite the fact that each year approximately half of all California firearm sales involve long-guns. Indeed, between 2007 and 2013 there were 4,157,849 firearm transactions conducted in California (an average of 593,978 per year), split roughly evenly between handgun and long-gun transactions.

Page 2

Effective January 1, 2014, a new California law mandated for the first time that the Department collect and retain firearm transaction information for all types of guns, including long-guns. By adding the long-gun registration requirement, the number of individuals who may fall into the APPS system has doubled. In 2014, there were 931,037 firearm transactions in California and we expect a similar volume for 2015 and in the years ahead. This new law will add to the APPS those individuals who purchase the hundreds of thousands of long-guns each year who subsequently commit a prohibiting offense. This statutory change alone justifies sustained and enhanced investment in the APPS.

In addition, we anticipate increased workload due to the new Gun Violence Restraining Order (Assembly Bill 1014) law that went into effect on January 1, 2016. This law allows family members who are concerned about the mental stability of a loved one who possesses a firearm to petition a court for a restraining order that would place the individual in the APPS database. We estimate that as many as 3,000 subjects could be added to the APPS database annually through this new law. Current agent staffing levels within the Bureau of Firearms are insufficient to deal with this increase in prohibited offenders.

In May 2013, just months after the horrific tragedy in Sandy Hook, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 140 with strong bipartisan support. SB 140 provided the Attorney General's Office with $\$ 24$ million over a three-year period to significantly reduce and eliminate the roughly 20,000 subjects in the APPS database. During the past two and half years, my Special Agents and other Bureau of Firearms staff conducted over 18,608 APPS investigations statewide. This reduced the subjects in the APPS database from a high of 21,357 on November 20, 2013, to 12,691 as of December 31, 2015, the lowest since September 2008.

These historic achievements came despite the addition of the new long-gun registration requirement and the increase in subjects being identified as armed and prohibited. In short, the Department's efforts, made possible by the funding from SB 140, has decreased the number of subjects in the APPS database every day and removed nearly 20,000 armed and prohibited subjects in under two and half years.

The Department needs additional resources to continue our successful work on the APPS and adequately address the public safety threat these individuals present to California. To achieve these goals, I respectfully request that the Legislature make permanent the temporary funding it has previously authorized in order to allow the Department to continue to disarm the people who become prohibited from possessing firearms in California.

Members of the California Legislature
January 21, 2016
Page 3

The Department has been privileged to receive the Legislature's support and encouragement on this important public safety initiative that can serve as a model for the country. We look forward to continuing this partnership in the years ahead.

Respectfully,


## PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

## COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I, Laura Palmerin, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802.

On June 30, 2017, I served the foregoing document(s) described as

## PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION: DECLARATION OF SCOTT M. FRANKLIN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

on the interested parties in this action by placing
[ ] the original
[X] a true and correct copy
thereof by the following means, addressed as follows:
Office of the Attorney General
Anthony Hakl, Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 1101
Sacramento, CA 95814
Anthony.Hakl@doj.ca.gov
X (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery by UPS/FED-EX. Under the practice it would be deposited with a facility regularly maintained by UPS/FED-EX for receipt on the same day in the ordinary course of business. Such envelope was sealed and placed for collection and delivery by UPS/FED-EX with delivery fees paid or provided for in accordance with ordinary business practices.
Executed on June 30, 2017, at Long Beach, California.
X (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) As follows: I served a true and correct copy by electronic transmission. Said transmission was reported and completed without error. Executed on June 30, 2017, at Long Beach, California.

X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.


Xavier Becerra
Attorney General of California
Stepan A. Haytayan
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
ANTHONY R. HAKI
Deputy Attorney General
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Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

## DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MID LAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of
California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in his official capacity as Director of the California Department of Justice Bureau of Firearms; BETTY T. YEE, in her official capacity as State Controller, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents. ${ }^{1}$

Case No. 34-2013-80001667

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION OF THE FIFTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION

Date: $\quad$ August 4, 2017
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: 31
Judge: The Honorable Michael P. Kenny
Action Filed: October 16, 2013

[^6]
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Merriam-Webster.com (2017) https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/estimate [as of June 29, 2017]

Merriam-Webster.com (2017) https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/reasonable [as of June 29, 2017]

## INTRODUCTION

Most of the discussion in plaintiffs' motion for adjudication of the fifth and ninth causes of action is irrelevant to the discreet legal issues currently before this Court. As a result, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that the Dealer's Record of Sale ("DROS") fee statute (Penal Code, § 28225) imposes on the Department of Justice a ministerial duty to act, and plaintiffs separately have failed to show that they have a clear and beneficial right to the performance of any duty. Plaintiffs argument that the word "possession" in section 28225, subdivision (b)(11) has a special meaning is also unpersuasive. Defining "possession" narrowly like plaintiffs contend is unsupported by the common sense meaning of that word and goes against the public safety purposes of the statute. The Court should deny plaintiffs' motion.

## ARGUMENT

## I. On the Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs Have Failed to Meet the Requirements for Writ of Mandate.

## A. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that defendants have a clear, present and ministerial duty to act.

The requirements for writ of mandate are well known. The writ "may be issued by any court . . . to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) With respect to this duty, " $[\mathrm{t}]$ he petitioner must demonstrate the public official or entity had a ministerial duty to perform. . . ." (California Pub. Records Research, Inc. v. Cty. of Yolo (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 150,177, italics added.) In their opening brief, plaintiffs effectively assume the existence of the required duty. But their assumption is unsupported by any argument, which is not surprising because section 28225 simply does not impose a ministerial duty on defendants.

Whether a statute like section 28225 "impose[s] a ministerial duty, for which mandamus will lie, or a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function is a question of statutory interpretation. We examine the language, function and apparent purpose of the statute." (California Pub. Records Research, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 178, citations and internal quotations omitted.)

Section 28225 states that " $[t]$ he Department of Justice may require the dealer to charge each firearm purchaser a fee not to exceed fourteen dollars (\$14), except that the fee may be increased at a rate not to exceed any increase in the California Consumer Price Index," and if the Department requires dealers to charge a fee, the fee "shall be no more than is necessary to fund" eleven categories of costs listed in the statute. Nothing in the language of section 28225 imposes the duty, or duties (to be precise), plaintiffs inconsistently assert. (Compare Pls.' Opening Brief at p. 8 [claiming "duty on the Department to consider" whether current fee is "excessive"] with id. at p. 19 ["duty to set the Fee" within Department's statutory authority] and with id. at p. 21 ["duty to monitor and adjust the amount of the Fee"]; see also Compl. qT 96, $99 \& 100$ [varying characterizations of Department's alleged duty]. $)^{2}$ Indeed, plaintiffs' inability to articulate the precise nature of any duty speaks to the absence of any duty. ${ }^{3}$

Moreover, the Third District Court of Appeal recently concluded that a very similar feesetting framework regarding copies of documents requested under the Public Records Act does not impose any ministerial duty. (California Public Records Research, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 178.) That framework involved two statutes, although the most pertinent one provided that " $[\mathrm{t}]$ he fee . . shall be set by the board of supervisors in an amount necessary to recover the direct and indirect costs of providing the product or service." (Gov. Code, § 27366.) In concluding that the statutes did not impose a duty on the county to limit copy fees, the Court of Appeal reasoned that even though the statutes "require the Board to charge and set copy fees, the Board must

[^7]exercise significant discretion in deciding how much to charge." (California Public Records Research, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 178.) The court explained: "Neither statute requires the Board to set fees in any particular amount. Rather, section 27366 requires the Board to set fees 'in an amount necessary to recover the direct and indirect costs of providing the product or service." (Ibid.) And the court had explained elsewhere in its opinion that the terms "direct costs" and "indirect costs" indicate the Legislature intended for boards of supervisors to consider "a wide range of indirect costs in actually setting copy fees, including overhead and other operating costs not specifically associated with the actual production of copies." (4 Cal.App.5th at p. 173.)

Here, section 28225 is akin to the statute in California Public Records Research. The DROS fee statute does not require the Department to set the DROS fee at any particular amount. Rather, if a fee is charged, it is "not to exceed fourteen dollars (\$14)," except that it may be increased to account for inflation. ( $\S 28225$, subd. (a).) In other words, the fee can be nonexistent (i.e., $\$ 0.00$ ) or it can fall within the range of $\$ 0.01$ up to and including $\$ 14.00$, and even beyond in the event of inflation. ${ }^{4}$ Additionally, like the statute in California Public Records Research, section 28225 authorizes the Department (and other state agencies) to consider a wide range of costs in setting the DROS fee. No less than eleven subdivisions list those costs, but subdivision (b)(11) perhaps illustrates this point the best, considering its broad language encompassing "costs associated with funding Department of Justice firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale, purchase, possession, loan, or transfer of firearms." Indeed, the statute goes on to say that these costs need only be "the estimated reasonable costs" of the Department. (See Merriam-Webster.com (2017) https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/estimate [as of June 29, 2017] ["to judge tentatively or approximately the value, worth, or significance of"; "to determine roughly the size, extent, or nature of"]; MerriamWebster.com (2017) https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reasonable [as of June 29, 2017] ["not extreme or excessive"; "moderate, fair"].) This language shows that section 28225

[^8]calls for the exercise of significant discretion in deciding the amount of the DROS fee, just like the situation in California Public Records Research.

Because plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that defendants have a ministerial duty to act, the Court should deny plaintiffs' motion as to the fifth cause action.

## B. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show a beneficial right.

Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to writ relief because "Defendants have not produced any evidence to dispute Plaintiffs' 'beneficial right.... to the performance of that duty' via past and likely future payment of the Fee." (Pls.' Opening Brief at p. 18.) Yet that is not the applicable legal standard. The law is clear that "[w]hat is required to obtain writ relief is a showing by a petitioner of '(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent . . .; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty . . . '" (Santa Clara Cty. Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 53940, overruled by statute on other grounds as recognized in Coachella Valley Mosquito \& Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1077; see Riverside Sheriff's Ass'n v. Cty. of Riverside, 106 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1289 ["The petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving the facts upon which the claim is based"]; MacLeodv. Long, 110 Cal.App. 334, 339 ["The burden is, therefore, upon the plaintiff to prove the existence of such right rather than upon the defendants to disprove the same."])

Moreover, plaintiffs have not even attempted to articulate what their beneficial right might be, much less demonstrated the required "direct" and "substantial" beneficial right. (Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of Alameda (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1233.) And to be sure, a general interest in having the laws of the State upheld is not special or unique. Rather, it is shared by the public at large. Such a broad interest does not amount to a beneficial right. (See Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica (2006) 14423 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1254 [interests "pertain[ing] to the effective operation of government and the rights of the public, not to specific interests or rights of [the petitioners] individually," are not beneficial interests]; Braude v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 83, 89 [taxpayer's interest in minimizing traffic congestion, though legitimate, was not a beneficial interest "over and above the public at large" because
"hundreds of thousands of people" shared the interest].) For this additional reason, the Court should deny plaintiffs' motion as to the fifth cause action.

## II. The Court Should Reject Plaintiffs' Narrow Construction of Section 28225 and Dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action.

Turning to the ninth cause of action defendants agree that the central issue is a matter of statutory interpretation. Yet plaintiffs' interpretation of the relevant statute fails to adhere to the basic tenets of statutory construction. (See Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 920 [courts "begin with the language of the statute" to "ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law"].) Plaintiffs narrowly focus on an isolated phrase in the uncodified language of SB 819 to the exclusion of everything else, including the definition of the word "possession," the actual statutory term at issue. Plaintiffs do not even address the plain meaning of the word "possession" much less explain how the Department's common sense interpretation of that word (see Defs.' Opening Brief at pp. 21-24) is in any way inconsistent with that meaning. For this reason alone, plaintiffs' argument is unavailing.

Nor is it relevant, as plaintiffs contend (see Pls.' Opening Brief at p. 17), what the Department may have "publicly acknowledged" in the legislative run-up to SB 819. (See In re Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36, 46, fn. 6 [declining to consider "two documents from the sponsoring entity, the State Bar of California . . . as they are not cognizable indicia of legislative intent"].) It is not relevant what a staffer of the authoring legislator of the bill might have said during the same period in an alleged informational handout intended for an unknown audience. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1176, fn. 5 [denying request to take judicial notice of authoring legislator's press releases and letters, explaining "we do not consider the objective of an authoring legislator when there is no reliable indication that the Legislature as a whole was aware of that objective and believed the language of the proposal would accomplish it"]; see also Decl. of Anthony R. Hakl in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. Adjud. ("Hakl Decl."), Exh. O at pp. 54-58 [discussing the nature of " $\mathrm{Q} \& \mathrm{~A}$ " document relied upon by plaintiffs].) And while courts may consider different versions of a bill as a general matter (see Quintano v. Mercury Cas. Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062, fn. 5 (1995) [taking judicial notice of "various
versions" of bill]), none of the versions of SB 819 offered by plaintiffs can change the plain meaning of the word "possession," which itself appeared in earlier versions of the bill. Indeed, it is hardly inconsistent for the Legislature to have "intended to address the APPS enforcement issue," as plaintiffs claim (see Pls.' Opening Brief at p. 17), and also more broadly intend to support "enforcement activities related to possession" and reduce the number of illegally possessed firearms that "present[] a substantial danger to public safety," which the uncodified language of SB 819 emphasized by plaintiffs also states. (Senate Bill 819 (Leno), Stats. 2010, ch. $743, \S 1(f)$, italics added.) On the contrary, these intentions are compatible, APPS being a major component of enforcement activities related to possession.

Plaintiffs cursory argument in support of the ninth cause fails to persuade. The Court should deny plaintiffs' motion as to that claim as well.

## CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny plaintiffs' motion in its entirety.

Dated: June 30, 2017
Respectfully Submitted,
Xavier Becerra
Attorney General of California
Stepan A. Haytayan


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Deputy Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents

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## DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL and U.S. Mail

Case Name: Gentry, David, et al. v. Kamala Harris, et al. No.: 34-2013-80001667

I declare:

I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business.

On June 30, 2017, I served the attached OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION OF THE FIFTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail. In addition, I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, in the internal mail system of the Office of the Attorney General, addressed as follows:

Scott Franklin
Michel \& Associates, P.C.
180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200
Long Beach, CA 90802
E-mail: SFranklin@michellawyers.com

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on June 30, 2017, at Sacramento, California.

Tracie L. Campbell
Declarant


Signature

Xavier Becerra
Attorney General of California
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Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

## DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MID LAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in his official capacity as Director of the California Department of Justice Bureau of Firearms; BETTY T. YEE, in her official capacity as State Controller, and DOES 1-10,

> Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 34-2013-80001667
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION ${ }^{1}$

Date: $\quad$ August 4, 2017
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: 31
Judge: The Honorable Michael P. Kenny
Action Filed: October 16, 2013

[^9]| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | To purchase a firearm in California, <br> qualified individuals must pay a <br> transaction fee known as a Dealer Record <br> of Sale ("DROS") fee ("Fee"). <br> Evidence: GENT002 | Undisputed. |
| 2 | The California Department of Justice (the <br> "Department") performs extensive <br> "background checks" of all applicants <br> seeking to purchase firearms. <br> Evidence: GENT002 | Undisputed. |
| 3 | The primary purpose of the "DROS <br> Process" is to ensure that people seeking <br> to purchase firearms in <br> California are not legally prohibited from <br> possessing them. <br> Evidence: GENT002 | Undisputed. |
| 4 | The Fee was \$2.25 in 1982 when it was <br> statutorily created to cover the costs of <br> background checks. <br> Evidence: AGIC007 | Undisputed. |
| 5 | In 1990, the amount of the DROS Fee <br> was \$4.25. <br> Evidence: GENT003, AGIC007 | Undisputed. |


| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 6 | In 1995, the legislature capped the DROS Fee at $\$ 14.00$, subject to Consumer Price Index adjustment. <br> Evidence: GENT003 | Undisputed. |
| 7 | In 2004, the Department increased the the DROS fee from $\$ 14$ to $\$ 19$ for the first handgun or any number of rifles or shotguns in a single transaction. <br> Evidence: GENT003 | Undisputed. |
| 8 | Section 28225 provides the rules for how the Fee should be set, i.e., that the fee "shall be no more than is necessary to fund the following:" eleven classes of costs, based on what the Department determined to be "actual" or "estimated reasonable" costs to pay for the eleven costs classes identified. <br> Evidence: Penal Code § 28225 | Disputed. Plaintiffs' description is not a complete and accurate summary of Penal Code §28225, the text of which speaks for itself. <br> Evidence: Penal Code §28225 |
| 9 | Penal Code section 28225 places a duty on the Department to consider whether the amount currently being charged for the DROS fee is excessive, and the Department; the Department admits it cannot legally increase the DROS fee to an amount the Department believes to be greater than necessary to fund the costs referred to in Penal Code section 28225. <br> Evidence: GENT009-10; GENT034; AGRFP000399 | Disputed. Penal Code §28225, the text of which speaks for itself, does not impose a ministerial duty on the Department. <br> Evidence: Penal Code §28225, GENT00910, GENT034, AGRFP000399 |
| 10 | The Department deposits DROS fee monies in the "Dealers' Record of Sale Special Account of the General Fund" ("DROS Fund"). <br> Evidence: GENT004 | Undisputed. |
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| No. | PLAINTIFES' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11 | Revenue from multiple fees is pooled in the DROS Fund. <br> Evidence: GENT051-52 | Undisputed. |
| 12 | Because of that pooling, however, it is impossible to trace if money paid in via a particular fee is actually used for costs related to that particular cost. For example, it is impossible to determine if a cost listed in Penal Code Section 28225 is funded from DROS fee funds, money from a mix of fee sources, or from fee sources exclusive of the DROS fee. <br> Evidence: GENT035-36; GENT051-952 | Disputed, but not material. Plaintiffs' description is not an accurate summary of the evidence cited. <br> Evidence: GENT035-36, GENT051-52 |
| 13 | The Department has claimed herein that it is "unable to admit or deny" whether DROS fee money constitutes a certain percentage of the money in the DROS Special Account. <br> Evidence: GENT035 | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not stand for the proposition claimed by plaintiffs. <br> Evidence: GENT035 |
| 14 | Internal Department documents the Department was ordered to produce herein show that DROS fee funds are the primary source of money going into the DROS Special Account. <br> Evidence: AGICO32 | Undisputed to the extent that this refers to the circumstances in 2005 , which is the date of the cited document. <br> Evidence: AGIC032 |
| 15 | The Department contends that Per Transaction Cost (i.e., the average cost of performing a given transaction, including a proportional share of overhead costs) of the DROS process is currently at least $\$ 19.00$. <br> Evidence: GENT011 | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not support the proposition advanced by plaintiffs. <br> Evidence: GENT011 |


| No. | PLAINTIFES' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 16 | The Department has not provided any basis, however, for that claim. In fact, the Department originally claimed that it would produce a current per transaction cost, but after two years of requests from Plaintiffs herein, the Department repudiated its promise during a meeting in chambers. <br> Evidence: Franklin Decl. $\uparrow 30$ | Disputed, but not material. In responding to Request for Admission No. 38 and the accompanying Form Interrogatory 17.1 defendants' explained why they are unable to admit that the average cost to the Department of a DROS transaction is less than $\$ 19.00$. Defendants also explained their calculation that for fiscal year 2003-2004 the average DROS transaction cost was $\$ 21.13$. Fiscal year 2003-2004 was the fiscal year immediately preceding the fiscal year that the DROS fee was last increased (from $\$ 14.00$ to \$19.00). <br> Evidence: GENT141; see also answers to Special Interrogatory Nos. $1 \& 2$, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to the Hakl declaration filed in connection with defendants' opposition brief. |
| 17 | It was only after years of discovery in this action that the Department finally admitted that it does not actually consider any of the specific costs listed in Penal Code section 28225 when evaluating how much should be charged for the DROS Fee. <br> Evidence: GENT080-81; GENT110-111 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' assertion. <br> Evidence: GENT080-81; GENT110-111 |


| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
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| 18 | The process used by the Department for at least the last thirteen years (the "Macro Review Process") consists of the following: occasionally, two people in the Department look at (1) how much money is in the DROS Fund, (2) then they estimate the total amount of money going into and coming out of the DROS Fund in the next year, and (3) as long as the DROS Fund will stay in the black and will have a surplus to cover up to one year's worth of operating expenses, the Fee will not be increased. <br> Evidence: AGIC007-12; GENT033-34; GENT057; GENT079-80; GENT087; GENT108; GENT110-111 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' assertion. <br> Evidence: AGIC007-12; ;GENT033-34; <br> GENT057; GENT079-80; GENT087; <br> GENT108; GENT110-111 |
| 19 | The Department does not have protocol for determining when it should examine if the amount currently being charged for the DROS Fee is excessive. <br> Evidence: GENT010; GENT139; GENT078; GENT083 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' assertion. <br> Evidence: GENT010; GENT139; GENT078; GENT083 |
| 20 | As to the eleven cost classes referred to in section 28225(b): (1) the Department is unaware of the amount spent yearly for eight of those categories, one of which is the particularly relevant class stated in section 28225(11) (and four of this group concern costs the Department has not been requested to pay since at least 2004), (2) the Department has identified two categories that are funded from a source other than the DROS Special Account, and (3) one is known: the amount spent for electronic information transfer (. 83 to 3.53 as of $20 \_$). <br> Evidence: GENT012-23; GENT043-47 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' assertion. <br> Evidence: GENT012-23; :GENT043-47 |


| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 21 | The Department has previously paid <br> Verizon for costs related to electronic <br> information transfer. <br> Evidence: GENT045 | Undisputed. |
| 22 | The Department cannot even provide the <br> total amount of section 28225 costs for <br> any year since 2002. <br> Evidence: GENT060A | Disputed, but not material. The cited <br> documents do not support plaintiffs' <br> assertion. |
| 23 | The Department claims its process does <br> contemplate the Fee being reduced. <br> Evidence: GENT081-83 | Disputed, but not material. The cited <br> documents do not support plaintiffs' <br> assertion. |
| 24 | The DROS Fee has never been lowered. <br> Evidence: AGIC007; 11 CCR § 4001 | Evidence: GENT081-83 |


| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 28 | The amount of the Fee was most recently increased in 2005 via an emergency rulemaking ("2005 Rulemaking") intended to resolve an anticipated negative balance in the DROS Fund. <br> Evidence: 11 CCR § 4001 (emergency regulation permanently instituted on March 1, 2005); AGRFP000391-396 | Undisputed. |
| 29 | At the time, the Department stated that 2005 increase was "only up to a level to cover actual costs as specified in statute." <br> Evidence: AGRFP000391-396 | Undisputed that the phrase "only up to a level to cover actual costs as specified in statute" appears in the cited document. <br> Evidence: AGRFP000393 |
| 30 | The Department concedes that the cost of APPS was not a cost considered in the calculation to raise the Fee. <br> Evidence: GENT011 | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not contain the admission claimed. <br> Evidence: GENT011 |
| 31 | The Department claims that it "created a written document that utilized specific cost data to provide an explanation as to why a $\$ 19.00 \ldots$ FEE was appropriate[:]" but the Department refuses to produce such material, claiming it is privileged. <br> Evidence: GENT027; GENT064-65 | Disputed, but not material. Defendants produced the relevant 2004 documents, which are Bates stamped AGIC007-020 and AGIC022-031. <br> Evidence: GENT027; GENT064-65 |
| 32 | Documents ordered produced by this Court over the Department's objections, however, show that the Macro Review Process was used in the 2005 Rulemaking. <br> Evidence: AGIC007-19; AGIC048; AGICO22-36; GENT026-27; GENT033 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: AGIC007-19; AGIC048; AGIC022-36; GENT026-27; GENT033 |


| No. | PLAINTIFES' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 33 | The Department's own internal audit recommended cost cutting as an element of a solution to the DROS Fund deficit. <br> Evidence: AGIC011-12; AGIC034 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: AGIC011-12; AGIC034 |
| 34 | The Department chose to not adopt a cost cutting recommendation as a way deal with the low funds in the DROS Fund, and instead raised the Fee as the only measure to address the deficit. <br> Evidence: 11 C.F.R. § 4001; cf. AGIC0011 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: 11 C.F.R. § 4001, cf. AGIC0011 |
| 35 | During the summer of 2009 thenAssemblyman Jim Nielsen contacted the Department about the unchecked growth of the DROS Fund surplus, which was over $\$ 8$ million at the time. <br> Evidence: GENT131 | Disputed as to "unchecked growth," but not material. The letter from Assemblyman Jim Nielsen is in the record. <br> Evidence: GENT131 |
| 36 | As of September 2, 2009, the Department knew the then $\$ 10.5$ million dollar surplus in the DROS Special Account was more than necessary. <br> Evidence: GENT131 | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not support plaintiffs' assertion. <br> Evidence: GENT131 |
| 37 | In response to the assemblyman's inquiry, the Department stated that it was "currently exploring numerous administrative and statutory options to reduce the surplus", and that "[s]hould [the Department] decide to pursue statutory changes to reduced the surplus, [the Department would] "welcome an opportunity to meet with [the assemblyman] to discuss the specifics of any proposal." <br> Evidence: GENT131 | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not contain this language. <br> Evidence: GENT131 |
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| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 38 | As a result of the pressure from the <br> legislature, on July 9, 2010, the <br> Department formally commenced <br> rulemaking (the "2010 Rulemaking") <br> regarding the possibility of reducing the <br> amount charged for the Fee from \$19.00 <br> to \$14.00. | Evidence: GENT84-86 <br> Eharacterization. <br> documents do not support plaintiffs' |
| 39 | The 2010 Rulemaking was initiated while <br> the Department was headed by Attorney <br> General Jerry Brown. | Undisputed. |
| Evidence: GENT005 | The Department stated the purpose of the <br> 2010 Rulemaking was to make the amount <br> of the Fee 'commensurate with the actual <br> costs of processing a DROS <br> [application]." | Disputed, but not material. The cited <br> documents do not support plaintiffs' <br> characterization. |
| 40 | Evidence: AGRFP000048-49 | Evidence: AGRFP000048-49 |


| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 42 | Defendant Lindley admitted the 2010 Rulemaking was based on a determination that the surplus in the DROS Fund was "excessive[,]" and that, with the " $\$ 19$ fee structure . . . there was a surplus at the end of every fiscal year[.]" Similarly, he said "at that point the $\$ 19$ was more than what was needed." <br> Evidence: GENT083; GENT091; GENT132-134; AGRGP000048-49. | Undisputed that Lindley testified that "[a]t one time part of the analysis was we thought we had an excessive amount in there and that led to the 2010 rulemaking process" and that "we saw the $\$ 19$ fee structure that the - that there was additional surplus at the end of every fiscal year." Disputed as to the rest because GENT132-134 and AGRGP000048-49 are not testimony by Lindley. <br> Evidence: GENT083; GENT091 |
| 43 | The Department claimed (1) that it never made even a preliminary determination that $\$ 19$ was excessive, and that (2) at the conclusion of the 2010 Rulemaking, the Department was of the opinion that the total amount collected as a result of the $\$ 19.00$ fee was reasonably related to the total amount of costs referred to in section 28225 that were being incurred by the Department at the time. <br> Evidence: GENT 10; GENT025; GENT030; AGRGP000048-49 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. Defendants have admitted, though, subject to various objections the gist of (2): that "at the conclusion of the 2010 rulemaking regarding the possible reduction of the DROS FEE from $\$ 19.00$ to $\$ 14.00$, CAL DOJ was of the opinion that the total amount collected as a result of the $\$ 19.00$ DROS FEE was reasonably related to the total amount of costs referred to in SECTION 28225 that were being incurred by CAL DOJ at the time." <br> Evidence: GENT 10; GENT025; GENT030; AGRGP000048-49 |
| 44 | As to the 2010 Rulemaking, the Department held a public hearing, and even created a final statement of reasons. <br> Evidence: AGRFP0000166-174 | Undisputed. |
| 45 | Notwithstanding that the Department had basically completed the 2010 Rulemaking, the Department sat on the rulemaking until SB 819 passed, and then the rulemaking was abandoned in favor of SB 819, without any explanation to the public. <br> Evidence: AGRFP000174; GENT030-31; GENT050; GENT054-55; GENT120 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: AGRFP000174; GENT030-31; GENT050; GENT054-55; GENT120 |
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| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 46 | When Defendant Lindley was asked in a deposition in a different lawsuit why the rulemaking was abandoned, he said it was because all of the public comment was against it. <br> Evidence: GENT101 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: GENT101 |
| 47 | The Calguns Foundation not only stated that it supported a fee reduction, but that it supported an even greater fee reduction than the 2010 Rulemaking proposed. <br> Evidence: AGRFP00176 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. For example, the documents show that Calguns "supports the reduction in fees" in general, but opposed the 2010 Rulemaking in particular. <br> Evidence: AGRFP00176 |
| 48 | When deposed in this matter, however, Defendant Lindley admitted that it was abandoned in favor of SB 819. <br> Evidence: GENT090A | Disputed, but not material. The evidence submitted does not contain a page stamped GENT090A |
| 49 | When Defendant Lindley was asked at deposition who made the decision to abandon the 2010 rulemaking, he indicated the decision had been made by then Attorney General Kamala Harris. <br> Evidence: GENT088-90; GENT092 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. Lindley testified that " $[t]$ hey wanted to move forward. There was a number -- not many people liked the idea of reducing the DROS fee for one reason or another. There were ideas about using the surplus DROS fee in order to pay for APPS enforcement and that's the way the administration wanted to go." <br> Evidence: GENT090 |
| 50 | Defendant Lindley stated in a discovery response that he made the decision to abandon the rulemaking. <br> Evidence: GENT055 | Undisputed, although defendants note that the Chief (now Director) of the Bureau of Firearms is part of "the administration" referred to the testimony cited immediately above. <br> Evidence: GENT055; GENT090 |
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| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
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| 51 | The initial statement of reasons for the 2010 Rulemaking literally says the purposes of the proposed fee reduction to " $\$ 14$, commensurate with the actual cost of processing a $\operatorname{DROS}[$,]" <br> Evidence: AGRFP000419 | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not appear to contain the quoted phrase. <br> Evidence: AGRFP000419 |
| 52 | Defendants herein admitted during discovery that the Department initiated the 2010 Rulemaking to reduce the amount of the Fee from $\$ 19$ to $\$ 14$. <br> Evidence: GENT029 | Disputed, but not material. The cited document contains only a denial, no admission. <br> Evidence: GENT029 |
| 53 | Defendant Lindley claims he does not "think there was an intent to lower it to \$14." <br> Evidence: GENT067-68 | Disputed, but not material. The relevant deposition passage reads: "Because I don't think there was an intent to lower it to $\$ 14$. I think there was an intent to lower it or to look at the prospects of lowering it in 2010." <br> Evidence: GENT067-68 |
| 54 | By winter 2010/2011, the DROS Fund surplus was over $\$ 14$ million. <br> Evidence: GENT124 | Disputed, but not material. The cited email states that "as of January 31, 2011 DROS had a $\$ 14,815,000.00$ surplus." <br> Evidence: GENT124 |
| 55 | In January 2011, newly elected Governor Jerry Brown released his proposed budget, which included almost $\$ 62$ million in cuts, over two years, to the Department's Division of Law Enforcement. <br> Evidence: GENT135-136 | Undisputed. |
| 56 | In August 2011, the legislature enacted the California state budget for 2011-2, which included a $\$ 71.5$ million dollar reduction in the Division of Law Enforcement's budge over two years. <br> Evidence: GENT137-38 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents reflect a figure of " $\$ 71.5$ million in 2012-13 and ongoing." <br> Evidence: GENT138 |


| No. | PLAINTIFES' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 57 | The intent behind the $\$ 71.5$ million cut to the Division of Law Enforcement's budget was to "[e]liminate General Fund from the Division of Law Enforcement[;]" previously, the General Fund was used to pay for the Division of Law Enforcement's APPS-based law enforcement activities, among other things. <br> Evidence: GENT011; GENT40; GENT96-98; GENT137-38 | Disputed, but not material. The relevant passage reflects the following "Adopted Solution": "Eliminate General Fund from the Division of Law Enforcement - A reduction of $\$ 36.8$ million beginning in $2011-12$, and $\$ 71.5$ million in 2012-13 and ongoing. General Fund resources have been maintained for the forensic laboratory program, the Armed Prohibited Persons Program, and investigation teams to assist the Department's legal services division." <br> Evidence: GENT138 |
| 58 | Shortly after Kamala Harris became California's Attorney General, the Department, acting on her specific instruction, brought proposed legislation to Senator Mark Leno that ultimately became Senate Bill 819 (Leno, 2011). <br> Evidence: GENT154A | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: GENT154A |
| 59 | The first substantive version of SB 819, introduced March 21, 2011, did nothing other than addition the word "possession" to two passages in section 28225. <br> Evidence: GENT144-146 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support this statement. The documents, with the use of italics and strikethrough, respectively, show other additions and deletions. Also, SB 819 was introduced on February 18, 2011. <br> Evidence: GENT144-146; see http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/postquery?bill number=sb 819\&sess $=11$ $12 \&$ house $=$ B\&author=leno |


| No. | PLAINTIFES' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
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| 60 | In the opinion of a Department attorney who was involved in the drafting of SB 819, "as the sponsor I think I can say that we felt that it [i.e., adding only the word "possession"] was a sufficient clarification of existing law." <br> Evidence: GENT114-15; GENT119; GENT121-22 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support this statement. The relevant deposition passage is apparently: "I don't remember specific discussions, but we certainly would have talked about whether it addressed the department's -- whether it was a sufficient clarification of the law." <br> Evidence: GENT119 |
| 61 | On April 14, 2011, Senator Leno introduced a new, and what was ultimately the final, version of SB 819. <br> Evidence: GENT147-53 | Undisputed. |
| 62 | The April 14, 2011, version of SB 819 included a new section, and specifically the subsection limiting SB 819 to providing a funding source for APPSbased law enforcement activities: Section 1 (g). <br> Evidence: GENT147-50 | Disputed that the new section was "specifically the subsection limiting SB 819 to providing a funding source for APPSbased law enforcement activities: Section $1(\mathrm{~g})$." This is a legal argument. The text of SB 819 speaks for itself. <br> Evidence: GENT147-50 |
| 63 | Senator Leno's "Q\&A" packet for SB 189 expressly stated that he "added declarations and findings to make it clear that [SB 819 wa]s intended to address the APPS enforcement issue." <br> Evidence: GENT125-27 | Disputed, but not material. Many of the details regarding the cited document are not known, included but not limited to its date, author, and any intended recipients. <br> Evidence: GENT125-27 <br> see also Decl. of Anthony R. Hakl in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. Adjud. ('Hakl Decl."), Exh. O at pp. 54-58 [discussing the nature of "Q \& A" document relied upon by plaintiffs].) |


| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
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| 64 | A parenthetical note in the " $\mathrm{Q} \& A$ " packet also shows that the Department was involved in the revision of SB 819 when it the new Section 1 was added. <br> Evidence: GENT125-27 | Disputed, but not material. Many of the details regarding the cited document are not known, included but not limited to its date, author, and any intended recipients. <br> Evidence: GENT125-27 <br> see also Decl. of Anthony R. Hakl in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. Adjud. ("Hakl Decl."), Exh. O at pp. $54-58$ [discussing the nature of "Q \& A" document relied upon by plaintiffss.) |
| 65 | APPS is a system that cross-references (1) firearm purchaser background check records and (2) criminal or other records that indicate if an individual is prohibited from possessing firearms. <br> Evidence: GENT102-03; AGIC0050 | Undisputed. |
| 66 | If the system produces a "hit" that is later verified by human analysis, it provides a basis for law enforcement to contact the person identified to determine that person is illegally possessing a firearm. <br> Evidence: GENT102-03 | Undisputed. |
| 67 | Senator Leno and the Department worked together extensively in promoting SB 819. <br> Evidence: GENT154A | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: GENT154A |
| 68 | While discussing SB 819 with the legislature and the public, Senator Leno and the Department both made it very clear that SB 819 only applied to funding for APPS-based law enforcement activities. <br> Evidence: GENT104; GENT125-127; GENT147-150 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: GENT104; GENT125-127; GENT147-150 |
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| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
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| 69 | Further, when the Department and Senator Leno were pushed on why SB 819's proposed statutory change was limited to one word-the addition of the word "possession" to section 28225-the response was clear: SB 819's non-codified provisions provide the needed context to understand what "possession" would mean in section 28225 if SB 819 was enacted. <br> Evidence: GENT125-27 | Disputed, but not material. The cited documents do not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: GENT125-27 <br> see also Decl. of Anthony R. Hakl in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. Adjud. ("Hakl Decl."), Exh. O at pp. 54-58 [discussing the nature of "Q \& A" document relied upon by plaintiffs].) |
| 70 | In 2011, the Legislature passed SB 819, which added the word "possession" to Section 28225, with the following uncodified intent language: "it is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this measure to allow the DOJ to utilize the Dealer Record of Sale Account for the additional, limited purpose of funding enforcement of the Armed Prohibited Persons System." <br> Evidence: GENT151-53 | Disputed, but not material. The complete text of section 28225 speaks for itself, and it does not contain any bolded or italicized language as indicated. <br> Evidence: GENT151-53 |
| 71 | Since 1999, the Department has been using the DROS Fund to pay for attorney services in over 50 cases. <br> Evidence: GENT073-74 | Disputed, but not material. The cited deposition testimony refers to a period from "2009," and the "estimate" is "around 50." <br> Evidence: GENT073-74 |
| 72 | In fiscal year 2013/2014, \$181,486.29 of DROS Fund money was spent on attorneys. <br> Evidence: GENT59-60 | Undisputed, but to be precise "the total amount of DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT <br> funds spent on salary for attorneys, limited to money expended during fiscal year 2013/2014" was "[a]pproximately $\$ 181,486.29$. This figure includes salary and benefits." <br> Evidence: GENT59-60 |
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| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
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| 73 | The total costs of attorney services paid for out of the DROS Fund is in the millions. <br> Evidence: GENT075 | Undisputed, but defendants note that this was an estimate and referring to "the last ten years." <br> Evidence: GENT075 |
| 74 | Five positions within the Department, but outside the Bureau, were being funded from the DROS Fund. <br> Evidence: AGIC010 | Undisputed that this was the case as of May 28,2004 , and that the same document reflects a recommendation to " $[\mathrm{m}]$ ove CJIS positions that are funded out of DROS and into the Fingerprint Fee Account." <br> Evidence: AGIC007-011. |
| 75 | The State's auditor stated the DROS Fund was a "dubious funding source for these [five abovementioned] positions. While they may somewhat contribute to the goals of the DROS program, an overwhelming majority of their time is spent on nonDROS workload." <br> Evidence: AGIC010 | Undisputed that this statement that was made by someone in the Department, likely a budget analyst, in a document dated May 28, 2004, and that the same document reflects a recommendation to "[m]ove CJIS positions that are funded out of DROS and into the Fingerprint Fee Account." <br> Evidence: AGIC007-011. |
| 76 | And once SB 819 became law, the Department started to use the DROS Fund not only to fund APPS-based law enforcement actives, it also used DROS Fund money to pay for APPS itself (e.g., generating the APPS list). <br> Evidence: AGRFP0017; GENT041 | Disputed, but not material. Defendants have explained that " $[t]$ he APPS program was funded with General Fund monies until approximately 2011 (i.e., the passage of SB 819)." Also, the distinction between "APPSbased law enforcement actives" and "APPS itself" as used here is unclear to defendants. <br> Evidence: AGRFP0017; GENT041 |


| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |$|$| 77 | Once SB 819 became law, the Department <br> started to use the DROS Fund for <br> investigations of people who were not on <br> the APPS list. The Department claims SB <br> 819 authorized DROS Fund money to be <br> spent on law enforcement activities related <br> to removing firearms from the possession <br> of prohibited persons, whereas Plaintiffs <br> contend SB 819 is expressly limited to <br> funding APPS-based law enforcement <br> activities. <br> Evidence: GENT069-71; GENT077 (See <br> also the First Amended Complaint and <br> Answer to the First Amended Complaint.) <br> documents do not support plaintiffs' <br> characterization in the first sentence. As to <br> the second sentence, it is not a statement of <br> fact, although defendants generally <br> understand the distinction plaintiffs are <br> drawing. |
| :--- | :--- |
| 78 | Evidence: GENT069-71; GENT077 |
| Prior to SB 819, APPS and APPS-based <br> law enforcement activities were funded <br> out of the General Fund. | Undisputed, although it is not entirely clear <br> what plaintiffs mean by "APPS" as opposed <br> to "APPS-based law enforcement activities." <br> Defendants have explained that "[t]he APPS <br> program was funded with General Fund <br> monies until approximately 2011 (i.e., the <br> passage of SB 819)." |
| Evidence: GENT40; GENT011; <br> GENT076; GENT095-96; GENT098-99 |  |
| 79 | Evidence: GENT41 <br> The list of costs funded from the DROS <br> Fund but not referred to in section 28225 <br> also includes the cost of legislative <br> analysis done by the department. <br> Evidence: GENT076 |
| Disputed, but not material. The relevant <br> deposition testimony is: "So, if there's a <br> legislation that comes through, we have to <br> produce a bill analysis for both entities or <br> both bureau and the division. So, in the <br> Bureau of Firearms we have staff that would <br> work on that and analyze the impact to the <br> department as it relates to the Bureau of <br> Firearms and their work is paid for out of the <br> DROS account." |  |


| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
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| 80 | The list of costs funded from the DROS Fund but not referred to in section 28225 also includes the cost of certain high-level Bureau executives' entire salaries. <br> Evidence: AGROG000016 | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not support plaintiffs' characterization. <br> Evidence: AGROG000016; see also section 28225, subd. (b)(11) |
| 81 | The Bureau does not just perform the DROS Process (and the extent relevant, APPS-based law enforcement); it administers over thirty state mandated programs. <br> Evidence: GENT139-143 | Undisputed that " $[\mathrm{t}]$ he Bureau of Firearms provides oversight, enforcement, education, and regulation of California's firearms/dangerous weapon laws by conducting firearms eligibility background checks and administering over thirty different state-mandated firearms-related programs" <br> Evidence: GENT141 |
| 82 | Approximately $25 \%$ of Defendant Lindley's time as chief of the Bureau was spent working on matters related to APPS. <br> Evidence: GENT074A | Disputed, but not material. The cited document does not indicate this, but GENT094A shows that as of February 14, 2014 the estimate "on a monthly basis" was " 25 percent," give or take. <br> Evidence: GENT094A |
| 83 | The Department does not separately record expenses for non-APPS-based law enforcement activities and APPS-based law enforcement activities. <br> Evidence: GENT077 | Undisputed, but the relevant distinction drawn by plaintiffs' counsel during the deposition was between "the APPS list cases and the similar but not so defined other cases," as opposed to "non-APPS-based law enforcement activities and APPS-based law enforcement activities." <br> Evidence: GENT077 |
| 84 | Approximately 5\% of the "APPS Cases" handled by the Department concern individuals not identified via APPS. <br> Evidence: GENT071-72 | Undisputed, but the actual testimony is an estimate that " $95 \%$ of the case we work would be system generated cases." <br> Evidence: GENT071-72 |
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| No. | PLAINTIFFS' UNDISPUTED FACT | DEFENDANTS' RESPONSES |
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| 85 | Based on the Department's own data and <br> estimation, and assuming both kinds of <br> enforcement activities take the same time, <br> the amount spent on non-APPS-based law <br> enforcement activities by the Department <br> is somewhere between \$131,272.16 to <br> 262,859.04 (the total yearly salary for <br> approximately 2.84 special agents)- <br> depending on pay grade-not to mention <br> overtime and support staff (e.g., non- <br> sworn criminal identification specialists). | Disputed, but not material. Defendants do <br> not follow this mathematical calculation <br> devised by plaintiffs, which is argumentative. <br> Also, the cited documents do not cite these <br> figures. <br> Evidence: GENT154; GENT156 |
| 86 | Evidence: GENT154; GENT156 <br> Support staff do a large amount of <br> investigatory work prior to special agents <br> going into the field to contact people who <br> may be armed but legally prohibited from <br> possessing firearms. | Disputed, but not material. The actual <br> testimony is "[c]riminal Identification <br> Specialists, like we said, the ones that are up <br> here in Sacramento, they're the ones that <br> work the triggering events. The intelligence <br> specialists are oftentimes in the field offices, <br> and they assist the Agents in preparing cases <br> to go work. Once an individual is identified <br> as someone that we want to make contact <br> with, we still have a lot of followup to do <br> beforehand to ensure the safety of our <br> Agents, the public and the individual we're <br> going to be contacting, so that we know <br> As much about them as possible." |
| Evidence: GENT100 | Evidence: GENT100 |  |

Dated: June 30, 2017

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Respectfully Submitted,
Xavier Becerra
Attorney General of California Stepan A. Haytayan
Supervisifg Députy Attorney General


Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents

# DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL and U.S. Mail 

## Case Name: Gentry, David, et al. v. Kamala Harris, et al. No.: 34-2013-80001667

I declare:
I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business.

On June 30, 2017, I served the attached DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail. In addition, I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, in the internal mail system of the Office of the Attorney General, addressed as follows:

Scott Franklin
Michel \& Associates, P.C.
180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200
Long Beach, CA 90802
E-mail: SFranklin@michellawyers.com

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on June 30, 2017, at Sacramento, California.

Tracie L. Campbell
Declarant


Xavier Becerra
Attorney General of California
Stepan A. Haytayan
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
ANTHONY R. HAKL
Deputy Attorney General
State Bar No. 197335
1300 I Street, Suite 125
P.O. Box 944255

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
Telephone: (916) 322-9041
Fax: (916) 324-8835
E-mail: Anthony.Hakl@doj.ca.gov
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MID LAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in his official capacity as Director of the California Department of Justice Bureau of Firearms; BETTY T. YEE, in her official capacity as State Controller, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 34-2013-80001667
DECLARATION OF ANTHONY R. HAKL IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
ADJUDICATION OF THE FIFTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION

Date: $\quad$ August 4, 2017
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: 31
Judge: $\quad$ The Honorable Michael P. Kenny
Action Filed: October 16, 2013

## DECLARATION OF ANTHONY R. HAKL

1. I am a Deputy Attorney General for the Office of the Attorney General in the California Department of Justice located in Sacramento, California. I am the attorney of record for defendants in this action. I make this declaration in support of defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' motion for adjudication as to the fifth and ninth causes of action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration, and if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to them.
2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Defendants Attorney General Kamala Harris and Bureau of Firearms Chief Stephen Lindley's Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One);
3. Attached as Exhibits B through L are documents covering fiscal years 2013-2014 through 2003-2004, respectively. They are true and correct copies of the documents produced by defendants to plaintiffs in this litigation and the related federal court litigation regarding the DROS fee (i.e., Bauer v. Becerra). The documents provide a summary of funding, per fiscal year, for the Special Funds (including but not limited to the DROS Special Fund) that supported various Programs in the Bureau of Firearms and the Division of Criminal Justice Information Services. In addition, detailed budget reports are included to show where the funds were spent within each program.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Signed this 30th day of June, 2017, at Sacramento, California.

ANTHONY R.JHAKL

# DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL and U.S. Mail 

## Case Name: Gentry, David, et al. v. Kamala Harris, et al. No.: 34-2013-80001667

I declare:
I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business.

On June 30, 2017, I served the attached DECLARATION OF ANTHONY R. HAKL IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail. In addition, I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, in the internal mail system of the Office of the Attorney General, addressed as follows:

Scott Franklin
Michel \& Associates, P.C.
180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200
Long Beach, CA 90802
E-mail: SFranklin@michellawyers.com

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on June 30,2017, at Sacramento, California.

Tracie L. Campbell
Declarant


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Kamala D. Harris
Attorney General of California
Stepan A. Haytayan
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Anthony R. Hakl, State Bar No. 197335
Deputy Attorney General
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E-mail: Anthony.Hakl@doj.ca.gov
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents

# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER,
MARK MID LAM, JAMES BASS, and
CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.

KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, JOHN CHIANG, in his official capacity as State Controller, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 34-2013-80001667
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA HARRIS AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS CHIEF STEPHEN
LINDLEY'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)

Defendants and Respondents.

## PROPOUNDING PARTY:

RESPONDING PARTY:
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA HARRIS AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS CHIEF STEPHEN LINDLEY

ONE
RESPONDINGPARTY:

## PLAINTIFFS

SET NUMBER:

## RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES

## INTERROGATORY NO. I:

State CAL DOJ's (as used herein, "CAL DOJ" refers to the California Department of Justice, including the office of the Attorney General, and all employees and representatives of the California Department of Justice) best estimate as to the average PER TRANSACTION COST (as used herein, "PER TRANSACTION COST" refers to the average cost of performing a given transaction, including a.proportional share of overhead costs) to perform the tasks included in the DROS PROCESS (as used herein, "DROS PROCESS" refers to the background check process that occurs when a firearm purchase or transfer occurs in California; CAL DOJ's own usage of "DROS PROCESS" can be found at http://oag.ca.gov/firearms/pubfaqs) regarding the purchase of one handgun.

## RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. I:

Defendants object to the term "DROS PROCESS" as defined to the extent that Plaintiffs" definition does not comport with its reference to the Defendants' usage of that term on its public website at http://oag.ca.gov/firearms/pubfaqs. Defendants' use of the term "DROS PROCESS" on that website only refers to the "front-end" portion of a firearms purchase (i.e., where the purchaser visits a firearms dealer to purchase a firearm). Subject to and without waiving this objection, Defendants respond as follows:

Defendants currently do not have the personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to this interrogatory even after making a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information sought.

## INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

If CAL DOJ contends that, upon a reasonable and good faith effort, it cannot provide a response to Interrogatory No. 1, please describe, in detail, what barriers, be they financial, factual, or otherwise, prevent the response sought from being provided.

## RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

While defendants know the approximate number of DROS transactions actually processed per year, defendants are not aware of any calculation showing the total annual cost of the "DROS PROCESS" as defined by plaintiffs.

There are a number of barriers to even estimating this cost. For example, the criminal histories of firearms purchasers can fluctuate greatly from purchaser to purchaser. One purchaser may have no criminal history, in which event the approval of the purchase can happen quickly, whereas another purchaser may have an extensive criminal history, requiring considerable time and resources to review and assess.

Another example is that the number of DROS transactions to be processed can vary widely over time. Firearms purchasing activity can fluctuate considerably based on a variety of factors, such as the time of year (e.g., holiday season, hunting season) or even certain political events (e.g., elections).

Nevertheless, defendants in good faith continue to work with California Department of Justice administrative and program personal to make such an estimate. Defendants will supplement this interrogatory answer accordingly.

## INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

List every line item amount, by Object Code, Object Title, or Object Description, that when summed comprised the $\$ 9,204,449$ total for Actual Year-End Expenditures for Fiscal Year 2011/2012 for the Dealers' Record of Sale program (Unit Code 510).

## RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3 :

The amounts requested in this interrogatory are listed in the document attached hereto as Exhibit A. Also, note that the correct actual year-end expenditures for the year in question total \$9,292,915.84.

## INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

State the Actual Year-Erid Expenditures for Fiscal Year 2012/2013 for the Dealers' Record of Sale program (Unit Code 510).

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
$\$ 12,308,671.47$.

## INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

List every line item amount, by Object Code, Object Title, or Object Description, that when summed comprised the total for Actual Year-End Expenditures for Fiscal Year 2012/2013 for the Dealers' Record of Sale program (Unit Code 510).

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5:
The amounts requested in this interrogatory are listed in the document attached hereto as Exhibit B.

Dated: August 1, 2014
Respectfully Submitted,
Kamala D. Harris
Attorney General of California
Stepan A. Haytayan
Super/ising Dfeputy Attomey General


Deputy Attomey General
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
SA2013113332

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Exhibit A

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## Exhibit B

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| 568100 INFORMERS EVIDENCE | . 00 | 2,319.45 | . 00 | 7,933.91 | . 00 | 7,933.91 | . 00 |
| OIHER ITEMS OF EXPENSE | . 00 | 74,233.95 | 247,000.00 | 174,788.84 | 69,824.95 | 2,386.21 | 99.03 |



$249,841.51 \quad 970,307.69 \quad 13,693,531.00 \quad 12,308,671.47 \quad 669,243.00 \quad 715,616.53 \quad 94.77$
GRAND TOTAL

I, Stephen Lindley, declare
I am the Chief of the Bureau of Firearms of the Califomia Department of Justice. I have read DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA HARRIS AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS CHIEF STEPHEN INDLEY'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE). I know their contents and the same are true to my knowledge, information and belief,

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Verification was executed on August 52014 , at Sichansen, Califomia.


DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY OVERNIGHT COURIER
Case Name: Gentry, David, et al. v. Kamala Harris, et al.
No.: 34-2013-80001667
I declare:
I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter; my business address is: 1300 I Street, Suite 125, P.O. Box 944255, Sacramento, CA 94244-2550.

On August 1. 2014, I served the attached
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA HARRIS AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS CHIEF STEPHEN LINDLEY'S RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)

DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA HARRIS AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS CHIEF STEPHEN LINDLEY'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)

DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA HARRIS AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS CHIEF STEPHEN LINDLEY'S RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS (SET ONE)

## DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL KAMALA HARRIS AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS CHIEF STEPHEN LINDLEY'S RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (SET ONE)

DEFENDANT STATE CONTROLLER JOHN CHIANG'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)

## DEFENDANT STATE CONTROLLER JOHN CHIANG'S RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (SET ONE)

by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with the Golden State Overnight courier service, addressed as follows:
C.D. Michel

Glenn S. McRoberts
Sean A. Brady
Michel \& Associates, P.C.
180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200
Long Beach, CA 90802
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on August 1, 2014, at Sacramento, California.
Brenda Apodaca


Exhibit B

# DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund 

FY 2013/14

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures | DROS <br> Funding $\%$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 861 | Technology Support Bureau | $\$$ | $1,279,000$ | $\$$ | $1,279,000$ |
| 795 | DROS - Long Gun | $\$$ | 197,203 | $\$$ | 195,925 |
| 732 | Firearms Program - DROS | $\$$ | 316,892 | $\$$ | 233,746 |
| 700 | CJIS Facilities | $\$$ | 2,000 | $\$$ | 2,066 |

1/Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 784,185$ in statewide ProRata charges.










## DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund

FY 2013/14 BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures | FSE <br> Funding $\%$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 507 | Handgun Safety Certification | $\$$ | $3,465,043$ | $\$$ | $3,113,441$ | $1 /$ |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | $\$$ | 51,000 | $\$$ | 37,767 | $13 \%$ |
| FIREARMS TOTAL FSE FUNDING | $\$ .3,516,043$ | $\$$ | $3,151,208$ |  |  |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 193,375$ in statewide ProRata charges.



# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

| $\begin{gathered} \text { FY } 2013 / 14 \\ \text { BUREAU OF FIREARMS } \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code$509$ | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |  |
|  | Firearms Safety Account | \$ | 343,000 | \$ | 273,482 | 1/ | 87\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING | S | 343.000 | 5 | 273,482 |  |  |

1 Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 18,483$ in statewide ProRata charges.


Exhibit C

## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

FY 2012/13

## BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Cear-End <br> Expenditures | Funding $\%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End | DROS <br> Expenditures | Funding $\%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 507,497$ in statewide ProRata charges.











# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund 

| $\begin{gathered} \text { FY } 2012 / 13 \\ \text { BUREAU OF FIREARMS } \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual Year-End Expenditures | FSE <br> Funding \% |
| -507 | Handgum Safety Centification | \$-3,342,904 | \$ 3,123,873 | 100\% |
| 509 | Firearms Saity Account | \$ 50,546 | \$ 218,055 | 13\% |
| FIREARMS | TAL FSE FUNDING | \$ 3,393,450 | \$ 3,341,928 |  |

1 Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 164,566$ in statewide ProRata charges.



# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

| $\begin{gathered} \text { FY } 2012 / 13 \\ \text { BUREAU OF FIREARMS } \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code$509$ | Program Title <br> Firearms Safety Account | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | FSA. <br> Funding \% |  |
|  |  | \$ | 333,990 | \$ | 287,350 | 1/ | 87\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING |  | 333,990 | S | 287,350 |  |  |

1 Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 17,311$ in statewide ProRata charges.


Exhibit D

## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

FY 2011/12

## BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual <br> Year-End Expenditures |  |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 510 | Dealers Record of Sale | \$ | . $9,582,111$ | \$ | 9,204,449 |  | 100\% |
| 823 | Gun Show | \$ | 772,172 | \$ | 727,250 |  | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | DROS FUNDING | \$ | 10,354,283 | \$ | 9,931,699 |  |  |

## DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

Actual

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 861 | Technology Support Bureau | \$ | 1,145,000 | \$ | 1,159,376 | 5\% |
| 795 | DROS - Long Gun | \$ | 176,319 | \$ | 185,045 | 100\% |
| 732 | Firearms Program - DROS | \$ | 369,251 | \$ | 311,022 | 100\% |
| DCJIS TOTAL DROS FUNDING |  | \$ | 1,690,570 | \$ | 1,655,443 |  |
| DOJ TOTAL DROS FUNDING |  |  | 2,044,853 | \$ | 11,587,142 |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 473,151$ in statewide ProRata charges.

FY 2011 CHAPT 0000 FUND 0000000 CROSS-REEERENCE NC4 DATE 11/29/2012

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DEPARTMENT OE JUSTICE FINAL 11-12 BUDGET REPORT FOR JUNE - 2012 CLEARING ACCOUNTS

COMPONENT: DROS *5100
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## DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund

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| Unit Code | Program Title |  | propriation |  | Actual Acar-End enditures | FSE <br> Funding \% |
| 507 | Handgun Safety Certification | \$ | 3,331,603 | \$ | 3,205,614 | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | TAL FSE FUNDING | \$ | 3,331,603 | \$ | 3,205,614 |  |

1 Actual year-end expenditures include \$160,702 in statewide ProRata charges.


# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

## FY 2011/12 <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |
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|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | \$ | 337,367 | \$ | 306,370 | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING | \$ | 337,367 | \$ | 306,370 |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 15,926$ in statewide ProRata charges.

## EY 2011 CHAPT 0000 FUND 0000000 CROSS-REEERENCE NC3

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Exhibit E

## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

FY 2010/11
BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 510 | Dealers Record of Sale | \$ | 8,778,666 | \$ | 8,470,616 |  | 100\% |
| 823 | Gun Show | \$ | 547,644 | \$ | 559,714 |  | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | DROS FUNDING | \$ | 9,326,310 | \$ | 9,030,330 |  |  |

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 861 | Technology Support Bureau | \$ | 747,257 | \$ | 687,446 | 4\% |
| 795 | DROS - Long Gun | \$ | 165,164 | \$ | 165,776 | 100\% |
| 732 | Firearms Program - DROS | \$ | 381,202 | \$ | 367,347 | 100\% |
| 700 | CJIS Facilities \& Communications | \$ | 2,000 | \$ | 1,979 | 0.04\% |
| DCJIS TOTAL DROS FUNDING |  | \$ | 1,295,623 | \$ | 1,222,549 |  |
| DOJ TOTAL DROS FUNDING |  | \$ | 0,621,933 | \$ | 0,252,878 |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 491,886$ in statewide ProRata charges.

FY 2010 . CHAPT 0000 EUND 0000000 CROSS-REEERENCE NC4 DATE 11/29/2012

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| DEPARTMENTAL SERVICES | . 56 | 55,000.00 | 50,327.34 | 3,449.13 | 1,223.53 | 97.77 |
| OTHER ITEMS OF EXPENSE | . 00 | 30,000.00 | 30,205.47 | . 00 | 205,47- | 100.68 |
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## DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund

FY 2010/11
BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | FSE <br> Funding \% |
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| 507 | Handgun Safety Certification | \$ | 3,196,800 | \$ | 3,071,063 | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | TAL FSE FUNDING |  | 3,196,800 | \$ | 3,071,063 |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 118,741$ in statewide ProRata charges.

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## DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund

## FY 2010/11 <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |
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| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | \$ | 335,000 | \$ | 308,694 | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING | \$ | 335,000 | \$ | 308,694 |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 11,834$ in statewide ProRata charges. CROSS-REEERENCE NC3
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$10,153.68$
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605.12
$18,953.50$
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$9,484.74$
$11,834.00$
$29,875.35$


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## OPERATING EXP \& EQUIP GENERAL EXPENSE

TRAINING
FACILITIES OPERATION
CONSULTANT \& PROEESSIONAL SVCS-I
DEPARTMENTAL SERVICES
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
OTHER ITEMS OF EXPENSE


Exhibit F

## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

## FY 2009/10

BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 510 | Dealers Record of Sale | \$ | 8,696,016 | \$ | 8,054,470 |  | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | L DROS FUNDING | \$ | 8,696,016 | \$ | 8,054,470 |  |  |

## DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures | DROS <br> Funding \% |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 861 | Technology Support Bureau | $\$$ | 570,733 | $\$$ | 553,040 | $2 \%$ |
| 795 | DROS - Long Gun | $\$$ | 408,332 | $\$$ | 278,657 | $79 \%$ |
| 732 | Firearms Program - DROS | $\$$ | 218,000 | $\$$ | 254,556 | $98 \%$ |
| DCJIS TOTAL DROS FUNDING | $\$$ | $1,197,065$ | $\$$ | $1,086,253$ |  |  |
| DOJ TOTAL DROS FUNDING | $\$$ | $9,893,081$ | $\$$ | $9,140,722$ |  |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 276,613$ in statewide ProRata charges.
FY 2009 CHAPT 0000 EUND 0000000 CROSS-REFERENCE NC4.
PAGE 1






641,546.43

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GRAND TOTAL
FY 2009 2 95vd BUDGET REPORT FOR JUNE 2012
FOR
CLEARING ACCOUNTS $\rightarrow$
CROSS-REEERENCE P37

V aONd DEFERENCE P42
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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CROSS-REFERENCE P42

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\text { FINAI 09-10 BUDGET } \underset{\text { FOR }}{\text { REPRT FOR }}
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$$ CLEARING ACCOUNTS

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## DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund

| FY 2009/10 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | propriation |  | Actual ear-End enditures |  | FSE <br> Funding \% |
| 507 | Handgun Safety Certification | \$ | 3,247,470 | \$ | 3,006,131 |  | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | TAL FSE FUNDING | \$ | 3,247,470 | \$ | 3,006,131 |  |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 75,483$ in statewide ProRata charges.
CROSS－REFERENCE NC2
PAGE $\quad 1$

FUND 0000000
EY 2009 CHAPT 0000
DATE $12 / 17 / 2012$
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## PROGRAM $:$ IAN ENFORCEMENT ELEMENT $:$ BUREAU OF EIREARMS

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FINAL 09－10 BUDGET REPORT FOR
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$3,247,470.00$
GRAND TOTAL

# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

| FY 2009/10 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BUREAU OF FIREARMS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | priation |  | Actual ar-End nditures |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | \$ | 331,000 | \$ | 282,825 | 1 | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING | \$ | 331,000 | \$ | 282,825 |  |  |

1 Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 7,624$ in statewide ProRata charges.

Exhibit G

# DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund 

| FY 2008/09 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BUREAU OF FIREARMS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | propriation |  | Actual ear-End enditures |  | DROS Funding \% |
| 510 | Dealers Record of Sale | \$ | 9,615,237 | \$ | 9,276,312 |  | 99.9\% |
| FIREARMS | L DROS FUNDING | \$ | 9,615,237 | \$ | 9,276,312 |  |  |

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES.

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures | DROS |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |  | Funding $\%$ |

1 Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 322,175$ in statewide ProRata charges.
CROSS-REEERENCE NC4



 FY 2008
 OPERATING EXP \& EQUIP
$=======z=z=z=$ 2,857,000.00
CROSS-REFERENCE P24
$\varepsilon$ आHd

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| PERSONAL SERVICES | 303,960.00 | 188,142.95 | . 00 | 115,817.05 | 61.89 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $===============$ | $==$ | $=\stackrel{=}{=}$ | = | $===$ |  |
| OPERATING EXP \&-EQUIP |  |  |  |  |  |
| GENERAL EXPENSE | 1,000.00 | . 00 | . 00 | 1,000.00 | . 00 |
| PRINTING | 621.00 | . 00 | . 00 | 621.00 | . 00 |
| TRAVEL IN-STATE | 4,000.00 | . 00 | .00 | 4,000.00 | . 00 |
| CONSULTANT \& PROEESSIONAL SVCS-IN | . 00 | 2,957.16 | . 00 | 2,957.16- | . 00 |
| DEPARTMENTAL SERVICES | 10,000.00 | 8,652.62 | . .00 | 1,347.38 | 86.52 |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & ==== \\ & 15,621.00 \end{aligned}$ | 11,609.78 | $.00$ | $\begin{aligned} & ==== \\ & 4,011.22 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & === \\ & 74.32 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  | . |  |  |  |
| GRAND TOTAL | 319,581.00 | 199,752.73 | . 00 | 119,828.27 | 62.50 |

CROSS-REEERENCE P42


## DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund

| FY 2008/09 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | propriation |  | Actual Year-End penditures |  | FSE <br> Funding \% |
| 507 | Handgun Safety Certification | \$ | 3,183,293 | \$ | 3,173,249 | 11 | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | TAL FSE FUNDING | \$ | 3,183,293 | \$ | 3,173,249 |  |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 85,862$ in statewide ProRata charges.

FY 2008 CHAPT 0000 FUND 0000000 CROSS-REFERENCE NC2 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INAL 08-09 BUDGEIT REPORT FOR JUNE 2011 BUDGET REPORT FOR
FOR
CLEARING ACCOUNTS

COMPONENT: BASIC FIREARMS SFTY*5070



## PERSONAL SERVICES

PROGRAM : IAN ENFORCEMENT
ELEMENT $:$ BUREAU OE EIREARMS






# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

|  | FY 2008/09 <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS |  |  |  |  |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | opriation |  | ctual <br> ar-End nditures |  |  |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | \$ | 330,982 | \$ | 219,412 |  | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING | \$ | 330,982 | \$ | 219,412 |  |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include \$9,201 in statewide ProRata charges.
PAGE 2
~ 昆易

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| 17.52 |
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Exhibit H

## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

| FY 2007/08 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BUREAU OF FIREARMS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | propriation |  | Actual Year-End penditures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| 510 | Dealers Record of Sale | \$ | 8,145,004 | \$ | 7,521,381 | 11 | 97.31\% |
| FIREARMS | DROS FUNDING | \$ | 8,145,004 | \$ | 7,521,381 |  |  |

## DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | Program Title |  |  |  | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | Funding \% |
| :---: |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 270,879$ in statewide ProRata charges.
CROSS－REFERENCE NC4
DEPARTMENT OE JUSTICE
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## $\begin{array}{r}\text { OUTSTANDING } \\ \text { ENCTMMBRANCES } \\ \hline\end{array}$


REPORT OF EXPENDITURES AS OF JUN 30， 2010 CLEARING ACCOUNTS
COMPONENT：DROS＊5100

| $\mathrm{Y}-\mathrm{T}-\mathrm{D}$ <br> EXPENDITURES |
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| OPERATING EXP \＆EQUIP |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| general exprnse | ． 00 | 335，000．00 | 99，530．00 | 6，243．44 | 229，226．56 | 31.57 |
| RRINTING | ． 00 | 51，000．00 | 71，251．74 | 841.92 | 21，093．66－ | 141.36 |
| COMMINNICATIONS | ． 00 | 264，000．00 | 105，500．15 | 19，396．86 | 139，102．99 | 47.30 |
| postage | ． 00 | 1，000．00 | 1，133．60 | ． 00 | 133．60－ | 113.36 |
| INSURANCE | ． 00 | ． 00 | 5，208．00 | ． 00 | 5，208．00－ | ． 00 |
| TRAVEL：IN－STATE | ． 00 | 102，000．00 | 84，581．10 | 6，542．00 | 10，876．90 | 89.33 |
| TRAVEL：OUT－OF－STATE | ． 00 | 30，000．00 | 1，464．43 | ． 00 | 28，535．57 | 4.88 |
| TRAINING | ． 00 | 12，000．00 | 1，329．00 | ． 00 | 10，671．00 | 11.07 |
| EACILITIES OPERATION | ． 00 | 477，000．00 | 506，659．34 | 3，154．00 | 32，813．34－ | 106.87 |
| Utilitites | ． 00 | ． 00 | 3，657．64 | 1，960．00 | 5，617．64－ | ． 00 |
| CONSULT \＆PROF SER－INT | ． 00 | 831，000．00 | 33，407．89 | 2，251．00 | 795，341．11 | 4.29 |
| CONSULT \＆PROF SER－EXT | ． 00 | ． 00 | 793，907．80 | 54.93 | 793，962．73－ | ． 00 |
| DEPARTMENTAL SERVICES | ． 00 | 588，000．00 | 500，636．57 | 24，168．31 | 63，195．12 | 89.25 |
| INEORMATION TECHNOLOGY | ． 00 | 27，000．00 | 16，787．39 | 332.17 | 9，880．44 | 63.40 |
| CENTRAL ADMIN SERVICES | ． 00 | 271，000．00 | 270，879．00 | ． 00 | 121.00 | 99.95 |
| EQUIPMENT | ． 00 |  | 37，824．50－ | ． 00 | 37，824．50 | ． 00 |
| OTHER ITEMS OF EXPENSE | ． 00 | 233，000．00 | 50，478．19 | 3，030．30 | 179，491．51 | 22.96 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GRAND TOTAL | ． 00 | 8，369，881．00 | 7，625，068．91 | 103，970．93 | 640，841．16 | 92.34 |

## PROGRAM ELEMENT ：LAW ENFORCEMENI BUREAU OF FIREARMS


PAGE 697我号
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REPORT OF EXPENDITURES AS OF JUN 30， 2010
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FY 2007 CHAPT 0000 FUND 0000000 - CROSS-REFERENCE P21


FY 2007 CHAPT 0000 FUND 0000000
CROSS-REEERENCE P611

> DEPARTMENT OE JUSTICE
REPORT OF EXPENDITURES AS OF JUN 30, 2010 CLEARING ACCOUNTS

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## DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special

 Fund| FY 2007/08 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | propriation |  | Actual ear-End penditures |  | FSE <br> Funding \% |
| 507 | Handgun Safety Certification | \$ | 3,114,118 | \$ | 2,864,129 | 1 | 100.00\% |
| FIREARMS | TAL FSE FUNDING | \$ | 3,114,118 | \$ | 2,864,129 |  |  |

$1 /$ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 100,268$ in statewide ProRata charges.

FY 2007 CHAPT 0000 FUND 0000000 CROSS-REEERENCE NC2
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT OF EXPENDITURES AS OF JUN 30,2010 CLEARING ACCOUNTS

COMPONENT: BASIC FTREARMS SFTY $\star 5070$ Y-T-D

714,842


| CURRENT |
| :---: |
| PERIOD EXPENSE |


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3,114,118.00

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( 17, .00 3,114.118.

GRAND TOTAL


## EXHIBIT B

# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

| FY 2007/08 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BUREAU OF FIREARMS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | opriation |  | Actual <br> ar-End <br> nditures |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | \$ | 330,728 | \$ | 330,823 | 11 | 100.00\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING | \$ | 330,728 | \$ | 330,823 |  |  |

1 Actual year-end expenditures include \$9,973 in statewide ProRata charges.

| PROGRAM : LAW ENFORCEMENT <br> ELEMENT : BUREAU OF FIREARMS | COMPONENT: FIREARMS SFTY ACCT *5090 |  |  | ; |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| DESCRIPTION | CURRENT <br> PERIOD EXPENSE | WORKING APPROPRTATTON | $Y-T-D$ <br> EXPENDTTURES | OUTSTANDING ENCIMBRANCES | BALANCE | $\begin{aligned} & \text { PCT } \\ & \text { USED } \end{aligned}$ |
| PERSONAL SERVICES |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CIVIL SERVICE--PERMANENT | . 00 | 32,111.00 | 19,875.34 | . 00 | 12,235.66 | 61.89 |
| OVERTIME | . 00 | 159, 000.00 | 132,646.84 | 11,127.00 | 15,226.16 | 90.42 |
| STAFE BENEFITS-PERMANENT | .. 00 | - 83,617.00 | 9,773.30 | . 00 | 73,843.70 | 11.68 |
| PERSONAL SERVICES | . 00 | 274,728.00 | 162,295.48 | 11,127.00 | 101,305.52 | 63.12 |
| OPERATING EXP \& EQUIP |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GENERAL EXPENSE | . 00 | 11,000.00 | 63,119.25 | 3,251.07 | 55,370.32- | 603.36 |
| PRINTING | . 00 | 1,000.00 | 14,588.60 | 1,191.43 | 14,780.03- | 578.00 |
| COMMNICATIONS | . 00 | 1,000:00 | 33,536.33 | 6, 686.18 | 39,222.51- | 22.25 |
| postage | . 00 |  | 2,488.33 | 139.00 | 2,627.33- | . 00 |
| TRAVEL: IN-STATE | . 00 | . 00 | 1,763.12 | . 00 | 1,763.12- | . 00 |
| TRAVEL: OUT-OF-STATE | . 00 | 9,000.00 | 613.70 | . 00 | 8,386.30 | 6.81 |
| TRAINING | . 00 | 1,000.00 | 2,963.00 | . 00 | 1,963.00- | 296.30 |
| EACILITTES OPERATION | . 00 | 6,000.00 | 15,004.53 | 4,094.65 | 13,099.18- | 318.31 |
| CONSULT \& PROF SER - INT | . 00 |  | 2,715.03 | 502.00 | 3,217.03-- | . 00 |
| DEPARTMENTAL SERVICES | . 00 | 12,000.00 | 31,502.70- | 493.23 | 43,009.47 | 258.41 |
| INEORMATION TECHNOLOGY | . 00 | . 0.00 | 601.46 | . 00 | $601.46-$ | . 00 |
| CENTRAL ADMIN SERVICES | . 00 | 10,000.00 | 9,973.00 | . 00 | 27.00 | 99.73 |
| OTHER ITEMS OF EXPENSE | . 00 | 5,000.00 | 24,543.24 | 635.57 | 20,178.81- | 503.57 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GRAND TOTAL | . 00 | 330,728:00 | 302,702.37 | 28,120.13 | $94.50-$ | 100.02 |

Exhibit I

## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

FY 2006/07
BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title |  |  |  | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | DROS |
| :---: |
| Funding $\%$ |

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | Program Tiite | Appropriation |  | Actual <br> Year-End Expenditures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 861 | Technology Support Bureau | \$ | 847,000 | \$ | 805,088 | 1.55\% |
| 795 | DROS - Long Gun | \$ | 190,557 | \$ | 180,761 | 100.00\% |
| 732 | Firearms Program - DROS | \$ | 474,169 |  |  | 100.00\% |
| 700 | CJIS Facilities \& Communications | \$ | 50,000 | \$ | 45,723 | 1.77\% |
| 705 | CJIS Executive Office | 8 | 213,000 | S | 194,911 | 5.64\% |
| DCJIS TOT | L DROS FUNDING | S | 1,774,726 | S | 1,226,484 |  |
| DOJTOTAL | DROS FUNDING | \$ | 9,088,217 | \$ | 7,878,869 |  |

$1 /$ Actual year-end expendifures include $\$ 258,702$ in stetewide ProRata charges.

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PACE 893 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT OF EXRENDTIUNES AS OR JUN 30,2007 DEALERS RECOOD OE SALE ACT
COMPCNENT: CJTS-EXECUIIVE:
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FACE 893

# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special 

Fund

FY 2006/07

## BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures |  | FSE <br> Funding \% |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 507 | Handgun Safety Cerification | s | 3,033,341 |  |  |  | 100.00\% |
| FIREARMS | TAL FSE FUNDING | S | 3,033,341 | \$ | 2,960,008 |  |  |

$1 /$ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 109,541$ in statewide ProRata charges.

CROSS-RELERLENCR R2

FY 2006 CHAPT 0047 FUND 1008000
FY 2006 CHAPT 0047
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## DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund

FY 2006/07
BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title |  |  | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | Funding \% |
| :---: |

$1 /$ Actual yearend expenditures include $\$ 10,290$ in statewide ProRata charges.
FY 2006 CUAFP 0047 FUND 0032000 CROSG-heribrencer r3


Exhibit J

# DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund 

## FY 2005/06 <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title |  | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End | DROS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Expenditures |  |  |  |  |  |$\quad$ Funding \%

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 861 | Technology Suppori Bureau | \$ | 805,000 | S | 897,266 | 1.66\% |
| 795 | DROS - Long Gun | \$ | 179,000 | S | 193,395 | 100.00\% |
| 732 | Firearms Program - DROS | \$ | 452,936 | S | 390,481 | 100.00\% |
| 700 | CJIS Facilities \& Communications | S | 48,000 | S | 44.242 | 1.77\% |
| 705 | CJIS Executive Office | \$ | 200,000 | \$ | 159,552 | 5.63\% |
| DCJIS TOTAL DROS FUNDING |  | S | 1,684,936 | s | 1,684,936 |  |
| DOJ TOTAL DROS FUNDING |  | \$ | 8,632,752 | \$ | 8,632,752 |  |

# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special 

## Fund

## FY 2005/06 <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures | FSE <br> Funding $\%$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 507 | Handgun Safety Cerification | $\$$ | $2,962,340$ | $\$$ | $2,955,530$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| FIREARMS TOTAL FSE FUNDING | $\$$. | $2,962,340$ | $\$$ | $2,955,530$ |  |  |

[^10]DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund

FY 2005/06
BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures | FSA <br> Funding \% |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | $\$$ | 323,000 | $\$$ | 323,000 | $100.00 \%$ |
| FIREARMS TOTAL FSA FUNDING | $\$$ | 323,000 | $\$$ | 323,000 |  |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 10,710$ in statewide Propata charges.

Exhibit K

## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

## FY $2004 / 05$ <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures | DROS <br> Funding $\%$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 510 | Dealers Record of Sale | $\$$ | $6,955,300$ | $\$ 6,615,900$ | $93.26 \%$ |
| FIREARMS TOTAL DROS FUNDING | $\$$ | $6,955,300$ | $\$ 6,615,900$ |  |  |

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | - Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| 795 | DROS - Long Gun. | \$ | 177,000 |  |  | \$ | 201,003 | 100.00\% |
| 732 | Firearms Program - DROS | \$ | 448,000 | \$ | 392,307 | 85.17\% |
| 700 | CJIS Facilities \& Communications | \$ | 51,000 | \$ | 49,270 | 1.83\% |
| 705 | CJIS Executive Oifice | \$ | 198,000 | S | 187,327 | 5.62\% |
| DCJIS TOT | L DROS FUNDING | S | 1,658,000 | \$ | 1,658,000 |  |
| DOJTOTAL | ROS FUNDING | \$ | 8,613,300 | S | 8,273,900 |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 350,628$ in stetewide ProRata charges.

# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special 

 Fund
## FY 2004/05 <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures | FSE <br> Funding $\%$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 507 | Handgun Saitety Certification | $\$$ | $2,924,000$ | $\$ .2,831,561$ | $100.00 \%$ |
| FIREARMS TOTAL FSE FUNDING | $\$$ | $2,924,000$ | $\$$ | $2,831,561$ |  |

$1 /$ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 211,037$ in stetewide ProRate charges.

# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

| $\text { FY } 2004 / 05$ <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | opriation |  | ctual <br> r-End |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |
| 861 | Hawkins Data Center | S | 2.000 | E | nditures <br> 2.000 |  |  |
| 509 | Firearms Safeiy Account | S | 317,000 | S | 317,000 | \# | 100.00\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING | S | 319,000 | \$ | 319.000 |  |  |

$1 /$ Actual year-end expenditures indude $\$ 12,928$ in stetewide FroRata charges.

Exhibit L

## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

## FY 2003/04 <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title |  |  | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End | DROS <br> Expenditures |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Funding $\%$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES.

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expendifures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 861 | Technology Suppori Bureau | S | 807,000 | E |  |  |
| 795 | DROS - Long Gun | S | 194,000 | \$ | 213,189. | 100.00\% |
| 732 | Firearms Program - DROS |  | 477,000. | \$ | 436,049 | 85.95\% |
| 700 | CJIS Facilities \& Communications | \$ | 50,000 | \$ | 48,813 | 1.83\% |
| 705 | CJIS Executive Office | \$ | 206,000 | \$ | 190,400 | 6.09\% |
| DCJIS TOT | L DROS FUNDING | S | 1,734,000 | \$ | 1,734,000 |  |
| DOJ TOTA | DROS FUNDING | \$ | 8,986,000 | \$ | 8,196,448 |  |

# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special 

 Fund
## FY 2003/04 <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Cods | Program Titie | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | FSE <br> Funding \% |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 507 | Handgun Safety Cerification | \$ | 2,709,000 |  |  |  |  |
| FIREARMS | TAL FSE FUNDING |  | 2,709,000 |  | 2,473,692 |  |  |

$1 /$ Actul year-end expenditures include S17,312 in stetewide ProRata cherges.

# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

| FY $2003 / 04$BUREAU OF FIREARMS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code | Program Tite |  | opriation |  | Actual <br> ar-End <br> nditures |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |
| 861 | Hawkins Data Center | \$ | 2,000 | \$ | 2,000 |  | 0.005\% |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | 8 | 318,000 | \$ | $\cdot 318,000$ | 1 | 100.00\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING | Sฺ | 320,000 | \$ | 320,000 |  |  |

1 / Actual year-end expenditures include 916,450 in statewide ProRata cherges.
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Scott M. Franklin - S.B.N. 240254
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Long Beach, CA 90802
Telephone: (562) 216-4444
Facsimile: (562) 216-4445
Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners


SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in His Official
Capacity as Attorney General For the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, BETTY YEE, in Her Official Capacity as State Controller, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 34-2013-80001667
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION OF FIFTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION

Date: $\quad$ August 4, 2017
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 31
Judge: Hon. Michael P. Kenny
Action filed: 10/16/13

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I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE MET ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR A WRIT OF MANDATE
A. The Department Claims No Ministerial Duty Exists-Ignoring the Mandatory Nature of the Extensive Limitations Specified in Section 28225-Rather than Admit Its Conduct Violated the Duty and Was Also an Abuse of Discretion.

The Opposition relies on a single case to support Defendants' claim that section $28225^{1}$ does not create ministerial duty: Cal. Pub. Records Research, Inc. v. Cnty. of Yolo, 4 Cal. App. 5th 150, 174 (2016). (Defs. Opp. at 5:14-8:4.) Plaintiffs discussed that case, and the similar case Cal. Pub. Records Research, Inc. v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 246 Cal. App. 4th 1432 (2016), in their recently filed Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication. (Plfs. Opp. at 12:1826 \& n.5.) Plaintiffs' Opposition explained the parallels, and differences, between the Cal. Pub. cases and the matter before the Court. Defendants, however, fail to address the patently relevant distinction that makes the Cal. Pub. cases insufficient to support Defendants' claims.

Defendants claim that section 28225 and Government Code section 27366 (the statute primarily at issue in the Cal. Pub. cases) include "very similar fee setting framework[s,]" i.e., Defendants claim "section 28225 is akin to the statute in California Public Records Research." (Defs.' Opp. at 6:12-17, 7:9.) This claim is without merit. The grant of authority in Government Code section 27366, which concerns setting and charging fees for copying public records, is broad and simple, expressed in a single sentence. ${ }^{2}$ Section 28225 , in stark contrast, has multiple subsections, includes eleven specifically described cost categories, and even provides an additional subsection to specify that, inter alia, the statutorily mandated cost estimates to be made by the California Department of Justice ("Department") must be "reasonable." Penal Code $\S 28225$. The level of detail provided by the legislature in section 28225 indicates the legislature was very concerned about setting forth the method used to set the Dealers' Record of Sale ("DROS") fee ("Fee"). (See also Plfs.' Opp. § II.B.1.iii.) Even a cursory review shows that section 28225 and Government Code section 27366 are not "very similar fee setting framework [s,]" and that the parallel Defendants attempt to draw is illusory.

[^11]Further, Defendants fail to appreciate how their citation to Cal. Pub. (Cnty. of Yolo) actually supports Plaintiffs' interpretation of that case and how it applies here. That is, as Defendants note, Cal. Pub. (Cnty. of Yolo) recognizes that the relevant statutes "require the Board to charge and set copy fees[.]" (Defs.' Opp. at 6:17-7:5 [italics added].) Therefore, even though the Cal. Pub. (Cnty. of Yolo) court found that the actual setting of copy fees was a discretionary activity (Cal. Pub. (Cnty. of Yolo), 4 Cal. App. 5th at 179), it still recognized that the overarching duty to set and charge copy fees was statutorily required, i.e., ministerial. Cnty. of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal. App. 4th 643, 653 (2013) ("A ministerial duty is one which is required by statute."). The Cal. Pub. (Cnty. of Stanislaus) court reached the same conclusion, holding that the relevant law: "grants a board of supervisors some discretionary authority when setting copying fees . . . limited by the phrase 'direct and indirect costs' [found in Government Code section 27366.]" Cal. Pub. v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 246 Cal. App. 4th at 1454 (2016),

That a ministerial duty can include discretionary aspects is not a revolutionary legal concept. In 1871 the California Supreme Court recognized the "large class of cases in which an inferior tribunal acts in a twofold capacity[;]" i.e., acts where both ministerial and discretionary elements are present. Tilden v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Sacramento Cnty., 41 Cal. 68, 76 (1871). And since then, the courts have consistently recognized that " $[t] 0$ the extent that [a duty's] performance is unqualifiedly required, it is not discretionary, even though the manner of its performance may be discretionary." ${ }^{3}$ Because the Court would have to disregard multiple provisions in section 28225 to hold that section 28225 does not include a ministerial duty, the Court should ignore Defendants' strained interpretation. Tuolumne Jobs \& Small Bus. All. v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. 4th 1029, 1038 (2014) ("courts should give meaning to every word of a statute and should avoid constructions that would render any word or provision surplusage").

[^12]
## 1. Defendants provide no substantive response in support of the Macro Review Process, the use of which exceeds any discretion the Department has under section 28225.

Defendants claim that " $[t]$ he requirements for writ of mandate are well known[, including that] the petitioner must demonstrate the public official or entity had a ministerial duty to perform[.]" (Defs.' Opp. at 5:15-20.) This claim is wrong; Cal. Pub. (Cnty. of Yolo) plainly states that mandamus is also available "to correct the exercise of discretionary legislative power . . where the action amounts to an abuse of discretion[.]" Cal. Pub. (Cnty. of Yolo), 4 Cal. App. 5th at 177. The Department's decision to set the DROS Fee based on a calculation that does not include any of the individual statutorily required cost estimations (section 28225(c)) is an abuse of discretion that is subject to mandamus relief even if section 28225 does not create a mandatory duty per se. Id.; (cf. Plfs.' Mot. § B at n. 7 and accompanying text.).

In Section III.B.2.a.i-ii. of Plaintiffs' Motion, Plaintiffs detail the process the Department uses to set the DROS Fee, i.e., the Macro Review Process, and how it is not only prone to obfuscating overspending in legitimate areas of spending, but that it also expressly considers costs that are not authorized under section 28225. In short, Plaintiffs allege the Department is exceeding the scope of authority granted in section 28225 by using the Macro Review Process. Defendants provide no substantive argument in response; they only dispute facts that, pursuant to Defendants' discovery responses, should have been undisputed. ${ }^{4}$ Regardless, this omission is telling, and confirms that Defendants cannot provide a rational explanation as to how the Macro Review Process comports with the requirements of section 28225. In light of the foregoing, the Court should grant a writ ordering the Department to perform a review-based on the specific requirements stated in section 28225 -of the amount currently being charged for the DROS Fee. //1

[^13]REPLY ISO PLAINTIFFS' MOT. FOR ADJ. RE: 5TH \& 9TH CAUSES OF ACTION

## 2. The Department should not be allowed to rely on ambiguities, latent or otherwise, that it knowingly helped create.

As described in Section II.C. of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Adjudication, Senate Bill ("SB") 819 (Leno, 2011) was revised, with the Department's involvement, specifically to make it clear that SB 819's addition of the word "possession" to section 28225 was a narrow amendment-a fact Defendants now unflinchingly ignore. In Section I.A. of Defendants' Opposition, Defendants again try to convince the Court that vague codified language-language that the Department surely helped draft-should be given a broad interpretation notwithstanding a clear intent that the relevant provision be interpreted narrowly.

Specifically, in an attempt to support Defendants' claim that discretion "to consider a wide range of costs in setting the DROS fee" negates the mandatory aspects of how that fee shall be set, Defendants make the following statement: "[S]ubdivision (b)(11) perhaps illustrates this point the best, considering its broad language encompassing 'costs associated with funding Department of Justice firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale, purchase, possession, loan, or transfer of firearms." (Defs.' Opp. at 7:14-19.) To understand why the quoted provision is not as broad as Defendants claim, one must look at two previous bills, Assembly Bill ("AB") 2080 (2002, Steinberg) and AB 161 (Steinberg, 2003).

## a. AB 2080 allows certain licensing-related costs to be funded out of the DROS Fund, though not from Fee money.

AB 2080, the Firearms Trafficking Prevention Act of 2002 (2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 909, § 1, provided, inter alia, that money in the DROS Special Account of the General Fund ("DROS Fund") could be appropriated for a new purpose: "to offset the costs incurred for the verification of [certain] licensure provisions[.]" Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2080 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) 2002 Cal.Stat. 909 (concerning change in former section 12076 (g) identified at 2002 Cal . Stat. 909 § 2). Though AB 2080 resulted in the revision of former section 12076(g) (now section 28235), AB 2080 did not modify former section 12076(e) (now located at section 28225(a)-(c)), which provided how the Fee was to be set. This distinction was seized upon by then-Senator Bill Morrow, who asked the Legislative Counsel of California ("Legislative Counsel") if AB 2080
actually authorized Fee money-as opposed to money in the DROS Fund from other sources-to be spent on the relevant licensure provisions. (Supplemental Declaration of Scott M. Franklin in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion ["Sup. Franklin Decl."] at Ex. 1.)

Legislative Counsel found that AB 2080's amendment of former section 12076(g) did allow the Department to use the DROS Fund money for the relevant licensing costs, but that $A B$ 2080 did not amend former 12076(e) (now 28225(b)). (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, Legislative Counsel determined that AB 2080 did not modify the way the Fee was set or spent, so AB 2080's new authority only applied to money in the DROS Fund that was not obtained via the Fee. (Id. at 5.)

## b. The Department tried to get unprecedented DROS Fund spending "flexibility" via $A B$ 161, but it eventually conceded $A B 161$ 's limits.

In response to the Legislative Counsel's determinations discussed above, the Department sponsored AB 161 (Steinberg, 2003), seeking to have the following additional cost category added to the list that is now located at section 28225 (b): "the costs associated with funding Department of Justice firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale, purchase, loan, or transfer of firearms pursuant to this chapter." In support of the bill, the Department expressed its position thusly:

Unfortunately, because of a recent legislative counsel opinion, the Department of Justice feels strongly that clarification of enforcement activity and the use of the DROS account to fund it is of extreme importance. At issue is whether or not the DROS fee (which makes up more than $80 \%$ of the DROS Fund) can be used to fund DOJ enforcement of the gun laws.
(Sup. Franklin Decl. at p. 7 of Ex. 2.) The Senate Public Safety Commission ("Public Safety"), however, saw through the proposed "clarification[.]" Public Safety noted that AB 161 was an attempt to use the ambiguity in AB 2080 to drastically increase what the Department could use Fee money for. (Id. at 9-10.)

In response, the Department claimed that AB 161 would not expand the use of Fee money, but clarify how it could be used, asserting that AB 161 would "not authorize DOJ to spend DROS fees for purposes other than what the Legislature has already approved through Budget Act appropriations" and two other bills in the 2003-04 Budget Bill that the legislature planned to fund from the DROS Fund. Id. at 10. Further, the Department's post-AB 161, pre-litigation
interpretation of the subsection added via AB 161 removes any doubt as to the narrow scope of that subsection. In 2010, when the Department published a (never adopted) proposed regulation that would have reduced the Fee from $\$ 19$ to $\$ 15$, the Department made the following pertinent statement in response to a formal comment on that rulemaking: "The Department is not authorized to use DROS funds . . . to notify new gun buyers of their duties and responsibilities" in the formal comment. (Declaration of Scott M. Franklin in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion ["Franklin Decl."], at AGRFP00178 in Ex. 28.) That the Department recognized there was no authority to fund this activity out of the DROS fund even though the activity seems to be a "firearms-related regulatory . . activit[y] related to the sale . . . of firearms" is strong evidence that AB 161 was not intended to address "a wide range of costs[.]"

At least in the case of AB 161 and SB 819, it is clear that the Department initially sought to drastically increase its access to the DROS Fund (and Fee money specifically), but ultimately conceded that the relevant bills, if enacted, would provide a funding source for much narrower purposes. It is disconcerting to think that the Department has a practice interpreting Departmentsponsored legislation in one manner prior to adoption, and a completely contrary manner after the legislation becomes law. As the California Supreme Court stated in Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal . 4th 1, 7 (1998), " $[t]$ he degree of respect accorded the agency's interpretation is not susceptible of precise formulation, . . . but is situational[, e.g.,] a vacillating position . . . is entitled to no deference." (Quotation marks and brackets omitted, italics added). Nonetheless, if the Court grants any deference to the Department's interpretations of SB 819 or AB 161, it should be granted as to the interpretations the Department publicly offered at the time those bills were being debated, and not the Department's current claims, which lack "the appearance of impartiality necessary to justify any reliance by the [C]ourt." Carmona v. Div. of Indus. Safety, 13 Cal. 3d 303, 312 (1975).

## B. Plaintiffs' Beneficial Right Is Obvious Here, but to (Again) Sidestep an Admission Detrimental to their case, Defendants Pretend Otherwise.

Defendants first appear to be making a hyper-technical claim that "plaintiffs have not even attempted to articulate what their beneficial right must be[,]" and thus, Plaintiffs have supposedly
failed to meet the "beneficial right" element required for writ relief. (Defs.' Opp. 8:5-9:2). If this argument is based on the fact that the First Amended Complaint does not literally state "Plaintiffs have a beneficial right to not be charged the DROS Fee in an unauthorized amount" or something similar, such omission is surely immaterial and without legal effect, ${ }^{5}$ as the Department clearly understands the gravamen of Plaintiffs' claims and the rights implicated thereby, and the Department has never attempted to dispute that the individual plaintiffs have paid the DROS Fee and that they expect to pay it in the future.

Defendants' substantive argument fairs no better. They argue, somewhat obliquely, that Plaintiffs' claim is based on "a general interest in having the laws of the State upheld[,]" an interest "shared by the public at large" and therefore, that "broad interest does not amount to a beneficial right." (Defs.' Opp. at 8:22-24). This is a false premise, one that cannot be reasonably made where the relevant complaint specifically identifies the individual plaintiffs as Fee payers who, inter alia, pray "[f]or a peremptory writ of mandate ordering . . . Defendants . . . to review the DROS Fee as currently imposed to determine whether the amount is "no more than is necessary[.]" (First Am. Compl. at p. 25:7-10.) Nonetheless, by wrongly characterizing Plaintiffs' right, the Department can then attack that straw man with what is actually inapplicable case law.

For example, Defendants cite Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1254 (2006), for the proposition that "interests 'pertain[ing] to the effective operation of government and the rights of the public, not to specific interests or rights of [the petitioners] individually,' are not beneficial interests[.]" (Defs.' Opp. at 8:24-26.) In that case, the Court expressly found that the plaintiffs' allegations therein primarily concerned how late-night city council meetings were "a subversion of the public's right to be heard[,]" a right that was not specific to the plaintiffs, who were city councilmembers. Id. at 1254. Importantly, Holbrook specially notes that if the plaintiffs there "[w]ere subject to particular liabilities by virtue of their membership on the City Council, the beneficial interest analysis might well be different." Id. at n.5. Thus, Holbrook is legally distinguishable from the instant case because the Holbrook

[^14]REPLY ISO PLAINTIFFS' MOT. FOR ADJ. RE: 5TH \& 9TH CAUSES OF ACTION
plaintiffs failed to allege an interest that was not held by the rest of the public, whereas the individual plaintiffs herein all allege payment of a fee that distinguishes them from the rest of the public, who do not pay such fee.

Similarly, Defendants cite Braude v. City of Los Angeles, 226 Cal. App. 3d 83, 89 (1990), for the proposition that a "taxpayer's interest in minimizing traffic congestion, though legitimate, was not a beneficial interest 'over and above the public at large' because 'hundreds of thousands of people' shared the interest[.]" (Defs.' Opp. at 8:26-9:2.) In Braude, a city councilmember who was outvoted 14 to 1 regarding the approval of an ordinance related to a construction project thereafter sought a "writ of mandate to, inter alia, command respondents to set aside their adoption of the ordinance and to comply with [CEQA] concerning proper building density and traffic flow." Id. at 86. Braude specifically notes that "cases applying the 'beneficial interest' standard tend toward a common sense rather than a merely technical approach. The standing determination appears to rest on the particular facts of the case." Id. at 88. Here, Plaintiffs are DROS Fee payers, and Defendants offer no logical allegation or actual evidence that the "public at large" is burdened by an unnecessarily high DROS Fee. This type of distinction was absent in Braude, which makes Defendants' reliance thereon unjustified.

Further, Defendants do not discuss the California Supreme Court's more recent opinions dealing with the "over and above" standard, e.g., Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 52 Cal. 4th 155, 165 (2011). Save the Plastic Bag provides how the "over and above" standard works in practice: "One who is in fact adversely affected by governmental action should have standing to challenge that action if it is judicially reviewable." Id. Plaintiffs are "in fact adversely affected by" the Department's overcharging of the DROS Fee; thus, they "have standing to challenge" the Department's decision to charge an amount without the proper statutorily required analysis having been performed.

## II. THE NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASED ON THE TEXT OF SB 819, WHICH INCLUDES A PELLUCID STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Defendants claim that "none of the versions of SB 819 offered by plaintiffs can change the plain meaning of the word 'possession,' which itself appeared in earlier versions of the bill."
(Defs.' Opp. at 9:27-10:2.) That statement is somewhat of a ruse: the question here is not whether the "plain meaning" of a word used in draft and final legislation has changed, but what the legislative intent was behind the final use of the word. But because a "plain meaning" interpretation inures to the Department's interests, Defendants argue their interpretation of SB 819 be adopted even though it is patently in conflict with SB 819's express legislative intent.

Defendants raise two arguments to support their position. First, Defendants ask the Court to disregard the relevant and specific uncodified intent language in favor of either general language or a "common sense" and non-contextual interpretation of the word "possession." (Defs.' Opp. at 9:5-13; 10:2-9.) As discussed thoroughly supra and in Plaintiffs' Motion for Adjudication, section (1)(g) of SB 819 expressly states a legislative intent that DROS Fund money be used for the "limited purpose" of funding APPS-based law enforcement activities. S.B. 819, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (enacted). Senator Leno specifically amended SB 819 to make this fact clear. (Franklin Decl. at GENT127 in Ex. 15.) Defendants attempt to downplay the legislature's statement of intent as an "isolated phrase" that should not trump Defendants' "common sense interpretation" (Defs.'s Opp. at 9:9-11), but that canard is exposed when the entirety of SB 819 is considered.
"The Codes of this state are simply a part of the statutory law of this state[; t]hey have no higher standing or sanctity than any other statute regularly passed by the Legislature." Los Angeles Cnty.v. Payne, 8 Cal. 2d 563, 574 (1937). "An uncodified section is part of the statutory law[;]" thus, "[i]n considering the purpose of legislation, statements of the intent of the enacting body contained in a preamble, while not conclusive, are entitled to consideration." Carter v. Cal. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 38 Cal. 4th 914, 925-6 (2006). Because section 1(g) of SB 819 is a direct and unequivocal expression of legislative intent, it, and not the Department's so-called "common sense interpretation[,]" nor the more general subsections of SB 819, section (1) (Defs.' Opp. at 10:2-9), ${ }^{6}$ sets the scope of what the legislature intended when it added the word "possession" to section 28225 via SB 819 .

[^15]Defendants claim Plaintiffs focus on section 1(g) of SB 819 "to the exclusion of everything else" (Defs.' Opp. at 9:9-14), which is apparently a backhanded way of arguing that the Court should ignore the legislature's express, but uncodified, statement of intent in favor of the Department's "common sense interpretation" of a single codified word taken out of context. Under Payne and Carter, it is clear that section 1(g) of SB 819 will be part of the Court's analysis of how section 28225's use of the word "possession" should be interpreted. Because Defendants' "common sense interpretation" plainly contradicts with a specific provision providing a statement of intent language for SB 819-the provision Plaintiffs' interpretation is literally based on-Plaintiffs' interpretation should be adopted by this Court. Cal. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n., 24 Cal. 3d 836, 844 (1979) ("Where a statute is theoretically capable of more than one construction we choose that which most comports with the intent of the Legislature.").

And to be clear, the Department's attempt to paint its interpretation as reasonable and one of "common sense" does not matter, as courts do not adopt "common sense," "plain language," or "plain meaning" interpretations when the legislature has spoken on how a relevant provision is to be interpreted. See Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey, 24 Cal. 4th 301, 310 (2000) ("Absent a compelling reason to do otherwise, we strive to construe each statute in accordance with its plain language.") (Emphasis added.) Even if it is true that Defendants' "common sense interpretation" is reasonable, that is irrelevant to the extent that Plaintiffs' interpretation is the one that "most comports with the intent of the legislature." Cal. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n., 24 Cal. 3d at 844.

## III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs' Motion should be granted for the reasons stated herein and in the Motion.

Dated: July 21, 2017
MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.


Scott M. Franklin
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

## PROOF OF SERVICE

## STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF FRESNO

I, Laura Palmerin, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802.

On July 21, 2017, I served the foregoing document(s) described as

## REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION OF FIFTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION

on the interested parties in this action by placing
[ ] the original
[X] a true and correct copy
thereof by the following means, addressed as follows:

Office of the Attorney General
Anthony Hakl, Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 1101
Sacramento, CA 95814
Anthony.Hakl@doj.ca.gov
X (BY OVERNIGHT MALL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery by UPS/FED-EX. Under the practice it would be deposited with a facility regularly maintained by UPS/FED-EX for receipt on the same day in the ordinary course of business. Such envelope was sealed and placed for collection and delivery by UPS/FED-EX with delivery fees paid or provided for in accordance with ordinary business practices.
Executed on July 21, 2017, at Long Beach, California.
X (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) As follows: I served a true and correct copy by electronic transmission. Said transmission was reported and completed without error. Executed on July 21, 2017, at Long Beach, California.

X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258

Scott M. Franklin - S.B.N. 240254
MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.
180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200
Long Beach, CA 90802
Telephone: (562) 216-4444
Facsimile: (562) 216-4445


Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners

## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTODAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners, vs.

XAVIER BECERRA, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, BETTY YEE, in her official capacity as State Controller for the State of California, and DOES 1-10.

Defendants and Respondents.

Date: $\quad$ August 4, 2017
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 31
Judge: Hon. Michael P. Kenny Action filed: 10/16/13

Plaintiffs hereby request that the following facts be judicially noticed pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (h), and 453. Legislative committee reports are properly the subject of judicial notice. Hutnick v. United States Fidelity \& Guaranty Co., 47 Ca .3 d 456, 465, n. 7 (1988).

The contents of the Senate Public Safety report regarding Assembly Bill 161 (Steinberg, 2003), dated of July 8, 2003. S. 2003-2004 Sess., at 7 (Cal. 2003). A copy of the report is
attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Scott M. Franklin filed contemporaneously herewith.

Dated: July 21, 2017

MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.


Scott M. Franklin Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Petitioners

## PROOF OF SERVICE

## STATE OF CALIFORNIA <br> COUNTY OF FRESNO

I, Laura Palmerin, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802.

On July 21, 2017, I served the foregoing documents) described as

## REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION OF FIFTH AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION

on the interested parties in this action by placing
[ ] the original
[X] a true and correct copy
thereof by the following means, addressed as follows:

Office of the Attorney General<br>Anthony Hakl, Deputy Attorney General<br>1300 I Street, Suite 1101<br>Sacramento, CA 95814<br>Anthony.Hakl@doj.ca.gov

X (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery by UPS/FED-EX. Under the practice it would be deposited with a facility regularly maintained by UPS/FED-EX for receipt on the same day in the ordinary course of business. Such envelope was sealed and placed for collection and delivery by UPS/FED-EX with delivery fees paid or provided for in accordance with ordinary business practices.
Executed on July 21, 2017, at Long Beach, California.
X (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) As follows: I served a true and correct copy by electronic transmission. Said transmission was reported and completed without error.
Executed on July 21, 2017, at Long Beach, California.
X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.


## PROOF OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

Case Name: Gentry, et al. v. Becerra, et al.
Court of Appeal Case No.: C089655
Superior Court Case No.: 34-2013-80001667
I, Sean A. Brady, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802.

On February 7, 2020, I served a copy of the foregoing document(s) described as: APPELLANTS' APPENDIX, VOLUME IX OF XVI, (Pages 2163 to 2435 of 4059), by electronic transmission as follows:

Robert E. Asperger
bob.asperger@doj.ca.gov
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents Xavier Becerra, et al.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on February 7, 2020, at Long Beach, California.
s/ Sean A. Brady
Sean A. Brady
Declarant


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ The motion casts the matter before the Court as one of summary adjudication; Plaintiffs, however, contend the hearing of August 4, 2017, was intended to be akin to a bench trial on two bifurcated issues. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs believe the summary adjudication standards stated in Section I of the motion are properly stated to the extent this Court chooses to treat the motion as a motion for summary adjudication.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ The relevant emergency rulemaking was effectively complete in 2004, but it was not finalized until 2005. (Additional Material Fact ["AMF"] \# 1). For consistency's sake only, the rulemaking is referred to herein as being completed in 2004.

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ All statutory references herein are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

[^3]:    ${ }^{5}$ The two Cal. Pub. cases are relevant because they show how, in the context of fee setting authority, a statute can have both ministerial and discretionary elements. The Cal. Pub. cases are,

[^4]:    ${ }^{8}$ Watson v. Cnty. of Merced, 274 Cal. App. 2d 263,265-66 (1969) (interpreting the following grant of authority: "local authorities . . . , within the reasonable exercise of their police powers[, may] require a permit therefor commensurate with the cost of enforcing this part and local ordinance with reference to the use of mobilehomes"); Urban v. Riley, 21 Cal. 2d 232, 236 (1942) (confirming that, in general-but without any reference to a particular statutory grant of authority-license fees can be set "at a sum sufficient to cover all expenses which may be reasonably anticipated" even if the expenses anticipated are not the exact expenses ultimately incurred).

[^5]:    ${ }^{9}$ A deposition statement that the department has a particular "duty for public safety" (Defs.' Mot. at 24:3-9; Defendants' Undisputed Material Facts No. 15) is not sufficient to confirm the existence of such a duty. Defendants cite no authority identifying the basis for this claimed duty.

[^6]:    ${ }^{1}$ Defendants respectfully request that Stephen Lindley, in his official capacity as Director of the California Department of Justice Bureau of Firearms, be substituted back into this action in the place of his predecessor Martha Supernor. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 368.5.)

[^7]:    ${ }^{2}$ In connection with these inconsistent assertions, plaintiffs continue to repeatedly refer to a DROS fund "surplus," which plaintiffs describe as "in excess of" or "over" \$14 million. (See Pls.' Opening Brief at pp. 7, 9, \& 12.) To be clear, though, whatever the condition of the relevant fund in the past, there is no DROS "surplus" at this time. According to the January 10, 2017 Governor's Budget, the DROS fund balance for fiscal year 2017-2018 was only $\$ 1.2$ million. (See http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2017-18/pdf/GovernorsBudget/0010/0820FCS.pdf [as of June 29, 2017] [Proposed Budget Detail. Legislative, Judicial, and Executive. Department of Justice. Fund Condition Statements.]; see also Depo. of Stephen Lindley at pp. 74-77 [discussing need for "backup" in DROS fund]; Depo. of David Harper at p. 71 [discussing "carry forward balance"].)
    ${ }^{3}$ Even plaintiffs' proposed remedy misses the mark. (See Pls.' Opening Brief at p. 23 [proposing that the Court "order the Department to individually calculate the incurred and estimated cost categories in section 28225 and to make the documents reflecting such calculations public"].) Such a writ would not track any statutory requirements of section 28225. As mentioned, a writ of mandate can only require the performance of a ministerial duty. It follows that such a writ cannot create a duty that is not reflected in statute.

[^8]:    ${ }^{4}$ In this regard, the current fee is $\$ 19.00$, and it has been that amount since approximately 2004.

[^9]:    ${ }^{1}$ As agreed with plaintiffs, defendants have submitted their own separate statement and offer this response to plaintiffs' separate statement. Defendants note, though, that such statements may be of limited utility in assessing plaintiffs' writ of mandate and declaratory relief claims, which are largely legal claims involving statutory construction. (See, e.g., Gilbertson v. Osman (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 3d 308, 315 [trial court may consider merits of summary judgment motion despite absence of separate statement where case involves "a single, simple issue" with minimal evidentiary support], disapproved on other grounds in Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315,320 .)

[^10]:    1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 185,548$ in statewide ProReta cherges.

[^11]:    ${ }_{2}^{1}$ All statutory references herein are to the Penal Code except where otherwise stated.
    2 "The fee for any copy of any other record or paper on file in the office of the recorder, when the copy is made by the recorder, shall be set by the board of supervisors in an amount necessary to recover the direct and indirect costs of providing the product or service or the cost of enforcing any regulation for which the fee or charge is levied." Gov't Code § 27366.

[^12]:    ${ }^{3}$ See, e.g., Ham v. Los Angeles Cnty., 46 Cal. App. 148, 162 (1920) (italics added); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 788 (1968) (citing Ham); Redwood Coast Watersheds All. v. State Bd. of Forestry \& Fire Prot., 70 Cal. App. 4th 962, 970 (1999) (citing Ham); Cotta v. Cty. of Kings, No. 1:13-CV-00359-LJO, 2013 WL 3213075, at *17 (E.D. Cal. June 24, 2013) (citing Ham).

[^13]:    ${ }^{4}$ Within one business day of having received Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, Plaintiffs served discovery-requests for admissions and contention interrogatories-on Defendants. The discovery is limited to instances where Defendants disputed a fact herein notwithstanding the issue having been (at least in Plaintiffs' view) resolved, often by a request for admission response. To the extent the Court's tentative ruling depends on Defendants disputing a fact that Plaintiffs contend is being disputed without justification, Plaintiffs plan to request the Court allow Plaintiff to file Defendants' responses to the relevant discovery prior to the Court issuing is final ruling on the parties' cross-motions.

[^14]:    ${ }^{5}$ Genger v. Albers, 90 Cal. App. 2d 52, 55 (1949) ("Where the variance is not misleading, the court may find the facts according to the evidence or may order an immediate amendment.")

[^15]:    ${ }^{6}$ Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1859 ("In the construction of a statute the intention of the Legislature, . . . when a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount

