# IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DAVID GENTRY; JAMES PARKER;
MARK MIDLAM; JAMES BASS; AND CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, V.

XAVIER BECERRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STEPHEN LINDLEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS Acting Chief of the California DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; BETTY T. YEE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS State Controller; and DOES 1-10,

DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS.

Case No. C089655

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Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento
Case No. 34-2013-80001667
Honorable Judge Richard K. Sueyoshi
C. D. Michel - SBN 144258

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| 2 | $01 / 22 / 2016$ | Stipulation Re: Expedited Dispute <br> Resolution Procedure Regarding Disputed <br> Discovery Responses Previously Deemed <br> Moot and Renewed Motions Currently <br> Scheduled for Hearing on February 19, 2016 | 579 |
| 10 | $07 / 21 / 2017$ | Supplemental Declaration of Scott M. <br> Franklin in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for <br> Adjudication of Fifth and Ninth Causes of <br> Action | 2461 |
| 10 | $10 / 27 / 2017$ | Supplemental Declaration of Scott M. <br> Franklin in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply in <br> Support of Motions to Compel Additional <br> Responses to [1] Requests for Admmissions <br> (Set Three) and [2] Special Interrogatories |  |
| (Set Four) |  |  |  |

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Exempt from Filing Fees Pursuant to Government Code $\$ 6103$

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MID LAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in his official capacity as Director of the California Department of Justice Bureau of Firearms; BETTY T. YEE, in her official capacity as State Controller, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 34-2013-80001667

## DECLARATION OF ANTHONY R. HAKL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION BRIEF

Date: $\quad$ March 16, 2018
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept: 28
Judge: The Honorable Richard K.
Sueyoshi
Action Filed: October 16, 2013

## DECLARATION OF ANTHONY R. HAKL

1. I am a Deputy Attorney General for the Office of the Attorney General in the California Department of Justice located in Sacramento, California. I am the attorney of record for defendants in this action. I make this declaration in support of defendants' opposition brief. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration, and if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to them.
2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of plaintiffs' initial complaint filed in the federal case, Bauer v. Becerra.
3. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of plaintiffs' first amended complaint filed in the federal case, Bauer v. Becerra.
4. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of plaintiffs' second amended complaint filed in the federal case, Bauer v. Becerra.
5. Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the cover pages and appearances of counsel pages from the transcripts of the depositions of defendant Lindley in the Bauer and Gentry litigation.
6. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the article: https://www.ammoland.com/2015/02/californias-triggerman-chuck-michel/\#axzz571CPByf4 [as of Feb. 13, 2018].
7. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of excerpts from Plaintiffs' Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) (May 14, 2014), and Plaintiffs' Requests for Production of Documents (Set Four) (Aug. 31, 2016).
8. Attached as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the civil docket for Bauer.
9. Attached as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of:
https://nramemberscouncils.com/directory/listing/calguns-shooting-sportsassociation?tab=related\&view=grid\&category $=0 \&$ center $=0 \% 2 \mathrm{C} 0 \& z o o m=15 \&$ is_mile $=1 \& d i r e c t o$ ry_radius=20\&sort=distance\&p=7\#sabai-inline-content-related [as of Feb. 13, 2018].
10. Attached as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of: http://nramemberscouncils.com/directories/MC-directory/[as of Feb. 13, 2018].
11. Attached as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of:
http://myemail.constantcontact.com/CALIFORNIA-ALERT-SYSTEM - --...-CALGUNS-GLOCK CHALLENGE-II-.html?soid=1103432343344\&aid=Chv1PODTq3U [as of Feb. 13, 2018].
12. Attached as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of: https://www.facebook.com/calguns/posts/402605069824860 [as of Feb. 13, 2018].
13. Attached as Exhibit $L$ is a true and correct copy of: http://cgssa.org/about-us/[as of Feb. 13, 2018].
14. Attached as Exhibit M is a true and correct copy of:
https://firearmtraining.nra.org/become-an-instructor/ [as of Feb. 13, 2018].
15. Attached as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of the chart titled "DEALER RECORD OF SALE TRANSACTIONS." A copy of this publicly-available data is also available at: https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/firearms/forms/dros chart.pdf.
16. Attached as Exhibit $O$ is a true and correct copy of a portion of defendants' document production to plaintiffs in this case.
17. Attached as Exhibit $P$ is a true and correct copy of an excel spreadsheet prepared by DOJ expanding upon the DROS transaction information contained in Exhibit N. This information is accurate to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Signed and sworn to this 20th day of February, 2018, at Sacramento, California.

ANTHONY R. HAKL
SA2013113332
12969644.doc

## EXHIBIT A

C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258

Hillary J. Green - S.B.N. 243221
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# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA FRESNO BRANCH COURTHOUSE 

 HERB BAUER SPORTING GOODS, INC.

Plaintiffs

KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General For the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, and DOES 110.

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS, by and through their undersigned attorneys, bring this Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against the above-named Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office, and in support thereof allege the following:

## INTRODUCTION

1. When a would-be firearm purchaser wishes to obtain a firearm in California, state law generally requires the buyer to process the transaction through a federally licensed California firearm dealer (an "FFL").
2. In doing so, the would-be purchaser must, among other things, fill out a Dealer's Record of Sale ("DROS") form, the information from which is used by the California Department of Justice ("DOJ") to conduct an extensive background check on the would-be purchaser before he or she can take possession of any firearm.
3. California statutory law confers on DOJ ${ }^{1}$ the authority, subject to some discretion, to impose multiple, separate "fees" on the purchasers of firearms. DOJ imposes and collects these fees through firearm retailers, and currently exercises that discretion by charging firearm purchasers the maximum amounts provided for by certain statutes.
4. PLAINTIFFS bring this suit to challenge the constitutionality and legality of the "fees" imposed under those statutes and levied on the purchase or transfer of firearms; specifically, California Penal Code sections 12076(e) [Revised Penal Code section 28255(a)-(c)], 12076.5 [28300(c)], 12088.9 [23690(a)], and 12805(e) [31650(c)] (collectively, the "Challenged Fees"). ${ }^{2}$
5. To some extent the amount of some "fees" are set at the discretion of, DOJ but in all cases the "fees" are enforced and collected by DOJ through an FFL
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regulated by DOJ.
6. The accounts containing the revenues amassed from the Challenged Fees, which DOJ manages, run a multi-million dollar surplus, even though constitutional principles and governing law limit such government assessments to the reasonable cost of regulating the actual activity on which the "fee" is imposed (i.e., the clearance of the firearm purchaser).
7. Each of the Challenged Fees unconstitutionally infringes on PLAINTIFFS' right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. PLAINTIFFS and other lawful firearm purchasers are subjected to these excessive "fees" as a prerequisite to exercising a fundamental right, and the windfall revenues from the "fees" are used by DEFENDANTS to finance state law enforcement activities unrelated to the regulation of the lawful purchase of firearms, or the clearance of firearm purchasers.
8. For similar reasons, each of the Challenged "Fees" is not really a "fee" at all, but an illegal tax enacted and imposed in violation of the California Constitution.
9. PLAINTIFFS seek declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate and halt DOJ's current imposition of the Challenged Fees.

## JURISDICTION and VENUE

10. Jurisdiction of this action is founded on 28 U.S.C. $\S \S 1331,1343$, and 1367, in that this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that this action seeks to redress the deprivation, under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of the State of California and political subdivisions thereof, of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and by Acts of Congress.
11. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over PLAINTIFFS' state law claims asserted herein under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because such claims arise out of the

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same case or controversy as the federal claims.
12. PLAINTIFFS' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
13. Venue in this judicial district is proper under 28 U.S.C. $\S 1391$ (b) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district.

## PARTIES

## I. Plaintiffs

14. Plaintiff BARRY BAUER is a resident, property owner, and taxpayer of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, Plaintiff BAUER has lawfully purchased firearms, including both handguns and long-guns.
15. Plaintiff BAUER is the "Responsible Person"3 on the Federal Firearms License of FFL Plaintiff HERB BAUER SPORTING GOODS, INC. As such, Plaintiff BAUER is subjected to being fingerprinted and background checked by the Federal Firearms Licensing Center every three (3) years upon license renewal, and annually subjected to at least one additional background check by California DOJ to obtain a Certificate of Eligibility, - which the "Responsible Person" for a licensed dealer must obtain to be on the Central List of Firearms Dealers (which is required to sell firearms in California) - and possibly a second background check as part of his annual application for a second-hand dealer permit. ${ }^{4}$

[^1]${ }^{4}$ These background checks on Plaintiff BAUER are in addition to the background check on him by DOJ for the renewal of his permit to carry a concealed handgun, pursuant to California Penal Code section 12050 every two years.
16. Despite being so thoroughly checked as a Responsible Person, for each of his transactions, Plaintiff BAUER has still had to pay all "fees" California imposes on firearm transfers.
17. Plaintiffs STEPHEN WARKENTIN ánd JEFFREY HACKER are residents, property owners, and taxpayers of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, each has purchased multiple firearms from both an FFL and a private party, through an FFL as required by California Penal Code § 12070 [26500]. These transactions have consisted of both handguns and long-guns. Some of these transactions involved a single firearm, while others involved multiple handguns (by way of private party transfers), multiple long-guns, and a combination of a handgun and a long-gun.
18. For each of their transactions, Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER have paid all "fees" California requires for firearm transfers described below. Accordingly, each of them has paid $\$ 50$ in state fees for a transaction including a single handgun and a single long-gun, $\$ 46$ for a transaction including two handguns, and $\$ 25$ for transactions involving a single firearm or multiple longguns. ${ }^{5}$ Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER have had to pay the Challenged Fees multiple times in the same year, and, in some cases, the same month. Also, within the last five years, Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER have each had to pay California's $\$ 15$ fee to obtain a Handgun Safety Certificate.
19. Plaintiff NICOLE FERRY is a resident of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, Plaintiff FERRY has purchased handguns from an FFL for self-defense and target practice. For each of her transactions, Plaintiff FERRY has paid all "fees" California requires for firearm transfers described below. Plaintiff FERRY has had to pay California's fees for firearm transfers more than once in the

[^2]same year. Also within the last five years, Plaintiff FERRY has had to pay California's $\$ 15$ fee to obtain a Handgun Safety Certificate.
20. Plaintiff LELAND ADLEY is a resident, property owner, and taxpayer of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, Plaintiff ADLEY has purchased multiple firearms from both an FFL and a private party, through an FFL as required by California Penal Code § 12070 [26500], including both handguns and long-guns.
21. For each of his transactions, Plaintiff ADLEY paid all "fees" California requires for firearm transfers described below. Plaintiff ADLEY has had to pay California's "fees" for firearm transfers multiple times in the same year. Also within the last five years, Plaintiff ADLEY has had to pay California's $\$ 15$ "fee" to obtain a Handgun Safety Certificate.
22. Plaintiff NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. (hereafter "NRA") is a non-profit association incorporated under the laws of New York, with its principal place of business in Fairfax, Virginia. NRA has a membership of approximately 4 million persons. The purposes of NRA include protection of the right of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear firearms for the lawful defense of their families, persons, and property, and from unlawful government regulations and preconditions placed on the exercise of that right. NRA brings this action on behalf of itself and its hundreds of thousands of members in California, including Plaintiffs BAUER, WARKENTIN, ADLEY, and HACKER, who are subjected to the Challenged Fees.

## 23. Plaintiff CALIFORNIA RIFLE AND PISTOL ASSOCIATION

 FOUNDATION ("CRPA FOUNDATION") is a non-profit entity classified under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and incorporated under California law, with headquarters in Fullerton, California. Contributions to the CRPA FOUNDATION are used for the direct benefit of Californians. Funds contributed to and granted by CRPA FOUNDATION benefit a wide variety of constituenciesthroughout California, including gun collectors, hunters, target shooters, law enforcement, and those who choose to own a firearm to defend themselves and their families. The CRPA FOUNDATION seeks to: raise awareness about unconstitutional laws, defend and expand the legal recognition of the rights protected by the Second Amendment, promote firearms and hunting safety, protect hunting rights, enhance marksmanship skills of those participating in shooting sports, and educate the general public about firearms. The CRPA FOUNDATION supports law enforcement and various charitable, educational, scientific, and other firearms-related public interest activities that support and defend the Second Amendment rights of all law-abiding Americans.
24. In this suit, the CRPA FOUNDATION represents the interests of its many citizen and taxpayer members and members of its related association the California Rifle and Pistol Association who reside in California and who wish to sell or purchase firearms, or who have sold or purchased firearms, and have been charged "fees" imposed by the laws of the State of California associated with those transactions. These members are too numerous to conveniently bring this action individually. The CRPA FOUNDATION and the individuals whose interests are represented by the CRPA FOUNDATION have been, are being, and will in the future be affected by DEFENDANTS' imposition of these "fees."
25. Plaintiff HERB BAUER SPORTING GOODS, INC., is a California corporation with its principal place of business in the County of Fresno, California. It is a licensed firearms dealer under both federal and California law (i.e., an FFL) that sells a variety of firearms, including both long-guns and handguns. California law requires Plaintiff HERB BAUER to collect the Challenged Fees for DOJ, at DOJ's direction, from firearm transferees. Accordingly, Plaintiff HERB BAUER is injured by its being forced to facilitate DEFENDANTS' unlawful "fee" collection activities.
26. The individual PLAINTIFFS identified above are citizens and taxpayers
of California from the City and County of Fresno who have been required to pay the Challenged Fees in violation of their rights and applicable law.
27. Each of the associational PLAINTIFFS identified above has individual members who are citizens and taxpayers of California, including in Fresno County, who have an acute interest in purchasing firearms and do not wish to pay unlawful fees, taxes, or other costs associated with that purchase and thus have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief to halt or reduce the imposition or charging of unconstitutional fees or taxes. The interests of these members are germane to their respective associations' purposes; and neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested herein requires their members participate in this lawsuit individually.

## II. Defendants

28. Defendant KAMALA HARRIS is the Attorney General of California. She is the chief law enforcement officer of California, and is charged by Article V, Section 13 of the California Constitution with the duty to inform the general public and to supervise and instruct local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies regarding the meaning of the laws of the State, including the Challenged Fees, and to ensure the fair, uniform and consistent enforcement of those laws throughout the state. She is sued in her official capacity.
29. Defendant STEPHEN LINDLEY is the Acting Chief of the DOJ Bureau of Firearms and, as such, is responsible for executing, interpreting, and enforcing the laws of the State of California - as well as its customs, practices, and policies at issue in this lawsuit. He is sued in his official capacity.
30. Defendants HARRIS and LINDLEY (collectively "DEFENDANTS") are responsible for administering and enforcing the Challenged Fees, are in fact presently enforcing the challenge provision against PLAINTIFFS, and will continue to enforce the Challenged Fees against PLAINTIFFS.
31. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or

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otherwise of the DEFENDANTS named herein as DOES 1-10, are presently unknown to PLAINTIFFS, who therefore sue said DEFENDANTS by such fictitious names. PLAINTIFFS pray for leave to amend this Complaint and Petition to show the true names, capacities, and/or liabilities of DOE Defendants if and when they have been determined.

## OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY SCHEME

## I. Constitutional Provisions

32. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. Amend. II.
33. The United States Supreme Court recently held in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), that the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an individual civil right to possess firearms for self-defense.
34. The Court soon thereafter held in McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), that the Second Amendment is incorporated through the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment to restrict state and local governments from infringing on the individual right to keep and bears arms, and made clear the right is a fundamental one.
35. Several courts, including a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Nordyke v. King, 664 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2011), have concluded that the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense implies a corresponding right to acquire firearms. See also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 2623511, *14 (July 6, 2011).
36. In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), the United States Supreme Court held that fees levied on regulated speech activities must be only of amounts necessary to "meet[] the expense incident to the administration of the Act and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed." (emphasis added.) Any additional charge above and beyond that rate would be invalid.
37. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), the United States

Supreme Court clarified the bounds of the Cox holding, indicating that when constitutionally protected activity is being regulated, States may impose a fee only "as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question." It is not permissible to impose "a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition" to the "enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution" and "unrelated to the scope of the activities of [the payer of the fee]."
38. In Forsythe County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), the Court further clarified the issue of when it is permissible to charge fees regulating constitutionally protected conduct, indicating that a State or locality may impose a tax or fee on constitutionally protected conduct, as long as it bears a sufficient relationship to a legitimate state interest.

## II. California Law

## A. Regulating the Imposition of Taxes and Fees

39. Section 3 of Article XIII A of the California Constitution (hereafter "Section 3"), originally passed in 1978 as Proposition 13 (and later amended by Proposition 26 below), provided:

From and after the effective date of this article, any changes in state taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto whether by increased rates or changes in method of computation must be imposed by an Act passed by not less than two- thirds of all members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature, except that no new ad valorem taxes on real property, or sales or transaction taxes on the sales of real property may be imposed.
40. In Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 15 Cal. 4th 866, (1997), the California Supreme Court established the test for determining whether an assessment is a "tax" under Section 3, holding it is not a "tax" unless: (1) the amount exceeds the "reasonable cost" of providing services related to the regulatory activity for which the charge was imposed, (2) the charge is levied for unrelated revenue purposes, or (3) there is no relationship or nexus between the activities or operations of the fee payer and the regulatory activities to be supported by the fee.

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41. Proposition 26 (2010) amended Section 3 to clarify what constitutes a "tax" under California law. It essentially incorporated the principles of Sinclair Paint Co. and its progeny, ending the previously common legislative and regulatory shell-game of levying a tax under the guise of a regulatory "fee." Proposition 26's most relevant amendment to Section 3 for purposes of this lawsuit is the following:

The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a levy, charge, or other exaction is not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in which those costs are allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor's burdens on, or benefits received from, the governmental activity.

Cal. Const. art. XIII A, § 3(d).

## B. State Fees Imposed on Firearm Sales and Transfers

## 1. The Dealer's Record of Sale (DROS) "Fee" ${ }^{6}$

42. California Penal Code section 12076, subdivisions (e) 28225(a)-(c)], (f) [28230], (g) [28235], and (i) [28240(a)-(b)], establish the "fees" associated with a DROS, and govern what the funds collected therefrom can be used for.
43. Subdivision (e) of Penal Code section 12076 [28225(a)] provides (emphasis added):

The [DOJ] may require the [FFL] to charge each firearm purchaser a fee not to exceed fourteen dollars (\$14), except that the fee may be increased at a rate not to exceed any increase in the California
Consumer Price Index as compiled and reported by the Department of Industrial Relations.
44. It further provides that " $[t]$ he fee shall be no more than is necessary to fund" the activities enumerated at Penal Code section 12076(e)(1)-(9) [28255(a),(b)(1)-(10)].
45. Subdivision (e)(10) [28225(b)(11)], enacted by Assembly Bill 161 (2003),

[^3]
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purports to authorize the DOJ to use revenues from the DROS "fee" to fund "the estimated reasonable costs of [DOJ] firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale, purchase, loan, or transfer of firearms."
46. Penal Code section 12076(f)(1)(B) [28230(a)(2)] further provides for DOJ to use "fee" revenues for "the actual processing costs associated with the submission of a [DROS] to the [DOJ]."
47. Subsection (g) of 12076 [28235] provides:

All money received by the [DOJ] pursuant to this section shall be deposited in the Dealer's Record of Sale Special Account of the General Fund, which is hereby created, to be available, upon appropriation by the Legislature, for expenditure by the [DOJ] to offset the costs incurred pursuant to this section, paragraph (1) and subparagraph (D) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (f) of Section
12072, Sections 12083 and 12099, subdivision (c) of Section 12131, Sections 12234, 12289, and 12289.5, and subdivisions (f) and (g) of Section 12305.
48. The activities covered in the Penal Code sections referenced by Subsection (g) of 12076 [28235] include: (1) the California FFL Check Program (Cal. Penal Code § 12072(f)(1)) [27555]; (2) a public education program pertaining to importers of personal handguns (Cal. Penal Code § 12072(f)(2)(D)) [27560(d)]; (3) the Centralized List of Exempted FFLs (Cal. Penal Code § 12083) [28450]; (4) inspections of Short-Barreled Long Gun Permit-Holders (Cal. Penal Code § 12099) [33320]; (5) retesting of handguns certified as "not unsafe" (Cal. Penal Code § 12131(c) [32020]; (6) inspections of Machine Gun Permit-Holders (Cal. Penal Code § 12234) [32670]; (7) public education program regarding registration of "assault weapons" (Cal. Penal Code § 12289) [31115]; (8) inspections of "Assault Weapon" Permit-Holders (Cal. Penal Code § 12289.5) [31110]; and (9) inspections of "Destructive Device" Permit- Holders (Cal. Penal Code § 12305(f)-(g)) [19000].
49. Penal Code section 12076(i)(1) [28240(a)] mandates that the DOJ shall charge only one DROS "fee" for a single transaction on the same date for any number of firearms that are not handguns (i.e., long-guns).
50. Where an individual purchases a handgun and any number of long-guns at

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the same time, DOJ charges the purchaser a full "DROS "fee" for each transaction.
51. Penal Code section 12076(i)(2) [28240(b)], provides that, in a single transaction on the same date for the delivery of any number of handguns, the DOJ must charge a reduced DROS "fee" for any additional handguns that are part of that same transaction.
52. The DOJ promulgated California Code of Regulations, title 11, section 4001 increasing the cap on the DROS "fee" from $\$ 14$ to $\$ 19$ for the first handgun in a single transaction, and for one or more rifles or shotguns in a single transaction. And, DOJ capped the DROS "fee" for each additional handgun being purchased at the same time as the first handgun at $\$ 15$.
53. The provisions conferring authority on DOJ to charge the DROS "fee" (Sections 12076(e) [28225(a)] \& (f)(1)(B)) [28230(a)(2)] do not require DOJ to charge the maximum amount allowed for under that statute, or to even charge any "fee" at all.
54. DOJ requires DROS "fees" for almost all firearm sales by an FFL as well as private party transfers of firearms (which must generally be processed through an FFL).
55. Pursuant to statute, revenue from the DROS "fee" is supposed to be deposited into the DROS Special Account of the General Fund ("DROS Special Account"). Cal. Pen. Code § 12076(g) [28235].
56. Revenue placed in the DROS Special Account is generated from the various different "fees" provided for in the Penal Code, covering a myriad of unique programs.
57. For example, revenues collected from fees for registration of "assault weapons" and .50 BMG rifles (Cal. Pen. Code § 12285(a) \& (b)) [30900-30905], concealed weapon permit applications (Cal. Pen. Code § 12054) [26190(a)-(b)], "Assault Weapon" Permits (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 12286-12287) [31000-31105], Destructive Device Permits (Cal. Pen. Code § 12305(e)) [18905], among other fees,
are placed in the DROS Special Account.

## 2. Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund "Fees"

## a. The Handgun Safety Certificate Exam "Fee" (\$15)

58. A would-be handgun purchaser must obtain a Handgun Safety Certificate ("HSC") before a handgun may be legally purchased.
59. To obtain an HSC, a certified instructor (usually the FFL) administers a test. Upon passage of the test, an individual receives an HSC, which is valid for five (5) years.
60. Penal Code section 12805(e) [31650(c)] provides: "The [DOJ] may charge the certified instructor up to fifteen dollars (\$15) for each handgun safety certificate issued by that instructor to cover the [DOJ's] cost in carrying out and enforcing this article, and enforcing this title, as determined annually by the [DOJ]." The $\$ 15$ fee ("HSC Exam "fee") is generally charged to the exam taker by the FFL, as allowed by law.
61. "This title," as used in section 12805(e) [31650(c)], includes all manner of laws regulating "deadly weapons," including not only handguns and long-guns, but also "unsafe handguns," machine guns, "assault weapons," destructive devices, ammunition, boobytraps, body armor, tear gas, silencers, and "less lethal devices." See Title 2. Control of Deadly Weapons, Cal. Penal Code §§ 12000 [16850], et seq.
62. Section 12805(e) [31650(c)], the statute conferring authority on DOJ to charge the HSC Exam "fee", does not require the DOJ charge the maximum amount authorized under that statute, or to even charge any "fee" at all.

## b. The Section 12076.5 [28300] "Fee"

63. California Penal Code section 12076.5 [28300] provides:
(a) The Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund is hereby established in the State Treasury and shall be administered by the [DOJ]. Notwithstanding Section 13340 of the Government Code, all moneys in the fund are continuously appropriated to the [DOJ] without regard to fiscal years for the purpose of implementing and enforcing the provisions of Article 8 (commencing with Section 12800), as added by the Statutes of 2001, enforcing the provisions of this title, and for the establishment,
maintenance and upgrading of equipment and services necessary for firearms dealers to comply with Section 12077 [28150-28180].
(b) The [DOJ] may require firearms dealers to charge each person who obtains a firearm a fee not to exceed five dollars (\$5) for each transaction. Revenues from this fee shall be deposited in the Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund.
64. The "provisions of Article 8," enforcement of which is funded, at least in part, by the Section 12076.5 [28300] "fee," concern the Handgun Safety Certificate Program provided for in sections 12800 [31610], et seq.
65. The title referred to in section 12076.5 [28300], i.e., Title 2. Control of Deadly Weapons, Cal. Penal Code $\S \S 12000$ [16850], et seq. (enforcement of which is funded, at least in part, by the Section 12076.5 [28300] "fee,") covers all manner of laws regulating "deadly weapons," including not only handguns and long-guns, but also "unsafe handguns," machine guns, "assault weapons," destructive devices, ammunition, boobytraps, body armor, tear gas, silencers, and less lethal devices.
66. Section 12076.5 [28300] does not require the DOJ to charge the maximum amount authorized under that statute (i.e., \$5), or to even charge any fee at all.

## 3. Firearm Safety Account "Fee" (\$1)

Penal Code section 12088.9 [23690] provides:
(a) The [DOJ] may require each dealer to charge each firearm purchaser or transferee a fee not to exceed one dollar ( $\$ 1$ ) for each firearm transaction. The fee shall be for the purpose of supporting [DOJ] program costs related to this act, including the establishment, maintenance, and upgrading of related data base systems and public rosters.
(b) There is hereby created within the General Fund the Firearm Safety Account. Revenue from the fee imposed by subdivision (a) shall be deposited into the Firearm Safety Account and shall be available for expenditure by the [DOJ] upon appropriation by the Legislature. Expenditures from the Firearm Safety Account shall be limited to program expenditures as defined by subdivision (a).
67. There is no provision in California law requiring DOJ to charge this fee at all.
68. With few exceptions, DEFENDANTS currently require that all transfers of any firearm, whether a handgun or a long-gun, be subject to this $\$ 1$ fee.

## C. Legislative History of the DROS "Fee" and Management of the DROS Special Account

69. The origins of the DROS system and its related "fees" are believed to go back to sometime in the 1920s.
70. The amount of a DROS "fee" in and around the year 1990 was $\$ 4.25$. See S. 670, 1995-1996 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (as introduced Feb. 22, 1995).
71. By 1995, the DROS "fee" had ballooned to $\$ 14.00$, an increase of greater than 300 percent in less than five years. S. 670, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (as introduced Feb. 22, 1995).
72. In 1995, the California Legislature passed Senate Bills 670 and 671 to cap the rate for a DROS "fee" at $\$ 14.00$, with increases "at a rate not to exceed any increase in the California Consumer Price Index." That amendment is reflected in Penal Code section 12076(e) [28225(a)] described above.
73. Senate Bill 670 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (as enacted) further prohibited the DOJ from using the "fee" to "directly fund or as a loan to fund any program not specified."
74. In the following years, a trend of appropriating DROS "fee" revenues to pay for additional activities unrelated to the clearance of the purchaser to buy a firearm emerged. A series of bills passed that allowed monies in the DROS Special Account to pay for the ever-expanding list of programs and services found at section 12076(g) [28235].
75. For example, Assembly Bill 2080 (2002) established a program to address illegal firearms trafficking and authorized its funding from the DROS Special Account. See Penal Code §§ 12072(f)(1) [27555], 12076(g) [28235].
76. Assembly Bill 2080 passed with less than two-thirds of the vote of all members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature.
77. Assembly Bill 2580 (2002) specifically amended section 12076(g) [282235] to authorize funding from the DROS Special Account for the inspections of several classes of dangerous weapon permit-holders. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 12076(g) [28235], 12099 [33320] [inspections of short-barreled long gun permitholders], 12234 [inspections of machine gun permit-holders], 12289.5 [31110] [inspections of "assault weapon" permit-holder], 12305(f)-(g) [19000] [inspections of destructive devices permit-holders].
78. Assembly Bill 2580 passed with less than two-thirds of the vote of all members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature.
79. Assembly Bill 2902 (2002) specifically amended section 12076(g) [28235] to authorize funding for the maintenance of the Centralized List of Exempted FFLs and the re-testing of handguns deemed "not unsafe." See Cal. Penal Code §§ 12076(g) [28235], 12083 [28450], 12131(c) [32020].
80. Assembly Bill 2902 passed with less than two-thirds of the vote of all members elected to each of the houses of the Legislature.
81. In 2001, Plaintiff NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION (NRA) requested the Office of California State Auditor ("CSA") to investigate the DOJ's operation of the DROS program, believing that DROS Special Account funds were being misused.
82. CSA responded to Plaintiff NRA's request, stating that an audit of the DROS program could only be conducted by request from the Joint Legislative Audit Committee ("JLAC"). Plaintiff NRA then began working with members of the Legislature to prepare a request to JLAC for an audit.
83. Before Assembly Bill 2080's final passage in 2002, the Office of Legislative Counsel was asked by Senator Bill Morrow to opine on whether Assembly Bill 2080 authorized using DROS "fee" revenues, paid by individual firearms transferees, to support Assembly Bill 2080's purposes. It was further asked whether expending those revenues to support Assembly Bill 2080 would
convert the DROS "fee" into an unauthorized "tax."
84. While awaiting the Office of Legislative Counsel's response to that request, then Assemblyman (now Senator) Rod Wright sought information on the DROS Special Account from the DOJ and Legislative Analyst's Office from the Assembly Budget Committee. A week later, the Assembly Budget Subcommittee on State Administration ordered the DOJ to submit a report on the DROS Special Account status. See 2002 Budget Act, Item 0820-001-0460.
85. The first report DOJ submitted to the Assembly Budget Subcommittee on State Administration detailed the status of the DROS Special Account. But no audit of spending was provided.
86. Later that year, the Office of Legislative Counsel responded to Senator Morrow's request regarding whether expending DROS revenues to support Assembly Bill 2080 would convert the DROS "fee" into an unauthorized tax, with the following analysis:

- Section 12076(e) [28255(b)] provides that the DROS "fee" be no more than is necessary to reimburse designated program purposes and may not be used to fund any other program;
- Nevertheless, section $12076(\mathrm{~g})$ [28235] identifies other purposes for which funds in the DROS Special Account may be used;
- Under the rules of statutory construction, section $12076(\mathrm{~g})$ [28235] refers generally to money in the DROS Special Account, rather than specifically to the revenue from the section 12076(e) [28225(a)] DROS "fee";
- Because the DROS Special Account contains funds in addition to fees obtained pursuant to $12076(\mathrm{e})$ [28225(b)(1)-(10)], the purposes of section 12076(g) [28235] may be accomplished without the use of 12076(e) [28225(a)] [DROS] funds;
- Because Assembly Bill 2080 did not amend 12076(e) [28225(a)-(c)] to . fund its new purposes, $12076(\mathrm{~g})$ [28235] could not be construed to
authorize the expenditure of DROS "fees" for any purpose not specified in 12076(e) [28225(b)];
- Because Assembly Bill 2080 would not authorize the expenditure of DROS "fees" for the purposes of Assembly Bill 2080, the bill made no change that would raise the issue whether any unauthorized expenditure of those funds for that new purpose would constitute a "tax" under Section 3.

87. The Office of Legislative Counsel's response provided its explanation on how it believed subsections (e) and (g) of section 12076 [28225(a)-(c) and 28235, respectively] could coexist, but failed to address the crux of the matter of whether any or all of these "fees" were actually "taxes."
88. The DOJ and the Legislative Analyst's Office then submitted a supplemental report on the status of the DROS Special Account to the Legislature pursuant to the 2002 Budget Act, Item 0820-001-0460. That report summarized the annual DROS Special Account revenues and expenditures, DROS-related programs, DROS application receipt information, the fees then charged, and the average cost of processing each application. Claiming that expert staff and necessary funding were unavailable, however, the report did not provide the necessary comprehensive examination into the DOJ's fee structure to determine whether the DROS "fee" was recovering actual costs of the DROS program, or what aspects of it, or if adjustments to the amount of the fee were appropriate.
89. In 2003, Assembly Bill 161 passed by only $60.2 \%$ of the vote of both houses (i.e., significantly less than two-thirds of all members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature).
90. Assembly Bill 161 removed the prohibition on using revenues from the DROS "fee" to "directly fund or as a loan to fund any program not specified," thereby allowing DOJ to use these funds collected firearm transactions for any "regulatory and enforcement activit[y] related to the sale, purchase, loan, or
transfer of firearms." ${ }^{7}$
91. As Assembly Bill 161 made its way through the legislative process, the Bill's sponsor argued that it did not expand the use of DROS "fees," but merely clarified their use. ${ }^{8}$
92. The Bill Analysis of Assembly Bill 161 also indicates the Legislature relied on the Legislative Counsel's opinion that DROS "fee" revenues could not be used to fund the activities mandated by Assembly Bill 2080.
93. The enactment of section $12076(\mathrm{e})(10)[28225(\mathrm{~b})(11)]$ expanded the scope of section 12076(e) [28225(a)-(c)], providing a "catch-all" to ensure that those programs (i.e., those sections listed in section 12076(g) [28235]) could be supported by DROS "fees" in the DROS Special Account.
94. Noting that the DOJ's previous reports lacked sufficient detail, on January 26, 2004, Senator Morrow submitted a written request to the JLAC, seeking a formal audit of the DROS Special Account. That request was heard a month later. ${ }^{9}$
95. A year after Assembly Bill 161 passed and expanded the list of activities that DROS funds could be spent on, the DOJ adopted California Code of Regulations, title 11, section 4001, which increased the cap on DROS "fees" as described above. No support was provided by DOJ tying the $\$ 5$ increase of the maximum fee (from $\$ 14$ to $\$ 19$ ) to the CCPI, nor was any support provided by DOJ justifying the $\$ 15$ fee as necessary to cover its costs relating to the sale of an additional handgun.

[^4]96. California Code of Regulations, title 11, section 4001 remained in effect without any attempts by DOJ to amend it to raise or lower the fee, until 2010 when the DOJ issued a notice of proposed rulemaking stating its intent to lower the maximum fee allowed from $\$ 19$ to the pre-2004 emergency regulation amount of \$14.
97. The 2010 initial statement of reasons concerning the proposed rulemaking indicated that "although the volume of DROS transactions has increased, the average time spent on each DROS, and thus the processing cost, has decreased." ${ }^{10}$ It also noted that "[ $[$ ]he proposed regulations [would] lower the current $\$ 19$ DROS "fee" to $\$ 14$, commensurate with the actual cost of processing a DROS." ${ }^{11}$ (emphasis added).
98. Ultimately, the 2010 proposed rulemaking was not adopted, presumably so that DOJ would continue obtaining a windfall from DROS "fee" revenues to fund present and future government activities. ${ }^{12}$
99. After rejection of the proposed decrease in the DROS fee, Plaintiff NRA

[^5]submitted a request under the California Public Records Act to the DOJ Bureau of Firearms, seeking all writings constituting, referring or relating to (1) the DOJ's policies and procedures for the handling and management of the DROS Special Account since January 1, 2000, and (2) a detailed accounting of the DROS Special Account for the same period.
100. An attorney with the DOJ Bureau of Firearms responded that there was no present way to compile the information sought, that no current audit of the DROS Special Account exists, that an official audit would be required, and that the Legislature has no money to initiate one.
101. Plaintiff NRA was provided, however, with a list of services the DOJ Bureau of Firearms provides using monies from the DROS Special Account, a table summarizing the statutory and regulatory authority for the "fees" charged and services provided, a table summarizing DROS Special Account annual revenues and expenditures since 2001, and a summary of the number of long-gun and handgun transactions for which DROS "fees" were collected during the same period.
102. In 2011, Plaintiff NRA sent the DOJ a follow-up request under the Public Records Act, seeking records explaining what constituted "DROS enforcement activities" as identified in the table DOJ previously disclosed that summarized its purported authority for the "fees" charged and services provided. Plaintiff NRA also requested other documents, including ledgers identifying individual transactions since 2001. The DOJ again asserted that no such accounting exists, raised numerous privilege grounds, and denied PLAINTIFF NRA's request.

## THE FEDERAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM

103. The federal government has in place the National Instant Criminal Background Check System ("NICS").
104. Mandated by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 ("the Brady Act"), Public Law 103-159, NICS was established so that an FFL could
contact federal agents by telephone or other electronic means and immediately determine whether the transferee is prohibited from receiving firearms under Section $922(\mathrm{~g})$ or (n) of Title 18, United States Code or state law.
105. NICS provides full service to FFLs in 30 states, five U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia. ${ }^{13}$ Located at the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CnS) Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia, NICS processes background checks for the FFLs in those states that have declined to serve as points of contact for NICS. A "point of contact" state is one that conducts for itself all or part of the background checks for that state's FFLs.
106. Upon a would-be purchaser's completion of the required federal Form 4473, FFLs contact NICS via a toll-free telephone number, or electronically on the Internet through the NICS E-Check System, to request a background check. NICS is customarily available 17 hours a day, seven days a week, including holidays (except for Christmas). The FFL will typically receive a response that the transfer may proceed or is delayed within 30 seconds.
107. As a point of contact state that has opted out of the NICS system, California conducts its own background checks for California firearm purchases, for which (at least in part) ${ }^{14}$ it charges the DROS "fee."
108. In comparison to California's DROS system, a NICS check, as a part of the Criminal Justice Information Services Division of the FBI, costs a firearm purchaser nothing. The background checks conducted by NICS are paid by the

[^6]funds appropriated to the FBI by Congress. ${ }^{15}$

## GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

109. Individual PLAINTIFFS BAUER, WARKENTIN, HACKER, FERRY, and ADLEY, and those persons represented by organizational PLAINTIFFS NRA and CRPA FOUNDATION, have each been required to, and have in fact paid each and all of the Challenged Fees before taking possession of firearms purchased from an FFL or transferred through an FFL, as a private party transfer.
110. The funds from the Challenged Fees PLAINTIFFS paid were ultimately surrendered to DEFENDANTS' control, and deposited into the DROS Special Account.

## I. Excessive Fees Are Being Imposed on the Exercise of a Constitutional Right

111. The fundamental right to possess firearms for protection includes a corresponding right to acquire a firearm.
112. The Challenged "Fees," which DOJ generally requires be paid before a purchaser can acquire a firearm, are unconstitutional and illegal prerequisites on the exercise of the fundamental right to acquire a firearm.
113. The Challenged "Fees" are unconstitutional because they are imposed for the purpose of funding, and in fact do fund, activities not reasonably related to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.
114. The Challenged "Fees" are unconstitutional because they are not calculated to defray the expenses of policing activities reasonably related to the legitimate government interests that concern the regulation of lawful firearm

[^7]transactions.

## A. The "Fees" Imposed Are Used For Purposes Unrelated to Regulating a Legitimate Interest

## 1. The "DROS 'Fee""

115. DOJ is spending revenues from the DROS "fee" on activities unrelated to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.
116. DEFENDANTS are using revenues from the DROS "fee" to fund all those activities enumerated at section $12076(\mathrm{~g})$ [28235]. ${ }^{16}$
117. The activities listed in 12076(g) [28235]; namely inspections of Short-Barreled Long Gun Permit-holders (Cal. Penal Code § 12099) [33320], retesting of handguns certified as "not unsafe" (Cal. Penal Code § 12131(c)) [32020], inspections of Machine Gun Permit-holders (Cal. Penal Code § 12234) [32670], inspections of "Assault Weapon" Permit- holders (Cal. Penal Code § 12289.5) [31110], and inspections of Destructive Device Permit-holders (Cal. Penal Code § 12305(f)-(g) [18910], are unrelated to the regulation of lawful firearm purchases and purchasers, like PLAINTIFFS.
118. The activities listed in 12076(g) [28235] cannot constitutionally be funded by "fees" paid by lawful firearm purchasers, like PLAINTIFFS.
119. Section $12076(\mathrm{~g})$ [28235] - by authorizing the expenditure of revenues from the DROS "fee" on the activities listed therein - on its face places the burden of funding activities that are, unrelated to any legitimate government interest as to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions on lawful firearm purchasers exercising a constitutional right, instead of the general public.
120. DOJ is improperly spending revenues from the DROS "fee" on general

[^8]law enforcement activities beyond those listed in 12076(g) [28235], which are unrelated to any legitimate government interest as to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.

## 2. The HSC Exam and Section 12076.5 [28300] "Fees"

121. Penal Code Sections 12805(e) [31650(c)] and 12076.5(a) [28300(a)-(b)] - by authorizing the expenditure of revenues from their respective "fee" on enforcing general criminal laws including laws regulating machine guns, "assault weapons," destructive devices, tear gas, silencers, etc. - on their face, place the burden of funding activities unrelated to any legitimate government interest as to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions on lawful firearm purchasers, instead of the general public.
122. Regulation of machine guns, "assault weapons," destructive devices, tear gas, silencers, etc. bears no reasonable relationship to the regulation of lawful firearm purchases and purchasers, like PLAINTIFFS.
123. Many activities provided for in Penal Code Sections 12805(e) [31650(c)] and 12076.5(a) [28300(a)-(b)] - including those regulating machine guns, "assault weapons," destructive devices, tear gas, silencers, etc. - cannot constitutionally be funded by "fees" charged under this section.
124. DOJ is spending revenues from the HSC Exam "fee" on activities unrelated to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.
125. DOJ is spending revenues from the Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fee" on activities unrelated to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.
126. Despite being, at least in part, for the purpose of "implementing and enforcing" the Handgun Safety Certificate Program, the Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fee" is charged to purchasers of long-guns as well, some of whom may not even own a handgun.

## 3. The $\$ 1$ "Fee"

127. DOJ is spending revenues from the $\$ 1$ "fee," on activities unrelated to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.
128. Law-abiding firearm purchasers like PLAINTIFFS are not just being required to internalize the full social costs of their choice to exercise their fundamental Second Amendment rights, but also those costs of choices made by others, including special weapon permittee holders (e.g., machine gun permits) and criminal users of completely unrelated firearms - much as if, for instance, all speakers were charged a fee that would be used to compensate those libeled by a small subset of speakers, or to subsidize those who engage in rallies or marches for causes that are unsupported by, or unavailable to, the payer.
129. The costs incurred by the DOJ in the licensing of special weapon permits and general law enforcement activities, unrelated to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions, cannot constitutionally fall on the shoulders of lawful firearm transferees via a fee.
130. The Challenged "Fees" unconstitutionally infringe on PLAINTIFFS' fundamental right to acquire firearms.

## II. The Challenged "Fees" Are Unconstitutionally Excessive and Illegal

131. Regardless of whether the "fees" are reasonably related to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions, they are still unconstitutionally excessive.

## A. The DROS "Fee"

132. The DROS "fee" is unconstitutionally excessive.
133. Between 2004 and 2010, the DROS Special Account has sustained an average surplus exceeding $\$ 2$ million annually.
134. The revenues making up the surplus in the DROS Special Account were, at least in part, generated from the DROS "fee."
135. The DROS "fee" exceeds the costs of DOJ's valid regulatory activities as to lawful firearm transactions. In explaining its proposal to lower the DROS "fee" in 2010, the DOJ stated "[t]he proposed regulations [would] lower the current $\$ 19$ DROS "fee" to $\$ 14$, commensurate with the actual cost of processing a DROS." ${ }^{17}$
136. The amount of the surplus funds in the DROS Special Account is so high that the DROS "fee" is not set at an amount "reasonably necessary" to cover only valid regulatory programs.
137. There is nothing requiring DOJ to charge the maximum amount statutorily allowed for a DROS "fee" (\$19), as the DOJ has the discretion to impose the fee in the first place (or a lesser amount commensurate with covering its costs).
138. DEFENDANTS have generally charged the maximum amount allowed by statute for the DROS "fee."
139. There is no reasonable support tying the DROS "fee" amount DOJ decides to charge to DOJ's actual, constitutionally valid regulatory costs.
140. The DROS "fee" exceeds the amount necessary to reimburse the DOJ for the costs of furthering any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.

## B. The HSC Exam and Section 12076.5 [28300] "Fees"

141. The HSC Exam "fee" is unconstitutionally excessive.
142. The "fee" authorized by Penal Code Section 12076.5 [28300] is unconstitutionally excessive.
143. DEFENDANTS generally impose the maximum "fee" of $\$ 15.00$ on certified instructors for every (with few exceptions) HSC exam, who in turn generally charge the $\$ 15$ to the individual obtaining the HSC, as allowed by law.

[^9]144. DEFENDANTS generally impose the maximum fee allowed by Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] of $\$ 5.00$ (with few exceptions) on each individual handgun transaction and every long-gun transaction, no matter how many long-guns it involves.
145. There is no reasonable support tying the HSC Exam "fee" amount DOJ decides to charge to DOJ's actual, constitutionally valid regulatory costs.
146. There is no support tying the Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fee" amount DOJ decides to charge to DOJ's actual, constitutionally valid regulatory costs.
147. The Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund, in which revenues from the HSC Exam and Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fees" are supposedly maintained, has a substantial annual surplus.

## C. The $\$ 1$ "Fee"

148. The imposition of the $\$ 1$ "fee" is unconstitutionally excessive.
149. The Firearms Safety Account, in which revenues from the $\$ 1$ "fee" are supposedly maintained, has a substantial annual surplus.
150. There is no reasonable support tying the $\$ 1$ "fee" DOJ imposes to DOJ's actual, constitutionally valid regulatory costs.

## III. Section 3 - Unconstitutional Taxes

151. Under the test laid out in Sinclair Paint Co., the Challenged Fees are invalid "taxes" on lawful firearm purchasers, in violation of the California Constitution.

## A. The DROS "Fee"

152. The DROS "fee," as currently set, imposed, managed and spent by DOJ is an illegal "tax" under California law.
153. The assessment of the DROS "fee" exceeds the reasonable cost of the valid regulatory activities funded by the revenues it generates.
154. Many of the services funded by the DROS "fee" do not bear a sufficient relationship to the "fee" payer's (i.e., firearm purchaser's) burdens on or benefits
from those services.
155. There is no reasonable nexus between a lawful firearm purchaser (i.e., the payer of the "fee") and criminal firearm misuse in general, or the administration of special-permit weapon issueance and use. Nonetheless, these programs and services performed by DEFENDANTS are funded using revenues from the DROS "fee."
156. The DROS "fee" is levied, at least in part, to generate revenue, rather than solely for legitimate government interests as to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.
157. The general law enforcement activities funded by revenues from the DROS "fee" purportedly benefit society as a whole, not just lawful firearm purchasers.
158. The DROS "fee" is levied to generate revenue for general governmental and law enforcement activities.

## B. The HSC Exam "Fee"

159. The HSC Exam "fee," as currently managed by DOJ, is a "tax" under California law.
160. The assessment of the HSC Exam "fee" exceeds the reasonable cost of the valid regulatory activities funded by the revenues it generates.
161. Many of the services allegedly funded by the HSC Exam "fee" do not bear a sufficient relationship to the "fee" payer's (i.e., firearm purchaser's) burdens on or benefits from those services.
162. There is no reasonable nexus between lawful firearm purchasers (i.e., the payer of the "fee") and criminal firearm misuse, or special-permit weapon use. Nonetheless, these programs and services are performed by DEFENDANTS using revenues from the HSC Exam "fee."
163. The HSC Exam "fee" is levied, at least in part, to generate revenue, rather than solely for legitimate government interests as to the regulation of lawful
firearm transactions.
164. The general law enforcement activities funded by revenues from the HSC Exam "fee" benefit society as a whole, not just lawful firearm purchasers.
165. The HSC Exam "fee" is levied to generate revenue for general governmental activities.
C. The "Fee" Authorized by Penal Code Section 12076.5 [28300]
166. The Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fee," as currently managed by DOJ, is a "tax" under California law.
167. The assessment of the Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fee" exceeds the reasonable cost of the valid regulatory activities funded by the revenues it generates.
168. Many of the services allegedly funded by the Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fee" do not bear a sufficient relationship to the "fee" payer's (i.e., firearm purchaser's) burdens on or benefits from those services.
169. There is no reasonable nexus between lawful firearm purchasers (i.e., the payer of the "fee") and criminal firearm use, or the issuance of special weapons permits. Nonetheless, these programs and services performed by DEFENDANTS are funded using revenues from the Section 12076.5 [28300(c)].
170. Despite being, at least in part, for the purpose of "implementing and enforcing" the Handgun Safety Certificate Program, the Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fee" is charged to purchasers of long-guns as well, some of whom may not even own a handgun.
171. The Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fee" is levied, at least in part, to generate revenue, rather than solely for legitimate government interests as to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.
172. The general law enforcement activities funded by revenues from the Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fee" purportedly benefit society as a whole, not just lawful firearm purchasers.
173. The Section 12076.5 [28300(c)] "fees" are levied to generate revenue for general governmental activities.

## D. The $\$ 1$ "Fee"

174. The $\$ 1$ "fee" as currently managed by DOJ, is a "tax" under California law.
175. The assessment of the $\$ 1$ "fee" exceeds the reasonable cost of the valid regulatory activities funded by the revenues it generates.
176. Many of the services allegedly funded by the $\$ 1$ "fee" do not bear a sufficient relationship to the "fee" payer's (i.e., firearm purchaser's) burdens on or benefits from those services.
177. There is no reasonable nexus between lawful firearm purchasers (i.e., the payer of the "fee") and criminal firearm use, or the issuance of special weapons permits. Nonetheless, these programs and services performed by DEFENDANTS are funded using revenues from the $\$ 1$ "fee."
178. The $\$ 1$ "fee" is levied, at least in part, to generate revenue, rather than solely for legitimate government interests as to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.
179. The general law enforcement activities funded by revenues from the $\$ 1$ "fee" purportedly benefit society as a whole, not just lawful firearm purchasers.
180. The $\$ 1$ "fee" is levied to generate revenue for general governmental activities.
181. DEFENDANTS cannot meet their burden of proving each of the Challenged "Fees" is not a tax under Section 3.
182. As taxes, each of the Challenged Fees was required to have been adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Legislature; none was.
183. The Challenged Fees are unconstitutionally imposed under the California Constitution, and are invalid and unenforceable.

## DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ALLEGATIONS

184. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties hereto in that PLAINTIFFS contend that the manner in which DOJ currently imposes the Challenged Fees is unlawful. DEFENDANTS continue to choose to require lawful firearm purchasers, including PLAINTIFFS, to pay the maximum amount statutorily allowed for each of the Challenged Fees.
185. PLAINTIFFS desire a judicial declaration of their rights and DEFENDANTS' duties; namely, that the manner in which DOJ currently imposes the Challenged Fees infringes on PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights.
186. PLAINTIFFS further desire a judicial declaration that the Challenged Fees are illegal "taxes" under Section 3 of Article XIIIA of the California Constitution, and that, as such, the statutes authorizing their imposition were required to have been adopted by the California Legislature pursuant to a twothirds vote of both houses respectively, and that since none was, each is void and unenforceable.

## INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ALLEGATIONS

187. If an injunction does not issue enjoining DEFENDANTS from imposing each of the Challenged Fees as currently imposed, PLAINTIFFS will be irreparably harmed. PLAINTIFFS are presently and continuously injured by the assessment of the Challenged Fees" insofar as they constitute unreasonable and unrelated preconditions on the exercise of PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights.
188. If not enjoined by this Court, DEFENDANTS will continue to enforce the Challenged Fees in derogation of PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights.
189. If an injunction does not issue enjoining DEFENDANTS from enforcing Penal Code sections 12076(g) [28235], 12076.5 [28300], and 12805(e) [31650(c)], PLAINTIFFS will be irreparably harmed. PLAINTIFFS are presently and continuously injured by the enforcement of these sections insofar as such
enforcement utilizes revenues from assessments charged solely to lawful firearm purchases for purposes not reasonably related thereto.
190. If an injunction does not issue enjoining DEFENDANTS from enforcing California Penal Code sections 12076(e) [28225(a)-(c)], 12076.5 [28300], 12088.9 [23690], and 12805(e) [31650(c)]), PLAINTIFFS will be irreparably harmed. PLAINTIFFS are presently and continuously injured by the enforcement of these sections insofar as each constitutes an unlawful tax under the California Constitution.
191. PLAINTIFFS have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Damages are indeterminate or unascertainable and, in any event, would not fully redress any harm suffered by PLAINTIFFS as a result of DEFENDANTS subjecting PLAINTIFFS to the illegal Challenged Fees as a precondition to exercise their constitutional right to acquire firearms.
192. Injunctive relief would eliminate PLAINTIFFS' irreparable harm and allow PLAINTIFFS to acquire firearms free from the unlawful assessments and taxes in accordance with their rights under the Second Amendment and the California Constitution.
193. Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: VALIDITY OF ALL CHALLENGED "FEES"
Violation of the Second Amendment Right to Keep and Bear Arms (U.S. Const., Amends. II and XIV)
(By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)
194. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
195. DEFENDANTS have imposed, and continue to impose, the Challenged Fees at an excessive amount beyond what is necessary to defray its valid regulatory expenses, use the resulting windfall revenues to fund activities unrelated to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions. In doing so, DEFENDANTS are abusing their discretion, applying
the "fees" in an unconstitutional manner, and propagating customs, policies, and practices that infringe on PLAINTIFFS' right to acquire firearms as guaranteed by the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
196. DEFENDANTS cannot satisfy their burden of justifying these customs, policies, and practices that infringe PLAINTIFFS' rights.
197. PLAINTIFFS are entitled to injunctive relief against DEFENDANTS and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction, enjoining them from engaging in such customs, policies, and practices.

## SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

FACIAL VALIDITY OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTIONS 12076(G)
[28235], 12076.5(A), [28300], \& 12805(E) [31650(C)]
Violation of the Second Amendment Right to Keep and Bear Arms
(U.S. Const., Amends. $\mathbf{H}$ and XIV)
(By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)
198. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
199. By expressly authorizing DOJ to use revenues from the Challenged Fees to fund activities unrelated to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm transactions, California Penal Code sections 12076(g) [28235], 12076.5(a) [28300(a)-(b)], and 12805(e) [31650(c)] are unconstitutional on their face.
200. PLAINTIFFS are entitled to permanent injunctive relief against DEFENDANTS, or any of their officers, agents; servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction, enjoining them from enforcing, or acting pursuant to, California Penal Code sections 12076(g) [28235], 12076.5(a) [28300], or 12805(e) [31650(c)].

## THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

 VALIDITY OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTIONS $12076(\mathrm{e}) \&(\mathrm{~g}), 12076.5$ [28300], 12088.9 [23690], and 12805(e) [31650(c)] Violation of California Proposition 13 (California Const., Art. XIIIA, Sec. 3) (By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)201. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
202. Because California Penal Code sections 12076(e) \& (g), 12076.5 [28300], 12088.9 [23690], and 12805(e) [31650(c)] provide for excessive government assessments to be levied against lawful firearm purchasers, the revenues from which are used for activities unrelated to lawful firearm purchases, each of these sections constitute a "tax" under the California Constitution, and were thus required to have been adopted by the California Legislature pursuant to a two-thirds vote of both legislative houses respectively, and since none was, each is void and unenforceable.
203. PLAINTIFFS are thus entitled to permanent injunctive relief against DEFENDANTS, and any of their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction, enjoining them from enforcing, or acting pursuant to, California Penal Code sections 12076(e) [28225(a)-(c)], 12076.5 [28300], 12088.9 [23690], and 12805(e) [31650(c)].

## PRAYER

WHEREFORE PLAINTIFFS pray for relief as follows:

1) For a declaration that the Challenged Fees as currently imposed by DEFENDANTS infringe upon the right to acquire firearms protected by the Second Amendment, as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, by impermissibly preconditioning the exercise of that right on the payment of an excessive assessment, the revenues from which are being used to fund activities unrelated to any legitimate government interest that concerns the regulation of lawful firearm
transactions, and that as such are invalid and cannot be imposed;
2) For a preliminary and permanent prohibitory injunction forbidding DEFENDANTS and its agents, employees, officers, and representatives from imposing the Challenged Fees without first limiting the activities for which their revenues are used to only those activities concerning a legitimate government interest as to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions, and reducing their amounts to be commensurate with the actual costs of those activities.
3) For a declaration that California Penal Code sections 12076(g) [28235], 12076.5(a) [28300], or 12805(e) [31650(c)] violate the Second Amendment on their face.
4) For a preliminary and permanent prohibitory injunction forbidding DEFENDANTS and its agents, employees, officers, and representatives, from enforcing, or acting pursuant to, California Penal Code sections 12076(g) [28235], 12076.5(a) [28300], or 12805(e) [31650(c)].
5) For a declaration that California Penal Code sections 12076 (e) \& (g) [28225(a)-(c), 28235], 12076.5 [28300], 12088.9 [23690] and 12805(e) [31650(c)] are illegal taxes under Article XIIIA, Section 3 of the California Constitution.
6) For a preliminary and permanent prohibitory injunction forbidding DEFENDANTS and its agents, employees, officers, and representatives, from enforcing, or acting pursuant to, California Penal Code sections 12076(e) \& (g) [28225(a)-(c), 28235], 12076.5 [28300], 12088.9 [23690] and 12805(e) [31650(c)].
7) For an order enjoining DEFENDANTS from charging or collecting the Challenged Fees in illegally excessive amounts, and from appropriating the Challenged Fees for purposes unrelated to legitimate government interests as to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions.
8) For remedies available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, California Code of Civil Procedure $\S 1021.5$ and/or other applicable state and federal law;
9) For such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

Dated: August 25, $2011 \quad$ Michel \& Associates, P.C.
$\frac{\text { /s/ C. D. Michel }}{\text { C. D. Michel }}$
Attorney for the Plaintiffs'

## EXHIBIT B

C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258

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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT <br> FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA FRESNO BRANCH COURTHOUSE 

BARRY BAUER, STEPHEN
WARKENTIN, NICOLE FERRY, LELAND ADLEY, JEFFREY HACKER, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., CALIFORNIA RIFLE PISTOL) ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, HERB BAUER SPORTING GOÓDS, INC.

Plaintiffs
vs.
KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General For the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, and DOES 110.

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS, by and through their undersigned attorneys, bring this Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against the above-named Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office (collectively "DEFENDANTS"), and in support thereof allege the following: FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJÚNCTIVE RELIEF

## INTRODUCTION

1. This case involves an important constitutional principle, that a state may not impose a fee on the People as a precondition to their enjoyment of a fundamental right secured by the federal constitution if the fee either exceeds the state's costs of regulating the fee payer's exercise of that right or the fee is used to finance state activities not reasonably related to such regulations.
2. Vindication of this principle requires enjoinment of DEFENDANTS' current implementation of its fee system for lawful firearm transactions, since it imposes fees that are both excessive and are improperly used to fund general law enforcement activities bearing no reasonable nexus to firearm purchasers nor valid regulations of their constitutionally protected activity.
3. California statutes confer on DEFENDANTS ${ }^{1}$ the authority to impose multiple, separate fees on the purchasers ${ }^{2}$ of firearms. Payment of these fees is mandatory before one can receive a firearm. DEFENDANTS have discretion as to whether to charge these fees and in what amount to charge them, up to a statutorily imposed cap.
4. DEFENDANTS' imposition of these fees, and in some cases the very statutes conferring the authority on DEFENDANTS to spend the revenues from the fees on extraneous matters, violates PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights.
5. When a person wishes to obtain a firearm in California, state law generally requires the person to obtain the firearm through a federally licensed California firearm vendor (commonly known as an "FFL").

[^10]6. In doing so, the would-be purchaser must, among other things, fill out a Dealer's Record of Sale form ("DROS"), the information from which is used by DEFENDANTS to conduct a background check and confirm the would-be purchaser may lawfully receive firearms before he or she can take possession of any firearm. In the case of a handgun, the information is also used to register the handgun to the purchaser in DEFENDANTS' Automated Firearm System ("AFS").
7. DEFENDANTS have statutory discretion to charge firearm purchasers a mandatory fee for processing each DROS, along with two additional fees, for every firearm transaction. And, in the case of a handgun, California requires purchasers to have a valid Handgun Safety Certificate, for which DEFENDANTS may impose yet another fee.
8. DEFENDANTS collect these fees through the FFL at the time of purchase and currently exercise their discretion by uniformly charging the statutorily allowed maximum amount for each of the Challenged Fees.
9. PLAINTIFFS bring this suit to challenge the constitutionality of DEFENDANTS' imposition of these fees levied on the transfer of firearms; specifically, those fees provided for by California Penal Code sections 28225(a)-(c) [12076(e)], 28300(c) [12076.5(b)], 23690(a) [12088.9(a)], and 31650(c) [12805(e)] (collectively, the "Challenged Fees"). ${ }^{3}$
10. Each of the Challenged Fees as currently imposed by DEFENDANTS infringes on PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights, both because DEFENDANTS charge the fees in excessive amounts and because they improperly

[^11]utilize the fees' windfall revenues to finance general law enforcement activities unrelated to the regulation of lawful firearm purchases.
11. It is not just PLAINTIFFS' contention alone that the Challenged Fees are excessive as currently imposed. DEFENDANTS themselves have admitted as recently as 2010 that at least one of the Challenged Fees is too high. And, the accounts containing the revenues amassed from the Challenged Fees, which DEFENDANTS manage, regularly run multi-million dollar annual surpluses when constitutional principles limit such government assessments to the reasonable cost of regulating the activity on which the fee is imposed.
12. Nor is it just PLAINTIFFS' contention alone that revenues from the Challenged Fees are used for purposes beyond regulating lawful firearm purchasers. DEFENDANTS' history of supporting legislation to expand the list of activities for which DEFENDANTS may use revenues from the Challenged Fees, demonstrates DEFENDANTS' past and continuing use of the Challenged Fees' revenues unconstitutionally.
13. Most notable is a recent amendment to the California Penal Code adding mere possession of firearms to that list, ${ }^{4}$ thereby forcing lawful firearm purchasers to finance any law enforcement operation concerning unlawful firearm possession. This is tantamount to the government charging a fee to all speakers and the funds being used to subsidize law enforcement programs targeting a small subset of speakers who scream "fire" in a crowded theater.
14. Despite the significant surpluses from their revenues and the use of those revenues on activities unrelated to regulating lawful firearm transfers, DOJ chooses to charge the maximum amounts statutorily allowed for the Challenged Fees.
15. Concomitant to their as applied challenge to DEFENDANTS' imposition of the Challenged Fees, PLAINTIFFS facially challenge certain California Penal

[^12]Code sections that expressly allow the unlawful expenditure of the Challenged Fees' revenues; specifically, California Penal Code sections 28235, 28225, 31650, and 28300.
16. Because the Challenged Fees and their related statutes affect constitutionally protected activity, irreparable harm is presumed. Accordingly, the following relief from this Court is warranted:
(a) a declaration that the Challenged Fees as currently imposed by DEFENDANTS are unconstitutionally excessive, and an injunction prohibiting DEFENDANTS from collecting the Challenged Fees until they reduce them to non-excessive amounts;
(b) a declaration that DEFENDANTS' use of revenues from the Challenged Fees on special weapon permitting and general law enforcement activities not reasonably related to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions is unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting DEFENDANTS from using those revenues on such activities; and
(c) a declaration that the California Penal Code statutes with provisions authorizing DEFENDANTS' improper expenditures of the Challenged Fees' revenues on activities not reasonably related to the regulation of lawful firearm transactions are facially unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting DEFENDANTS from acting pursuant to those statutes.

## JURISDICTION and VENUE

17. Jurisdiction of this action is founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, in that this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that this action seeks to redress the deprivation, under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of the State of California and political subdivisions thereof, of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and by

Acts of Cong ress.
18. PLAINTIFFS' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. $\S \S 2201$ and 2202.
19. Venue in this judicial district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district.

## PARTIES

## I. Plaintiffs

20. Plaintiff BARRY BAUER is a resident, property owner, and taxpayer of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, Plaintiff BAUER has lawfully purchased firearms, including both handguns and long-guns, for which he has had to pay each of the Challenged Fees. Plaintiff BAUER intends to continue to purchase firearms through an FFL in the future.
21. Plaintiffs STEPHEN WARKENTIN and JEFFREY HACKER are residents, property owners, and taxpayers of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, each has purchased multiple firearms from both an FFL and a private party, through an FFL as required by California Penal Code § 26500 [12070]. These transactions have consisted of both handguns and long-guns. Some of these transactions involved a single firearm, while others involved multiple handguns (by way of private party transfers), multiple long-guns, and a combination of a handgun and a long-gun. Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER intend to continue their pattern of regularly purchasing firearms through an FFL in the future.
22. For each of their transactions, Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER have paid all fees California requires for firearm transfers described below. Accordingly, each of them has paid $\$ 50$ in state fees for a transaction including a single handgun and a single long-gun, $\$ 46$ for a transaction including two handguns, and $\$ 25$ for transactions involving a single firearm or multiple long-
guns. ${ }^{5}$ Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER have had to pay the Challenged Fees multiple times in the same year, and, in some cases, the same month. Also, Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER have each had to pay California's $\$ 15$ fee to obtain a Handgun Safety Certificate once within the last five years.
23. Plaintiff NICOLE FERRY is a resident of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, Plaintiff FERRY has purchased handguns from an FFL for self-defense and target practice. For each of her transactions, Plaintiff FERRY has paid all "fees" California requires for firearm transfers described below. Plaintiff FERRY has had to pay California's fees for firearm transfers more than once in the same year. Also, Plaintiff FERRY has had to pay California's $\$ 15$ fee to obtain a Handgun Safety Certificate once within the last five years. Plaintiff FERRY intends to purchase firearms through an FFL in the future.
24. Plaintiff LELAND ADLEY is a resident, property owner, and taxpayer of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, Plaintiff ADLEY has purchased multiple firearms from both an FFL and a private party, through an FFL as required by California Penal Code $\S 26500$ [12070], including both handguns and long-guns.
25. For each of his transactions, Plaintiff ADLEY paid all fees California requires for firearm transfers described below. Plaintiff ADLEY has had to pay California's fees for firearm transfers multiple times in the same year. Also, Plaintiff ADLEY has had to pay California's $\$ 15$ fee to obtain a Handgun Safety Certificate once within the last five years. Plaintiff ADLEY intends to continue his pattern of regularly purchasing firearms through an FFL in the future.
26. Plaintiff NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. (hereafter "NRA") is a non-profit entity classified under section 501(c)(3) of the
${ }^{5}$ See OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY SCHEME, Section II. - "California Fees Imposed on Firearm Sales and Transfers" for an explanation and breakdown of each of these fee amounts.

Internal Revenue Code and incorporated under the laws of New York, with its principal place of business in Fairfax, Virginia. NRA has a membership of approximately 4 million persons. The purposes of NRA include protection of the right of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear firearms for the lawful defense of their families, persons, and property, and from unlawful government regulations and preconditions placed on the exercise of that right. NRA spends its resources on each of those activities. NRA brings this action on behalf of itself and its hundreds of thousands of members in California, including Plaintiffs BAUER, WARKENTIN, ADLEY, and HACKER, who have been, are being, and will in the future be subjected to DEFENDANTS' imposition of the Challenged Fees.

## 27. Plaintiff CALIFORNIA RIFLE AND PISTOL ASSOCIATION

 FOUNDATION ("CRPA FOUNDATION") is a non-profit entity classified under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and incorporated under California law, with headquarters in Fullerton, California. Contributions to the CRPA FOUNDATION are used for the direct benefit of Californians. Funds contributed to and granted by CRPA FOUNDATION benefit a wide variety of constituencies throughout California, including gun collectors, hunters, target shooters, law • enforcement, and those who choose to own a firearm to defend themselves and their families. The CRPA FOUNDATION spends its resources seeking to raise awareness about unconstitutional laws, defend and expand the legal recognition of the rights protected by the Second Amendment, promote firearms and hunting safety, protect hunting rights, enhance marksmanship skills of those participating in shooting sports, and educate the general public about firearms. The CRPA FOUNDATION supports law enforcement and various charitable, educational, scientific, and other firearms-related public interest activities that support and defend the Second Amendment rights of all law-abiding Americans.28. In this suit, the CRPA FOUNDATION represents the interests of its many citizen and taxpayer members and members of its related association the California

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Rifle and Pistol Association who reside in California and who wish to sell or purchase firearms, or who have sold or purchased firearms, and have been charged fees imposed by the laws of the State of California associated with those transactions. These members are too numerous to conveniently bring this action individually. The CRPA FOUNDATION brings this action on behalf of itself and its tens of thousands of supporters in California, including Plaintiff BAUER, who have been, are being, and will in the future be subjected to DEFENDANTS' imposition of the Challenged Fees.
29. Plaintiff HERB BAUER SPORTING GOODS, INC., is a California corporation with its principal place of business in the County of Fresno, California. It is a licensed firearms dealer under both federal and California law (i.e., an FFL) that sells a variety of firearms, including both long-guns and handguns. California law requires Plaintiff HERB BAUER to collect the Challenged Fees for DOJ, at DOJ's direction, from firearm transferees. Accordingly, Plaintiff HERB BAUER is injured by its being forced to facilitate DEFENDANTS' unlawful fee collection activities.
30. The individual PLAINTIFFS identified above are residents and taxpayers of California from the City and County of Fresno who have been required to pay the Challenged Fees in violation of their rights and applicable law.
31. Each of the associational PLAINTIFFS identified above has individual members who are citizens and taxpayers of California, including in Fresno County, who have an acute interest in purchasing firearms and do not wish to pay unlawful fees, taxes, or other costs associated with that purchase and thus have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief to halt or reduce the imposition or charging of unconstitutional fees. The interests of these members are germane to their respective associations' purposes; and neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested herein requires their members participate in this lawsuit individually.

## II. Defendants

32. Defendant KAMALA HARRIS is the Attorney General of California. She is the chief law enforcement officer of California, and is charged by Article V , Section 13 of the California Constitution with the duty to inform the general public and to supervise and instruct local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies regarding the meaning of the laws of the State, including the Challenged Fees, and to ensure the fair, uniform and consistent enforcement of those laws throughout the state. She is sued in her official capacity.
33. Defendant STEPHEN LINDLEY is the Acting Chief of the DOJ Bureau of Firearms and, as such, is responsible for executing, interpreting, and enforcing the laws of the State of California - as well as its customs, practices, and policies at issue in this lawsuit. He is sued in his official capacity.
34. Defendants HARRIS and LINDLEY (collectively "DEFENDANTS") are responsible for administering and enforcing the Challenged Fees, are in fact presently enforcing the challenge provision against PLAINTIFFS, and will continue to enforce the Challenged Fees against PLAINTIFFS.
35. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise of the DEFENDANTS named herein as DOES 1-10, are presently unknown to PLAINTIFFS, who therefore sue said DEFENDANTS by such fictitious names. PLAINTIFFS pray for leave to amend this Complaint and Petition to show the true names, capacities, and/or liabilities of DOE Defendants if and when they have been determined.

## OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY SCHEME

## I. Constitutional Provisions and Controlling Law

36. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II.
37. The United States Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller, 10
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554 U.S. 570 (2008), that the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an individual civil right to possess firearms for self-defense.
38. The Court soon thereafter held in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025 (2010), that the Second Amendment is incorporated through the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment to restrict state and local governments from infringing on the individual right to keep and bears arms, and confirmed the right is a fundamental one.
39. The right to keep and bear arms for self-defense implies a corresponding right to acquire firearms. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Andrews v: State, 50 Tenn. 165, 178, 8 A. Rep. 8, 13 (1871) (cited approvingly in Heller at 614).
40. In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), the United States Supreme Court indicated that government's authority to levy fees on the exercise of constitutional rights is limited. The Court held that fees charged for licenses to parade on public property, being protected speech activity, can only be of amounts necessary to "meet the expense incident to the administration of the Act and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed." Id. at 577 (emphasis added). Any additional charge above and beyond that rate would be invalid.
41. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), the United States Supreme Court expounded on the principle it enunciated in Cox, holding "[a] state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution" because "a person cannot be compelled to purchase, through a license fee or a license tax, the privilege freely granted by the constitution." Id. at 112. The Murdock Court qualified that general rule by indicating that States may impose a fee when constitutionally protected activity is involved, but only if the fee is imposed "as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question." It is not permissible, however, to impose "a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition" to the "enjoyment of a right granted by the

Federal Constitution" and "unrelated to the scope of the activities of [the fee payer]." Id. at 114.

## II. California Fees Imposed on Firearm Sales and Transfers

42. California confers discretion on DOJ to impose various fees - all of which have a statutory cap - on firearm purchasers, which they must pay as a prerequisite to qualify for receiving a firearm.
A. The Dealer's Record of Sale (DROS) Fee ${ }^{6}$
43. California Penal Code sections 28225(a)-(c) [formerly 12076(e)], 28230 [12076(f)], 28235 [12076(g)], and 28240(a)-(b) [12076(i)], establish the fees associated with a DROS, and govern what the funds collected therefrom can be used for.
44. Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 28225 [12076(e)] provides:

The [DOJ] may require the [FFL] to charge each firearm purchaser a fee not to exceed fourteen dollars (\$14), except that the fee may be increased at a rate not to exceed any increase in the California
Consumer Price Index as compiled and reported by the Department of Industrial Relations.
45. The use of the "may" in subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 28225 [12076(e)] makes clear that DEFENDANTS are not required to charge the maximum fee amount allowed for by that statute, or to even charge any fee at all.
46. Penal Code section 28240(a) [12076(i)(1)] mandates that DOJ charge only one DROS fee for a single transaction on the same date for any number of firearms that are not handguns. This means regardless of the number of long-guns (i.e., rifles and shotguns) an individual purchases at one time, the DOJ charges one DROS fee for all of them.
47. Penal Code section 28240(b) [12076(i)(2)], provides that, in a single

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transaction on the same date for the delivery of any number of handguns, the DOJ must charge a reduced DROS fee for any additional handguns that are part of that same transaction. This means when an individual purchases more than one handgun at the same time, the DOJ charges the DROS fee in full for the first handgun and a reduced DROS fee for each additional handgun.
48. Where an individual purchases a handgun and any number of long-guns at the same time, DOJ charges the purchaser a full DROS fee for each transaction. This means where a long-gun is purchased along with a handgun the purchaser must pay two full DROS fees, one for the handgun and one for the long-gun despite no separate DROS fee being required for additional long-gun purchases and only a reduced DROS fee being required for each additional handgun.
49. The DOJ promulgated California Code of Regulations, Title 11, section 4001, increasing the cap on the DROS fee from $\$ 14$ to $\$ 19$ for the first handgun or any amount of rifles/shotguns in a single transaction, and capping the DROS fee for each additional handgun being purchased along with the first handgun at $\$ 15$.
50. Subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 28225 [12076(e)] further provides that " $[t]$ he [DROS] fee shall be no more than is necessary to fund" the activities enumerated at Penal Code section 28225(b)(1)-(11) [12076(e)(1)-(10)].
51. Penal Code section 28225(b)(11) [12076(e)(10)] purports to authorize the DOJ to use revenues from the DROS fee to fund "the estimated reasonable costs of [DOJ] firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale, purchase, possession, loan, or transfer of firearms."
52. Prior to January 1, 2012, section 28225(b)(11) [12076(e)(10)] did not provide for expenditure of DROS fee revenues on the mere "possession" of firearms. But the Legislature amended that section during the 2011 Legislative session to allow for such, based on its following purported findings:

SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a) California is the first and only state in the nation to establish an
automated system for tracking handgun and assault weapon owners who might fall into a prohibited status.
(b) The California Department of Justice (DOJ) is required to maintain an online database, which is currently known as the Armed Prohibited Persons System, otherwise known as APPS, which cross-references all handgun and assault weapon owners across the state against criminal history records to determine persons who have been, or will become, prohibited from possessing a firearm subsequent to the legal acquisition or registration of a firearm or assault weapon.
(c) The DOJ is further required to provide authorized law enforcement agencies with inquiry capabilities and investigative assistance to determine the prohibition status of a person of interest.
(d) Each day, the list of armed prohibited persons in California grows by about 15 to 20 people. There are currently more than 18,000 armed prohibited persons in California. Collectively, these individuals are believed to be in possession of over 34,000 handguns and 1,590 assault weapons. The illegal possession of these firearms presents a substantial danger to public safety.
(e) Neither the DOJ nor local law enforcement has sufficient resources to confiscate the enormous backlog of weapons, nor can they keep up with the daily influx of newly prohibited persons.
(f) A Dealer Record of Sale fee is imposed upon every sale or transfer of a firearm by a dealer in California. Existing law authorizes the DOJ to utilize these funds for firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale, purchase, loan, or transfer of firearms pursuant to any provision listed in Section 16580 of the Penal Code, but not expressly for the enforcement activities related to possession.
(g) Rather than placing an additional burden on the taxpayers of California to fund enhanced enforcement of the existing armed prohibited persons program, it is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this measure to allow the DOJ to utilize the Dealer Record of Sale Account for the additional, limited purpose of funding enforcement of the Armed Prohibited Persons System.
53. Penal Code section $28230(\mathrm{a})(2)[12076(\mathrm{f})(1)(\mathrm{B})]$ provides for DOJ to also use DROS fee revenues for "the actual processing costs associated with the submission of a [DROS] to the [DOJ]."

## 54. Section 28235 [12076(g)] provides:

All money received by the department pursuant to this article shall be deposited in the Dealers' Record of Sale Special Account of the General Fund, which is hereby created, to be available, upon appropriation by the Legislature, for expenditure by the department to offset the costs incurred pursuant to any of the following:
(a) This article.
(b) Section 18910.
(c) Section 27555.
(d) Subdivisions (d) and (e) of Section 27560.
(e) Article 6 (commencing with Section 28450).
(f) Section 31110.
(g) Section 31115.
(h) Subdivision (a) of Section 32020.
(i) Section 32670.
(j) Section 33320 .
55. The reference to "this article" in section 28235 means Article 3 of Chapter 6 of Title 4 of Part 6 of the California Penal Code (beginning at section 28200 and ending with section 28250), which includes the section providing for imposition of the DROS fee.
56. The activities covered in the Penal Code sections referenced by section 28235 [12076(g)] include: (1) inspections of "Destructive Device" Permit-Holders (Cal. Penal Code § 18910 [12305(f)-(g)]); (2) the California FFL Check Program (Cal. Penal Code § 27555 [12072(f)(1)]); (3) a public education program pertaining to importers of personal handguns (Cal. Penal Code § [27560(d)-(e)]) [12072(f)(2)(D)]; (4) the Centralized List of Exempted FFLs (Cal. Penal Code § 28450, et seq. [12083]); (5) inspections of "Assault Weapon" Permit-Holders (Cal. Penal Code § 31110 [12289.5]); (6) public education program regarding registration of "assault weapons" (Cal. Penal Code § 31115 [12289]); (7) retesting of handguns certified as "not unsafe" (Cal. Penal Code § 32020(a) [12131(c)]); (8) inspections of Machine Gun Permit-Holders (Cal. Penal Code § 32670 [12234]); and (9) inspections of Short-Barreled Long Gun Permit-Holders (Cal. Penal Code § 33320 [12099]).
57. Pursuant to statute, revenue from the DROS fee is supposed to be deposited into the DROS Special Account of the General Fund ("DROS Special

Account"). Cal. Penal Code § 28235 [12076(g)]. ${ }^{7}$

## B. Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund Fees

58. California Penal Code section 28300(a)-(b) [12076.5(a)] provides:
(a) The Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund is hereby established in the State Treasury and shall be administered by the [DOJ].
(b) Notwithstanding Section 13340 of the Government Code, all moneys in the fund are continuously appropriated to the [DOJ], without regard to fiscal years, for the purpose of implementing and enforcing the provisions of Article 2 (commencing with Section 31610) of Chapter 4 of Division 10, enforcing Section 830.95 , Title 2 (commencing with Section 12001) of Part 4, Sections 16000 to 16960 [12070(c)(2)], inclusive, Sections 16970 [12277] to 17230 [12650], inclusive, Sections 17240 [12401] to 21390 [12028(a)], inclusive, and Sections 21590 [12028(a)] to 34370 [12078(a)(5)], inclusive, and for the establishment, maintenance, and upgrading of equipment and services necessary for firearms dealers to comply with Article 2 (commencing with Section 28150 [12077(g)]).
59. The "provisions of Article 2" mentioned in Section 28300(b) concern the Handgun Safety Certificate Program (discussed below) provided for in sections 31610 [12800], et seq.
60. California Penal Code section 830.95 mentioned in Section 28300(b) prohibits picketing while wearing the uniform of a peace officer.
61. Title 2 (commencing with Section 12001) of Part 4 concerns sentence enhancements for convictions of firearm related crimes.
62. The provisions ranging between Section 16000 and 34370 [12078(a)(5)] mentioned in section 28300 (b) as activities funded by the Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund, include all manner of laws regulating "deadly weapons," including not only handguns and long-guns, but also "unsafe
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handguns," machine guns, "assault weapons," destructive devices, ammunition, boobytraps, body armor, tear gas, silencers, switchblade knives, and "less lethal devices."
63. The Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund is funded by revenues generated from two separate fees charged to firearm purchasers.

## 1. The $\$ 5$ Fee

64. California Penal Code Section 28300(c) [12076.5(b)] provides:
(c) The [DOJ] may require firearms dealers to charge each person who obtains a firearm a fee not to exceed five dollars (\$5) for each transaction. Revenues from this fee shall be deposited in the Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund.
65. Section 28300 [12076.5] does not require the DOJ to charge the maximum amount authorized under that statute (i.e., $\$ 5$ ), or to even charge any fee at all.

## 2. The Handgun Safety Certificate Exam Fee (\$15)

66. A would-be handgun purchaser must obtain a Handgun Safety Certificate ("HSC") before a handgun may be legally received. Cal. Penal Code § 31615.
67. To obtain an HSC, a certified instructor (usually the FFL) administers a test for which the certified instructor is charged up to fifteen dollars (\$15) by the DOJ. ${ }^{8}$ The $\$ 15$ fee ("HSC Exam fee") is generally charged to the exam taker by the FFL, as allowed by law.
68. Upon passage of the test, an individual receives an HSC, which is valid for five (5) years, meaning an HSC holder can purchase handguns throughout the 5 -year period the HSC is valid without retaking the test or repaying the HSC Exam Fee. Once the HSC expires (after 5 years) the person would have to pay the HSC Exam Fee and pass the exam again before the person could purchase or receive a handgun.
69. Funds collected from the HSC Exam Fee are placed in the Firearms Safety

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{ }^{8} \text { (Cal. Pen. Code § 31650(c) [12805(e)]) }
$$

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and Enforcement Special Fund. See Cal. Pen. Code § 31650(d) [12805(f)].
70. Section 31650(c) [12805(e)], the statute conferring authority on DOJ to charge the HSC Exam fee, does not require the DOJ charge the maximum amount authorized under that statute, or to even charge any fee at all.
C. Firearm Safety Account Fee (\$1)
71. Penal Code section 23690 [12088.9] provides:
(a)(1) The Department of Justice may require each dealer to charge each firearm purchaser or transferee a fee not to exceed one dollar (\$1) for each firearm transaction.
(2) The fee shall be for the purpose of supporting department program costs related to this act, including the establishment, maintenance, and upgrading of related database systems and public rosters.
(b)(1) There is hereby created within the General Fund the Firearm Safety Account.
(2) Revenue from the fee imposed by subdivision (a) shall be deposited into the Firearm Safety Account and shall be available for expenditure by the Department of Justice upon appropriation by the Legislature.
(3) Expenditures from the Firearm Safety Account shall be limited to program expenditures as defined by subdivision (a).
72. There is no provision in California law requiring DOJ to charge this fee at all.

## D. Legislative History of the DROS Fee and Management of the DROS Special Account

73. The origins of the DROS system and its related fees are believed to go back to sometime in the 1920s.
74. The amount of a DROS fee in and around the year 1990 was $\$ 4.25$. See S.B. 670, 1995-1996 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (as introduced Feb. 22, 1995).
75. By 1995 , the DROS fee had ballooned to $\$ 14.00$, an increase of greater than 300 percent in less than five years. Id.
76. In 1995, the California Legislature passed Senate Bills 670 and 671 to cap the rate for a DROS fee at $\$ 14.00$, with increases "at a rate not to exceed any increase in the California Consumer Price Index." That amendment is reflected in

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Penal Code section 28225(a) [12076(e)] described above.
77. Senate Bill 670 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995) (as enacted) further prohibited the DOJ from using the fee to "directly fund or as a loan to fund any program not specified."
78. In the following years, a trend of appropriating DROS fee revenues to pay for additional activities unrelated to the clearance of the purchaser to buy a firearm or register handguns emerged. A series of bills passed that allowed monies in the DROS Special Account to pay for the ever-expanding list of programs and services found at section 28235 [12076(g)].
79. For example, Assembly Bill 2080 (2002) established a program to address illegal firearms trafficking and authorized its funding from the DROS Special Account. See Penal Code §§ 27555 [12072(f)(1)], 28235 [12076(g)].
80. Assembly Bill 2580 (2002) specifically amended section 28235 [12076(g)] to authorize funding from the DROS Special Account for the inspections of several classes of dangerous weapon permit-holders. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 28235 [12076(g)], 12099 [33320] [inspections of short-barreled long gun permit-holders], 32670 [12234] [inspections of machine gun permit-holders], 31110 [12289.5] [inspections of "assault weapon" permit-holders], 19000 [12305(f)-(g) [inspections of destructive devices permit-holders].
81. Assembly Bill 2902 (2002) specifically amended section 28235 [12076(g)] to authorize funding for the maintenance of the Centralized List of Exempted FFLs and the re-testing of handguns deemed "not unsafe." See Cal. Penal Code §§ 28235 [12076(g)], 12083[28450 et seq. ], 32020 [12131(c)].
82. In 2001, Plaintiff NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION (NRA) requested the Office of California State Auditor ("CSA") to investigate the DOJ's operation of the DROS program, believing that DROS Special Account funds were being misused.
83. CSA responded to Plaintiff NRA's request, stating that an audit of the

DROS program could only be conducted by request from the Joint Legislative Audit Committee ("JLAC"). Plaintiff NRA then began working with members of the Legislature to prepare a request to JLAC for an audit.
84. Before Assembly Bill 2080's final passage in 2002, the Office of . Legislative Counsel was asked by Senator Bill Morrow to opine on whether Assembly Bill 2080 authorized using DROS fee revenues, paid by individual firearms transferees, to support Assembly Bill 2080's purposes.
85. While awaiting the Office of Legislative Counsel's response to that request, then Assemblyman (now Senator) Rod Wright sought information on the DROS Special Account from the DOJ and Legislative Analyst's Office from the Assembly Budget Committee. A week later, the Assembly Budget Subcommittee on State Administration ordered the DOJ to submit a report on the DROS Special Account status. See 2002 Budget Act, Item 0820-001-0460.
86. The first report DOJ submitted to the Assembly Budget Subcommittee on State Administration detailed the status of the DROS Special Account. But no audit of spending was provided.
87. Later that year, the Office of Legislative Counsel responded to Senator Morrow's request regarding expending DROS Fee revenues to support Assembly Bill 2080, with the following analysis:

- Section 28225(b) [12076(e)] provides that the DROS fee be no more than is necessary to reimburse designated program purposes and may not be used to fund any other program;
- Nevertheless, section 28235 [12076(g)] identifies other purposes for which funds in the DROS Special Account may be used;
- Under the rules of statutory construction, section 28235 [12076(g)] refers generally to money in the DROS Special Account, rather than specifically to the revenue from the section 28225(a) [12076(e)] DROS fee;
- Because the DROS Special Account contains funds in addition to fees
obtained pursuant to $28225(\mathrm{~b})(1)-(10)$ [12076(e)], the purposes of section 28235 [12076(g)] may be accomplished without the use of 28225(a) [12076(e)] [DROS] funds;
- Because Assembly Bill 2080 did not amend 28225(a)-(c) [12076(e)] to fund its new purposes, $28235[12076(\mathrm{~g})]$ could not be construed to authorize the expenditure of DROS fees for any purpose not specified in 28225(b) [12076(e)];

88. The Office of Legislative Counsel's response provided its explanation on how it believed 28225 (a)-(c) and 28235 [subsections (e) and (g) of section 12076, respectively] could coexist. Though the Office of Legislative Counsel explained how those sections could coexist, it did not say DOJ was actually limiting expenditures in such a manner.
89. The DOJ and the Legislative Analyst's Office then submitted a supplemental report on the status of the DROS Special Account to the Legislature pursuant to the 2002 Budget Act, Item 0820-001-0460. That report summarized the annual DROS Special Account revenues and expenditures, DROS-related programs, DROS application receipt information, the fees then charged, and the average cost of processing each application. Claiming that expert staff and necessary funding were unavailable, however, the report did not provide the necessary comprehensive examination into the DOJ's fee structure to determine whether the DROS fee was recovering actual costs of the DROS program, or what aspects of it, or if adjustments to the amount of the fee were appropriate. DOJ thus conceded that it was expending millions of dollars without information showing that expenditures of funds from the DROS fee were legally authorized.
90. In 2003, Assembly Bill 161 passed, removing the prohibition on using DROS fee revenues to "directly fund or as a loan to fund any program not specified." AB 161 therefore allowed DOJ to use funds collected from firearm transactions for any "regulatory and enforcement activit[y] related to the sale,

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purchase, loan, or transfer of firearms" regardless of whether the activity related to constitutionally allowable spending. ${ }^{9}$
91. As Assembly Bill 161 made its way through the legislative process, the bill's sponsor argued that it did not expand the use of revenues from the DROS fee, but merely clarified their use. ${ }^{10}$
92. The Bill Analysis of Assembly Bill 161 also indicates the Legislature relied on the Legislative Counsel's opinion that DROS fee revenues could not be used to fund the activities mandated by Assembly Bill 2080.
93. The enactment of section $28225(\mathrm{~b})(11)$ [12076(e)(10)] expanded the scope of section 28225(a)-(c) [12076(e)], providing a "catch-all" to ensure that those programs (i.e., those sections listed in section 28235 [12076(g)]) could be supported by revenues from the DROS fee in the DROS Special Account.
94. Noting that the DOJ's previous reports lacked sufficient detail, on January 26, 2004, Senator Morrow submitted a written request to the JLAC, seeking a formal audit of the DROS Special Account. That request was heard a month later. ${ }^{11}$
95. A year after Assembly Bill 161 passed and expanded the list of activities that DROS funds could be spent on, the DOJ adopted California Code of Regulations, title 11, section 4001, which increased the cap on DROS Fees as described above in Paragraph 49. No support was provided by DOJ tying the $\$ 5$

[^15]increase of the maximum fee (from $\$ 14$ to $\$ 19$ ) to the California Consumer Price Index to which DROS fee increases are statutorily limited, nor was any support provided by DOJ justifying the $\$ 15$ fee as necessary to cover its costs relating to the sale of an additional handgun.
96. California Code of Regulations, title 11, section 4001 remained in effect without any attempts by DOJ to amend it to raise or lower the DROS fee, until 2010 when the DOJ issued a notice of proposed rulemaking stating its intent to lower the maximum fee allowed from $\$ 19$ to the pre-2004 emergency regulation amount of \$14.
97. The 2010 initial statement of reasons concerning the proposed rulemaking indicated that "although the volume of DROS transactions has increased, the average time spent on each DROS, and thus the processing cost, has decreased."12 It also noted that "[ $[$ ]he proposed regulations [would] lower the current $\$ 19$ DROS fee to $\$ 14$, commensurate with the actual cost of processing a DROS." (emphasis added). ${ }^{13}$
98. Ultimately, the 2010 proposed rulemaking was not adopted, thereby allowing DOJ to continue obtaining an invalid windfall from DROS fee revenues to fund present and future government activities.
99. After rejection of the proposed decrease in the DROS fee, Plaintiff NRA submitted a request under the California Public Records Act to the DOJ Bureau of Firearms, seeking all writings constituting, referring or relating to (1) the DOJ's policies and procedures for the handling and management of the DROS Special Account since January 1, 2000, and (2) a detailed accounting of the DROS Special Account for the same period.

[^16]100. An attorney with the DOJ's Bureau of Firearms responded that there was no present way to compile the information sought, that no current audit of the DROS Special Account exists, that an official audit would be required, and that the Legislature has no money to initiate one.
101. Plaintiff NRA was provided, however, with a list of services the DOJ Bureau of Firearms provides using monies from the DROS Special Account, a table summarizing the statutory and regulatory authority for the fees charged and services provided, a table summarizing DROS Special Account annual revenues and expenditures since 2001, and a summary of the number of long-gun and handgun transactions for which the DROS fee was collected during the same period.
102. In 2011, Plaintiff NRA sent the DOJ a follow-up request under the Public Records Act, seeking records explaining what constituted "DROS enforcement activities" as identified in the table DOJ previously disclosed that summarized its purported authority for the fees charged and services provided. Plaintiff NRA also requested other documents, including ledgers identifying individual transactions since 2001. The DOJ again asserted that no such accounting exists, raised numerous privilege grounds, and denied PLAINTIFF NRA's request.
103. Finally, the California Legislature passed and Governor Brown signed into law Senate Bill 819 (Leno). It is effective as of January 1, 2012. SB 819 again expanded the uses to which DROS fee revenues may be put as described in the findings for amending section 28225 (see paragraphs 50-52 above).
DEFENDANTS have admitted SB 819s' purpose and effect of using funds from the DROS fee on activities unrelated to the lawful purchase of a firearm: "To clear the [Armed and Prohibited Persons System] backlog of approximately 34,000 handguns, Attorney General Harris is the sponsor of Senate Bill 819, which would revise the Penal Code to expand the use of existing regulatory fees collected by gun dealers to allow the state [DOJ] to use fee revenue to pay for the APPS program."

Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Seizure of 1,200 Guns from Mentally Unstable and Other Individuals (June 16, 2011) (emphasis added).
104. The history of the DROS fee is thus one of continuous expansion regardless of surrounding circumstances.

## E. Legislative History of the Other Challenged Fees and Management of Their Respective Accounts

## 1. The $\mathbf{\$ 1} \mathbf{F e}$

105. The provision providing for the $\$ 1 \mathrm{Fee}$, section 23690 [section 12088.9] did not come into existence until 2002. It was created by California Assembly Bill 106 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (as enacted) ("AB 106"). Section 23690 [section 12088.9] was not a part of the changes made by AB 106 when it was introduced by Senators Scott and Aroner. Rather, the bill was originally about prohibiting the unlicensed importing of firearms and requiring that all firearms sold, transferred, or delivered for sale by licensed FFLs be accompanied by a firearm safety device and warning label in order to prevent accidental shootings involving children.
106. The $\$ 1$ Fee was not a part of AB 106 until after the bill's fifth amendment, at which time the author decided to include it "for the purpose of supporting various department program costs related to firearms safety and registration." Sen. Comm. on Pub. Safety, Bill Analysis: Firearms - Safety Devices, at 6-7 (June 22, 1999) available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/ 99-00/bill/asm/ab 0101-0150/ab 106 cfa 19990622 133507 sen comm.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).

## 2. The $\mathbf{\$ 5}$ Fee

107. Not satisfied with the revenue generated from the $\$ 1$ Fee for financing DEFENDANTS' various government programs, barely two years later, the California Legislature passed Senate Bill 52 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) ("SB 52"). SB

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52 created Penal Code section 28300 [12076.5], authorizing DEFENDANTS to charge the $\$ 5$ Fee in addition to the $\$ 1$ Fee.
108. Like the $\$ 1$ Fee and AB 106, when SB 52 was introduced by Senators Scott and Perata it did not include the $\$ 5$ Fee. Rather, SB 52 was originally aimed at eliminating the basic firearms safety certificate program and replacing it with a handgun safety license (which would come to be the Handgun Safety Certificate). It also contemplated requiring a shooting proficiency demonstration, as well as a safe handling demonstration before a handgun could be purchased. ${ }^{14}$ It was not until SB 52's fifth amendment that the $\$ 5$ Fee was included.
109. According to the Senate Rules Committee's Bill Analysis of SB 52, "the revenues from [the \$5] fee would be deposited in the Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund, created by [SB 52], administered by [Defendant] DOJ, and continuously appropriated to implement and enforce the provisions of this measure."
110. The "provisions of this measure" refer to establishing and maintaining the Handgun Safety Certificate Program (which, as discussed below, was also created by SB 52). See Sen. Rules Comm., Bill Analysis: Handgun safety certificate, at 4 (Sept. 10, 2001) available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/ pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_52_cfa_20010913_101416_sen_floor.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
111. Despite being for the Handgun Safety Certificate Program - which, as explained below, is funded by an additional fee charged to handgun purchasers SB 52 did not differentiate between purchasers of handguns and long-guns in assessing the $\$ 5$ Fee. It included long-gun transactions as subject to the fee as well,
${ }^{14}$ See SB 52 (as introduced Dec. 18, 2000), at 1 available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb 0051-0100/sb 52 bill 2000121 8 introduced.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).

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despite those purchases having nothing to do with handguns.

## 3. The HSC Exam Fee

112. SB 52 also created section 31650 (c) [12805(e)], providing for another fee charged to handgun purchasers, the HSC Exam Fee. The rest of then-section 12805 (excluding subsection (e)) was created about a decade earlier by Assembly Bill 618 (1991-1992) ("AB 618").
113. Prior to the addition of subsection (e), then-section 12805 generally required handgun purchasers to have a "Basic Firearms Safety Certificate" ("BFSC"). See Department of Justice Regulations for the Basic Firearms Safety Certificate Program, http://www.ag.ca.gov/firearms/regs/bfsc.pdf.
114. To obtain a BFSC, one had to pass an exam with a one-time fee of $\$ 10$ (with an additional $\$ 10$ charged to the test administrator, generally the FFL). The certificate was valid forever, with no renewal fees required (unless it was lost). Id.
115. SB 52's replacement of the BFSC program with section 31650(c) [12805(e)] (i.e.,the current HSC Program) resulted in the fee to take the required exam to be eligible to receive a handgun being raised to $\$ 15$, the certificate for passing the exam going from having no expiration date to being valid only for five years, and the elimination of the exception to the certificate requirement for honorably discharged military veterans and those with valid hunting licenses. ${ }^{15}$
116. In sum, SB 52 made it so more people had to take a required exam more often, and pay more fees.
117. SB 52 stated that the purpose of the HSC Exam Fee was."to cover the department's cost in carrying out and enforcing [HSC provisions]." See SB 52 as chaptered (Oct. 14, 2001), at 86 available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
[^17]01-02/bil1/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_52_bill_20011014_chaptered.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). But the California Penal Code currently allows the HSC Exam Fee to fund regulations of "deadly weapons," including not only handguns and long-guns, but also "unsafe handguns," machine guns, "assault weapons," destructive devices, ammunition, boobytraps, body armor, tear gas, silencers, switchblade knives, and "less lethal devices," among others. See Cal. Penal Code § 28300(b).
118. This phenomenon of creating and expanding the scope of these other fees charged to firearm purchasers appears to have chronologically paralleled with the similar increase of the DROS Fee and expanded uses of that fee's revenues.

## GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

119. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
120. Individual PLAINTIFFS BAUER, WARKENTIN, HACKER, FERRY, and ADLEY, and those persons represented by organizational PLAINTIFFS NRA and CRPA FOUNDATION, have each been required to pay, have in fact paid, and expect to pay in the future each of the Challenged Fees as currently required by California law before taking possession of firearms purchased from an FFL or transferred through an FFL as a private party transfer.
121. The funds from the Challenged Fees PLAINTIFFS paid and expect to pay are ultimately surrendered to DEFENDANTS' control, and purportedly deposited into the respective account established for each Challenged Fee as required by California law.

## I. Defendants' Imposition of the Challenged Fees as a Prerequisite to the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Is Unlawful

122. The fundamental right to possess firearms under the Second Amendment includes a corresponding right to acquire a firearm.
123. The Challenged Fees, which DEFENDANTS generally require be paid before a purchaser can acquire a firearm, are unconstitutional prerequisites on the
exercise of the fundamental right to acquire a firearm freely granted by the United States Constitution because DEFENDANTS impose them in excessive amounts and use the resulting windfall revenues to fund activities beyond their valid regulatory costs.
124. The historical and continual increase and improper utilization of the Challenged Fees by DEFENDANTS for ever expanding improper purposes, necessitates judicial action to halt infringements and violations of PLAINTIFFS' constitutional rights.

## A. Defendants Use Revenues from the Challenged Fees Unlawfully

125. DEFENDANTS unconstitutionally impose the Challenged Fees for the purpose of funding, and in fact do fund, activities which are "unrelated to the scope of the activities of [the fee payer]" (i.e., Plaintiffs')] and which do not even bear a reasonably sufficient nexus to any legitimate regulation of the fee payers' lawful firearm transactions.
126. DEFENDANTS spend revenues from the Challenged Fees on activities that the Penal Code authorizes, but which have no reasonable relation to regulating lawful firearm purchases.
127. Law-abiding firearm purchasers like PLAINTIFFS are not just being required to internalize the full social costs of their choice to exercise their fundamental Second Amendment rights, but also those costs of choices made by others, including special weapon permittee holders (e.g., machine gun permits) and criminal users of completely unrelated firearms - much as if, for instance, all lawful abortion patients had to pay a fee subsidizing specific abortion procedures they do not support or that are not lawfully available to them, or to finance law enforcement programs cracking down on illegal abortion operations.
128. The costs incurred by DEFENDANTS in processing, issuing, and policing special weapon permits and conducting general law enforcement operations cannot constitutionally fall on the shoulders of PLAINTIFFS and other
lawful firearm purchasers via a fee.
129. DEFENDANTS cause PLAINTIFFS irreparable harm by choosing to spend revenues obtained from the Challenged Fees on activities not reasonably related to regulating lawful firearms transactions.

## B. The Challenged Fees Are Unconstitutionally Excessive

130. Regardless of whether any of the Challenged Fees are reasonably related to regulating lawful firearm purchasers like PLAINTIFFS, each is nevertheless unconstitutionally excessive because the Challenged Fees are fixed in an amount not calculated to defray DEFENDANTS' expenses of policing the fee payers' (i.e., Plaintiffs') lawful firearm transactions, but rather are collected to fund general law enforcement activities that should be funded by the whole public.
131. DEFENDANTS currently require all persons not statutorily exempt to pay each of the applicable Challenged Fees in the maximum amount allowed by statute before they can receive a firearm. ${ }^{16}$
132. There is nothing requiring DOJ to charge the maximum amount statutorily allowed for any of the Challenged Fees, as the DOJ has the discretion to impose them in the first place (or a lesser amount commensurate with covering its actual, valid regulatory costs).
133. DEFENDANTS do not exercise their statutorily-conferred authority to lower the amount charged for any of the Challenged Fees.
134. Each of the amounts DEFENDANTS have chosen to charge for the Challenged Fees exceeds the amount necessary to reimburse the DOJ for the costs of furthering any of DEFENDANTS' valid regulatory activities as to lawful firearm transactions.
135. There is no reasonable support tying the amounts DEFENDANTS decide to charge for the Challenged Fees to DEFENDANTS' actual, constitutionally valid

[^18]regulatory costs.
136. The relatively moderate amounts of the fees is not relevant as to whether they are excessive for constitutional purposes; they are excessive because they are more than is necessary for reasonably related regulations.
137. Moreover, the amounts DEFENDANTS charge for the Challenged Fees are not as inoffensive as they may appear when viewed from the perspective of certain Plaintiffs who have spent hundreds of dollars a year on these fees while DEFENDANTS have enjoyed substantial (multi-million dollar) annual surpluses in the accounts into which the funds from the Challenged.Fees are deposited, year after year.
138. The surpluses of funds in the Challenged Fees' respective accounts are so high that the Challenged Fees are not set at an amount "reasonably necessary" to cover only valid regulatory programs.
139. Between 2004 and 2010, the DROS Special Account sustained an average surplus exceeding $\$ 2$ million annually.
140. In explaining its proposal to lower the DROS Fee in 2010, the DOJ stated "[ $t$ ]he proposed regulations [would] lower the current $\$ 19$ DROS fee to $\$ 14$, commensurate with the actual cost of processing a DROS. ${ }^{17}$
141. DEFENDANTS cause PLAINTIFFS irreparable harm by refusing to exercise their discretion to lower the Challenged Fees to an amount commensurate with covering their valid regulatory costs alone.

## II. California Penal Code Sections Authorizing Defendants' Unlawful Use of Revenues from the Challenged Fees Are Facially Unconstitutional

142. Regardless of whether DEFENDANTS do in fact spend revenues from the Challenged Fees on activities not reasonably related to regulating lawful

[^19]firearms transactions (PLAINTIFFS maintain that they do as outlined above), the Penal Code sections expressly authorizing such expenditures by DEFENDANTS are facially unconstitutional.
143. California Penal Code section 28235 [12076(g)] - by expressly authorizing DEFENDANTS' expenditure of DROS fee revenues on the activities listed therein such as inspections of Short-Barreled Long Gun Permit-holders (Cal. Penal Code § 33320 [12099]), retesting of handguns certified as "not unsafe" (Cal. Penal Code § 32020(a) [12131(c)]), inspections of Machine Gun Permit-holders (Cal. Penal Code § 32670 [12234]), inspections of "Assault Weapon" Permitholders (Cal. Penal Code § 31110 [12289.5]), and inspections of Destructive Device Permit-holders (Cal. Penal Code § 18910 [12305(f)-(g)]) - unlawfully places the burden of funding activities not reasonably related to regulating lawful firearms transactions on people like PLAINTIFFS exercising their constitutional right to lawfully purchase a firearm, instead of the general public. It is thus invalid on its face.
144. California Penal Code section 28225 - by subsection (b)(11) thereof [12076(e)(10)] expressly authorizing DEFENDANTS’ expenditure of DROS fee revenues on general law enforcement activities regulating the unlawful possession of firearms, including "assault weapons" - unlawfully places the burden of funding activities not reasonably related to regulating lawful firearms transactions on people like PLAINTIFFS exercising their constitutional right to lawfully purchase a firearm, instead of the general public. It is thus invalid on its face.
145. Activities regulating the unlawful possession of firearms are not reasonably related to the regulation of lawful firearm purchases- especially "assault weapons" which PLAINTIFFS are generally prohibited from obtaining under

California law ${ }^{18}$ - and thus cannot constitutionally be funded by fees paid by lawful firearm purchasers like PLAINTIFFS.
146. California Penal Code Sections 31650 [12805(e)] and 28300 [12076.5(b)] - by their respective subsection (c) expressly authorizing DEFENDANTS' expenditure of the revenues from their respective fees (the HSC Exam Fee and $\$ 5$ Fee) on enforcing general criminal laws, including laws regulating machine guns, "assault weapons," destructive devices, tear gas, silencers, etc. - unlawfully place the burden of funding activities not reasonably related to regulating lawful firearms transactions on people like PLAINTIFFS exercising their constitutional right to lawfully purchase a firearm, instead of the general public. Both statutes are thus invalid on their face.
147. Despite being, at least in part, for the purpose of "implementing and enforcing" the Handgun Safety Certificate Program (i.e., the "provisions of Article 2" mentioned in Section 28300(b)), the $\$ 5 \mathrm{Fee}$ is charged to purchasers of longguns as well, some of whom may not even own, or wish to own, a handgun.

## DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ALLEGATIONS

148. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties hereto in that PLAINTIFFS contend that the manner in which DOJ currently imposes the Challenged Fees is unlawful. DEFENDANTS have chosen and continue to choose to require lawful firearm purchasers, including PLAINTIFFS, to pay the maximum amount statutorily allowed for each of the Challenged Fees.
149. PLAINTIFFS desire a judicial declaration of their rights and DEFENDANTS' duties; namely, that the manner in which DOJ currently imposes the Challenged Fees infringes on PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights.
[^20]
## INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ALLEGATIONS

150. If an injunction does not issue enjoining DEFENDANTS from imposing each of the Challenged Fees as currently imposed, PLAINTIFFS will be irreparably harmed. PLAINTIFFS have been, are presently, and will continue to be injured by the assessment of the Challenged Fees insofar as they constitute unreasonable and unrelated preconditions on the exercise of PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights.
151. If not enjoined by this Court, DEFENDANTS will continue to enforce the Challenged Fees in derogation of PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights.
152. If an injunction does not issue enjoining DEFENDANTS from enforcing Penal Code sections 28225, 28235, 28300, and 31650, PLAINTIFFS will be irreparably harmed. PLAINTIFFS are presently and continuously injured by the enforcement of these sections insofar as such enforcement allows revenues from assessments charged solely to lawful firearm purchasers to be utilized for purposes not reasonably related to valid regulations of lawful firearm transactions.
153. PLAINTIFFS have no adequate remedy at law. Damages are indeterminate or unascertainable and, in any event, would not fully redress any harm suffered by PLAINTIFFS as a result of DEFENDANTS subjecting PLAINTIFFS to the illegal Challenged Fees as a precondition to exercise their constitutional right to acquire firearms.
154. Injunctive relief would eliminate PLAINTIFFS' irreparable harm and allow PLAINTIFFS to acquire firearms free from the unlawful Challenged Fees in accordance with their rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
155. Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate.

## FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: <br> VALIDITY OF DEFENDANTS' IMPOSITION OF CHALLENGED FEES <br> Violation of the Second Amendment Right to Keep and Bear Arms (U.S. Const., Amends. II and XIV) (By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)

156. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
157. DEFENDANTS have decided to impose, and continue to impose, the Challenged Fees at an excessive amount beyond what is necessary to defray their valid regulatory expenses, and choose to use the resulting windfall revenues to fund activities not reasonably related to regulating lawful firearms transactions such as those engaged in by PLAINTIFFS. In doing so, DEFENDANTS are abusing their discretion, applying the Challenged Fees in an unconstitutional manner, and propagating customs, policies, and practices that infringe on PLAINTIFFS' right to acquire firearms as guaranteed by the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
158. DEFENDANTS cannot satisfy their burden of justifying these customs, policies, and practices that infringe PLAINTIFFS' rights.
159. PLAINTIFFS are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief against DEFENDANTS and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction, enjoining them from engaging in such customs, policies, and practices.

## SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FACIAL VALIDITY OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTIONS 28235, 28300, 31650, \& 28225 <br> Violation of the Second Amendment Right to Keep and Bear Arms (U.S. Const., Amends. II and XIV) <br> (By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants)

160. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
161. By their provisions expressly authorizing DOJ to use revenues from the Challenged Fees to fund activities not reasonably related to regulating the

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
constitutionally protected activity of lawful firearms transactions such as those engaged in by PLAINTIFFS, California Penal Code sections 28225, 28235, 28300, and 31650 are unconstitutional on their face.
162. PLAINTIFFS are entitled to declaratory and permanent injunctive relief against DEFENDANTS, and any of their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction, enjoining them from enforcing, or acting pursuant to, California Penal Code sections 28225, 28235, 28300, and 31650.

## PRAYER

WHEREFORE PLAINTIFFS pray for relief as follows:

1) For a declaration that the Challenged Fees as currently imposed by DEFENDANTS infringe upon the right to acquire firearms protected by the Second Amendment, as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, by impermissibly preconditioning the exercise of that right on the payment of excessive fees, the revenues from which are being used to fund activities not reasonably related to regulating lawful firearms transactions such as those engaged in by PLAINTIFFS, and that as such are invalid and cannot be lawfully imposed;
2) For a preliminary and permanent prohibitory injunction forbidding DEFENDANTS and their agents, employees, officers, and representatives from imposing the Challenged Fees without first limiting the activities for which the fees' revenues are used to only those activities reasonably related to regulating lawful firearm purchasers like PLAINTIFFS, and reducing their amounts to be commensurate with the actual costs of those activities.
3) For a declaration that California Penal Code sections 28225, 28235, 28300, and 31650 violate the Second Amendment on their face.
4) For a preliminary and permanent prohibitory injunction forbidding DEFENDANTS and its agents, employees, officers, and representatives, from enforcing, or acting pursuant to, California Penal Code sections 28225, 28235,

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28300, or 31650.
6) For remedies available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and/or other applicable state and federal law;
7) For such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

Dated: February 9, 2012
/s/ C. D. Michel
C. D. Michel

Attorney for the Plaintiffs
.

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA FRESNO BRANCH COURTHOUSEBARRY BAUER, STEPHEN<br>CASE NO.: CV-09-2143-RS

WARKENTIN, NICOLE FERRY, LELAND ADLEY, JEFFREY HACKER, NATIONAL RIFLE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., CALIFORNIA RIFLE PISTOL) ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, HERB BAUER SPORTING GOÓDS, INC.

Plaintiffs
VS.
KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General For the ) State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, and DOES 1- ) 10.

Defendants.
$\qquad$
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT:
I, the undersigned, am a citizen of the United States and am at least eighteen years of age. My business address is 180 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, California, 90802.

I am not a party to the above-entitled action. I have caused service of:
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1988
on the following party by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the District Court using its ECF System, which electronically notifies them.
Electronically filed documents have been served conventionally by the filer to:
Kimberly Granger, Deputy Attorney General Kamala Harris, in her official capacity as
Office of the Attorney General
1300 I Street Attorney General 1300 I Street

Sacramento, CA 95814 Sacramento, CA 95814
Stephen Lindley, in his official capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice 4949 Broadway Sacramento, CA 95814
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 9, 2012.
$\frac{/ \text { S/ }}{\text { C. D. Michel }}$
Attorney for Plaintiffs

## EXHIBIT C

C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258

Sean A. Brady - S.B.N. 262007
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT <br> FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA FRESNO BRANCH COURTHOUSE 

BARRY BAUER, STEPHEN
WARKENTIN, NICOLE FERRY,
WEFFREY HACKER,NATIONAL $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text { CASE NO. 1:11-cv-01440-LJO-MJS } \\ \text { RIFLE ASSOCIATIONOF } \\ \text { AMERICA, INC. CRPA } \\ \text { FOUNDATION, HERB BAUER }\end{array}\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text { SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT } \\ \text { FOR DECLARATORY AND } \\ \text { INJUNCTIVE RELIEF }\end{array}\right.\right.$ SPORTING GOODS, INC.

Plaintiffs

KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General For the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, and DOES 110.

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS, by and through their undersigned attorneys, bring this Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief against the above-named Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors in office (collectively "DEFENDANTS"), and in support thereof allege the following:

## INTRODUCTION

1. This case involves an important constitutional principle, that while the government may impose fees on individuals seeking to engage in certain constitutionally protected activities, the monies generated by such fees cannot be used to finance state activities not reasonably related to regulating the fee payer's impact on the state.
2. Vindication of this principle requires that DEFENDANTS be enjoined from using monies generated by a fee, payment of which is required to obtain a firearm in California, for the purpose of funding general law enforcement activities associated with the California Department of Justices' ("DOJ") Armed Prohibited Persons System ("APPS")program. For, such activities share no reasonable nexus with regulating lawful firearm purchases and, thus, forcing fee payers like PLAINTIFFS to subsidize them is an unlawful infringement on the Second Amendment right to lawfully obtain a firearm.
3. When a person wishes to obtain a firearm in California, state law generally requires the person to obtain the firearm through a federally licensed California firearm vendor (commonly known as an "FFL").
4. In doing so, the would-be purchaser ${ }^{1}$ must, among other things, fill out a Dealer's Record of Sale form ("DROS"), the information from which is used by DEFENDANTS ${ }^{2}$ to conduct a background check and confirm the would-be purchaser may lawfully receive firearms before he or she can take possession of any firearm. In the case of a handgun, the information is also used to register the
[^21]SECOND AMENDED COMPLAANT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
handgun to the purchaser in DEFENDANTS' Automated Firearm System ("AFS").
5. DEFENDANTS have statutory discretion to charge firearm purchasers a mandatory fee for processing each DROS for every firearm transaction (a "DROS Fee"), which is collected from the firearm recipient through the FFL at the time of initiating the firearm's transfer.
6. The monies that are collected by DEFENDANTS from the DROS Fee are placed in a special account separate from the general fund, from which the Legislature may appropriate monies to the DEFENDANTS for statutorily prescribed purposes.
7. Originally, monies from the DROS Fee were intended to cover only DOJ's costs of processing a DROS, conducting a background check, and, in the case of a handgun, registration. But the activities for which DROS Fee funds are used have been ever-expanding for years, going far beyond funding these basic regulatory functions of the DOJ.
8. PLAINTIFFS bring this suit to challenge the constitutionality of DEFENDANTS' use of the revenues generated from the DROS Fee for general law enforcement activities which have no relation to fee payers; specifically, activities associated with the DOJ's Armed Prohibited Persons System program provided for by California Penal Code section 28225(b)(11) [12076(e)(10)]. ${ }^{3}$
9. That section was recently amended to add mere possession of firearms to the list of activities for which DEFENDANTS could use DROS Fee revenues, ${ }^{4}$

[^22][^23]thereby allowing the State to force lawful firearm purchasers to finance any law enforcement operation concerning unlawful firearm possession. And that it has done.
10. Governor Brown recently signed into law Senate Bill 140 ("SB 140"), appropriating $\$ 25$ million dollars of the DROS Special Account's surplus - a surplus that was not supposed to exist in the first place ${ }^{5}$ - solely to fund activities associated with the APPS program, which seeks to investigate individuals suspected of possessing firearms unlawfully and to remove the firearms from their possession.
11. Law-abiding firearm purchasers like PLAINTIFFS are thus not just being required to internalize the full social costs of their choice to exercise their fundamental Second Amendment rights, but also those costs of choices made by others to criminally use firearms - much as if, for instance, those exercising their fundamental right to marry were forced to fund enforcement of domestic violence restraining orders with their marriage license fees because some spouses become subject to one, or, as if the license fees from those who exercise their fundamental right to assemble in a public forum were taken to fund counter-gang measures

[^24]simply because they relate to gatherings of people, or, as if those who exercise their fundamental right to vote were forced to fund voter fraud enforcement actions via a poll tax.
12. Because DEFENDANTS' use of DROS Fee revenues on purposes unrelated to the fee payer affects constitutionally protected activity, irreparable harm is presumed. Accordingly, PLAINTIFFS seek from this Court a declaration that DEFENDANTS' use of revenues generated from the DROS Fee to fund general law enforcement activities associated with the DOJ's APPS program is unconstitutional, because the criminal misuse of firearms is not sufficiently related to the fee payers' activities, i.e., lawful firearm transactions. And, as such, an injunction prohibiting DEFENDANTS from using those revenues on such activities should issue.

## JURISDICTION and VENUE

13. Jurisdiction of this action is founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, in that this action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and under 28 U.S.C. § $1343(\mathrm{a})(3)$ and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that this action seeks to redress the deprivation, under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of the State of California and political subdivisions thereof, of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and by Acts of Congress.
14. PLAINTIFFS' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
15. Venue in this judicial district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district.

## PARTIES

## I. Plaintiffs

16. Plaintiff BARRY BAUER is a resident, property owner, and taxpayer of

Fresno, California. Within the last five years, Plaintiff BAUER has lawfully purchased firearms from an FFL, for which he has had to pay the DROS Fee. Plaintiff BAUER intends to continue to purchase firearms through an FFL in the future.
17. Plaintiffs STEPHEN WARKENTIN and JEFFREY HACKER are residents, property owners, and taxpayers of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, each has purchased multiple firearms from both an FFL and a private party, through an FFL as required by California Penal Code § 26500 [12070]. Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER intend to continue their pattern of regularly purchasing firearms through an FFL in the future.
18. For each of their transactions, Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER have paid the DROS Fee. Plaintiffs WARKENTIN and HACKER have had to pay the DROS Fee multiple times in the same year, and, in some cases, the same month.
19. Plaintiff NICOLE FERRY is a resident of Fresno, California. Within the last five years, Plaintiff FERRY has purchased handguns from an FFL for self-defense and target practice. For each of her transactions, Plaintiff FERRY has paid the DROS Fee. Plaintiff FERRY intends to purchase firearms through an FFL in the future.
20. Plaintiff NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC. (hereafter "NRA") is a non-profit entity classified under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and incorporated under the laws of New York, with its principal place of business in Fairfax, Virginia. NRA has a membership of approximately 4 million persons. The purposes of NRA include protection of the right of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear firearms for the lawful defense of their families, persons, and property, and from unlawful government regulations and preconditions placed on the exercise of that right. NRA spends its resources on each of those activities. NRA brings this action on behalf of itself and its hundreds

[^25]of thousands of members in California, including Plaintiffs BAUER, WARKENTIN, and HACKER, who have been, are being, and will in the future be subjected to DEFENDANTS' imposition of the DROS Fee.
21. Plaintiff CRPA FOUNDATION is a non-profit entity classified under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and incorporated under California law, with headquarters in Fullerton, California. Contributions to the CRPA FOUNDATION are used for the direct benefit of Californians. Funds contributed to and granted by CRPA FOUNDATION benefit a wide variety of constituencies throughout California, including gun collectors, hunters, target shooters, law enforcement, and those who choose to own a firearm to defend themselves and their families. The CRPA FOUNDATION spends its resources seeking to raise awareness about unconstitutional laws, defend and expand the legal recognition of the rights protected by the Second Amendment, promote firearms and hunting safety, protect hunting rights, enhance marksmanship skills of those participating in shooting sports, and educate the general public about firearms. The CRPA FOUNDATION supports law enforcement and various charitable, educational, scientific, and other firearms-related public interest activities that support and defend the Second Amendment rights of all law-abiding Americans.
22. In this suit, the CRPA FOUNDATION represents the interests of the many citizen and taxpayer members of its related association, the California Rifle and Pistol Association, who reside in California and who wish to sell or purchase firearms, or who have sold or purchased firearms, and have been charged the DROS Fee. These members are too numerous to conveniently bring this action individually. The CRPA FOUNDATION brings this action on behalf of itself and its tens of thousands of supporters in California, including Plaintiff BAUER, who have been, are being, and will in the future be subjected to the DROS Fee being used to fund unrelated activities.
23. Plaintiff HERB BAUER SPORTING GOODS, INC., is a California
corporation with its principal place of business in the County of Fresno, California. It is a licensed firearms dealer under both federal and California law (i.e., an FFL) that sells a variety of firearms. California law requires Plaintiff HERB BAUER to collect the DROS Fee for DOJ, at DOJ's direction, from firearm transferees. Accordingly, Plaintiff HERB BAUER is injured by its being forced to facilitate DEFENDANTS' unlawful use of revenues collected from the DROS Fee.
24. The individual PLAINTIFFS identified above are residents and taxpayers of California from the City and County of Fresno who have been required to pay the DROS Fee, Defendants' use of which violates PLAINTIFFS' constitutional rights.
25. Each of the associational PLAINTIFFS identified above either has individual members or supporters; or represents individual members of a related organization, who are citizens and taxpayers of California, including in Fresno County, who have an acute interest in purchasing firearms and do not wish to pay unlawful fees, taxes, or other costs associated with that purchase and thus have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief to halt or reduce the unconstitutional use of the monies collected from the DROS Fee. The interests of these members are germane to their respective associations' purposes; and neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested herein requires their members participate in this lawsuit individually.

## II. Defendants

26. Defendant KAMALA HARRIS is the Attorney General of California. She is the chief law enforcement officer of California, and is charged by Article V , Section 13 of the California Constitution with the duty to inform the general public and to supervise and instruct local prosecutors and law enforcement agencies regarding the meaning of the laws of the State, including the DROS Fee, and to ensure the fair, uniform and consistent enforcement of those laws throughout the state: She is sued in her official capacity.
27. Defendant STEPHEN LINDLEY is the Acting Chief of the DOJ Bureau of Firearms and, as such, is responsible for executing, interpreting, and enforcing the laws of the State of California - as well as its customs, practices, and policies at issue in this lawsuit. He is sued in his official capacity.
28. Defendants HARRIS and LINDLEY (collectively "DEFENDANTS") are responsible for administering and enforcing the DROS Fee, are in fact presently enforcing the DROS Fee against PLAINTIFFS, and will continue to enforce the DROS Fee against PLAINTIFFS.
29. DEFENDANTS also are responsible for spending monies appropriated to the DOJ by the Legislature from the DROS Special Account, and have been spending, are spending, and will continue to spend monies from the DROS Fee on the APPS program.
30. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise of the DEFENDANTS named herein as DOES 1-10, are presently unknown to PLAINTIFFS, who therefore sue said DEFENDANTS by such fictitious names. PLAINTIFFS pray for leave to amend this Complaint and Petition to show the true names, capacities, and/or liabilities of DOE Defendants if and when they have been determined.

## OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY SCHEME

## I. Constitutional Provisions and Controlling Law

31. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II.
32. The Second Amendment protects a fundamental, individual right to possess firearms for self-defense that is incorporated through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict state and local governments from infringing on the right.
33. The right to keep and bear arms for self-defense implies a corresponding SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
right to acquire firearms.
34. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that government's authority to levy fees on the exercise of constitutional rights is limited. Such fees may only be imposed to defray the government's expenses incurred in regulating activities reasonably related to the fee payer.
II. The Dealer's Record of Sale (DROS) Fee Imposed on Firearm Transfers
35. California confers discretion on DOJ to impose various fees on firearm purchasers, which they must pay as a prerequisite to qualify for receiving a firearm. The only fee at issue in this case is the DROS Fee, the one associated with processing the Dealer's Record of Sale.
36. California Penal Code sections 28225(a)-(c) [formerly 12076(e)], 28230 [12076(f)], 28235 [12076(g)], and 28240(a)-(b) [12076(i)], establish the fees associated with a DROS, and govern what the funds collected therefrom can be used for.
37. Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 28225 [12076(e)] provides:

The [DOJ] may require the [FFL] to charge each firearm purchaser a fee not to exceed fourteen dollars (\$14), except that the fee may be increased at a rate not to exceed any increase in the California
Consumer Price Index as compiled and reported by the Department of Industrial Relations.
38. The DOJ promulgated California Code of Regulations, Title 11, section 4001, increasing the cap on the DROS fee from $\$ 14$ to $\$ 19$ for the first handgun or any number of rifles/shotguns in a single transaction, and capping the DROS fee for each additional handgun being purchased along with the first handgun at $\$ 15$.
39. Subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 28225 [12076(e)] further provides that " $[t]$ he $[D R O S]$ fee shall be no more than is necessary to fund" the activities enumerated at Penal Code section 28225(b)(1)-(11) [12076(e)(1)-(10)].
40. Penal Code section $28225(\mathrm{~b})(11)$ [12076(e)(10)] purports to authorize the DOJ to use revenues from the DROS fee to fund "the estimated reasonable costs of [DOJ] firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale,
purchase, possession, loan, or transfer of firearms."
41. Prior to January 1, 2012, section $28225(\mathrm{~b})(11)$ [12076(e)(10)] did not provide for expenditure of DROS fee revenues on the mere "possession" of firearms. But the Legislature amended that section during the 2011 Legislative session to allow for such, based on its following purported findings:

SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a) California is the first and only state in the nation to establish an automated system for tracking handgun and assault weapon owners who might fall into a prohibited status.
(b) The California Department of Justice (DOJ) is required to maintain an online database, which is currently known as the Armed Prohibited Persons System, otherwise known as APPS, which cross-references all handgun and assault weapon owners across the state against criminal history records to determine persons who have been, or will become, prohibited from possessing a firearm subsequent to the legal acquisition or registration of a firearm or assault weapon.
(c) The DOJ is further required to provide authorized law enforcement agencies with inquiry capabilities and investigative assistance to determine the prohibition status of a person of interest.
(d) Each day, the list of armed prohibited persons in California grows by about 15 to 20 people. There are currently more than 18,000 armed prohibited persons in California. Collectively, these individuals are believed to be in possession of over 34,000 handguns and 1,590 assault weapons. The illegal possession of these firearms presents a substantial danger to public safety.
(e) Neither the DOJ nor local law enforcement has sufficient resources to confiscate the enormous backlog of weapons, nor can they keep up with the daily influx of newly prohibited persons.
(f) A Dealer Record of Sale fee is imposed upon every sale or transfer of a firearm by a dealer in California. Existing law authorizes the DOJ to utilize these funds for firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale, purchase, loan, or transfer of firearms pursuant to any provision listed in Section 16580 of the Penal Code, but not expressly for the enforcement activities related to possession.
(g) Rather than placing an additional burden on the taxpayers of

California to fund enhanced enforcement of the existing armed prohibited persons program, it is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this measure to allow the DOJ to utilize the Dealer Record of Sale Account for the additional, limited purpose of funding enforcement of the Armed Prohibited Persons System.
42. Penal Code section 28230(a)(2) [12076(f)(1)(B)] provides for DOJ to also
use DROS fee revenues for "the actual processing costs associated with the submission of a [DROS] to the [DOJ]."
43. Pursuant to statute, revenue from the DROS fee is supposed to be deposited into the DROS Special Account of the General Fund ("DROS Special Account") and appropriated by the Legislature. Cal. Penal Code § 28235 [12076(g)].

## GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

44. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
45. Individual PLAINTIFFS BAUER, WARKENTIN, HACKER, and FERRY, and those persons represented by organizational PLAINTIFFS NRA and CRPA FOUNDATION, have each been required to pay, have in fact paid, and expect to pay in the future the DROS Fee as currently required by California law before taking possession of firearms purchased from an FFL or transferred through an FFL as a private party transfer.
46. The funds from the DROS Fee that PLAINTIFFS paid and expect to pay in the future are purportedly deposited into the DROS Special Account and ultimately surrendered to DEFENDANTS' control pursuant to appropriation from the DROS Special Account by the Legislature.
47. The Legislature has appropriated, and DEFENDANTS intend to spend from the DROS Special Account, $\$ 25$ million to fund, at least in part, general law enforcement activities associated with the APPS Program.
48. Because the fundamental right to possess a firearm under the Second Amendment includes a corresponding right to acquire a firearm, monies collected from the DROS Fee must only be used to fund activities that are reasonably related to the fee payer's impact on the state.
49. Simply because the crimes targeted by the APPS program involve
firearms does not mean they have a sufficient nexus to DROS Fee payers such that its enforcement costs may constitutionally fall on the shoulders of PLAINTIFFS and other lawful firearm purchasers via the DROS Fee; they do not and cannot.
50. DEFENDANTS cause PLAINTIFFS irreparable harm by choosing to spend revenues obtained from the DROS Fee on general law enforcement operations associated with the APPS program because they are requiring PLAINTIFFS to uniquely subsidize government services that are not reasonably related to regulating lawful firearms transactions, but are admittedly for the general welfare.
51. The utilization of the DROS Fee by DEFENDANTS for these improper purposes necessitates judicial action to halt infringements and violations of PLAINTIFFS' constitutional rights.

## DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ALLEGATIONS

52. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
53. There is an actual and present controversy between the parties hereto in that PLAINTIFFS contend that the manner in which DOJ currently uses the revenues from the DROS Fee is unconstitutional and on information and belief, allege that DEFENDANTS' disagree.
54. PLAINTIFFS desire a judicial declaration of their rights and DEFENDANTS' duties; namely, that the DOJ's expenditure of monies collected from the DROS Fee on general law enforcement activities associated with the APPS program infringes on PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights.
55. To be clear, PLAINTIFFS do not ask this Court to address the legality of imposing the DROS Fee in the first place nor that of the APPS System. PLAINTIFFS here merely seek a declaration as to whether the monies from a fee that they are required to pay before they may lawfully engage in Second

Amendment protected conduct, i.e., obtaining a firearm, can be appropriated to general law enforcement purposes unrelated to regulating PLAINTIFFS' impact on the state.

## INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ALLEGATIONS

56. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
57. PLAINTIFFS have been, are presently, and will continue to be irreparably harmed by the assessment of the DROS Fee as a precondition on the exercise of PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights insofar as the revenues from such assessment are utilized for purposes not reasonably related to regulating fee payers' activities in lawfully obtaining a firearm, i.e., general law enforcement activities.
58. If an injunction does not issue from this Court enjoining DEFENDANTS from spending DROS Fee revenues on such general law enforcement activities, DEFENDANTS will continue to do so in derogation of PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights, thereby irreparably harming PLAINTIFFS.
59. PLAINTIFFS have no adequate remedy at law. Damages are indeterminate or unascertainable and, in any event, would not fully redress any harm suffered by PLAINTIFFS as a result of DEFENDANTS subjecting PLAINTIFFS to the illegal precondition on the exercise of PLAINTIFFS' constitutional right to acquire firearms, i.e., funding general law enforcement activities.
60. Injunctive relief would eliminate PLAINTIFFS' irreparable harm and allow PLAINTIFFS to acquire firearms free from the unlawful precondition currently inherent in the mandatory DROS Fee, in accordance with their rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
61. Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate.

# CLAIM FOR RELIEF: VALIDITY OF DEFENDANTS' USE OF DROS FEE REVENUES Violation of the Second Amendment Right to Keep and Bear Arms (U.S. Const., Amends. II and XIV) <br> (By All Plaintiffs Against All Defendants) 

62. All of the above paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.
63. DEFENDANTS use revenues collected from a fee, payment of which is generally required as a precondition for the lawful receipt of a firearm in California, in order to fund general law enforcement activities not reasonably related to regulating the behavior or impact on the state of the fee payers - like PLAINTIFFS. In doing so, DEFENDANTS are propagating customs, policies, and practices that infringe on PLAINTIFFS' right to acquire firearms as guaranteed by the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
64. DEFENDANTS cannot satisfy their burden of justifying these customs, policies, and practices that infringe PLAINTIFFS' rights.
65. PLAINTIFFS are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief against DEFENDANTS and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction, enjoining them from engaging in such customs, policies, and practices.

## PRAYER

WHEREFORE PLAINTIFFS pray for relief as follows:

1) For a declaration that DEFENDANTS' enforcement of the APPS program is not sufficiently related to PLAINTIFFS' lawful firearm purchases so as to justify DEFENDANTS' using the revenues from the DROS Fee - which PLAINTIFFS must pay to obtain a firearm - for the purpose of funding the APPS program, and that such use of DROS Fee funds impermissibly infringes on PLAINTIFFS' Second Amendment rights because it improperly requires PLAINTIFFS to bear the burden of financing general law enforcement activities as a precondition to exercising those rights;
2) For a preliminary and permanent prohibitory injunction forbidding DEFENDANTS and their agents, employees, officers, and representatives from using DROS Fee revenues to fund the APPS program;
3) For remedies available pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and/or other applicable state and federal law;
4) For such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

Dated: July 24, 2013
/s/ C. D. Michel
C. D. Michel

Attorney for the Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA FRESNO BRANCH COURTHOUSE

BARRY BAUER, STEPHEN WARKENTIN, NICOLE FERRY, LELAND ADLEY, JEFFREY HACKER, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., CALIFORNIA RIFLE PIŚTOL) ASSOBCIATION FOUNDATION, HERB BAUER SPORTING GOODS, INC.

Plaintiffs

## vs.

KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official
Capacity as Attorney General For the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, and DOES 110.

Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT:
I, the undersigned, am a citizen of the United States and am at least eighteen years of age. My business address is 180 E . Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, California, 90802.

I am not a party to the above-entitled action. I have caused service of:
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
on the following party by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the District Court using its ECF System, which electronically notifies them.
Electronically filed documents have been served conventionally by the filer to:
Anthonv R. Hakl. Deputy Attorney General
California Debartment of Justice
Office of the Attorney General
Civil Law Division
Government Law Section
1300 I Street. Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94244
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 24, 2013.
/s/ C. D. Michel
C. D. Michel Attorney for Plaintiffs

## EXHIBIT D

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRESNO BRANCH COURTHOUSE

BARRY BAUER, STEPHEN
WARKENTIN, NICOLE FERRY, LELAND ADLEY, JEFFREY HACKER, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC., CALIFORNIA RIFLE AND PISTOL ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, HERB BAUER SPORTING GOODS, INC.,
Plaintiffs,

VS.
Case No.
1: 11-CV-01440-LJO-MJS
KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official
Capacity as Attorney General
For the state of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants.



| INDEX OF | EXAMINATION |
| :--- | :--- |
| WITNESS: Stephen J. Lindley |  |
| EXAMINATION | PAGE |
| BY Mr. Franklin | 5 |

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
--000--

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES
PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS
SHOOTING SPORTS
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
vs.
Case No. 34-2013-80001667
KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official Capacity as
Attorney General for the State of California;
STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, BETTY YEE, in Her Official Capacity as State Controller for the state of California and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

DEPOSITION OF
STEPHEN 'J. LINDLEY
May 24, 2017

$$
9: 52 \text { a.m. }
$$

1300 I Street
Sacramento, California

```
LAURIE
D. LERDA,
CSR No 3649
```

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.
By: SCOTT M. FRANKLIN, ESQ.
180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200
Long Beach, California 90802
(562) 216-4444
sfranklin@michelandassociates.com

On Behalf of the Defendants and Respondents:
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
CIVIL LAW DIVISION, GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION By: ANTHONY HAKL, Deputy Attorney General 1300 I Street
Sacramento, California 95814
(916) 322-9041
anthony.hakl@doj.ca.gov

Also Present: Robert D. Wilson


EXAMINATION
PAGE

By Mr. Franklin

## EXHIBIT E



三 menu

Home » Featured Articles $x$

Ammoland inc. Posted on February 2, 2015 by Ammoland

## KEEP IN THE KNOW

by Bill Blum
Long Get the latest firearms news delivered straight to your regulations - and winning. Inbox



California Lawyer

California - -(Ammoland.com)- C.D. "Chuck" Michel won big against what he calls the "gun grabbers" last February when a three-judge panel of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court ruling in one of the most significant Second Amendment cases $x$ of his career.

Not only did the 2-1 majority invalidate San Diego County's restrictive policy for obtaining a concealedcarry handgun permit, it went on to declare that the personal right to keep and bear arms extenksbbiblddtrd

Micher, , thenlagteetairemersedrebftract attorney for the California Rifle and Pistol Association (CRPAdeliwneqfatrint affiMate of the National Rifle Association - has been the lead plaintiffs attorneynlaqYeruta v. San Diego (742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014)) since April 2010. In 2011 former Solicitor General Paul D. Clement filed an amicus brief on behalf of the NRA, and he later argued the case for the appellants.
"We got everything we asked for from the court," says Michel, who drafted the pleadingSUBSCRIBE

In a 69-page opinion, Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, one of the circuit's most conservative members, crafted a meticulous analysis of the Second Amendment and pre-Civil War gunownership rights. He concluded that the county's interpretation of "good cause" to obtain a concealed-carry permit - documenting circumstances showing that the applicant was uniquely in harm's way - infringed the constitutional right to "bear Arms."

> O'Scannlain wrote, "[T]he right is, and has always been, oriented to the end of selfdefense. Any contrary interpretation of the right, whether propounded in 1791 or just last week, is error." (Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1155 (emphasis by the court).)

One other federal circuit had explicitly issued such a holding before - Moore v. Madigan (702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012)) - but not in so detailed and definitive an opinion.

From Michel's perspective, the broad sweep of O'Scannlain's prose also vindicated the NRA's steady and deliberate approach to litigation. In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision recognizing an individual's right to own firearms (District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)), gun-rights groups had rushed to clarify the scope of permissible regulation. The NRA's contentious rival - the Second Amendment Foundation in Washington state - had brought a similar challenge to concealed-carry policy in California's Yolo County. Three weeks after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Peruta, the same panel invalidated Yolo's policy. But it did so in an unpublished three-page decision that cited Peruta as controlling precedent. (RiChards v. Prieto, 560 Fed. Appx. 681 (9th Cir. 2014).)
 attempted to step into the breach. But in November the Ninth Circuit denied intervenor
 and the California Police Chiefs and Peace Officers' Associations. (Peruta v. County of San Diegegetthe laxteft freathrsiheros 4).) Still, Judge Sidney R. Thomas's strong dissent in Peruta daverelejigheraighte fogcioncern.

## Inbox

In December, two days after the Montana jurist began a seven-year term as Chief Judge, Michel's worries were borne out: The Ninth Circuit called for briefing - due Christmas Eve to defedidhin@whetmiPeruta should be reheard en banc. If review is granted, Thomas will lead a tribunal that includes ten other judges chosen at random.

No one knoSUBSGRIBE
"The Circuit consists of roughily two-thirds Democratic appointees and one-third Republican," says Michel. "But judges don't always vote along political lines. And our position is very persuasive."

Should the respondents lose an en banc ruling, Michel promises he won't back down. He'll appeal Peruta all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court - very likely joined by libertarians and other advocates of individual gun rights....


## 6 thoughts on "California's Triggerman - C.D. 'Chuck' Michel"

## $\times$

The dark side is that Chuck Michel and the NRA espouse marketing of NRA financial servi火estochidren and frobdyently sell any kid's name and address they can get as an adult to other companies, to get money for the NRA. While Chuck Michel does some good work het the fathicillfrearis tonpretend like he's on the side of reasonable discourse, but lies and theniusesed sqal inguses to stab people in the back. Not a nice guy! But it's really amazing that therinRA keeps him working for them, despite his advocating of marketing and illegally selling to kids, and darcing around the edges of mail fraud and wire fraud. Chuck Michel, your past will catch up to you!

Add Your Email Reply

## Oscar ESBSCRIRE

July 6, 2016 at 1:32 PM
Keep up the great work Mir İMichei. I just recently joined the California Rifle and Pistol Association.

Reply

When Wayne La Pierre and the NRA were treating gun owning Californians like redheaded step children (Roberti, Roos) I vowed that they would not get one more dime from me. He (La Pierre) said they would not support a losing fight. I have always supported CRPA and Chuck Michel They won't give up and neither will I. This is OUR state and it was once a beautiful, and Constitutional, place to grow up in and live. I would walk through hell on Sunday for Chuck Michel and CRPA. Gentlemen, keep up the good work.

Reply

## - Raymond Scott says:

February 11, 2015 at 3:11 PM
Way to go Chuck Michel, Esq.!! Many have given up on our state, but things can change and for the better. Keep up the good fight for our civil rights in California.

Reply

## $x$

## AAMAEALAND

There are times when ithink going to war here in california would be injoyable.
KEEP in the KNOW
Reply
Get the latest firearms news

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whut
    Add Your Email
Reply
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Leave a COSbBSCRIBE

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *
Comment
$\square$

Notify me of followup comments via e-mail
Name *
$\square$
Email *
$\square$

## EXHIBIT F

C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258

Glenn S. McRoberts - S.B.N. 144852
Scott M. Franklin - S.B.N. 240254
Sean A. Brady - S.B.N. 262007
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION

Plaintiffs and Petitioners, vs.
KAMALA HARRIS, in Her Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of) California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, JOHN CHIANG, in his official capacity as State Controller for the State of California, and DOES 1-10.

Defendants and Respondents.

CASE NO. 34-2013-80001667

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (SET ONE)

PROPOUNDING PARTY:
RESPONDING PARTY:

SET NO:

## PLAINTIFFS

DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL
KAMALA HARRIS \& BUREAU OF
FIREARMS CHIEF STEPHEN LINDLEY
ONE

Plaintiffs David Gentry, James Parker, Mark Midlam, James Bass, and Calguns Shooting Sports Association (collectively "PLAINTIFFS") hereby demand Defendants Kamala Harris and Stephen Lindley (collectively "DEFENDANTS"), produce for inspection and/or photocopying, all documents, papers, books, account letters, photographs, objects and all other things designated herein. The production is to take place on June 22, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., at 180 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, California, or at such prior time and place as may be agreed upon by counsel.

Within thirty days after service of this request, DEFENDANTS must serve a written response subscribed under oath describing the documents/things DEFENDANTS will produce and stating any objections DEFENDANTS have to the production of any documents/things described below. Failure to serve a response within the allotted time shall be deemed to be a waiver of any objections to the production of the demanded documents/things.

If DEFENDANTS withhold, under claim of privilege or otherwise, any document or part thereof, which is requested to be produced, the following information must be provided for each such document:
(a) the date same was dated, or if undated, the date prepared;
(b) the name, address, and title of the person preparing same;
(c) the name, address, and title of the person for or to whom the same was prepared or addressed;
(d) the name, address, and title of all persons to whom copies of the same were provided or otherwise furnished;
(e) without revealing any privileged or otherwise protected information, a detailed description of the subject matter and content of same;
(f) the name, address, location, and title of the person or persons having possession, custody or control of same at the present time; and
(g) the grounds upon which the claim of privilege or other reason for failure to produce document, or part thereof, rests.

As to all documents required to be produced hereby, duplicates or photocopies may be
provided in place of the original documents where duplicates or photocopies are identical in every respect to the originals and are clear, legible copies.

## REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1

Each and every DOCUMENT (as used herein, "DOCUMENT"' means any written, printed, typed, photostatic, photographed, recorded, or otherwise reproduced communication or record of every kind and description, whether comprised of letters, words, numbers, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or any combination thereof, whether prepared by hand or by electronic, magnetic, photographic, mechanic or other means, and including audio or video recordings of communications, occurrences or events. This definition includes, but is not limited to, any and all of the following: e-mails, correspondence, notes, minutes, records, messages, memoranda, diaries, contracts, agreements, invoices, orders, acknowledgments, receipts, bills, statements, checks, check registers, carbon copies, financial statements, journals, ledgers, appraisals, reports, forecasts, compilations, schedules, studies, summaries, analyses, pamphlets, brochures, advertisements, newspaper clippings, articles, tables, tabulations, plans, photographs, pictures, film, microfilm, microfiche, computer-stored or computer-readable data, computer programs, computer printouts, telegrams, telexes, facsimiles, tapes, transcripts, recordings, and all other sources or formats from which data, information, or communications can be obtained. "DOCUMENT" shall also include any draft, preliminary version, or revisions of the foregoing, and all copies of a DOCUMENT shall be produced to the extent that the copies differ from the document produced due to notations, additions, insertions, deletions, comments, attachments, enclosures or markings of any kind, but excluding any document produced as part of the December 21, 2012, Response to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, Set One, in the action Bauer v. Harris, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Case No. 1:11-cv-1440-LJO-MJS, and also excluding any document provided in a supplement to the response of December 21, 2012, that has been served on counsel for the Plaintiffs in that action) appearing to have been created after January 1,2000, that shows the calculation of a cost, including an estimated cost, referred to in SECTION 28225 (as used herein,"SECTION 28225" refers to California Penal Code section 28255 and its predecessor, California Penal Code section
12706).

## REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2

Each and every DOCUMENT appearing to have been created after January 1, 2000, specifically identifying any figure to be a cost, including an estimated cost, referred to in Penial Code section 28225, excluding any DOCUMENT provided in response to a request above.

## REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3

Each and every DOCUMENT referring to a cost arising from APPS (as used herein, "APPS" refers to the Armed Prohibited Persons System program, also known as Armed \& Prohibited Persons System program or California Armed and Prohibited Person Program, and enforcement activities based on the use of data derived from APPS, including but not limited to investigations of persons identified by APPS as potentially possessing one or more firearm illegally) being paid out funds obtained from the DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT (as used herein, "DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT" refers to the portion of the state's General Fund wherein funds collected under SECTION 28225 are deposited) prior to May 1, 2013.

## REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4

Each and every DOCUMENT referring to an APPS-related cost being paid out funds obtained from the GENERAL FUND (as used herein, the term "GENERAL FUND" refers to the General Fund for the state of California, excluding any special accounts that are normally considered to be within the General Fund) after April 30, 2013.

## REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5

Each and every DOCUMENT referring to an APPS-related cost being paid from a source other than the GENERAL FUND or the DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT.

## REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6

Each and every written transcript, audio file, or other DOCUMENT that reflects testimony Defendant Kamala Harris has given to a legislative body in California, limited to testimony concerning APPS, the DROS PROCESS (as used herein, "DROS PROCESS" refers to the background check process that occurs when a firearm purchase or transfer occurs in California; "DROS PROCESS" can be found at http://oag.ca.gov/firearms/pubfaqs), or DROS FEE FUNDS
C. D. Michel - S.B.N. 144258 Scott M. Franklin - S.B.N. 240254
Sean A. Brady - S.B.N. 262007
MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.
180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200
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Facsimile: 562-216-4445
Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
vs.
KAMALA HARRIS, in her official capacity ) as Attorney General for the state of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in his official capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, Bureau of ) Firearms; BETTY YEE, in her official capacity as State Controller for the state of California, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

PROPOUNDING PARTIES:
RESPONDING PARTIES:
PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS KAMALA HARRIS \& STEPHEN LINDLEY

FOUR
//1

Plaintiffs David Gentry, James Parker, Mark Midlam, James Bass, and Calguns Shooting Sports Association (collectively "PLAINTIFFS") hereby demand defendants Kamala Harris and Stephen Lindley (collectively "DEFENDANTS") produce for inspection and/or photocopying all documents, papers, books, account letters, photographs, objects, and all other things designated herein. The production is to take place on October 10, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. at 180 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, California, or at such prior time and place as may be agreed upon by counsel.

Within thirty days after service of this request, DEFENDANTS must serve a written response subscribed under oath describing the documents/things DEFENDANTS will produce and stating any objections DEFENDANTS have to the production of any documents/things described below. Failure to serve a response within the allotted time shall be deemed a waiver of any objections to the production of the demanded documents/things.

If DEFENDANTS withhold, under claim of privilege or otherwise, any document or part thereof which is requested to be produced, the following information must be provided for each such document:
(a) the date same was dated, or if undated, the date prepared;
(b) the name, address, and title of the person preparing same;
(c) the name, address, and title of the person for or to whom same was prepared or addressed;
(d) the name, address, and title of all persons to whom copies of same were provided or otherwise furnished;
(e) without revealing any privileged or otherwise protected information, a detailed description of the subject matter and content of same;
(f) the name, address, location, and title of the person or persons having possession, custody, or control of same at the present time; and
(g) the grounds upon which the claim of privilege or other reason for failure to produce document, or part thereof, rests.

As to all documents required to be produced hereby, duplicates or photocopies may be
provided in place of the original documents where duplicates or photocopies are identical in every respect to the originals and are clear, legible copies.

## REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 92

Each and every DOCUMENT ("DOCUMENT" means any written, printed, typed, photostatic, photographed, recorded, or otherwise reproduced communication or record of every kind and description, whether comprised of letters, words, numbers, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or any combination thereof, whether prepared by hand or by electronic, magnetic, photographic, mechanic or other means, and including audio or video recordings of communications, occurrences, or events. This definition includes, but is not limited to, any and all of the following: $e-m a i l s$, correspondence, notes, minutes, records, messages, memoranda, diaries, contracts, agreements, invoices, orders, acknowledgments, receipts, bills, statements, checks, check registers, carbon copies, financial statements, journals, ledgers, appraisals, reports, forecasts, compilations, schedules, studies, summaries, analyses, pamphlets, brochures, advertisements, newspaper clippings, articles, tables, tabulations, plans, photographs, pictures, film, microfilm, microfiche, computer-stored or computer-readable data, computer programs, computer printouts, telegrams, telexes, facsimiles, tapes, transcripts, recordings, and all other sources or formats from which data, information, or communications can be obtained. "DOCUMENT" shall also include any draft, preliminary version, or revisions of the foregoing, and all copies of a document shall be produced to the extent that the copies differ from the document produced due to notations, additions, insertions, deletions, comments, attachments, enclosures or markings of any kind, but excluding any document produced in the action Bauer v. Harris, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Case No. 1:11-cv-1440-LJO-MJS, and also excluding any document provided in response to discovery previously propounded in this action) provided or appearing to have been provided by CAL DOJ (as used herein, "CAL DOJ" refers to the California Department of Justice, including the office of the Attorney General, and all persons working for or at the direction of the California Department of Justice) to a legislative budget committee that refers to the DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT (as used herein, "DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT" refers to the portion of the state's General Fund wherein DROS FEE funds are
deposited), limited to DOCUMENTS that appear to have been created after January 1, 2008.

## REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 93

Each and every DOCUMENT listing the sources of the revenue comprising the $\$ 17,286,000$ of revenue related to "miscellaneous services to the public" that went into the DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT for fiscal year 2014-2015; this request is based on data stated in California's 2016-2017 budget, though responding to this request does not require reference thereto by the responding parties.

## REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 94

Each and every DOCUMENT listing the classes of expenditures that comprise the $\$ 28,616,000$ of expenditures related to "Department of Justice (State Operations)" that were funded from the DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT for fiscal year 2014-2015; this request is based on data stated in California's 2016-2017 budget, though responding to this request does not require reference thereto by the responding parties.

## REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 95

Each and every DOCUMENT titled "DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund" concerning fiscal years 2014-2015 to the present.

## REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 96

Each and every DOCUMENT, whether provided to the office of State Senator Mark Leno or not, referring to SB 819's potential impact on the general taxpaying public.

## REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 97

Each and every DOCUMENT appearing to have been created by CAL DOJ between January 1, 2010, and January 1, 2013, concerning the impact, whether potential or actual, of the $\$ 11,500,000$ loan taken from the DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT.

## REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 98

Each and every email appearing to have been created by CAL DOJ between January 1, 2010 , and January 1,2013 , concerning the impact-whether potential or actual-of the $\$ 11,500,000$ loan taken from the DROS SPECIAL ACCOUNT.

# EXHIBIT G 

# U.S. District Court <br> Eastern District of California - Live System (Fresno) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE \#: 1:11-cv-01440-LJO-MJS 

Bauer, et al. vs. Harris, et al.
Assigned to: District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng
Case in other court: USCA, 15-15428
Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

## Plaintiff

## Barry Bauer

## Plaintiff

Stephen Warkentin

## Plaintiff

Nicole Ferry

## Plaintiff

Leland Adley

## Plaintiff

Jeffrey Hacker

## Plaintiff

National Rifle Association of America, Inc.

## Plaintiff

California Rifle \& Pistol Association
Foundation

Date Filed: 08/25/2011
Date Terminated: 03/02/2015
Jury Demand: None
Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
represented by Carl Dawson Michel
Michel \& Associates, P.C.
180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200
Long Beach, CA 90802
562-216-4444
Fax: 562-216-4445
Email: cmichel@michellawyers.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Dawson Michel
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Dawson Michel
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Dawson Michel
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Dawson Michel
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Dawson Michel
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl Dawson Michel
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

## Plaintiff

## Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc.

## V.

## Defendant

Kamala D. Harris

## Defendant

## Stephen Lindley

represented by Carl Dawson Michel
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan K. Smith
Office of the Attorney General of California 300 South Spring Street
6th Floor, South Tower
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 897-2105

Fax: (213) 897-1071
Email: susan.smith@doj.ca.gov
TERMINATED: 07/24/2012
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony R. Hakl, III
Attorney General's Office for the State of California
Department of Justice
1300 I Street
P.O. Box 255200

Sacramento, CA 95814
916-210-6065
Fax: 916-324-8835
Email: anthony.hakl@doj.ca.gov
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Susan K. Smith
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 07/24/2012
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Anthony R. Hakl, III
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

## Defendant

Does 1-10

| Date Filed $\#$ Docket Text <br> $08 / 25 / 2011$ 1 CIVIL COVER SHEET by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol <br> Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., <br> https:/lecf.caed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?330178698752027-L_1_0-1   |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |


|  |  | National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin (Michel, Chuck) (Entered: $08 / 25 / 2011$ ) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08/25/2011 | 2 | COMPLAINT For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 1988 against Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley, Does 1-10 by National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., Barry Bauer, Leland Adley, Nicole Ferry, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Stephen Warkentin, Jeffrey Hacker. Attorney Michel, Chuck D. added.(Michel, Chuck) (Entered: 08/25/2011) |
| 08/26/2011 |  | RECEIPT number \#CAE100016086 $\$ 350.00$ fbo Barry Bauer by C. D. Michel on 8/26/2011. (Marrujo, C) (Entered: 08/26/2011) |
| 08/26/2011 | 4 | SUMMONS ISSUED as to *Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley* with answer to complaint due within *21* days. Attorney *Chuck D. Michel* *Michel \& Associates, P.C.**180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200* *Long Beach, CA 90802*. (Lundstrom, T) (Entered: 08/26/2011) |
| 08/26/2011 | 5 | CIVIL NEW CASE DOCUMENTS ISSUED; Initial Scheduling Conference set for 12/8/2011 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng. (Attachments: \# $\underline{1}$ Standing Order, \# $\underline{2}$ Consent Form, \# $\underline{3}$ VDRP Form) (Lundstrom, T) (Entered: 08/26/2011) |
| 12/02/2011 | 6 | MINUTE ORDER: (***TEXT ONLY***) Plaintiff's notified the Court they are still serving Defendant in case. Initial Scheduling Conference set for 12/8/2011 at 10:30 a.m. is CONTINUED to 2/9/2012 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng. A Joint Scheduling Conference Report carefully prepared and executed by all counsel, shall be electronically filed in CM/ECF one (1) full week prior to the Scheduling Conference. (Yu, L) (Entered: 12/02/2011) |
| 01/09/2012 | 7 | SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED: Kamala D. Harris served on 12/22/2011, answer due 1/12/2012. (Attachments: \# 1 Exhibit A)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 01/09/2012) |
| 01/09/2012 | 8 | SUMMONS RETURNED EXECUTED: Stephen Lindley served on 12/22/2011, answer due 1/12/2012. (Attachments: \# 1 Exhibit A)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 01/09/2012) |
| 01/10/2012 | 9 | STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER for To Extend Pleading Deadlines by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 01/10/2012) |
| 01/11/2012 | 10 | STIPULATION TO EXTEND PLEADING DEADLINES AND ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 1/11/2012. (Yu, L) (Entered: 01/11/2012) |
| 01/17/2012 | 11 | MINUTE ORDER: $(* * * T E X T$ ONLY***) Initial Scheduling Conference set for 2/9/2012 at 11:00 AM is CONTINUED to 4/12/2012 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng. A Joint Scheduling Report carefully prepared shall be filed with the Court one (1) full week prior to the Scheduling Conference, and shall be emailed to mjsorders@caed.uscourts.gov. (Yu, L) (Entered: 01/17/2012) |
| 02/09/2012 | 12 | FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT against Does 1-10, Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley by National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Nicole Ferry, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Stephen Warkentin, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, Jeffrey Hacker.(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 02/09/2012) |
| 03/08/2012 | 13 | ANSWER to 12 Amended Complaint, by Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley. Attorney Smith, Susan K. added.(Smith, Susan) (Entered: 03/08/2012) |
| 03/21/2012 | 14 | MOTION to STAY by Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley. Motion Hearing set for 4/18/2012 at 08:30 AM in Courtroom 4 (LJO) before District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. |


|  |  | (Attachments: \# 1 Declaration of Susan K. Smith in Support of Notice of Motion and Motion to Stay)(Smith, Susan) (Entered: 03/21/2012) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 03/21/2012 | 15 | REQUEST for Judicial Notice Filed Concurrenlty with Motion to Stay by Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley re 14 MOTION to STAY filed by Stephen Lindley, Kamala D. Harris. (Smith, Susan) (Entered: 03/21/2012) |
| 03/22/2012 | 16 | MINUTE ORDER: (***TEXT ONLY***) 14 Motion to Stay set for 04/18/2012 at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom 4 (LJO) before District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill is MOVED to 4/20/2012 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng. Initial Scheduling Conference set for 04/12/2012 in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng is CONTINUED to 6/28/2012 at 11:30 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng. (Yu, L) (Entered: 03/22/2012) |
| 04/02/2012 | 17 | STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER for Continuance of Motion to Stay Hearing Date and Extend Associated Deadlines and [Proposed] Order by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 04/02/2012) |
| 04/03/2012 | 18 | STIPULATION FOR CONTINUANCE OF MOTION TO STAY HEARING. Motion Hearing is continued to 5/25/2012 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 04/03/2012. (Yu, L) (Entered: 04/03/2012) |
| 04/20/2012 | 19 | STIPULATION For Continuance of Motion to Stay Hearing Date and Extend Associated Deadlines and [Proposed] Order by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 04/20/2012) |
| 04/20/2012 | $\underline{20}$ | STIPULATION FOR CONTINUANCE OF MOTION TO STAY HEARING DATE AND EXTEND ASSOCIATED DEADLINES and ORDER THEREON. Motion Hearing is continued to 6/22/2012 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 04/20/2012. (Yu, L) (Entered: 04/20/2012) |
| 05/15/2012 | 21 | MINUTE ORDER: (***TEXT ONLY***) 14 Motion to Stay set for June 22, 2012 at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng is CONTINUED to July 6, 2012 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng. Initial Scheduling Conference set for June 28, 2012 in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng is CONTINUED to August 9, 2012 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng. (Yu, L) (Entered: 05/15/2012) |
| 06/06/2012 | $\underline{22}$ | WITHDRAWAL of 14 MOTION to STAY by Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley. (Smith, Susan) (Entered: 06/06/2012) |
| 06/07/2012 | 23 | MINUTE ORDER: (***TEXT ONLY***)On June 6, Defendant filed a 22 Withdrawal of Motion to Stay. The Motion Hearing set for July 6, 2012 at 9:30 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng is VACATED. The Initial Scheduling Conference set for August 9, 2012 at 11:00 a.m. before Magsitrate Judge Michael J. Seng shall proceed as previously ordered. (Yu, L) (Entered: 06/07/2012) |
| 07/06/2012 | $\underline{24}$ | JOINT SCHEDULING REPORT by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 07/06/2012) |


| 07/24/2012 | $\underline{25}$ | NOTICE of Change of Assignment of Counsel Within Attorney General's Office by Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley. (Smith, Susan) (Entered: 07/24/2012) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08/07/2012 | 26 | MINUTE ORDER (Text Only): The Initial Scheduling Conference set for August 9, 2012 at 11:00 a.m. shall be held in Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng's Yosemite Chambers. The parties are directed to appear telephonically by making reservations through CourtCall at 866-582-6878. Please send confirmations to the courtroom deputy at lyu@caed.uscourts.gov. (Arellano, S.) (Entered: 08/07/2012) |
| 08/09/2012 | 27 | MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng: SCHEDULING CONFERENCE held on 8/9/2012 in Chambers. Plaintiffs Counsel Sean Brady present. Defendants Counsel Anthony Hakl present. Court Reporter/CD Number: Held in Chambers, off the record. (Yu, L) (Entered: 08/10/2012) |
| 08/10/2012 | $\underline{28}$ | SCHEDULING ORDER :Initial Disclosures: 07/11/2012, Discovery Deadlines: NonExpert: $2 / 27 / 2013$. Expert: $6 / 27 / 2013$. Motion Deadlines: Non-Dispositive Motions filed by $6 / 27 / 2013$. Dispositive Motions filed by $8 / 16 / 2013$, Pretrial Conference $11 / 14 / 2013$ at 08:15 AM in Courtroom 4 (LJO) before District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. Jury Trial 1/28/2014 at 08:30 AM in Courtroom 4 (LJO) before District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 08/10/2012. (Yu, L) (Entered: 08/13/2012) |
| 01/22/2013 | $\underline{29}$ | STIPULATION To Extend Discovery Cut-Off Dates and Proposed Order by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 01/22/2013) |
| 01/23/2013 | 30 | STIPULATION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATES AND ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 1/23/2013. (Yu, L) (Entered: 01/23/2013) |
| 05/22/2013 | $\underline{31}$ | STIPULATION and PROPOSED ORDER for to Vacate Rule 16 Scheduling Order by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Attachments: \# 1 Declaration of Sean A. Brady in Support)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 05/22/2013) |
| 05/28/2013 | $\underline{32}$ | Stipulation to Vacate Rule 16 Scheduling Order and Order Thereon. A Scheduling Conference is now set for August 8, 2013 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 05/28/2013. (Yu, L) (Entered: 05/28/2013) |
| 06/13/2013 | $\underline{33}$ | MOTION to AMEND the 12 Amended Complaint, by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Attachments: \# 1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, \# $\underline{2}$ Exhibit A to Memorandum of Points and Authorities, \# $\underline{3}$ Declaration of Sean A. Brady in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 06/13/2013) |
| 06/14/2013 | 34 | MINUTE ORDER: (***TEXT ONLY****)A Motion Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is set for July 26, 2013 at 09:30 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 06/14/2013. (Yu, L) (Entered: 06/14/2013) |
| 07/09/2013 | $\underline{35}$ | STATEMENT of NON-OPPOSITION by Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley to 33 MOTION to AMEND the 12 Amended Complaint,. (Attachments: \# 1 Proof of Service) (Hakl, Anthony) (Entered: 07/09/2013) |
| 07/22/2013 | $\underline{36}$ | ORDER granting 33 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. |


| 2/20/2018 | rict Court for Eas |  |
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|  |  | The Motion Hearing set for July 26, 2013 is VACATED. Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of the service of this order, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 7/22/2013. (Yu, L) (Entered: 07/22/2013) |
| 07/24/2013 | 37 | SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT against All Defendants by National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Nicole Ferry, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Stephen Warkentin, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, Jeffrey Hacker.(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 07/24/2013) |
| 08/02/2013 | 38 | MINUTE ORDER: (***TEXT ONLY***)The Initial Scheduling Conference set for August 8, 2013 at 10:30 a.m. is CONTINUED to September 27, 2013 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 08/02/2013. (Yu, L) (Entered: 08/02/2013) |
| 08/07/2013 | 39 | ANSWER to 37 Amended Complaint, by Kamala D. Harris, Stephen Lindley. (Attachments: \# 1 Proof of Service)(Hakl, Anthony) (Entered: 08/07/2013) |
| 09/13/2013 | 40 | JOINT SCHEDULING REPORT by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 09/13/2013) |
| 09/17/2013 | 41 | MINUTE ORDER: (***TEXT ONLY***)The Initial Scheudling Conference set for September 27, 2013 at 10:30 a.m. is ADVANCED to September 27, 2013 at 09:00 AM in Courtroom 6 (MJS) before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng. The parties may appear telephonically by contacting Courtroom Deputy, Laurie C. Yu at (209)372-8917 or lyu@caed.uscourts.gov, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 09/17/2013. (Yu, L) (Entered: 09/17/2013) |
| 09/27/2013 | 42 | MINUTES (Text Only) for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng: SCHEDULING CONFERENCE held on 9/27/2013. Parties appeared telephonically. Formal order to follow. Plaintiffs Counsel Sean Brady present. Defendants Counsel Anthony Hakl present. Court Reporter/CD Number: Held in Chambers off the record. (Yu, L) (Entered: 09/27/2013) |
| 09/30/2013 | 43 | SCHEDULING ORDER : Discovery Deadlines: Non-Expert: 4/20/2014. Expert: 8/15/2014. Expert Disclosure Deadlines: Filing: 5/22/2014, Supplemental/Rebuttal: 06/20/2014. Motion Deadlines: Non-Dispositive. Motions filed by 9/22/2014. Dispositive Motions filed by 11/17/2014, Pretrial Conference set for 2/10/2015 at 08:30 AM in Courtroom 4 (LJO) before District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. Jury. Trial set for 3/24/2015 at 08:30 AM in Courtroom 4 (LJO) before District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill, signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 09/30/2013. (Yu, L) (Entered: 09/30/2013) |
| 11/06/2014 | 44 | MOTION to CONTINUE Time for Filing Dispositive Motions by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Attachments: \# 1 Declaration Declaration of Sean A Brady in Support of Joint Motion to Extend Time for Filing Dispositive Motions, \# $\underline{2}$ Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 11/06/2014) |
| 11/07/2014 | 45 | (TEXT ENTRY ONLY) MINUTE ORDER: The Court has reviewed the joint motion to extend time for filing dispositive motions 44 , which also contains a request to vacate the trial date. This submission does not present good cause to either vacate or continue the trial date and is therefore DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties may submit a revised stipulation that reasonably modifies the dispositive motions and pretrial deadlines signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on November 7, 2014. (Munoz, I) (Entered: 11/07/2014) |


| 2/20/2018 |  | LIVE 6.1 CM/ECF - U.S. District Court for Eastern California |
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| 11/07/2014 | 46 | MOTION for EXTENSION OF TIME to file Dispositive Motions \& Related Deadlines by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. (Attachments: \# 1 Declaration of Sean A. Brady in Support of Motion, \# $\underline{2}$ Proposed Order)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 11/07/2014) |
| 11/13/2014 | 47 | ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR FILING DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS 46 signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on November 13, 2014. (Munoz, I) (Entered: 11/13/2014) |
| 12/12/2014 | 48 | MOTION for 45-DAY EXTENSION OF TIME to Extend Time to File Dispositive Motions by Barry Bauer. (Attachments: \# 1 Declaration of Sean A Brady in Support of Joint Motion to Extend Time to File Dispositive Motions, \# $\underline{2}$ Proposed Order)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 12/12/2014) |
| 12/15/2014 | 49 | AMENDED MOTION for EXTENSION OF TIME to re 48 MOTION for 45-DAY EXTENSION OF TIME to Extend Time to File Dispositive Motions by Barry Bauer. (Attachments: \# 1 Declaration of Sean A Brady in Support of Joint Amended Motion to Extend Time to File Dispositive Motions, \# $\underline{2}$ Proposed Order Granting Joint Motion to Extend Time to File Dispositive Motions)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 12/15/2014) |
| 12/15/2014 | 50 | ORDER GRANTING JOINT AMENDED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS (Docs. 48 \& 49) signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on December 15, 2014. (Munoz, I) (Entered: 12/15/2014) |
| 01/20/2015 | 51 | MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Kamala D. Harris. Motion Hearing set for 2/26/2015 at 08:30 AM in Courtroom 4 (LJO) before District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. (Attachments: \# 1 Points and Authorities, \# $\underline{2}$ Statement Undisputed Facts in Support, \# $\underline{3}$ Declaration of Stephen Lindley, \# 4 Declaration of Joel Tochterman, \# 5 Declaration of Anthony R. Hakl, \# $\underline{6}$ Exhibit Exhibit A to Dec of Hakl, \# 7 Exhibit Exhibit B to Dec of Hakl, \# 8 Exhibit Exhibit C-E of Dec of Hakl, \# 9 Exhibit Exhibit F to Dec of Hakl, \# 10 Proof of Service)(Hakl, Anthony) (Entered: 01/20/2015) |
| 01/20/2015 | 52 | MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin. Motion Hearing set for 2/26/2015 at 08:30 AM in Courtroom 4 (LJO) before District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. (Attachments: \# 1 Points and Authorities Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, \# $\underline{2}$ Statement Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, \# 3 Declaration Declaration of Jeffrey Hacker In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, \# 4 Declaration Declaration of Christopher Cox on Behalf of the National Rifle Association in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, \# $\underline{5}$ Declaration Declaration of Steven Dember on Behalf of the CRPA Foundation in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, \# $\underline{6}$ Declaration Declaration of Barry Bauer as Plaintiff and on Behalf of Herb Bauer's Sporting Goods, Inc. in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, \# 7 Declaration Declaration of Margaret E. Leidy in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; Exhibits A Through JJ, \# $\underline{8}$ Exhibit Exhibits to Margaret Leidy's Declaration - Part 1, \# $\underline{9}$ Exhibit Exhibits to Margaret Leidy's Declaration - Part 2, \# 10 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice, \# 11 Exhibit Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 01/20/2015) |
| 01/21/2015 | 53 | NOTICE of Errata re Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice by Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin re 52 MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Attachments: \# 1 Exhibit Plaintiffs' Request for |


|  |  | Judicial Notice, \# $\underline{2}$ Exhibit Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 01/21/2015) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 02/12/2015 | 54 | OPPOSITION by Kamala D. Harris to 52 MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT. <br> (Attachments: \# 1 Declaration of Anthony Hakl, \# $\underline{2}$ Exhibit Exhibit A to Hakl Dec, \# $\underline{3}$ <br> Exhibit Exhibit B to Hakl Dec, \# 4 Declaration of Stephen LIndley, \# $\underline{5}$ Exhibit Exhibit A to Lindley Dec, \# $\underline{6}$ Response to Statement of Undisputed Facts)(Hakl, Anthony) (Entered: 02/12/2015) |
| 02/12/2015 | 55 | OPPOSITION by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin to 51 MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Attachments: \# 1 Response Plaintiffs' Response to Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication)(Michel, Carl) (Entered: 02/12/2015) |
| 02/17/2015 | 56 | MINUTE ORDER: (TEXT ENTRY ONLY) In the interests of judicial and party efficiency and to afford the Court sufficient time to confirm the parties' contention that this this case can be decided on the pending cross motions for summary judgment without the need for a trial, the deadline for filing a joint pretrial conference statement is EXTENDED to Friday, February 20, 2015 signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on February 17, 2015. (Munoz, I) (Entered: 02/17/2015) |
| 02/18/2015 | 57 | MINUTE ORDER: (TEXT ENTRY ONLY) The Court has reviewed preliminarily the pending cross motions for summary judgment and concurs with the parties that this case can be resolved on the papers without the need for a trial. Accordingly, the pretrial conference and trial dates are VACATED. In addition, upon expiration of the reply deadline, the Court will take the matter under submission on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule $230(\mathrm{~g})$. Therefore, the hearing on the pending motions, currently set for February 26, 2015, is also VACATED signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on February 18, 2015. (Munoz, I) (Entered: 02/18/2015) |
| 02/19/2015 | 58 | REPLY by Kamala D. Harris to RESPONSE to 51 MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Hakl, Anthony) (Entered: 02/19/2015) |
| 02/19/2015 | 59 | REPLY by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Stephen Warkentin re 52 MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 02/19/2015) |
| 03/02/2015 | 60 | MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER Re Cross Motions for Summary Judgment re $\underline{51}, \underline{52}$, signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 03/02/15. CASE CLOSED. (Gonzalez, R) (Entered: 03/02/2015) |
| 03/02/2015 | 61 | JUDGMENT dated *03/02/15* pursuant to order. (Gonzalez, R) (Entered: 03/02/2015) |
| 03/06/2015 | 62 | NOTICE of APPEAL by Leland Adley, Barry Bauer, California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Nicole Ferry, Jeffrey Hacker, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Inc.. (Filing fee \$505, receipt number 0972-5780827) (Michel, Carl) (Entered: 03/06/2015) |
| 03/09/2015 | 63 | USCA APPEAL FEES received in the amount of \$ 505 (Receipt \# 09725780827) from Leland Adley on 3/6/2015 re 62 Notice of Appeal, filed by Barry Bauer, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Jeffrey Hacker, Leland Adley, National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Nicole Ferry. (Lundstrom, T) (Entered: 03/09/2015) |
| 03/09/2015 | 64 | APPEAL PROCESSED to Ninth Circuit re $\underline{62}$ Notice of Appeal, filed by Barry Bauer, |


| 2/20/2018 | LIVE 6.1 CM/ECF - U.S. District Court for Eastern California |  |
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|  |  | Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Jeffrey Hacker, Leland Adley, National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Nicole Ferry. Notice of Appeal filed *3/6/2015*, Complaint filed *8/25/2011* and Appealed Order / Judgment filed *3/2/2015*. ** *Fee Status: Paid on 3/6/2015 in the amount of $\$ 505.00^{*}$ (Attachments: \# 1 Appeal Information) (Gonzalez, R) (Entered: 03/09/2015) |
| 03/09/2015 | 65 | USCA CASE NUMBER 15-15428 for 62 Notice of Appeal, filed by Barry Bauer, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Jeffrey Hacker, Leland Adley, National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Nicole Ferry. (Gonzalez, R) (Entered: 03/09/2015) |
| 06/01/2017 | 66 | USCA OPINION as to 62 Notice of Appeal, filed by Barry Bauer, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Jeffrey Hacker, Leland Adley, National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Nicole Ferry. AFFIRMED. (Gonzalez, R) (Entered: 06/02/2017) |
| 07/12/2017 | 67 | ORDER of USCA as to $\underline{62}$ Notice of Appeal, filed by Barry Bauer, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Jeffrey Hacker, Leland Adley, National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Nicole Ferry. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED. (Sant Agata, S) (Entered: 07/12/2017) |
| 07/20/2017 | 68 | USCA MANDATE as to $\underline{62}$ Notice of Appeal, filed by Barry Bauer, Herb Bauer Sporting Goods, Inc., California Rifle \& Pistol Association Foundation, Jeffrey Hacker, Leland Adley, National Rifle Association of America, Inc., Nicole Ferry. The judgment of this Court, entered June 01, 2017, takes effect this date. (Gonzalez, R) (Entered: 07/20/2017) |


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EXHIBIT H

## CALGUNS Shooting Sports Association

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Gun Clubs
- 1135 W Queenside Dr Covina CA 917223123
1135 W Queenside Dr Covina CA }91722312
}.62675782076267578207
- jacob@cgssa.org
Bookmark
* Share
* Facebook
- D Twitter
* Google+
- Tumbir
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- Photos
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- Nearby Listings
Filter
Sort by: Helpfulness
* Newest First
- OldestFirst
* Rating
-Write a Review
Sort by: Votes
- Newest First
* Oldest First
- Random
Filter
Sort by: Distance
- Newest First
* Oldest First
- Title
- Most Reviews
- Highest Rated
```



## EXHIBIT I

Solect Page

## Members' Council Directory

The NRA Members' Councils of Califormia - California's ORIGINAL
Grassroots Gun Lobby

Find your local Members' Council



## Contact Us

## Click to eMail

## About NRA

The National Rifle Association is America's longest-standing civil rights organization. Together with our more than five million members, we're proud defenders of history's patriots and diligent protectors of the Second Amendment.

## Explore

NRA
NRA ILA
NRA TV
NRA Publications

## EXHIBIT J

# NRA Members' Councils of California CALIFORNIA ALERT SYSTEM 

A message from our friends at the Calguns Shooting Sports Association

## FIGHT BACK

| Clich Heral <br> Work with NRA <br> Members in <br> jour areal |
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## CALIFORNIANS

Join with other NRA
Members in your area! We are only asking for a little of your time.

## Together, we can make a

 difference!
## HELP THE NRA <br> Spread phe word about our activities in califormal

Take a moment and post this message to Internet forums and web sites where gun owners congregate on-line. And don't forget to click on the "Forward this e-mail to a Friend" button so they can sign up for our important messages from the CALIFORNIA ALERT SYSTEM. CAL-ERTs are provided as a free service of the NRA Memberș' Councils of California.

As seen on the NRA Members' Council Facebook and Twitter pagess https://www.facebook.com/NRAMembersCouncils/
https://twitter.com/CaINRA

## Challengers \& Volunteers Needed!

Come on out and test out that Glock you bought. The match is low key and fun. Bring a friend, ammo, and your Glock and enjoy the day. Interested?


This is the new format for the CALIFORNIA ALERT SYSTEM.

Please sign-up for CAL-ERTs by using this link and entering your email address. As is our policy, we will only send something to you when it is important that you receive our information. Also, please don't hesitate to forward this message to your friends.

Thank you in advance.

## H. Paul Payne

Program Administrator for the NRA Members' Councils of California
Join Our Mailing List!

## WEST COAST CHALLENGE II SPRING 2017

On Saturday, April 1st, and Sunday, April 2nd, in conjunction with the GLOCK Sports Shooting Foundation (GSSF), we will be returning to Burro Canyon Shooting Park (22100 E East Fork Rd, Azusa, CA 91702) to host the GLOCK West Coast Challenge II - Spring. The event will run both days, and consist of open squadding from 9AM to 1 PM .

We're currently looking for volunteers for three days (Friday, Saturday, and Sunday) of the event (Friday will be a setup day). To make things a little easier to manage, and improve the quality of match officiation we're going to open up volunteer opportunities to those who can work full days first and then open it up to partial day volunteers as needed. As a full day volunteer, you will still earn two entries for each day worked into the special drawing of a free GLOCK Pistol. This drawing is just for the volunteers and the winner will be drawn at the end of the day on Sunday (you do not have to be present to win). In addition, each volunteer will receive a trendy GLOCK Range Officer Polo Shirt, a GLOCK Range Officer Hat, and complimentary gift of their choice from GLOCK for each day worked. If you're a volunteer who has volunteered both days, but is also competing, we will allow you time off to shoot your match (or matches).

Click here to register as a volunteer for the match (Volunteer Registration)

Click here to register for the match. (Standard Registration)
Click here to register for the match. (GLOCK Girls Side Match and Pocket GLOCKs Division)

## Directions to the range

## GLOCK Shooting Sports Foundation (GSSF) Website

The GLOCK Report Volume II 2015 (The rules start on page 7)
If you're not familiar with GSSF matches here's a nice 17 minute video that takes you stage by stage and division by division.


# DON'T FORGET TO FORWARD THIS MESSAGE TO YOUR FRIENDS, CLUBS, GROUPS, AND EVERY GUN OWNER IN CALIFORNIA 

## Help NRA Get Californians Connected with NRA's California Resources

Help the NRA expand its California network to keep all pro-Second Amendment Californians better informed about legislation in Congress, Sacramento, and locally that threatens your right to keep and bear arms, as well as developments in Second Amendment litigation and regulatory enforcement actions. Please forward this email to your family, friends and fellow gun owners, whether they belong to the NRA or not! Encourage them to sign up for California NRA's Stayed Informed e-mails here. And follow NRA through these additional connections:

## Websites:

## NRA-ILA, NRA-ILA California, CalNRA.com, CalGunLaws.com, HuntforTruth.org

## Facebook Pages:

NRA's Facebook page, CalGunLaws.com Facebook page, NRA Members' Councils' Facebook page, Hunt for Truth Facebook page

LinkedIn: NRA's LinkedIn page, YouTube: NRA YouTube, Twitter: NRA Twitter, NRA-ILA Twitter, CalNRA Twitter, CalGunLaws Twitter

The NRA recognizes that California is one of the most active Second Amendment "battleground states," so for decades NRA has devoted substantial resources to fighting for the right to keep and bear arms for Californians. The NRA has full-time legislative advocates in its Sacramento office fighting ill-conceived gun ban proposals. NRA coordinates a statewide campaign to fight illconceived local gun bans and regulations. And NRA has been litigating cases in California courts to promote the right to selfdefense, the right to hunt, and the Second Amendment for many years. NRA's California legal team continues to work pro-actively to strike down ill-conceived gun control laws and ordinances, and to protect the Second Amendment rights of California firearms owners. For information about NRA's litigation efforts, see http://michellawyers.com/significant-cases/civil-rights-cases/


| You <br> 而相 <br> NRA <br> NEWS <br> Videos |
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NRA's California Attorneys

## Confirm that you like this.

Click the "Like" button.

## EXHIBIT K



## Calguns Shooting Sports Association

January 14, 2013.
From NRA's H Paul Payne:
LAST MINUTE ALERT -- PLEASE ATTEND MEETING IN DEL MAR
$======================================$
We just learned that the city of Del Mar, in San Diego County is attempting to pass a resolution that would negatively affect the Crossroads of the West Gun Show that is held at the Del Mar Fairgrounds five times per year. http://www.delmar.ca.us/../City\ C.../cc20130114_item\ 12.pdf While we realize that this information comes at the last minute, please try to attend the Del Mar City Council meeting and speak against "Item 12" on the agenda, which is the resolution.
The meeting will begin at 6:00PM tonight and will occur at 1050 Camino Del Mar. A map is available at http://goo.g//maps/2hW3Q

FORWARD THIS INFORMATION TO ANYONE IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY!
http://www.delmar.ca.us/Government/C..._item\%2012. pdf

DELMAR.CA.US

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## EXHIBIT L

## (http://cgssa.org/)

CalGuns Shooting Sports Association

- Ncgssaadmin@cgssa.org (mailto:cgssaadmin@cgssa.org)
- f(https://facebook.com/calguns)
- (https://twitter.com/calgunsdotnet)
- in (http://linkedin.com/company/calgsuns-shooting-sports-association)
- $\mathcal{I}$ (https://www.google.com/+cgssa.org)


## About Us

Home (http://cgssa.org) / About Us


## Mission Statement

## To help rebuild the California Shooting Sports Community.

The CALGUNS Shooting Sports Association believes that the 2nd Amendment must be maintained, exercised and advanced in order to keep it relevant within our current day California Shooting Community. To support this belief we:

1. Maintain: Bring California Firearms Owner out from behind their keyboards and back out to the range to meet like-minded people thereby encouraging what becomes a constantly developing community.
2. Exercise: Once out and meeting and gathering, empower this developing community with information about the political landscape and its effect on their future as well as what Shooting Sports Options there are and can be in California.
3. Advance: Encourage the developing community to reach out and involve others through education and community development events.

- 

Warmest Regards
Jacob Rascon
(aka) Pennys Dad
President, CALGUNS Shooting Sports Assoc.
State Director, CALGUNS.Net Community Outreach
Appleseed and NRA Instructor
Jacob@CGSSA.Org

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- Cart (http://cgssa.org/cart/)
- Checkout (http://cgssa.org/checkout/)
- Checkout $\rightarrow$ Pay
- My Account (http://cgssa.org/my-account/)


## Archives

- July 2017 (http://cgssa.org/2017/07/)
- May 2017 (http://cgssa.org/2017/05/)
- April 2017 (http://cgssa.org/2017/04/)
- March 2017 (http://cgssa.org/2017/03/)
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uA well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
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- (https://twitter.com/calgunsdotnet)
- in (http://linkedin.com/company/calgsuns-shooting-sports-association)
- 8 (https://www.google.com/+cgssa.org)


## EXHIBIT M

## BECOME AN INSTRUCTOR

Since 1871, a major objective of the National Rifle Association has been to provide education and training in the safe and proper use of firearms. Knowing how to shoot is an important requirement for NRA instructors, but you will also need to know how to teach others to shoot. NRA Instructor Training Courses help you develop the additional knowledge, skills and techniques needed to organize and teach courses in the NRA Basic Firearm Training Program.

## To qualify as an NRA Instructor:

- Candidates must possess and demonstrate a solid background in firearm safety and shooting skills acquired through previous firearm training and/or previous shooting experience. Instructor candidates must be intimately familiar with each action type in the discipline for which they wish to be certified.
- Candidates will be required to demonstrate solid and safe firearm handling skills required to be successful during an instructor training course by completing pre-course questionnaires and qualification exercises administered by the NRA Appointed Training Counselor.
- Candidates must satisfactorily complete an NRA Instructor Training Course in the discipline they wish to teach (e.g., NRA Basic Pistol Course), and receive the endorsement of the NRA Training Counselor conducting that training. methodology; use of a training team and training aids; organizing a course, building a budget; and finally preparing to teach. In addition, candidates will be provided the appropriate lesson plans and basic course student packets. Role-playing is a major part of an instructor course; therefore, the minimum class size should be at least four candidates, with 10-12 candidates being ideal. Candidates take turns working in teams, actually conducting portions of the course to other candidates who portray basic students.

Instructor training courses are conducted by NRA Training Counselors. Training Counselors are active and experienced instructors who have been certified by NRA to train experienced shooters to teach others to shoot. Training Counselors will evaluate candidates' performance based on their ability to handle the firearms with confidence, use of appropriate training aids, following the lesson plans and meeting all learning objectives, while utilizing the teaching philosophies expected of NRA Certified Instructors. Candidates can also expect to learn the NRA discipline specific instructional methods and evaluating and improving the performance of beginning shooters.

## To qualify as an NRA Carry Guard Instructor:

Though much of the above NRA Instructor requirements still apply to potential NRA Carry Guard instructors, the advanced nature of NRA Carry Guard training requires an additional application process.

The NRA Carry Guard Instructor Program will be led by the NRA Carry Guard Development Team, which includes NRA Director of Education and Training and NRA Carry Guard Training Director Eric Frohardt and NRA Carry Guard National Director George Severence.

Prerequisites: For instructor applications to be considered, potential instructors must:

- Pass the NRA Carry Guard Level 1 training course with Distinction (score of $90 \%$ or more)
- Submit a resume
- Attend and pass an NRA Carry Guard Level 1 Instructor Training course (Instructor Training dates to be announced)
- Undergo a probationary instructor period (details of such will be provided during Instructor Training)

Note: Any potential NRA Carry Guard instructor may be subject to a background check, as well as in-person and/or telephone interviews.


## Home Safety Courses [ $\mathbb{Z}$

When it comes to shooting, safety is always priority number one. Learn how to teach others to safely handle their firearm at home and at the range. Take your first step towards becoming an NRA safety training instructor.


## Pistol Courses [

Gain the knowledge, skills, and attitude essential to organizing, promoting and teaching the NRA Education \& Training Division's various pistol courses, including basics of pistol shooting, defensive training, reloading and NRA Carry Guard concealed carry training. Explore the available courses below and get more information about the curriculum and focus of each instructor class.
(f) Course Details


## Rifle Courses [

The NRA Education \& Training Division offers a variety of rifle training courses, from the basics of pistol shooting to muzzleloading and reloading. Get more information about the curriculum and focus of each course.
(3) Course Details


## Shotgun Courses [

Share your love of shotgun shooting with others and become an NRA certified shotgun instructor or coach. Get more information about the curriculum and focus of each course.

Course Details

## EXHIBIT N

DEALER RECORD OF SALE TRANSACTIONS
The following chart shows the total number of transactions processed by DOJ between 1972 and 2016.


## NOTES

1972-1990: Figures represent handguns only; legislation requiring eligibility check on long gun purchasers and expanded prohibiting categories effective January 1, 1991.

1972-1974: DOJ was required to notify dealers and law enforcement of prohibited firearm purchasers, but was unable to stop delivery because the waiting period was limited to 5 days.

1975-1997: 15-day waiting period in place.
1997-present: 10-day waiting period in place.
2000: Limit handgun purchases to 1 in a 30 -day period.
2014:
DOJ retains long gun information.

## DEALER RECORD OF SALE

(Calendar Year Statistics)

| Year | Handguns | Handgun <br> Denials |
| :---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1972 | 190,335 |  |
| 1973 | 192,108 |  |
| 1974 | 234,691 |  |
| 1975 | 231,916 |  |
| 1976 | 204,658 |  |
| 1977 | 225,412 |  |
| 1978 | 258,485 |  |
| 1979 | 268,447 |  |
| 1980 | 325,041 |  |
| 1981 | 371,160 |  |
| 1982 | 311,870 | 1,008 |
| 1983 | 268,462 | 1,148 |
| 1984 | 275,882 | 1,349 |
| 1985 | 293,624 | 1,413 |
| 1986 | 266,480 | 1,515 |
| 1987 | 273,628 | 1,702 |
| 1988 | 291,171 | 1,803 |
| 1989 | 333,069 | 1,793 |
| 1990 | 330,295 | 2,437 |
|  |  |  |


| Year | Handgun | Handgun Denials | Long guns | Long gun Denials | All Guns | Total Denials |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1991 | 329,133 | 3,934 | 160,300 | 1,925 | 489,433 | 5,859 |
| 1992 | 382,122 | 4,037 | 177,486 | 1,726 | 559,608 | 5,763 |
| 1993 | 433,822 | 4,605 | 208,375 | 1,904 | 642,197 | 6,509 |
| 1994 | 382,085 | 3,862 | 217,587 | 2,564 | 599,672 | 6,426 |
| 1995 | 254,626 | 2,534 | 157,042 | 1,672 | 411,668 | 4,206 |
| 1996 | 215,804 | 2,111 | 138,068 | 1,531 | 353,872 | 3,642 |
| 1997 | 204,409 | 1,839 | 150,727 | 1,615 | 355,136 | 3,454 |
| 1998 | 189,481 | 1,721 | 153,059 | 1,596 | 342,540 | 3,317 |
| 1999 | 244,569 | 2,233 | 268,849 | 2,546 | 513,418 | 4,779 |
| 2000 | 201,865 | 1,572 | 184,345 | 1,903 | 386,210 | 3,475 |
| 2001 | 155,203 | 1,449 | 198,519 | 2,158 | 353,722 | 3,607 |
| 2002 | 169,469 | 1,661 | 182,956 | 2,172 | 352,425 | 3,833 |
| 2003 | 126,233 | 1,254 | 164,143 | 1,774 | 290,376 | 3,028 |
| 2004 | 145,335 | 1,497 | 169,730 | 1,828 | 315,065 | 3,325 |
| 2005 | 160,990 | 1,592 | 183,857 | 1,878 | 344,847 | 3,470 |
| 2006 | 169,629 | 2,045 | 205,944 | 1,689 | 375,573 | 3,734 |
| 2007 | 180,190 | 2,373 | 190,438 | 1,926 | 370,628 | 4,299 |
| 2008 | 208,312 | 2,737 | 216,932 | 2,201 | 425,244 | 4,938 |
| 2009 | 228,368 | 2,916 | 255,504 | 2,221 | 483,872 | 5,137 |
| 2010 | 236,086 | 2,740 | 262,859 | 2,286 | 498,945 | 5,026 |
| 2011 | 293,429 | 3,094 | 307,814 | 2,767 | 601,243 | 5,805* |
| 2012 | 388,006 | 3,842 | 429,732 | 3,682 | 817,738 | 7,524 |
| 2013 | 422,030 | 3,813 | 538,149 | 3,680 | 960,179 | 7493 |
| 2014 | 512,174 | 4,272 | 418,863 | 4,297 | 931,037 | 8,569 |
| 2015 | 483,372 | 5,417 | 397,231 | 4,252 | 880,603 | 9,669 |
| 2016 | 572,644 | 6,172 | 758,678 | 6,149 | 1,331,322 | 12,321 |

*The Handgun and Long Gun Dealer Record of Sale Denials counts do not equal because the same subject may have been denied for both a handgun and long gun purchased at the same time.

## EXHIBIT O

## Scott Franklin

Michel \& Associates, P.C.
180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200
Long Beach, CA 90802

## RE: Gentry, David, et al. v. Xavier Becerra, et al.

Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, Case No. 34-2013-80001667

## Dear Mr. Franklin:

Attached are the documents responsive to the Request for Production of Documents (Set Four), Request No. 95. They are numbered AGRFP001240-001301. Note that they cover fiscal year 2014-15 (the year requested) and 2015-16 (the most recent year for which complete data is available).

Also attached are the verifications for the discovery responses we served earlier this week.

Please contact me if you have any questions.


ANTHONY R. HAKL
Deputy Attorney General
For XAVIER BECERRA
Attorney General

## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

FY 2015/16

## BUREAU OF FIREARMS



DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation | Actual <br> Year-End <br> Expenditures | DROS |
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DATE $7 / 25 / 2016$.

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# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund 

| Unit Code | FY 2015/16BUREAU OF FIREARMS |  |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | FSE <br> Funding \% |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Program Title | Appropriation |  |  |  |  |  |
| 507 | Handgun Safety Certification | \$ | 4,249,000 | \$ | 4,113,121 | $1 /$ | 100\% |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | \$ | 53,000 | \$ | 37,501 |  | 13\% |
| FIREARMS | TAL FSE FUNDING | \$ | 4,302,000 | \$ | 4,150,621 |  |  |

// Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 156,540$ in statewide ProRata charges,
FY 2015
PAGE 700
CROSS－HRFERENCE NC2
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DEPARTMENT OF JTSTICE REPRORI OF EXPENDITITRES AS OF JUN 30,2016



## EXPETDIDURES

## WORKING APPROPRIATION


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## FY 2015 CHAPT 0010

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# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

| FY 2015/16AU OF FIREARM |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |  |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | \$ | 344,000 | \$ | 257,987 | $1 /$ | 87\%. |
| FIREARMS | IL FSA FUNDING | \$. | 344,000 | \$ | 257,987 |  |  |

1/Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 14,587$ in statewide ProRata charges.

CROSS-REREREENCE NC3
DTPARTMENT OF TVETICE
REPCRTI OF EXPENDITITEES AS OF UUN 30,2016
. FIREARM SAFEETY ACcotint
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FY 2015 CHAPS 0010 FUND 0032000 DATIE $7 / 25 / 2016$.

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$340,000.00$

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## DOJ Programs Funded with DROS Special Fund

FY 2014/15

## BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| BUREAU OF FIREARMS |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unit Code | Program Title |  | propriation. | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| 510 | Dealers Record of Sale | \$ | 13,938,458 | \$ 13,243,312 | 11 | 100\% |
| 505 | Armed Prohibited | \$ | 6,921,859 | \$ $\cdot 7,330,454$ |  | 100\% |
| 823 | Gun Show | \$ | 785,365 | \$ 933,138 |  | 100\% |
| 930 | APPS (SB 140) | \$ | 8,000,000 | \$ 5,481,379 |  | 100\% |
| FIREARMS | L DROS FUNDING |  | 29,645,682 | \$ 26,988,283 |  |  |

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  |  | Actual Year-End penditures | DROS <br> Funding \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 861 | Technology Support Bureau | \$ | 1,308,000 | \$ | 1,223,845 | 2\% |
| 795 | DROS - Long Gun | \$ | 199,659 | \$ | 185,656 | 100\% |
| 732 | Firearms Program - DROS | \$ | 315,885 | \$ | 216,253 | 100\% |
| 700 | CJIS Facilitios | \$ | 2,000 | \$ | 2,040 | 0.04\% |
| DCJIS TOTAL DROS FUNDING |  | \$ | 1,825,544 | \$ | 1,627,794 |  |
| DOJ TOTAL DROS FUNDING |  | \$ | 31,471,226 |  | 28,616,077 |  |

1/Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 1,415,577$ in statewide ProRata charges.
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| PROCRAM : IAG ENTORCHEMENT |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BESCRIPIION | CJERENT <br> PFRTOD FXPENSE | FRRKING Amproverantical | $y-x-D$ <br> EXPENDTPURES | COMSTAMNTNG ENECTMBRANCES |  | TCT |
|  |  |  | EXPENDTYURES |  | BAIANGT |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EERSCNAE SERTVICES |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CTVII SERVICE-PERMANENTI | 689,258.38 | .00 | 8,023.728.56 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| CIVII SERVICE-THMP EETIP | 37.715 .82 | -00 | 382,739.21 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| CuISPITME | 113.518.18 | . 00 | 1,306,917.58 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| STMEE BENEFTMS | 333,737.56 | . 00 | 3,974,886.80 | -00 | . 00 | . 00 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PEPSOEAL SERVIICES | $1,174.229 .94$ | . 00 | 13,688,272.25 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| OPERPAFITNE EXP \& EQUIP |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GETYERAL ESPERNSE | 5,814.51 | . 00 | 85,349.89 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| PRINTITNG | 7,368.00 | . 00 | - 33,497.75 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| COMMENCPTONS | 11,663.75 | . 00 | 178,594.67 | . 00 | . 00 | .00 |
| POSTAGE | 445.70 | . 00 | $6,817.32$ | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| Traves In-SIATE | 14.420.72 | . 00 | 132,253.00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| ITEVEU CTI-OF-SITATE | 214.11 | . 00 | 1.418.25 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| TRRATNIRE | 985.00 | . 00 | 3.227.00 | . 50 | . 00 | . 00 |
| FECITITTES OPERATICRI | $605,233.73-$ | . 00 | 304.179.68 | . 00 | -00 | . 00 |
| TIITLTITES | 2,83A.63 | .00 | 33,220.83 | -00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| COASUITANT \& PROEESSICRAE SVCS-I | 189,000.15 | . 00 | 885,606.93 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| COISUIJPMrI \& PROFESSICMAI SVCS-E | - 64,465.32 | .00 | 561.411.54 | -00 | .00 | . 00 |
| DEPARTMEMTPRL SERVICES | 189,873.50 | . 00 | 1,249,965.39 | . 00 | -00 | . 00 |
| INECRMATEON TECTHOLOEX | $660,815.46$ | . 00 | 877,593.65 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| CENTIRAL ALAINISTTRATIVE SERVVICES | -00 | . 00 | $1_{5} 415.577 .00$ | . 00 | . 00 | -00 |
| EQUIPMENT | 51,627.00- | . 00 | 1,785,751.90 | -00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| OXEPER ITHAS OE EXPENSE | 23,937.19 | .00 | 264.166.32 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
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| - ITNEERNAJ COST RECOVERRY | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |  |
| SPEC ITHMS OF EXPENSE |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CRAND TOTAL | 1,689,238.25 | 21,645,682, 00 | 21,506,903.37 | .00 | 138,778.63 | 99.35 |

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# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety and Enforcement Special Fund 



1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 165,793$ In statewide ProRata charges.

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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PEESORAI SERVICES |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CIVIE SERVICE-PERMANENT | 86,945.89 | . .00 | . 825,020.74 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| OVERTTME | 2,736.83 | . 00 | 5,409.12 | .00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| STAFF BENEFMS | $54,212.08$ | . 00 | $479,122.68$ | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| OPERRATINC EXP \& EOUIP |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GEMVEPAD EXYEMSE | 5,061.32 | .00 | 39,834.55 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00. |
| ERINTITIG | 725.00 | .00 | 22,943.20 | -00 | . 00 | -00 |
| FOSTACE | 26.73 | . 00 | 1,432.00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| TRAVES IN-SITATE | $1,061.74$ | . 00 | 29,133.65 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| TRATMINE | . 00 | .00 | 1,673.00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| EACIITITIES OPERAMION | -671, 756.52 | . 00 | 674,121.52 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| COMSUTTANT \& Prowessionai svos-i | - $18,655.50$ | . 00 | 53,365,90 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| COMSUETMNT \& PROEESSIONAL SVCS-E | - $43,858.56$ | -00 | 582,536.85 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| DEPARTMAENTAI SERVICES | 13,537.92 | . 00 | 89,122.08 | . 00 | -00 | . 00 |
| INECRTAATION TIECHNOLOGY | 36,379.00 | .00 | - 52,529.93 | -00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| CEANERAE ADMINISTPATIVE SERVVICES | . 00 | . 00 | 165.793.00 | . 00 | . 00 | .00 |
| EOUTEMENT | 3,953.50- | . 00 | 3,953.50- | . 00 | -00 | . 00 |
| OMHER ITEMS OF EXPENSE | $9,722.27$ | . 00 | 94,751.77 | . 00 | . 00 | -00 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SPEC IIEMS OE EXPRMSE |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| INJIERNAT COST RECOVERY | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 | . 00 |
| SEEC ITISNS OF EXPENSE |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CRAND TOIA | $940_{5} 725.86$ | 3,491,109.00 | $3,112,816.49$ | .00 | 378,292.51 | 89.16 |

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# DOJ Programs Funded with Firearms Safety Account Special Fund 

## FY 2014/15 <br> BUREAU OF FIREARMS

| Unit Code | Program Title | Appropriation |  | Actual Year-End Expenditures |  | FSA <br> Funding \% |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 509 | Firearms Safety Account | \$ | 339,000 | \$ | 234,059 | $1 /$ | 87\% |
| FIREARMS | AL FSA FUNDING | \$ | 339,000 | \$ | 234,059 |  |  |

1/ Actual year-end expenditures include $\$ 15,316$ in statewide ProRata charges.

## FY 2014 CEAPT 0025 FUND 0032000 . COOSS-REAFERENCE NC3



## VERIFICATION

## 1, Stephen Lindley, declare:

I am the Director of the Bureau of Firearms of the California Department of Justice. I have read DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS DIRECTOR STEPHEN LINDLEY'S RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (SET FOUR). I know their contents and the same are true to my knowledge, information, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of undet the law of the Staty of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Verification was executed on October $C 2017$; at $Q_{w} v \Omega \Delta \Delta \leq$, Califomia.


## VERIFICATION

## I, Stephen Lindley, declare:

I am the Director of the Bureau of Firearms of the California Department of Justice. I have read DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS DIRECTOR STEPHEN LINDLEY'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET FOUR). I know their contents and the same are true to my knowledge, information, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of under the layso 0 \& the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Verification, was execyed on October $C_{2} 2017$, at $D_{0} 0 \operatorname{Ln} \Delta \leq$ California.


## VERIFICATION

1, Stephen Lindley, declare:
I am the Director of the Bureau of Firearms of the California Department of Justice. I have read DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS DIRECTOR STEPHEN LINDLEY'S RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES (SET FOUR). I know their contents and the same are true to my knowledge, information, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of under the lats- -5 the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Verification was executed on October $C$ 2017, at $\cap u \leq S \in L \leq$, California.


## VERIFICATION

I, Stephen Lindley, declare:
I am the Director of the Bureau of Firearms of the California Deparment of Justice. I have read DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA AND BUREAU OF FIREARMS DIRECTOR STEPHEN LINDLEY'S RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS (SET THREE) I know their contents and the same are true to my knowledge, information, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of under the laws of the state of
mia that the foregoing is true and correct and that this yerification was executed on October $C$ 2017, at $Q \omega \angle \triangle \leq$; California.


## EXHIBIT P

| 2012 |  |  |  | Revenue |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | DROS Transactions | Billable (\$19) | Billable (\$15) |  |
| YEARLY TOTAL | 817,738 | 735,964 | 81,774 | \$15,209,927 |
|  | 2013 |  |  |  |
|  | DROS Transactions | Billable (\$19) | Billable (\$15) |  |
| YEARLY TOTAL | 960,179 | 864,161 | - 96,018 | \$17,859,329 |
| 2014 |  |  |  |  |
|  | DROS Transactions | Billable (\$19) | Difference |  |
| YEARLY TOTAL | 931,037 | 844,128 | 86,909 | \$16,038,432 |
| 2015 |  |  |  |  |
|  | DROS Transactions | Billable (\$19) | Difference |  |
| YEARLY TOTAL | 880,603 | 775,587 | 105,016 | \$14,736,153 |
| 2016 |  |  |  |  |
|  | DROS Transactions | Billable (\$19) | Difference |  |
| YEARLY TOTAL | 1,331,322 | 1,129,959 | 201,363 | \$21,469,221 |
| 2017 |  |  |  |  |
|  | DROS Transactions | Billable (\$19) | Difference |  |
| YEARLY TOTAL | 882,585 | 781,889 | 100,696 | \$14,855,891 |

[^30]
# DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL and U.S. Mail 

## Case Name: Gentry, David, et al. v. Kamala Harris, et al. <br> No.: 34-2013-80001667

I declare:
I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of business.

On February 20, 2018, I served the attached DECLARATION OF ANTHONY R. HAKL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION BRIEF by transmitting a true copy via electronic mail. In addition, I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, in the internal mail system of the Office of the Attorney General, addressed as follows:

## Scott Franklin

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on February 20, 2018, at Sacramento, California.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

DAVID GENTRY, JAMES PARKER, MARK MIDLAM, JAMES BASS, and CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs and Petitioners,

## v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General for the State of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the California Department of Justice, BETTY T. YEE, in Her Official Capacity as State Controller, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 34-2013-80001667
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPENING TRIAL BRIEF

Hearing Date: $\quad$ March 16, 2018 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

Judge:
Dept.:
Honorable Richard K. Sueyoshi 28

Trial Date: $\quad$ March 16, 2018
Action Filed: October 16, 2013

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## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

## I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants' Opposition consists primarily of two meritless arguments that fill the space left bare as a result of Defendants' refusal to address the clear evidence of unauthorized governmental spending presented by Plaintiffs in this case. Accordingly, the Court should grant the relief Plaintiffs seek for the reasons stated in their Opening Brief and this Reply.

## II. ARGUMENT

## A. Defendants Cannot Meet Two of the Three Elements of Claim Preclusion

1. The Primary Right Theory Only Potentially Creates a Res Judicata Bar as to Claims Arising from "a Particular Injury[,]" Not, as Defendants Argue, a Particular Type of Injury

Defendants correctly state the claim preclusion standard (Opp. at 19:20-25), ${ }^{1}$ but they cannot meet their burden as to two of its three elements. ${ }^{2}$ Regarding the first element-that there is a second suit involving "the same cause of action" as was brought in a prior action (DKN Holdings, 61 Cal. 4th at 824)—"California law approaches the issue by focusing on the 'primary right' at stake." (Opp. at 19:28-20:6 (citing Cal Sierra Dev., Inc. v. George Reed, Inc., 14 Cal . App. 5th 663, 675 (2017)). "If two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake[.]" (Id. (italics added).) So when a primary right raised in an action litigated to final judgment is raised in another action, the application of the doctrine of res judicata results in the later-raised "cause [being] merged into the judgment and . . . serves as a bar to further litigation of the same cause of action." (Opp. at 9:1216, citing Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896-97 (2002).)

Though Defendants repeatedly claim Bauer and this action "concern the same legal wrong

[^31]and injury" (Opp. at 21:19-22 \& 9:10-13, 19:26, 20:18, 21:26-28), Defendants never actually identify and compare the injuries at issue in Bauer and this action. Doing so would have shown that Bauer and this case do not concern "the same . . injury" at all-they instead only concern the same type of injury, which is not enough to meet the first claim preclusion element. Planning \& Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 180 Cal. App. 4th 210, $227-28$ (2009), as modified on denial of reh'g (Jan. 14, 2010); Frommhagen v. Bd. of Supervisors, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1292, 1299-300 (1987); Roam v. Koop, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 1041, (1974); Yates v. Kuhl, 130 Cal.App.2d 536, 540 (1955).
"The scope of the primary right . . . depends on how the injury is defined. A cause of action comprises the plaintiff's primary right, the defendant's corresponding primary duty, and the defendant's wrongful act in breach of that duty." Fed'n of Hillside \& Canyon Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1180, 1203 (2004). "An injury is defined in part by reference to the set of facts, or transaction, from which the injury arose." Id. The "set of facts, or transaction, from which the injury [in Bauer] arose" is completely separate from the "set of facts, or transaction, from which the injury [in this case] arose[.]" Id. As stated in the relevant complaints, the individual Plaintiffs in Bauer and in this action alleged injury occurring when they each purchased a firearm and were forced to pay the challenged levy. (Decl. of Anthony Hakl in Supp. of Opp. ["Hakl Decl."] at Ex. A, बी 14, 17, 19, 20; Am. Compl., बी 21-24.) The fact that each plaintiff has a unique injury in and of itself proves there was not a single invasion of a primary right upon which the "same action" requirement could be met.

Further, the timing of the injuries pleaded in this action is dispositive as to the whether this case concerns the same invasion of a primary right that was addressed in Bauer. That is, each individual Plaintiff herein alleged that, between October 31, 2012, and October 31, 2013, they had purchased a firearm, and in the course thereof were injured because they had to pay the inflated Dealers Record of Sale ("DROS") fee ("DROS Fee"). (Am. Compl., Iffl 21-24, 111.). Bauer was filed on August 25, 2011 (Hakl Decl. at Ex. A), well before any of the occurrence of any of the injuries at issue herein. (Am. Compl., gIfl 21-24.) Because "a cause of action is framed by the facts in existence when the underlying complaint is filed, res judicata 'is not a bar to claims
that arise after the initial complaint is filed." Planning \& Conservation League, 180 Cal . App. 4th at 227. Indeed, where post-filing injuries violate a plaintiff"s rights, " $[t]$ hese rights may be asserted in a supplemental pleading, but if such a pleading is not filed a plaintiff is not foreclosed from asserting the rights in a subsequent action." Id. at 228 . There is simply no merger where "the second action is on a different cause of action, where there are successive breaches of an obligation, or . . . new rights accrued since the rendition of the former judgment." 7 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 5th Judgm. § 404 (2017) (identifying more than a dozen relevant cases).

Frommhagen is particularly instructive. There, the plaintiff brought and litigated a lawsuit regarding a "county service area charge" (the "Charge") levied on him for fiscal year 1984-1985 that was dismissed by the trial court, a decision upheld on appeal. Frommhagen, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1292, 1297-98. Soon after his first case was over, Frommhagen filed a new action regarding the assessment of the Charge for fiscal year 1985-1986, and the defendant county raised a res judicata argument based on the first action. Id. at 1298-99.

The Frommhagen court had little trouble in finding that the "suit attacking the 1985-1986 charges is not based on the same cause of action as the suit attacking the 1984-1985 charges." Id. at 1300. It held that "each year is the origin of a new charge fixing procedure, new charge liability, and, we believe, a new cause of action. In the parlance of the 'primary right theory,' those paying charges have a primary right to have the charges properly calculated and imposed each year." Id. The rejected res judicata allegations in Frommhagen and those made in this action are patently parallel. Just like each yearly levy of the Charge created a new cause of action (id.), ${ }^{3}$ each firearm purchase burdened with the payment of the illegally inflated DROS Fee created a

[^32]new cause of action. Accordingly, because none of the Plaintiffs herein base their claims on the fee payments at issue in Bauer, Defendants cannot meet the first element and their res judicata claim fails for that reason alone.

## 2. Defendants Cannot Show the Required Privity.

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs have a sufficient relationship with the Bauer plaintiffs to meet the res judicata privity requirement. (Opp. at 25:3-4.) This assertion is based on three factual allegations: (1) the same law firm (and to some extent, the same specific lawyers) that represents Plaintiffs also represented the plaintiffs in Bauer; (2) Plaintiffs "worked in cooperation with the plaintiffs in Bauer [;]" and (3) that the entity plaintiffs in this case and Bauer "maintain a relationship of privity as a practical matter[.]"(Id. at 23:3-25:2). Even if all of those factual assertions are true, Defendants have nonetheless failed to show the existence of privity upon which a claim preclusion bar could be applied to Plaintiffs.

Defendants' own case law dooms their attempt to show privity. In the res judicata context, "[a] privy is one who, after rendition of the judgment, has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession, or purchase." (Opp. at 22:14-16.; citing Cal Sierra, 14 Cal. App. 5th at 672.) Under this definition, Plaintiffs are only privies of the Bauer plaintiffs if Plaintiffs "acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one of the [Bauer plaintiffs] as by inheritance, succession, or purchase." (Id.) Defendants, however, fail to allege (1) an interest in the "subject matter" obtained by a Plaintiff from a Bauer Plaintiff, let alone one that was obtained (2) "as by inheritance, succession, or purchase." (Id.).
"A party is adequately represented for purposes of the privity rule 'if his or her interests are so similar to a party's interest that the latter was the former's virtual representative in the earlier action.'" Citizens for Open Access, 60 Cal. App. 4th at 1070. "This requires more than a showing of parallel interests-it is not enough that the non-party may be interested in the same questions or proving the same facts." In re Yellow Cab Co., 212 B.R. 154, 158 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997). "The cases uniformly state that, in addition to an identity or community of interest between the party to be estopped and the losing party in the first action, and adequate
representation by the latter, 'the circumstances must have been such that the party to be estopped should reasonably have expected to be bound by the prior adjudication.'" Rodgers v. Sargent Controls \& Aerospace, 136 Cal. App. 4th 82, 93 (2006), as modified (Feb. 7, 2006). As the Rodgers court noted, in Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis \& Pogue, 121 Cal. App. 4th 282, 298-299 (2004), the court there "discern[ed] no basis for concluding Vega 'should reasonably have expected to be bound by' the adjudication of lawsuits in which he did not participate in any way, in which he had no proprietary or financial interest, and over which he had no control of any sort." Id. (italics added).
"'This requirement of identity of parties or privity is a requirement of due process of law.' [Citation.] 'Due process requires that the nonparty have had an identity or community of interest with, and adequate representation by, the losing party in the first action." Cal Sierra, 14 Cal. App. 5th at 673. Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala. 517 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1996), decisively directs that Defendants have not made a sufficient privity showing. In that ruling, the Supreme Court held that the final ruling in a prior taxpayer lawsuit brought by three taxpayers, who acted for their own benefit and not for a class or the public at large, was not res judicata as to a later, substantially similar lawsuit brought by different parties. Id. at 798, 801-02. As the Supreme Court stated, "to contend that the plaintiffs in [the first action] somehow represented [plaintiffs in the second action], let alone represented them in a constitutionally adequate manner, would be 'to attribute to them a power that it cannot be said that they had assumed to exercise.'" Id. at 1768. "Accordingly, [Richards holds that] due process prevents the [plaintiffs in the second action] from being bound by the [plaintiffs in the first actions'] judgment" (id.), just as this Court should.

## i. Use of the Same Attorney Is Not Per Se Relevant as to Privity

Defendants claim that "the same counsel's representation of different plaintiffs in successive actions is a factor this Court should consider in determining privity[,]" citing Alvarez v. May Dept. Stores Co., 143 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 1238 (2008). (Opp. at 23:13-16.) Defendants do not, however explain why this "factor" weighs in favor of a privity finding in this action. As Defendants admit: "[w]hether someone is in privity with the actual parties requires a close examination of the circumstances of each case." (Opp. at 22:26-23:2, citing Citizens for Open

Access, 60 Cal. App. 4th at 1070.) And yet, Defendants provide no argument supporting their position. Indeed, the idea that an attorney's representation of two similarly situated clients in two similar cases should be the basis for penalizing the second such client is contrary to public policy.

> That appellant is represented by the same counsel as were the plaintiffs in the prior actions does not, we conclude, suffice to extend the doctrine of privity to his case. . . [T]he representation of different plaintiffs in different cases by the same attorneys is not a factor that justifies imposition of collateral estoppel to preclude litigation of an issue by appellant as a non-party to the prior actions, at least without evidence that through his attorney he participated in or controlled the adjudication of the issue sought to be relitigated. [citation] To find that an identity of attorneys presenting the same issue on behalf of different parties results in issue preclusion would promote attorney shopping, and tend to prevent parties from obtaining representation by chosen counsel familiar with an issue or matter in litigation.

Rodgers, 136 Cal. App. 4th at 93-94 (discussing privity vis-à-vis issue preclusion) (italics added).
Thus, if this "factor" is relevant at all, it is only relevant to the extent that one of the Plaintiffs used their counsel to "participate[] in or control[] the adjudication" in Bauer. Id. Defendants have not produced even a scintilla of argument of that having occurred. That Plaintiffs chose a law firm with firearms law experience to bring a case concerning firearms law—just as the Bauer plaintiffs did—is of no import to the privity analysis. Indeed, to hold otherwise would cut against the well-established "interest of clients in having the attorney of [their] choice[.]" Howard v. Babcock, 6 Cal. 4th 409, 425 (1993).

## ii. Cooperation Does Not Evince Privity

Defendants' attempt to show privity based on the supposition that Plaintiffs "worked in cooperation with the plaintiffs in Bauer" also fails for the same reason. That is, two sets of plaintiffs "working in cooperation" is not a salient consideration vis-à-vis proving privity unless it shows a plaintiff in one lawsuit participated in, had a proprietary interest in, or had control over another lawsuit. Rodgers, 136 Cal . App. 4th at 93. Defendants claim that Plaintiffs "had access to all of the discovery [responses] in the possession of the Bauer plaintiffs[,]" but such access would not further the assertion of privity—obtaining "presumptively public" ${ }^{4}$ discovery responses from Bauer does nothing to show a Plaintiff "had a right to make a defense [in], control . . . , [or]

[^33]appeal" that case. (Opp. at 22:12-14, citing Cal Sierra, 14 Cal. App. 5th at 672.)

## iii. Defendants Show No Privity between the Entity Plaintiffs

Defendants claim their privity assertion is assisted because the "lead organizational plaintiff in Bauer" and the "lead organizational plaintiff in" this case "maintain a relationship of privity as a practical matter, when it comes to lobbying, litigating, and generally advocating to promote firearm rights." (Opp. at 24:8-25:2). First, the claim about "a relationship of privity . . . when it comes to . . . litigating" is speculation: Defendants do not identify a single evidentiary basis for this contention. Second, even assuming Defendants' citation to internet sources did suggest these two entities had a relationship that generally included some aspect concerning litigation, that fact would do nothing to show the Plaintiffs had "adequate representation" of their interests in a particular prior lawsuit, i.e., Bauer. Consumer Advocacy Grp., Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 168 Cal. App. 4th 675, 690 (2008) (citing Richards, 517 U.S. 793, passim).

In sum, Defendants offer three arguments to support a finding of privity and each fails. Accordingly, Defendants have not met their burden to show privity, in addition to having failed to show that this action and Bauer concern the same primary right. Therefore, there are two independent, elemental reasons why claim preclusion is inapplicable here.

## 3. The Public Policy/Injustice Exception

When the Bauer court determined that the Armed Prohibited Person System ("APPS") "can fairly be considered an 'expense[ ] of policing the activities in question,"" relying upon certain First Amendment fee jurisprudence (Bauer, 858 F.3d at 1225), it was ruling on a question of law. Bd. of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 698 (1977) ("a determination is one of law if it can be reached only by the application of legal principles"). If the Court finds a prima facie issue preclusion claim exists, "public policy considerations . . . warrant an exception to the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata." People v. Barragan, 32 Cal. 4th 236, 256, 83 P.3d 480, 495 (2004); see also Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com., 11 Cal. 4th 607, 622 (1995) ("when the issue is a question of law . . . , the prior determination is not conclusive either if injustice would result or if the public interest requires that relitigation not be foreclosed.") The conclusion reached in Bauer is completely at odds with the import of Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization 15

Cal. 4th 866, 874 (1997) (see infra Section II.B.1.), and it would be unjust to allow a legal determination in a federal action, concerning a claim brought under the United States Constitution, to run roughshod over the clear instruction of the California Supreme Court. Thus, the public policy/injustice exception should prevent claim preclusion based on Bauer .

## B. The DROS Fee Operates as an Unconstitutional Tax

Before dismantling Defendants' arguments attempting to characterize the DROS Fee as a regulatory fee, it is worth noting that Defendants make no real argument that if the DROS Fee is held to be a tax, it would necessarily be an unconstitutional tax. Defendants' only comment on this point is an unsupported claim, raised in a footnote, that "even if article XIII were somehow implicated, plaintiffs have not cited a single case holding that section 1 (b), 2, or 3(m) applies to firearms." (Opp. at 29:27-28). The non-existence of such a case is patently irrelevant. Just because a court has not had the opportunity to apply the relevant law to a certain factual scenario imparts no indication as to applicability of such law to that scenario. Factual distinctions, e.g., whether a case concerns firearms or some other form of property, mean nothing unless the distinction is legally relevant. See People v. Johnson, 6 Cal. 4th 1, 40-41 (1993); People v. Byoune, 65 Cal. 2d 345, 348 (1966). Because Defendants fail to identify a legally relevant distinction between the facts here and the facts in the case law cited by Plaintiffs (Open. Br. at $24: 8-9,25: 14-18$.) the sole disputed issue is whether the DROS Fee is a completely valid regulatory fee-which is Defendants' position (Opp. at 29:7-32:13)—or if it is operating, at least in part, as an unconstitutional tax. The Opposition fails to overcome the reality that the Department is using the DROS Fee to collect an unconstitutional tax.

## 1. Defendants Avoid Admitting that the DROS Fee Is a Tax by Wrongly Claiming the Sinclair Paint Standard Does Not Apply

Even though the proper framework for "distinguishing taxes from regulatory fees" is of central importance in this case, Defendants use a footnote to argue that the two-prong approach identified by Plaintiffs "misses the mark." (Opp. 27:23-28.) Defendants claim that: San Diego Gas \& Electric Co. v. San Diego County Air Pollution Control Dist. 203 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1146 (1988) is "the case outlining that approach that plaintiffs urge this court to follow[,]" that San

Diego Gas "expressly indicates that it [the two-prong analysis] applies to determining whether a fee is a 'special tax under Proposition 13 (i.e., article XIIIA [of the California Constitution]), and that "the issue in this case is not whether the DROS Fee is a special tax under Proposition 13." ${ }^{5}$ (Opp. at 27:23-28.) What Defendants cobble together here is a textbook strawman argument.

San Diego Gas is not "the," i.e., the only, case identified by Plaintiffs that outlines the approach that plaintiffs urge this Court to follow." (Id.; see Mot. at § IV.A (discussing a series of cases going back to 1906, including the pre-Proposition 13 case Un. Busi. Com. v. City of San Diego, 91 Cal. App. 3d 156 (1979) and the seminal case Sinclair Paint). In contrast, the Opposition repeatedly cites a single case (Cal. Farm Bureau Federation v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 51 Cal. 4th 421 (2011), as modified (Apr. 20, 2011), and never identifies an analytical framework in Cal. Farm that could be utilized in this case. (Opp. at 26:8-27:18.)

The reason for this omission is clear: Cal. Farm adopts the standard Defendants now urge this Court not to follow, hereinafter referred to as the Sinclair Paint standard. Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 441 (noting that, "in Sinclair Paint, to determine the tax or fee issue, we directed courts to examine [(1)] the costs of the regulatory activity and [(2)] determine if there was a reasonable relationship between the fees assessed and the costs of the regulatory activity"), 436-37. The Cal. Farm court expressly recognized the two-prong Sinclair Paint standard was valid, concluding that "the question [at issue in Cal. Farm] revolve[d] around [(1)] the scope and the cost of the Division's regulatory activity and [(2)] the relationship between those costs and the fees imposed." Id. Accordingly, Cal. Farm, just like Sinclair Paint, is a Proposition 13 case that nonetheless relies on a "tax v. fee" analytical framework predating Proposition 13 (i.e., the Sinclair Paint Standard)—meaning that framework is necessarily not limited to Proposition 13

[^34]cases. ${ }^{6}$ For example, in Northwest Energetic, which does not concern Proposition 13, the court stated that "the distinction between a tax and a fee has been well-discussed in Proposition 13 cases" and then went on to cite and rely on, e.g., Sinclair Paint. Nw. Energetic Servs., LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd., 159 Cal. App. 4th 841, 857 (2008), as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 3, 2008). Therefore, Defendants are wrong as a matter of law in trying to distinguish the San Diego Gas/Sinclair Paint line of cases and the analytical framework it provides.

Considering the foregoing, Defendants' well-camouflaged strawman comes into view. Defendants set up this distraction by erroneously implying that Plaintiffs contend "the DROS Fee is a special tax under Proposition 13." (Opp. at 27:27-28.) Because the relevant aspect of Proposition 13 (article XIIIA, section 4) only applies to "Cities, Counties and special districts" (id.), and the California Department of Justice ("Department") is clearly none of those, Plaintiffs are obviously not making such a claim. What Plaintiffs do assert is that, under generally applicable law, the DROS Fee is a tax. That such generally applicable law has been relied upon in Proposition 13 cases in no way operates to limit the use of such law in non-proposition 13 cases. Because the Sinclair Paint standard is applicable here, Defendants' claim that the DROS Fee is a reasonable regulatory fee must be analyzed under that standard. As shown below, that analysis clearly identifies the DROS Fee as a tax.

## 2. Cal. Farm Is Distinguishable, and Even Assuming It Is Not, It Would Support Plaintiffs' Position, Not Defendants'

Defendants' attempt to compare this action to Cal. Farm is confounding. First, they assert that in Cal. Farm "the California Supreme Court upheld the state's water right statutes . . imposing annual fees on those who hold permits and licenses to appropriate water." (Opp. at 27:20-23; citing Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 446.) That is not an accurate representation of the Cal.
${ }^{6}$ Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 436-37 (citing Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. 4th at 874, 876, 878); Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. 4th at 878 (citing United Business, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 166-68 ); United Business, 91 Cal. App. 3d at 165 (noting a municipality could impose a regulatory fee under the police power if "the fee constitutes [(1)] an amount necessary to 'legitimately assist in regulation and [(2)]. . . not exceed the necessary or probable expense of issuing the license and of inspecting and regulating the . . subject that it covers.'")

Farm holding. The Cal. Farm court did "affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment holding that the fee statutes at issue [we]re facially constitutional." Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 446. But literally the next sentence of that opinion-unmentioned by Defendants-states: "the Court of Appeal's judgment is reversed as to its determination that the statutes and their implementing regulations are unconstitutional as applied." (Id. at 446-47.) That omission is strange; the Opposition later quotes the Cal. Farm court's explanation of why it reversed and remanded. (Opp. at 29:12-17).

Second, and stranger still, is that Defendants approvingly quote the portion of Cal. Farm that reiterates the Sinclair Paint standard applies in cases like Cal. Farm: "the [tax or fee] question revolves around [(1)] the scope and the cost of the Division's regulatory activity and [(2)] the relationship between those costs and the fees imposed." (Opp. at 29:12-17, citing Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 441.) ${ }^{7}$

Third, Cal. Farm shines little light on this case because there "the record before [the Court wa]s insufficient to resolve the 'tax or fee' question." Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 441 . Without an application of law to facts, Cal. Farm is little more than a recapitulation of the judicial landscape vis-à-vis the 'tax or fee' question, a landscape that Cal. Farm recognized was (and still is) dominated by Sinclair Paint. Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 441. Because Cal. Farm does not include a determination based on a factual analysis intended to resolve the 'tax or fee' question, it has no materiality to this case, and the Court should ignore Defendants' conclusions based on Cal. Farm.

## 3. Section 28225 and the Statute at Issue in Cal. Farm Are Not Analogous

For reasons not totally clear, Defendants cite Cal. Farm's statement that the statute at issue there "'revealed a specific intention to' impose a regulatory fee[,]' [and that] Penal Code section 28225 ("Section 28225"), also reveals a specific legislative intention to impose a regulatory fee." (Opp. at 27:21-28:4). If Defendants are attempting to claim the legislature can make a tax into a regulatory fee by naming it as such, that assetion is plainly wrong. "Whatever it is and by whatever name it may be called, the character of the tax 'must be ascertained by its

[^35]incidents and from the natural and legal effect of the language employed in the (legislative enactment)."" Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 473 (1949). Further, Senate Bill 819 (Leno, 2011) ("SB 819") plainly shows an intent to create a (special) tax. It states that: "[r]ather than placing an additional burden on the taxpayers of California to fund enhanced enforcement of [APPS], it is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this measure to allow the [Department] to utilize the [DROS] Account for the additional, limited purpose of funding enforcement of [APPS]." Compare 2011 Cal. Stat., ch. 743 § 1(g); with Nw. Energetic, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 857 (2008), ("the Legislature's plain intent to impose the Levy in order to make up for lost income tax revenues . . . indicat[e]s that the Levy constitutes a tax rather than a fee.") ${ }^{8}$

More likely, Defendants' strategy is to gloss over critical distinctions between Section 28225 and Water Code 1525 (the primary statute at issue in Cal. Farm) so they can (wrongly) conclude that Section 28225 is a facially valid fee like Water Code section 1525 was determined to be. Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 438-39.

Defendants claim "Section 28225 'carefully sets out that the fee[] imposed shall relate to costs linked to' the eleven categories set forth in subdivision (b)(1) through (11), and it 'lists the recoverable costs in some detail[,]" relying on Cal. Farm's discussion of Water Code section 1525. (Opp. at 28:8-10.) That claim may be correct as to some of the categories stated in section 28225(b) (which are minimally relevant here), ${ }^{9}$ but not as to the subsection at the heart of this case, Section 28225(b)(11). Subsection (b)(11) refers to "costs associated with funding Department of Justice firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities related to the sale, purchase, possession, loan, or transfer of firearms pursuant to any provision listed in Section 16580." Defendants admit they view this provision as being broadly applicable to firearm-related activities. (Opp. Pls.' Mot Adj. re: 5th \& 9th Causes of Action, 9:9-12, 10:2-7; accord Memo Supp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. Adj. at 21:26-22:15("section 28225 . . . broadly speaks in terms of 'costs associated with . . . the sale, purchase, possession, loan, or transfer of firearms.").)

[^36]Water Code section 1525 provides a helpful contrast, as it, unlike Section 28225(b)(11), is actually drafted "in some detail[.]"(Opp. at 28:8-10.)

The board shall set the fee schedule authorized by this section so that the total amount of fees collected pursuant to this section equals that amount necessary to recover costs incurred in connection with the issuance, administration, review, monitoring, and enforcement of permits, licenses, certificates, and registrations to appropriate water, water leases, statements of water diversion and use for cannabis cultivation, and orders approving changes in point of discharge, place of use, or purpose of use of treated wastewater. . . .

Water Code § 1525(c). Thus, Water Code section 1525 is limited to recovery of a narrowly defined class of costs related to processing and enforcing documentary proof of rights related to water (e.g., permits, wastewater-related orders). Id. Further, Water Code section 1525 has a provision-with no analog in Section 28225-requiring "that [the state water board] 'set the amount of total revenue collected each year through the fees authorized by this section at an amount equal to the revenue levels set forth in the annual Budget Act for this activity." Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 439-40. Also, "There is a safeguard in subdivision (d)(3) authorizing the [state water board] to "further adjust the annual fees" if it "determines that the revenue collected during the preceding year was greater than, or less than, the revenue levels set forth in the annual Budget Act...." Id. at 440. Section 28225 does not include these kinds of limitations.

Defendants assert that, [1]ike the situation in" Cal. Farm, the "language [in Section 28225] also allows the [Department] to adjust the amount of the DROS fee as needed." (Opp. at 29:1-2.) This is a false comparison, as Section 28225 does not have the type of "safeguard" language found in Water Code section 1525 that requires a yearly review. If it did, the Department might not have failed to review the amount being charged for the DROS Fee for more than thirteen years. (Ruling of Aug. 9, 2017, at 11:2-5.) And in any event, Defendants do not explain how a regulatory agency's statutory ability to adjust a levy "reveals a specific legislative intention to impose a regulatory fee[.]" (Opp. at 27:22-28:4.) That ability could just as easily support Plaintiffs' observation that Section 28225 violates the Separation of Powers doctrine specifically because the Department can adjust the DROS Fee, which is a tax. (Open. Br. § IV.D.1.).

To conclude Defendants' Cal. Farm-centric analysis in Section II.A. of their Opposition, they claim the DROS Fee "is hardly a tax" because "like the fees upheld in California Farm

Bureau, the DROS Fee authorized by section 28225 is "linked to the activities that [the Department] and other specified agencies perform." (Opp. at 29:4-7; citing Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 440.) But Defendants' claim fails to recognize the context in which the quoted material arose. That is, the final paragraph in Cal. Farm's facial challenge analysis concludes that: "the fees charged under section 1525 are linked to the activities the [state water board] performs." Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 440. Defendants use this summary statement to argue that, under Cal. Farm, a challenge to a purported tax can be defeated upon nothing more than a showing that the charge "is linked to" activities performed by the relevant agency. (Opp. at 29:4-7; citing Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 440.) But as the paragraph at issue makes clear, Cal. Farm specifically rejected the idea that "the 'activity' subject to fees under [water code section 1525] could represent all of the [state water board]'s activities[.]" Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th at 439-440. Rather, Cal. Farm's reference to "the activities the [state water board] performs" was limited to the plainly regulatory activities actually identified in Water Code section 1525(a)-(c). Id. Thus, even if Cal. Farm's facial challenge analysis is relevant, Defendants cannot cherry-pick it and ignore the critically important limitation identified above. A fair reading of Cal. Farm shows that it does not support Defendants' interest in using DROS Fee money for activities not listed in Section 28225. ${ }^{10}$

Because of the material distinctions-ignored by Defendants-that negate Defendants' attempt to construct an argument based on Water Code section 1525, the Court should ignore it.

## 4. Defendants' Confused "Reasonable Relationship" Argument Fails; the Framework that Must Be Applied is the Sinclair Paint Standard, Under Which the DROS Fee Is a Tax

Section II.B. of the Opposition is the core of Defendants' argument on the "tax or fee" issue. But that section is muddled as to what analytical framework is being applied-assuming one is. The section does quote the Cal. Farm court's restatement of the Sinclair Paint standard (Opp. at 29:12-14), but the remainder of the section does not refer to the Sinclair Paint standard. The latter is consistent with footnote 19 of the Opposition, which (incorrectly) argues the Sinclair

[^37]Paint standard is inapplicable because it is a Proposition 13 case.
Rather, it seems Defendants have manufactured a standard that is based on their faulty "linked to" argument described in the prior subsection. Though Defendants do not cite any authority, they are apparently arguing that the Court should utilize the following standard: a levy [e.g., "the $\$ 19$ DROS fee"] is not a tax if it "is reasonably related to all of the costs related to the regulation of the fee payors." (Opp. at 32:12-13; accord Opp. at 29:7-8 \& 29:22-23 (italics added.) That "standard" is much broader than the Sinclair Paint standard in at least two ways. First, it changes the scope of costs under consideration from "the reasonable cost of providing services necessary to the activity for which the fee is charged (Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal . 4th at 876 (italics added)) "to all of the costs related to the regulation of the fee payors" (Opp. at 32:12-13 (italics added)), i.e., costs beyond those for a specific program. Second, the phrase "fee payors" (id.) includes all fee payers, even those that get no benefit from, nor create a burden on, a relevant program. On the other hand, the phrase "fee payor's" (Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. 4th at 876) is much narrower and looks at what costs are actually attributable to a particular person.

Presumably, Defendants ask the Court to adopt a "novel" standard because they recognize the DROS Fee is a tax under Sinclair Paint. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Defendants never even attempt to mount a defense of the DROS Fee in the context of the Sinclair Paint standard. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs now explain why Defendants' factual and legal assertions cannot prevent the DROS Fee from being recognized as a tax.
i. Irrelevant Data Cannot Trump Relevant, Undisputed Data

Defendants claim financial data going back five years shows that "all of the costs associated with funding the relevant firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities actually exceeded the amount of DROS fee revenue[; t]his demonstrates that the $\$ 19.00$ DROS fee is proportional to the costs of the regulated activities." (Opp. at 29:25-30:21.) That assertion is pure obfuscation: Defendants provide an answer to a question that no one has asked.

The expenditure data Defendants cite (Id. at 30:11-14) is not limited to only expenditures authorized by section 28225, but includes other expenses that, as Plaintiff have already explained (Open. Brief § IV.D.2.; see also Mot. Adj. Pls.' 5th \& 9th Causes of Action, § II.F.), are not
authorized to be funded via the DROS Fee. (Id.) So when Defendants claim "that the $\$ 19.00$ DROS fee is proportional to the costs of the regulated activities[,]" Defendants are obfuscating a key issue: both prongs of the Sinclair Paint standard only consider the costs of the regulatory program giving rise to the relevant levy, not some undefined list of regulatory activities performed by the levy-imposing agency. See Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. 4th at 8767; see also Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control Dist., 178 Cal. App. 4th 120, 131, (2009) ("a regulatory fee is charged to cover the reasonable cost of a service or program connected to a particular activity.") In contrast to Defendants' disinformation, Plaintiffs provided the Court undisputed evidence that the Department is spending numerous millions of dollars on activities that are not "regulatory activities" identified in Section 28225. (Open. Brief § IV.D.2.; see also Mot. Adj. Pls.' 5th \& 9th Causes of Action, § II.F.)

## ii. The Compulsory Versus Voluntary Dichotomy

To further the claim that the DROS Fee is nothing but a legitimate regulatory fee, Defendants state that " $[t]$ he DROS fee is not compulsory, whereas, one of the hallmarks of a tax is that it is compulsory." (Opp. at 31:12-21.) Plaintiffs do no dispute that "one of the hallmarks of a tax is that it is compulsory," but that is not an absolute requirement. (See Opp. at 26:14-15, quoting Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. App. At 874 ("[T]he word 'tax’ has no fixed meaning . . . . Most taxes are compulsory . . . .") (italics added).) more to the point, the issue of "compulsory" payment needs to be understood in context. It is used in contrast to a situation where a levy is charged "in response to a voluntary decision to develop or to seek other government benefits or privileges" and paid "in return for a specific benefit conferred or privilege granted." (Id. at 26:1314, citing language originally found in Sinclair Paint.)

Firearm ownership is an individual right, not a "government benefit or privilege[.]" District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). Thus, if there is a "government privilege" here, it is only the "privilege" of having the Department conduct a background check. Accordingly, if the costs to be considered in setting a regulatory fee are the costs of performing background checks, Plaintiffs have produced undisputed evidence that a $\$ 19.00$ DROS Fee is so
grossly disproportionate to the relevant costs ${ }^{11}$ and that it therefore violates the first prong of the Sinclair Paint standard. Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. 4th at 878.

If the Court recognizes that there is no "government benefit or privilege" at issue here-a point Defendants implicitly concede ${ }^{12}$ —and identifies the levy at issue is burden-based like in Sinclair Paint (id.), only two options will remain as to the compulsory versus voluntary dichotomy issue. The Court could disregard the dichotomy as irrelevant to determining if a burden-based levy is a tax. Or, the Court could recognize that the dichotomy presents two mutually exclusive scenarios-which would necessarily lead to the conclusion the non-existence of a voluntarily obtained "benefit or privilege" determines the fee is compulsory, and thus a tax. Either way, the compulsory versus voluntary dichotomy, like all of Defendants' arguments, fail to meet Defendants' "Reasonable Relationship" "standard," let alone the Sinclair Paint standard. In light thereof, the Court should find the DROS Fee is a tax, and that it is unconstitutional.

## 5. Bauer Cannot Be Used to Avoid the Requirements of Sinclair Paint

Once again, context matters. The Court should not be persuaded to disregard California law due to a passage in Bauer that was intended to address a Second Amendment claim, inasmuch as this case presents no substantive analog to that claim. Defendants ask the Court to deny Plaintiffs' claims based on Bauer's conclusion that "[t]he APPS program is, in essence, a temporal extension of the background check program." (Opp. at 32:1-8.) But the Bauer court was not making a broad pronouncement that, for all purposes, there is a relevant connection between the background check process (wherein the DROS Fee is charged) and APPS. Rather, it made a judgment only that "the enforcement activities carried out through the APPS program are sufficiently related to the DROS fee under this line of jurisprudence, [i.e.] First Amendment fee jurisprudence[.]" Bauer v. Becerra, 858 F.3d at 1226. ${ }^{13}$ Whether "targeting illegal possession

[^38]12 "[D]efendants submit . . . evidence that the fee imposed on firearms purchasers bears a reasonable relationship to the burdens of firearms regulation." (Opp. at 31:26-28.)
${ }^{13}$ Plaintiffs contend Bauer was wrongly decided, but unless this Court determines it is relevant to analyze the propriety of that ruling, Plaintiffs will not delve into that issue any further.
under APPS is closely related to the DROS fee" under First Amendment fee jurisprudence (id. at 1225) does not illuminate the issue here-i.e., whether Defendants can prove the DROS Fee is a regulatory fee under Sinclair Paint. Because this Court is not bound to accept the Ninth Circuit's analysis or conclusions (Governor Gray Davis Com. v. Am. Taxpayers All., 102 Cal. App. 4th 449,468 (2002)) and there is no persuasive reason to do so, Bauer should be disregarded. See Busch v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11-CV-03192-EJD, 2011 WL 3627042, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17,2011 ) ("every case arises on different facts; the persuasive value of precedent exists when the legal principles that apply to the facts of one case can be analogized to the facts of another").

A comparison of the legal standards at issue here and Bauer illuminates Plaintiffs' point. In Bauer, the court's salient inquiry, under intermediate scrutiny, was whether there was a "'reasonable fit' between the government's stated objective and its means of achieving that goal[; this standard] does not require the least restrictive means of furthering a given end." Id. at 1223. Bauer's "reasonable fit" analysis is expressly based on evaluating DROS Fee payers' "burdens" as a whole. Id. at 1224 ("the unlawful firearm possession targeted by APPS is the direct result of certain individuals' prior acquisition of a firearm through a DROS-governed transaction") (italics added). Conversely, in this case, the relevant analysis is much more prescribed than it is under the intermediate scrutiny standard. Sinclair Paint requires the reviewing court must look at an individual fee payer's burden vis-à-vis "the activity for which the fee is charged" (Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. 4th at 876,881 -here, participation in the background check process. Because the conclusion stated in Bauer is based on a materially distinguishable analysis, this Court should not give any weight to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, as doing so would run afoul of binding California Supreme Court precedent.

Coincidentally, the reason the Court should not follow Bauer is disclosed in Defendants' attempt to support the supposed relevance of Bauer with a citation to Sinclair Paint. Defendants quote Sinclair Paint's statement that: "case law 'clearly indicates that the police power is broad enough to include mandatory remedial measures to mitigate the past, present, or future adverse impact of the fee payer's operations[.]" (Opp. at 32:8-11, citing Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. 4th at 877878 [emphasis added].) As discussed above, the second prong of the analysis must be performed
based on the specific "payor's" conduct, not the conduct of all fee payors. (Id.); see Sinclair Paint, 15 Cal. 4th at 881 ("Sinclair will have the opportunity to try to show [at trial] that no clear nexus exists between its products and childhood lead poisoning, or that the amount of the fees bore no reasonable relationship to the social or economic "burdens" its operations generated.") (emphasis added).

Defendants' claim that "[t]his Court should reject [Plaintiffs'] argument just like the Ninth Circuit did" in Bauer v. Beccera, 858 F.3d 1216 (Opp. at 31:1-11) is basically an issue preclusion argument that-if it had been fully briefed-would have shown an elementary deficit. "[The] issue preclusion . . . bar is asserted against a party who had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first case but lost." DKN Holdings, 61 Cal . 4th at 826 . "[I]ssue preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party." Id. at 825 . Elements 1, 2, and 4 are also found in the claim preclusion standard. Zevnik v. Super. Ct., 159 Cal. App. 4th 76, 82-83 (2008). As shown above in Section II.A., Defendants cannot meet two of the "common elements" shared by claim and issue preclusion: (1) that both actions concerned "identical" claims, and (2) that "the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding." Zevnik, 159 Cal . App. 4th at 82-83.

Defendants' Bauer and Cal. Farm-based arguments work only as distractions, pulling attention away from all the evidence cited and arguments raised in the Opening Brief. Because Sinclair Paint is controlling and the DROS Fee is an unconstitutional tax thrice over, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action.

## C. Allowing Amendment According to Proof Is Appropriate

Notwithstanding Defendants' protests (Opp. § III.), the simple fact is that Plaintiffs did not recognize the proposed new claims until after the 2017 depositions of Department employees, wherein new evidence was obtained, viz., that: (1) the Department believes it can adjust the amount of the DROS Fee based on the costs of a general fund program, i.e., APPS, and (2) the Department has spent millions of DROS Fee dollars to pay for defense attorneys. (Franklin Decl.;

Ex. 3, 1:21, 66:6-67:3; Ex. 4, 1:21, 33:1-11, 71:14-72:1). Further, Plaintiffs have no objection to the Court granting the opportunity for supplemental briefing on the issue, which should be relatively straightforward. That is, the proposed claims are largely, if not completely, are questions of law or depend on facts already at issue. Defendants' opposition on this point is faulty because the cases cited by Defendants, each denying leave to amend, all concern attempts to raise new fact-based issues that would have unreasonably burdened an opponent (Opp. at 33:4-15).

Granting leave here would not create any such burden, and Defendants produce no real argument to the contrary. Finally, the proposed new claims concern ongoing wrongs that are not subject to any temporal bar, so it makes sense to hear them in this case rather than a separate action. As such, leave to amend according to proof should be granted.

## III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs should be granted relief for the reasons stated herein and in the Opening Brief.

Dated: March 1, 2018
MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.


Scott M. Franklin
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Petitioners

## PROOF OF SERVICE

## STATE OF CALIFORNIA

## COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

I, Laura Palmerin, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, CA 90802.

On March 1, 2018, the foregoing document described as

## REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPENING TRIAL BRIEF

on the interested parties in this action by placing
$\square$ the original
区a true and correct copy
thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows:
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## Attorney for Defendants

区 (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) As follows: I served a true and correct copy by electronic transmission. Said transmission was reported and completed without error.
Executed on March 1, 2018, at Long Beach, California.
(BY MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under the practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Long Beach, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing an affidavit. Executed on March 1, 2018, at Long Beach, California.
$\boxtimes$ (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

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# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 

| DAVID GENTRY; JAMES PARKER; MARK MIDLAM; JAMES BASS; and | CASE NO. 34-2013-80001667 |
| :---: | :---: |
| CALGUNS SHOOTING SPORTS | PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND |
| ASSOCIATION, | MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND |
|  | AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR |
| Plaintiffs and Petitioners, | DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE |
|  | RELIEF AND SECOND AMENDED |
| vs. | PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS[CONCURRENTLY FILED WITH |
|  |  |
| XAVIER BECERRA, in His Official | DECLARATION OF SCOTT M. |
| Capacity as Attorney General For the State | FRANKLIN IN SUPPORT THEREOF; \{PROPOSED\} ORDER] |
| of California; STEPHEN LINDLEY, in His ) |  |
| Official Capacity as Acting Chief for the ) |  |
| California Department of Justice, BETTY T.) |  |
| YEE, in Her Official Capacity as State | Date: June 22, 2018 |
| Controller, and DOES 1-10, | Time: 10:00 a.m. |
|  | Dept.: 28 |
| Defendants and Respondents. | Hon. Richard K. Sueyoshi 10/16/13 |
|  |  |

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 22, 2018, at 10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Department 28 of the Sacramento County Superior Court, located at 720 9th Street, Sacramento, CA 95814, Plaintiffs/Petitioners David Gentry, James Parker, Mark Midlam, James Bass, and Calguns Shooting Sports Association (collectively "Plaintiffs") will and hereby do move this Court for an order granting Plaintiffs leave to file their Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Second Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus (collectively the "Second Amended Complaint") and that the proposed Second Amended Complaint submitted with this Motion be deemed filed.

The Motion is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 473(a)(1) and is based on this Notice of Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the proposed Second Amended Complaint and proposed order filed herewith, all of the files and records of this action, and on any additional material that may be elicited at the hearing of the Motion.

Please take further notice that
[p]ursuant to Local Rule 1.06 (A), the court will make a tentative ruling on the merits of this matter by $2: 00$ p.m., the court day before the hearing. The complete text of the tentative rulings for the department may be downloaded off the court's website. If the party does not have online access, they may call the dedicated phone number for the department as referenced in the local telephone directory between the hours of 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing and receive the tentative ruling. If you do not call the court and the opposing party by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing, no hearing will be held.

Sac. Super. Ct. L.R. 106(A).
Dated: May 31, 2018
MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.


Scott M. Franklin, attorney for Plaintiffs
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## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

## I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs seek leave to file the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 473(a)(1). The proposed Second Amended Complaint filed herewith (Declaration of Scott M. Franklin ["Franklin Decl."] 『 2, Ex. 1), is the same as Plaintiffs’ prior pleading, except that two new causes of action have been added, and the prayer is amended to reflect the relief sought via the new causes of action. No unfair prejudice will result from the proposed amendment, which is intended to add new legal theories that do not require any additional factual development. Because granting the requested leave will not cause prejudice to any party, and denial of the Motion will unfairly prejudice Plaintiffs, the Motion should be granted.

## II. STATEMENT OF FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs' Opening Brief on the Merits, filed January 30, 2018, provides a detailed factual and procedural history for this matter. Nonetheless, a summary of that history, in addition to relevant recent events, is provided below.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Mandamus (the "Complaint") on October 16, 2013. On June 5, 2015, the Court heard argument regarding Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the "MJOP"). During the hearing, the Court requested the parties draft a proposed order regarding the MJOP ruling and other issues that were before the Court. (See Franklin Decl. ๆ 3.) Defendants submitted a proposed order to the Court, along with an explanation of Plaintiffs' objections thereto, on July 2, 2015. The Court issued an order on July 20, 2015 (the "Order After Hearing"), dismissing Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action and a portion of Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, based on a finding that the First Cause of Action (alleging that Senate Bill 819 [2011, Leno] violated article XIII A, section 3, of the California Constitution) failed to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Order After Hearing at 2:1121.)

Soon after the issuance of the Order After Hearing, Plaintiffs moved for, an obtained, leave to file the First Amended Complaint. (Order of December 23, 2015.) Later, and upon Judge Michael
P. Kenny's suggestion, the parties agreed to bifurcate the action such that the Fifth and Ninth Causes of Action would be tried first, with the remaining causes of action to be tried in a separate trial. (See Bifurcation Order of November 4, 2016, at 2:3-5 in the attached stipulation.) In a ruling issued August 9, 2017, Judge Kenny granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Adjudication as to the Fifth and Ninth Causes of Action, and denied Defendants' motion seeking to have those causes of action dismissed.

The docket herein reflects the fact that the parties have had multiple discovery disputes. It is Plaintiffs position that Defendants, especially in written discovery responses, have been intentionally vague or evasive (or both) over the course of this action, in an attempt to prevent Plaintiffs from having a clear view of how the Department spends DROS Fee funds, and relatedly, how the Department interprets Penal Code section 28225. For example, it took years for Defendants to even take a partial position as to a keystone issue in this case: how, if at all, law abiding DROS Fee payers (e.g., Plaintiffs) created a burden on, or received a special benefit from, APPS-based law enforcement activities funded via the DROS Fee. (Franklin Dec. 9 4, Ex. 2.)

But when depositions of Department employees were taken in 2017, Plaintiffs learned of key evidence relevant to the proposed claims. Namely, that: (1) the Department believes it can adjust the amount of the DROS Fee based on the costs of a general fund program, i.e., APPS, and (2) the Department has spent millions of DROS Fee dollars to pay for defense attorneys. (Franklin Decl. $\mathbb{I}$ 5; Ex. 3.) In light there of, Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, filed January 30, 2018, sought leave to amend the First Amended Complaint to include the new claims in this Action. By order of March 15, 2018, this Court ruled that if Plaintiffs wanted the Court to grant leave to amend to include the new claims in this action, such leave could only be sought by a noticed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1). Plaintiffs now brings that motion.

Plaintiffs' counsel proposed to Defendants' counsel that this hearing for this Motion be set on June 22, 2018, and that trial in this matter be rescheduled for August 24, 2018, which was the first hearing date the Court had available after June 22, 2018. (Franklin Decl. 『| 6.) Counsel for Defendants agreed to the two hearing dates proposed by Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Id.) That agreement specifically included an agreement as to a briefing schedule for supplemental briefing if this motion is granted. (Id.)

## III. ARGUMENT

## A. Background Law Regarding Motions for Leave to Amend a Complaint

"The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading[.]" Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 473(a)(1); see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 576 ("Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading."). "There is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments." Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 296 (1985). "It requires no citation of authority that our decisional law holds that the [statutory law regarding the amendment of pleadings is] to be construed liberally so that cases might be tried upon their merits in one trial where no prejudice to the opposing party or parties is demonstrated." Rainer v. Buena Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 18 Cal. App. 3d 240, 254 (1971). "It has even been held that no abuse of discretion transpired even though an amendment was permitted at the outset of the trial even though the neglect was not excusable but no prejudice resulted to the opposing party[; s]imilar rulings have been made where the parties objecting to the amendment were not taken by surprise." Id. "Where additional investigation and discovery is not required to meet the new issue, it would appear that it would constitute an abuse of discretion not to permit the amendment of a complaint even at the outset of a trial," if "the amendment merely adds a new theory of recovery on the same set of facts constituting the cause of action." Id.

And even though Plaintiffs are not seeking leave to amend during trial, the cases addressing that scenario are persuasive in showing that the timing of a request for leave to amend is not itself the critical inquiry when considering if leave to amend should be granted. "The cases on amending pleadings during trial suggest trial courts should be guided by two general principles: (1) whether facts or legal theories are being changed and (2) whether the opposing party will be prejudiced by the proposed amendment." N. 7th St. Assocs. v. Constante, 92 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 7, 10 (2001) (quoting City of Stanton v. Cox, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1557, 1563 (1989)). "Frequently, each principle represents a different side of the same coin: If new facts are being alleged, prejudice may easily result because of the inability of the other party to investigate
the validity of the factual allegations while engaged in trial or to call rebuttal witnesses." Id. "If the same set of facts supports merely a different theory ... no prejudice can result." Id.

## B. Adding the Proposed Claims to this Action Will Not Prejudice Defendants

That the amendment sought will not prejudice Defendants is readily apparent from the fact that Defendants agreed to the trial of this action to be scheduled for August 24, 2018, regardless of whether Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend. (Franklin Decl. © 6.) When Plaintiffs’ counsel spoke with this Court's clerk to confirm the June 22, 2018, hearing date for this Motion, she indicated that August 24, 2018, was the first available hearing date available after the hearing date reserved for this Motion. (Id.) Accordingly, Defendants’ agreement to have this matter tried on the earliest available date-irrespective of whether it has to prepare supplemental briefing or not- shows the proposed amendment will not delay this action at all, which impliedly proves, as otherwise explained below, that there is no potential for prejudice that could justify the denial of this Motion.

## 1. Adding a Separation of Powers Claim Will Not Prejudice Defendants

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to add a cause of action alleging that Penal Code section 28225, and specifically the Department's interpretation thereof, violates the separation of powers doctrine. To prove their proposed separation of powers claim, Plaintiffs will have to show the Department's Penal Code section 28225-based conduct violates the nondelegation doctrine. The nondelegation doctrine is violated "when a legislative body (1) leaves the resolution of fundamental policy issues to others or (2) fails to provide adequate direction for the implementation of that policy." Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 3 Cal. 5th 1118, 1146 (2017).

Both aged and recent cases show taxation is a matter of fundamental policy that cannot be delegated to another branch of the government. See, e.g., Woodward v. Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 99 Cal. 554, 561 (1893) ("[t]he legislature cannot delegate to other than the municipal corporations power to assess [and] collect taxes"); Sav. \& Loan Soc. v. Austin, 46 Cal. 415, 515 (1873) (Wallace, C.J., concurring but dissenting in part) (noting that "the power to lay taxes under our system is one of the powers of Government which does not belong to either the
executive or the judicial department, [a]nd . . . the right to exercise this power cannot be delegated is self-evident"); see also Cal. Chamber v. State Air Resources Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 604, 625 (2017) (stating "taxes must be levied by the legislative, not executive, branch"); $c f$. Abbott Labs. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 175 Cal. App. 4th 1346, 1360 (2009), as modified (Aug. 6, 2009) (stating "the power to tax . . . is vested in the Legislature and cannot be delegated to the courts").

Here, the question of whether the DROS Fee is, at least in part, a tax, is already squarely before the Court because of Plaintiffs' Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of action, which are allege the DROS Fee is an unconstitutional tax in one way or another. Thus, whether the DROS Fee is operates as a tax, also central to Plaintiffs' proposed nondelegation argument, will be resolved without the need to introduce additional evidence to support that particular argument. In light of that reality, analysis under the standard stated in Gerawan Farming would not require the introduction of any factual allegations not already before the Court, meaning there will be no undue prejudice on Defendants if the Court allows leave to amend so Plaintiffs can plead a separation of powers argument. Rainer, 18 Cal . App. 3d at 254.

## 2. Adding a New Illegal Tax Claim Will Not Prejudice Defendants

Plaintiffs also seek leave to add a cause of action alleging that even prior to its amendment Senate Bill ("SB") 819 (Leno, 2011), Penal Code 28225 operated as a illegal tax in the guise of a regulatory fee, and would continue to operate as a tax regardless of whether the SB 819-based revisions to Penal Code section 28225 are held to violate one of the constitutional provisions identified in Plaintiffs' Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth causes of Action. Put simply, this argument is in part parallel to Plaintiffs' previously adjudicated Ninth Cause of Action, which alleged the Department was improperly interpreting the word "possession" (added to Penal Code section 28225(b)(11) via SB 819) much more broadly than the legislature intended, leading to the Department using DROS Fee money for activities outside what the legislature intended SB 819 to cover.

Specifically, Plaintiffs now seek to add a cause of action challenging the Department's overbroad interpretation of other language in Penal Code section 28225(b)(11)—"the costs
activities related to the sale, purchase, [] loan, or transfer of firearms"-which results in the Department spending DROS Fee money on activities beyond the what the Legislature intended the quoted language to address. This argument is primarily legal, as it concerns the scope of what the Legislature intended the relevant statutory language to address. Regardless, to the extent it is relevant, Plaintiffs have already developed the factual record about how, separate from the spending at issue in Plaintiffs' SB 819-based claims, the Department was and is using DROS Fee money on statutorily unauthorized costs, e.g., defense attorneys. (Franklin Decl. at \$ 5, Ex. 3.) Because the addition of the relevant cause of action will not prejudice Defendants, leave to amend should be granted. Rainer, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 254.

## IV. CONCLUSION

In light of Plaintiffs' good faith, and the fact that the amendment sought will not prejudice Defendants nor delay this Action, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court grant this Motion and allow Plaintiffs to file the proposed Second Amended Complaint.

Dated: March 31, 2018
MICHEL \& ASSOCIATES, P.C.


Scott M. Franklin, attorney for Plaintiffs

## PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

## COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

I, Laura Palmerin, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200, Long Beach, CA 90802.

On May 31, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document(s) described as:

# PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS [CONCURRENTLY FILED WITH DECLARATION OF SCOTT M. FRANKLIN IN SUPPORT THEREOF; \{PROPOSED\} ORDER] 

on the interested parties in this action as follows:
Anthony R. Hakl
anthony.hakl@doj.ca.gov
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
P.O. Box 944255

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
X (BY MAIL) As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under the practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Long Beach, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing an affidavit.
Executed on May 31, 2018, at Long Beach, California.
X (VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL) As follows: I served a true and correct copy by electronic transmission. Said transmission was reported and completed without error. Executed on May 31, 2018, at Long Beach, California.
X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

- (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of the member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.



## PROOF OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

Case Name: Gentry, et al. v. Becerra, et al.
Court of Appeal Case No.: C089655
Superior Court Case No.: 34-2013-80001667
I, Sean A. Brady, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802.

On February 7, 2020, I served a copy of the foregoing document(s) described as: APPELLANTS’ APPENDIX, VOLUME XII OF XVI, (Pages 2998 to 3289 of 4059), by electronic transmission as follows:

Robert E. Asperger
bob.asperger@doj.ca.gov
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents Xavier Becerra, et al.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on February 7, 2020, at Long Beach, California.
s/ Sean A. Brady
Sean A. Brady
Declarant


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ DEFENDANTS, being sued in their official capacity as heads of the DOJ, and DOJ being under DEFENDANTS' control, all references to "DOJ" herein should be construed as a reference to DEFENDANTS.
    ${ }^{2}$ Pursuant to the Legislature's enactment of Assembly Concurrent Resolution 73 (McCarthy) 2006, which authorized a Non-Substantive Reorganization of California's Deadly Weapons Statutes, various California Penal Code sections will be renumbered, effective January 1, 2012. For convenience and ease of reference, the corresponding "renumbered" code section for each referenced Penal Code section is provided in brackets.

[^1]:    ${ }^{3}$ ATF defines a "responsible person" as "a sole proprietor, partner, or anyone having the power to direct the management, policies, and practices of the business as it pertains to firearms. In a corporation this includes corporate officers, shareholders, board members, or any other employee with the legal authority described above." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Online - Firearms - How To - Become An FFL, http://www.atf.gov/firearms/how-to/ become-an-ffl.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2011); see also Instruction Sheet for ATF Form 7 (5310.12) (Application for Federal Firearms License) at \# 10, available at http://www.atf.gov/forms/download/atf-f-5310-12.pdf.

[^2]:    ${ }^{5}$ See OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY SCHEME, Section II. B - "State Fees Imposed on Firearm Sales and Transfers" for an explanation and breakdown of each of these "fee" amounts.

[^3]:    ${ }^{6}$ The "fees" DOJ charges pursuant to California Code of Regulations, Title 11, Section 4001, and Penal Code sections 12076(e) [28225(a)-(c)], 12076(f)(1)(B) [28230(a)(2)], discussed herein, shall be referred to as the "DROS 'fee"' throughout.

[^4]:    ${ }^{7}$ Found in current Penal Code section 12076(e)(10) [28225(b)(11)].
    ${ }^{8}$ See Sen. Comm. on Public Safety, Bill Analysis: Dealers Record of Sale Special Account - Expanding Authorized Use - Appropriation to Fund Firearms Trafficking Prevention Act of 2002, at 10 (July 8, 2003) available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab 0151-0200/ab 161 cfa 20030708141850 se n comm.html (last visited July 18, 2011).
    ${ }^{9}$ PLAINTIFFS have so far been unable to ascertain the vote or outcome of that February 24, 2004 hearing, despite diligent efforts.

[^5]:    ${ }^{10}$ Cal. Dept. of Justice, Initial Statement of Reasons concerning Proposed DROS Fee Regulations (2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/regs/DROSisor.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
    ${ }^{11}$ Id.
    ${ }^{12}$ The State's appetite for increased funds to pay for general police work off the backs of gun buyers is insatiable. Senate Bill 819 (Leno) is currently pending in the California Legislature. Senate Bill 819 seeks to again expand the uses to which DROS "fees" may be put, and would expand the use of "fees" to include "costs associated with [DOJ] firearms-related regulatory and enforcement activities regarding possession, in addition to costs associated with the explicitly referenced sale, purchase, loan, or transfer, of firearms." Assem. Comm. on Appropriations, Bill Analysis: Senate Bill 819, at (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb 0801-0850/sb 819 cfa 20110705 162650 as m comm.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2011). "To clear the [Armed and Prohibited Persons System] backlog of approximately 34,000 handguns, [DEFENDANT] Attorney General Harris is the sponsor of Senate Bill 819, which would revise the Penal Code to expand the use of existing regulatory fees collected by gun dealers to allow the state [DOJ] to use fee revenue to pay for the APPS program." Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Seizure of 1,200 Guns from Mentally Unstable and Other Individuals (June 16, 2011) (emphasis added).

[^6]:    ${ }^{13}$ See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Operations 2010, at 4, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/2010-operations-report/2010-operations-report-pdf, (last visited August 23, 2011).
    ${ }^{14}$ Id.

[^7]:    ${ }^{15}$ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fiscal Year 2011 Authorization and Budget Request to Congress 4-56 and 4-57, available at http://www.justice.gov/imd/2011justification/pdf/fy11-fbi-justification.pdf; see also Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State Procedures Related to Firearms Sales, 2005, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ssprfs05.pdf., at 3.

[^8]:    ${ }^{16}$ PLAINTIFFS base this allegation, in part, on the legislative history for 12076(e)(10) [28225(b)(11)] (discussed supra), which explained it was passed, among other reasons, to allow DROS "fee" revenues to be used for the activities listed in 12076(g) [28235].

[^9]:    ${ }^{17}$ Cal. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Firearms, Initial Statement of Reasons [Concerning Proposed DROS Fee Rulemaking] (2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/regs/DROSisor.pdf

[^10]:    ${ }^{1}$ DEFENDANTS are being sued in their official capacity as heads of the California Department of Justice, which entity is authorized by the Legislature to assess the Challenged Fees.
    ${ }^{2}$ These fees apply even if a firearm is not being purchased but gifted or traded as well. But for simplicity sake "purchase" will be used throughout this Complaint to include all such activities unless specifically stated otherwise.

[^11]:    ${ }^{3}$ Pursuant to the Legislature's enactment of Assembly Concurrent Resolution 73 (McCarthy) 2006, which authorized a Non-Substantive Reorganization of California's Deadly Weapons Statutes, various California Penal Code sections were renumbered, effective January 1, 2012. For convenience and ease of reference, the corresponding previous code section for each referenced Penal Code section is provided in brackets.

[^12]:    ${ }^{4}$ See description of Senate Bill 819, discussed below at Paragraph 103. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[^13]:    ${ }^{6}$ The fees DOJ charges pursuant to California Code of Regulations, Title 11, Section 4001, and Penal Code sections 28225(a)-(c) [12076(e)], 12076(f)(1)(B) [28230(a)(2)], discussed herein, shall be referred to as the "DROS fee" throughout.

[^14]:    ${ }^{7}$ DEFENDANTS deposit (and commingle) funds collected from some additional fees - for special firearm licensing and miscellaneous services (see e.g,, Cal. Penal Code $\S \S 30900-30905$ [12285(a),(b)]), concealed weapon permit applications and Cal. Pen. Code § 26190(a)-(b) [12054]), "Assault Weapon" Permits - into the DROS Special Account. The validity of those fees is not at issue, here; rather, what is at issue is whether DEFENDANTS spend revenues from the Challenged Fees on regulating the activities those other fees are collected for. PLAINTIFFS contend that DEFENDANTS are improperly doing so.

[^15]:    ${ }^{9}$ Found in current Penal Code section 12076(e)(10) [28225(b)(11)], which was further amended in the 2011 Legislative session by Senate Bill 819 as described below.
    ${ }^{10}$ See Sen. Comm. on Public Safety, Bill Analysis: Dealers Record of Sale Special Account - Expanding Authorized Use - Appropriation to Fund Firearms Trafficking Prevention Act of 2002, at 10 (July 8, 2003) available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab 0151-0200/ab 161 cfa 200307 $08 \quad 141850$ sen comm.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
    ${ }^{11}$ PLAINTIFFS have so far been unable to ascertain the vote or outcome of that February 24, 2004 hearing, despite diligent efforts.

[^16]:    ${ }^{12}$ Cal. Dept. of Justice, Initial Statement of Reasons concerning Proposed DROS Fee Regulations (2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/regs/DROSisor.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).

    $$
    { }^{13} \mathrm{Id} .
    $$

[^17]:    ${ }^{15}$ See Department of Justice Regulations for the Basic Firearms Safety Certificate Program, http://www.ag.ca.gov/firearms/regs/bfsc.pdf, at 5-7 (listing the exemptions to the former Basic Firearms Safety Certificate and the authority for those exemptions).

[^18]:    ${ }^{16}$ Except the HSC Exam Fee if the transfer does not involve a handgun.

[^19]:    ${ }^{17}$ Cal. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Firearms, Initial Statement of Reasons [Concerning Proposed DROS Fee Rulemaking] (2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/firearms/regs/DROSisor.pdf

[^20]:    ${ }^{18}$ See generally Cal. Penal Code $\S \S 30500-31115$ [12275-12290] (also known as the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 and the . 50 Caliber BMG Regulation Act of 2004).

[^21]:    ${ }^{1}$ These fees apply even if a firearm is not being purchased but gifted or traded as well. But for simplicity sake "purchase" will be used throughout this Complaint to include all such activities unless specifically stated otherwise.
    ${ }^{2}$ DEFENDANTS are being sued in their official capacity as heads of the California Department of Justice, which entity is authorized by the Legislature to expend the monies at issue in this action.

[^22]:    ${ }^{3}$ Pursuant to the Legislature's enactment of Assembly Concurrent Resolution 73 (McCarthy) 2006, which authorized a Non-Substantive Reorganization of California's Deadly Weapons Statutes, various California Penal Code sections were renumbered, effective January 1, 2012. For convenience and ease of reference, the corresponding previous code section for each referenced Penal Code section is provided in brackets.

[^23]:    ${ }^{4}$ See S.B. 819, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011).

[^24]:    ${ }^{5}$ California law requires that the DROS fee "shall be no more than is necessary to fund" certain activities provided by statute (Penal Code section 28225(b)(1)-(11) [12076(e)(1)-(10)]), and constitutional principles prohibit excessive fees on constitutionally protected conduct. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112-14 (1943). Arguably, the large surplus, here, is evidence suggesting the current DROS fee is excessive, in violation of state and federal law. Plaintiffs in this case, however, do not ask the Court to resolve that argument. The passage of SB140 has made the expenditure of the existing $\$ 25$ million dollar surplus the more immediate concern. Moreover, whether the DROS fee is excessive depends, in part, on first determining what activities may be considered to fall within the scope of the DROS program and thus properly funded thereby. This case seeks a declaration that SB140 improperly authorizes expenditures on APPS activities that do not fall within that scope, along with injunctive relief preventing such expenditures.

[^25]:    SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

[^26]:    GRaN TOTAL

[^27]:    

[^28]:    2.040 .41

[^29]:    

[^30]:    Billable DROS Estimated at $90 \%$ of Actual Transactions

[^31]:    1 "Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves: (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit." DKN Holdings LLC $v$. Faerber, 61 Cal. 4th 813, 824 (2015).

    2 "The burden of proving that the requirements for application of res judicata have been met is upon the party seeking to assert it as a bar or estoppel." Vella v. Hudgins, 20 Cal. 3d 251, 257 (1977). Relatedly, Plaintiffs do not dispute that, as to the third claim preclusion element, the judgment in Bauer was a final judgment on the merits (Opp. at 25:5-22, citing Bauer v. Becerra, 858 F.3d 1216, 1226 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018)). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs do not concede Defendants' characterization of the substance of that judgment is accurate. (Id.).

[^32]:    ${ }^{3}$ See also Yates, 130 Cal.App.2d at 540 (noting that "it is . . . well established that the doctrine [of res judicata] is limited by the rule that it does not apply to new rights" and holding the doctrine was inapplicable in a case concerning "successive causes of action arising out of the same general subject matter"); Roam, 41 Cal. App. 3d at 1041 (holding that, pursuant to "ten separate contracts entered into over a period of approximately two years . . . each may be viewed as involving a separate primary right and thus giving rise to a separate and independent cause of action [even "though they all concerned the same general subject matter"); Citizens for Open Access to Sand \& Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass'n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1069 (1998) ("the application of the doctrine of res judicata 'depends on whether the issue in both actions is the same, not whether the issue arises in the same context."").

[^33]:    4 "It is well-established that . . . the fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively public." San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court-N. Dist., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir.1999).

[^34]:    ${ }^{5}$ As enacted, Proposition 13 created two new constitutional provisions that are worth identifying to understand why Defendants' argument on this point does not hold water. Those two provisions can be summarized as follows: (1) "any changes in State taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto . . . must be imposed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature" and (2) "Cities, Counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district[.]" Ballot Pamp., Prim. Elec., text of Prop. 13, p. 57 (June 6, 1978), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1849\&context =ca_ballot_props).

[^35]:    ${ }^{7}$ The material quoted by Defendants is directly preceded in the Cal. Farm opinion by this sentence: "Thus, in Sinclair Paint, to determine the tax or fee issue, we directed courts to examine the costs of the regulatory activity and determine if there was a reasonable relationship between the fees assessed and the costs of the regulatory activity." Cal. Farm, 51 Cal. 4th 441 (citation and footnote omitted).

[^36]:    ${ }^{8}$ Like the levy at issue in $N w$. Energetic, SB 819 was intended to make up for a reduction in available general fund money. (Open. Br., § II.C.).
    ${ }^{9}$ E.g, Section 28225(b)(8) is a category described "in some detail[:]" "actual costs associated with the electronic or telephonic transfer of information pursuant to Section 28215."

[^37]:    ${ }^{10}$ Defendants still seem to advocate for a broad interpretation of Section 28225(b)(11), but Plaintiffs contend that issue was largely, if not completely, resolved when Judge Kenney ordered that the reference to "possession"-related enforcement activates in Section 28225 were limited to "APPS-Based Law Enforcement Activities." (Ruling of Aug. 9, 2017, at 11:2-5.)

[^38]:    ${ }^{11}$ (Decl. Scott Franklin Supp. Open. Br. ["Franklin Decl"], Exs. 11 \& 12; Open. Br., 10:1128.)

