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NOTICE OF AND DEMURRER TO ANSWER AND MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER

NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on October 14, 2021, at 9:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 85 of the above-entitled court, located at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA, 90012, before Judge James Chalfant, Petitioners-Plaintiffs Franklin Armory, Inc. and California Rifle and Pistol Association, Incorporated ("Petitioners") will and do demur to and move to strike Respondents-Defendants' Answer to the First, Second, and Eighth Causes of Action of the Second Amended Complaint.

Petitioners' demurrer is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.20, subdivisions (a)-(b), while the motion to strike is brought pursuant to section 436, subdivisions (a)-(b). First, the entire pleading should be stricken because it is not verified as required by section 1089. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) Alternatively, all of the State's affirmative defenses, except Affirmative Defense Nos. 1, 2, and 43, are subject to demurrer because they state insufficient facts to constitute a defense and are also "uncertain." (*Id.*, § 430.20, subds. (a)-(b).) Further, Affirmative Defense Nos. 3 through 53 should be stricken because they are either irrelevant to the claims currently unstayed or they are otherwise improper. (*Id.*, § 436, subd. (a).)

As explained in the concurrently filed Declaration of Anna M. Barvir, this demurrer and motion to strike is made following unsuccessful attempts to meet and confer with the State about this matter in compliance with sections 430.41, subdivision (a), and 435.5, subdivision (a).

The demurrer and motion to strike is based on this notice of demurrer and motion to strike, the attached demurrer and motion to strike, the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities filed in support, the concurrently filed Declaration of Anna M. Barvir, all pleadings and papers on file, and upon other oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the time of the hearing.

Dated: August 4, 2021 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Anna M. Damin

Anna M. Barvir

Attorneys for Petitioners-Plaintiffs

DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE

Pursuant to section 436, subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs-Petitioners Franklin Armory, Inc., and California Rifle & Pistol Association, Incorporated ("Petitioners"), hereby move to strike the answer filed by Respondents-Defendants California Department of Justice and Attorney General Robert A. Bonta ("the State") in its entirety because it is not verified as required by section 1089 of the Government Code, as set forth more fully in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, filed concurrently herewith.

Pursuant to section 430.20, subdivisions (a)-(b), of the Code of Civil Procedure, Petitioners hereby demur to the Third through Forty-Second and Forty-Fourth through Fifty-Third "Affirmative Defenses" in the State's Answer on the following grounds, as set forth more fully in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Pursuant to section 436, subdivisions (a)-(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, Petitioners also move to strike the State's Third through Fifty-Third affirmative defenses on the following grounds, as set forth more fully in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

<u>Third Affirmative Defense – Demurrer and Motion to Strike</u>

- 1. The Third Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[t]he second amended complaint and each and every cause of action stated therein are barred by the applicable statute of limitations," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the First, Second, or Eighth Causes of Action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).)
- 2. The Third Affirmative Defense, as pleaded in the answer on file, is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).)
- 3. The Third Affirmative Defense should also be stricken as improper because it is duplicative of other affirmative defenses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

Fourth Affirmative Defense – Demurrer and Motion to Strike

4. The Fourth Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[t]he second amended

¹ As will be explained in the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, Petitioners contend that some of these are not valid affirmative defenses. But all are listed here for the sake of completion.

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The Eighth Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[t]o the extent applicable, the

deprived Plaintiffs of any right guaranteed by law," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a

- 45. The Nineteenth Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[t]he second amended complaint and each and every cause of action stated therein, are barred because at all relevant times, Defendants actions were taken to satisfy applicable constitutional, judicial, and statutory mandates[;] Defendants are therefore not liable for any injury or damages, if any there were," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the First, Second, or Eighth causes of action to the
- 46. The Nineteenth Affirmative Defense, as pleaded in the answer on file, is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).)

Second Amended Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).)

- 47. The Nineteenth Affirmative defense should be stricken as improper because, even if the State could plead additional facts, it would not constitute a cognizable affirmative defense.

 (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
- 48. If it does constitute a cognizable defense, the Nineteenth Affirmative Defense should be stricken as improper because it is duplicative of other affirmative defenses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

<u>Twentieth Affirmative Defense – Demurrer and Motion to Strike</u>

- 49. The Twentieth Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[t]here are superseding and intervening actions from third parties[;] Plaintiffs failed to allege and/or have not stated facts sufficient to show an affirmative causal link between Defendants' actions and/or omissions and the alleged violation of Plaintiffs' rights," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the First, Second, or Eighth causes of action to the Second Amended Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).)
- 50. The Twentieth Affirmative Defense, as pleaded in the answer on file, is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).)
- 51. The Twentieth Affirmative Defense should be stricken as improper because it is duplicative of other affirmative defenses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

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52. The Twenty-First Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[t]he second amended complaint is barred because Defendants were not aware of any wrongful conduct, and had no reason to be aware of any wrongful conduct, if any there were," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the First, Second, or Eighth causes of action to the Second Amended Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).)

- 53. The Twenty-First Affirmative Defense, as pleaded in the answer on file, is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).)
- 54. The Twenty-First Affirmative defense should be stricken as improper because, even if the State could plead additional facts, it would not constitute a cognizable affirmative defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
- 55. If it does constitute a cognizable affirmative defense, the Twenty-First Affirmative Defense should be stricken because it is irrelevant to the unstayed causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

<u>Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense – Demurrer and Motion to Strike</u>

- 56. The Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[t]o the extent Defendants were aware of any wrongful conduct, if any there was, Defendants exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any wrongful conduct, if any there was," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the First, Second, or Eighth causes of action to the Second Amended Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).)
- 57. The Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense, as pleaded in the answer on file, is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).)
- 58. The Twenty-Second Affirmative defense should be stricken as improper because, even if the State could plead additional facts, it would not constitute a cognizable affirmative defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
- 59. If it does constitute a cognizable affirmative defense, the Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense should be stricken as improper because it is duplicative of other affirmative defenses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

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- 60. The Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[t]o the extent applicable, Defendants are immune from suit under public entity immunity pursuant to, but not limited to, Government Code §§ 815, 815.2, 818, 818.2, 818.8, 820.4, 820.8, 821," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the First, Second, or Eighth causes of action to the Second Amended Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).)
- 61. The Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense, as pleaded in the answer on file, is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).)
- 62. The Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense should be stricken because it is irrelevant to the unstayed causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
- 63. The Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense should be stricken as improper because it presents more than one affirmative defense and because it is duplicative of other affirmative defenses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

<u>Twenty-Fourth Affirmative Defense – Demurrer and Motion to Strike</u>

- 64. The Twenty-Fourth Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "Defendants allege that they did not act with the requisite intent to deprive Plaintiffs of statutory or constitutional rights or to cause any other injury[;] Defendants therefore allege that they are immune from liability," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the First, Second, or Eighth causes of action to the Second Amended Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).)
- 65. The Twenty-Fourth Affirmative Defense, as pleaded in the answer on file, is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).)
- 66. The Twenty-Fourth Affirmative defense should be stricken as improper because, even if the State could plead additional facts, it would not constitute a cognizable affirmative defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)

<u>Twenty-Fifth Affirmative Defense – Demurrer and Motion to Strike</u>

67. The Twenty-Fifth Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "Plaintiffs have suffered no actual injury due to Defendants' conduct," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the First, Second, or Eighth causes of action to the Second Amended Complaint. (Code

governed exclusively by statute and is outside the purview of any public employees' authority; and

the lack of any duty running to Plaintiffs; by the fact that any such purported act or omission is

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The Twenty-Ninth Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[a]ny and all alleged

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The Thirty-First Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[t]he second amended

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165. The Fifty-Second Affirmative Defense, as pleaded in the answer on file, is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).)

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430.20, subd. (a).)

166. The Fifty-Second Affirmative defense should be stricken as improper because it

First, Second, or Eighth causes of action to the Second Amended Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §

1	presents more than one affirmative defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
2	<u>Fifty-Third Affirmative Defense – Demurrer and Motion to Strike</u>
3	167. The Fifty-Third Affirmative Defense, which reads in full, "[b]ecause Plaintiffs'
4	second amended complaint is couched in conclusory terms, answering Defendants cannot fully
5	anticipate all affirmative defenses that may apply in this case; [i]n addition, information disclosed
6	during discovery and investigation may indicate additional defenses that apply in this case[;]
7	accordingly, Defendants reserve the right to supplement, alter or amend this answer to add
8	additional defenses," fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the First, Second, or
9	Eighth causes of action to the Second Amended Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).)
10	168. The Fifty-Third Affirmative Defense, as pleaded in the answer on file, is uncertain.
11	(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).)
12	169. The Fifty-Third Affirmative defense should be stricken as improper because, even
13	if the State could plead additional facts, it would not constitute a cognizable affirmative defense.
14	(Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
15	170. If it does constitute a cognizable affirmative defense, the Fifty-Third Affirmative
16	defense should be stricken as improper because it presents more than one affirmative defense.
17	(Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)
18	Dated: August 4, 2021 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
19	Charabac
20	Anna M. Barvir Attorneys for Petitioners-Plaintiffs
21	Attorneys for rentioners-rightning
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4	I, Laura Palmerin, am employed in the City of Long Beach, Los Angeles County, California. I am over the age eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802.
5	
6	On August 4, 2021, I served the foregoing document(s) described as
7 8	PLAINTIFFS AND PETITIONERS' NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE RESPONDENTS' ANWER TO THE FIRST, SECOND, AND EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION TO THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
9	on the interested parties in this action by placing
10	[] the original
11	[X] a true and correct copy thereof by the following means, addressed as follows:
12	Benjamin Barnouw
13	Deputy Attorney General
14	Email: Ben.Barnouw@doj.ca.gov Kenneth G. Lake
	Deputy Attorney General
15	Email: Kenneth.Lake@doj.ca.gov Alexis Diamond
16	Deputy Attorney General Email: Alexis.Diamond@doj.ca.gov
17	California Department of Justice
18	300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013
19	Attorney for Respondents-Defendants
20	X (BY ELECTRONIC MAIL) As follows: I served a true and correct copy by electronic
21	transmission through One Legal. Said transmission was reported and completed without
22	error.
23	X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
24	
25	Executed on August 4, 2021, at Long Beach, California.
26	Jaim Paleire
27	Laura Palmerin
20	Laura Pannerin

25 PROOF OF SERVICE