ORIGINAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 2 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE HONORABLE 3 ROGER T. BENITEZ, DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING 4) Case No: 3:17-cv-01017-BEN-JLB 5 VIRGINIA DUNCAN, et al., Plaintiffs, 6) Motion Hearings Department 5A V.) Date: 12/12/2022 ROB BONTA, in his official 8 capacity as attorney general of the State of California 9 10 Defendants. 11 12 KIM RHODE, et al.,) Case No: 3:18-cv-00802-BEN-JLB 13 Plaintiffs, 14 V. ROB BONTA, in his official 15 capacity as attorney general 16 of the State of California, Defendants. 17 18) Case No: 3:19-cv-01537-BEN-JLB JAMES MILLER, et al., 19 Plaintiffs, 20 v. 21 CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL 22 ROB BONTA, et al., 23 Defendants. 24 25 --- caption continued on the following page ---

```
1
 2
    RUSSELL FOUTS, et al.,
                                     ) Case No: 3:19-cv-01662-BEN-JBL
 3
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
 5
    ROB BONTA, in his official
    capacity as attorney general
 6
    of the State of California.
 7
    Defendants.
 8
                   REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
 9
                           Pages 1 through 51
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
          --- appearances continued on the following page ---
22
                              Abigail R. Torres, CSR, RPR/RMR, FCRR
    REPORTED BY:
23
                              CSR No. 13700
                              United States District Court
24
                              Southern District of California
                              333 West Broadway, Suite 420
25
                              San Diego, California 92101
```

1	APPEARANCES:	
2		
3	For the Plaintiffs: Duncan, et al.	MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, PC 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200 Long Beach, California 90802
4		By: ANNA M. BARVIR, ESQ. By: SEAN A. BRADY, ESQ.
5		By: KONSTADINOS T. MOROS, ESQ.
6	For the Defendants: Becerra, et al.	DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
7	·	GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION 300 South Spring Street, Suite 9012
8		Los Angeles, California 90013 By: KEVIN J. KELLY, ESQ.
9		-000- DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
10		OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION
11		300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, California 90013
12		By: MARK R. BECKINGTON, ESQ.
13	<u>APPEARANCES</u> :	
14	For the Plaintiffs: Rhode, et al.	MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, PC 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200
15		Long Beach, California 90802 By: ANNA M. BARVIR, ESQ.
16		By: SEAN A. BRADY, ESQ. By: KONSTADINOS T. MOROS, ESQ.
17	For the Defendants:	DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
18	Becerra, et al.	OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION
19		1300 I Street, Suite 125 Sacramento, California 95814
20		By: ANTHONY P. O'BRIEN, ESQ.
21		DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
22		GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION
23		300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, California 90013 By: MARK R. BECKINGTON, ESQ.
24		DY. MARK K. DECKINGION, EDQ.
25	appearances co	ntinued on the following page

1	APPEARANCES:	
2		DILLON LAW GROUP, APC
3	Miller, et al.,	2647 Gateway Road, Suite 105, No. 255 Carlsbad, California 92009 By: JOHN W. DILLON, ESQ.
4	For the Defendants:	DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
5	Becerra, et al.,	OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION
6		300 South Spring Street, Suite 9012 Los Angeles, California 90013
7		By: KEVIN J. KELLY, ESQ.
8		DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
9		GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
10		Los Angeles, California 90013 By: MARK R. BECKINGTON, ESQ.
11	A DDEADANGE C	by. Print It. Dickington, bog.
12	<u>APPEARANCES</u> :	
13	For the Plaintiffs: Fouts, et al.,	LAW OFFICE OF ALAN BECK 2692 Harcourt Drive San Diego, California 92123
14		By: ALAN A. BECK, ESQ.
15		STAMBOULIEH LAW, PLLC PO Box 428
16		Olive Branch, Mississippi 38654 By: STEPHEN D. STAMBOULIEH, ESQ.
17	For the Defendants:	DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
18	Becerra, et al.	OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION
19		1300 I Street, Suite 125 Sacramento, California 95814
20		By: ANTHONY P. O'BRIEN, ESQ.
21		DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
22		GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION
23		300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, California 90013
24		By: MARK R. BECKINGTON, ESQ.
25		

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA; MONDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2022; 10:38 A.M. 1 2 -000-3 THE COURT: Good morning. THE CLERK: Calling 1, 2, 3, and 4 on calendar. 5 One, 17-cv-1017, Duncan, et al., v. Becerra, et al. Two, 18-cv-0802, Rhode, et al., v. Becerra, et al. 6 Three, 19-cv-1537, Miller, et al., v. Becerra, et al. Four, 19-cv-1662, Fouts, et al., v. Becerra, et al. 8 All set for status conference. 9 THE COURT: All right, Counsel. Thank you for being 10 here this morning. Let's start with the Plaintiff. 11 12 If you would please identify yourself. Please speak 13 slowly, clearly, so that my court reporter can take down your 14 names and so that I can, hopefully, do justice to them. Okay? 15 MS. BARVIR: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 Anna Barvir, B-a-r-v-i-r, for Plaintiff Virginia 17 Duncan, et al. 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 MR. BRADY: Good morning, Your Honor. 20 Sean Brady, S-e-a-n, B-r-a-d-y, on behalf of the 21 Plaintiffs. 22 MR. MOROS: Good morning, Your Honor. 23 Konstadinos Moros on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 24 K-o-n-s-t-a-d-i-n-o-s. And last name is Moros, M-o-r-o-s. 25 THE COURT: Okay. And for the State?

```
1
             MR. O'BRIEN: Good morning, Your Honor.
 2
             Deputy Attorney General Anthony O'Brien,
    A-n-t-h-o-n-y; O, apostrophe, B-r-i-e-n, on behalf of the
 3
    Attorney General and the Fouts and Rhode matter.
             THE COURT: Okay.
 5
             MR. KELLY: Your Honor, excuse me. I'm also
 6
 7
    appearing -- I'm appearing on behalf of the State and the
8
    Attorney General in the Duncan and Miller matters.
 9
             My name is Kevin Kelly. K-e-v-i-n. Kelly, K-e-l-l-y.
10
    Deputy Attorney General. Thank you.
11
             THE COURT: I'm sorry. You're on Duncan and Miller?
12
             MR. KELLY: Correct, Your Honor.
13
             THE COURT: Okay. Boy, I hope I can keep all this
    straight. Okay.
14
15
             MR. BECKINGTON: Good morning, Your Honor.
16
             Mark Beckington, B-e-c-k-i-n-g-t-o-n. I'm joining
17
    Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Kelly on all four cases.
18
             THE COURT: I'm sorry?
19
             MR. BECKINGTON: I'm joining Mr. Kelly and Mr. O'Brien
20
    on all four of the cases.
21
             THE COURT: On all four. I remember you from the
2.2
    Miller case.
23
             MR. BECKINGTON: Yes, Your Honor.
24
             THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. Great.
25
             All right. All right. Let's see Plaintiff in the
```

```
1
    Rhode case.
 2
             MR. BRADY: Your Honor, Sean Brady on behalf of the
    Plaintiffs on Rhode.
 3
             MS. BARVIR: Anna Barvir on behalf of the Plaintiffs
    and Rhode as well.
 5
             THE COURT: All right. And on the Fouts matter?
 6
 7
             MR. STAMBOULIEH: Steven Stamboulieh,
    S-t-a-m-b-o-u-l-i-e-h, for Plaintiff Fouts.
 8
 9
             THE COURT: I'm sorry. Just a second.
10
             Can you repeat your last name again for me, please?
             MR. STAMBOULIEH: Stamboulieh, S-t-a-m-b-o-u-l-i-e-h.
11
12
             MR. BECK: Alan Beck on behalf of the Plaintiffs.
13
    A-l-a-n. Last name B-e-c-k, sir.
14
             THE COURT: Okay. Have I missed anyone?
15
             MR. DILLON: Your Honor, this is John Dillon appearing
16
    on behalf of the Plaintiffs for the Millers and --
17
             THE COURT: I'm sorry. For Miller?
18
             MR. DILLON: Yes.
19
             THE COURT: And?
20
             MR. DILLON: John Dillon.
21
             THE COURT: Just on the Miller case?
2.2
             MR. DILLON: Yeah, just for Miller.
23
             THE COURT: All right. Have I missed anyone?
24
             Okay. Well, thank you so much for being here this
25
    morning. The reason why I called the status conference -- and
```

I called all these cases at the same time -- is because, you know, a great deal of my life over the last few years has been devoted to dealing with these Second Amendment cases.

As you probably know, I have four of these cases and recently inherited the fee-shifting case from two other judges. And I've spent an awful lot of time, an awful lot of time, and read an awful lot of material and heard testimony on some of these -- at least one of these cases, anyway.

And so I thought that, given the fact that these cases have been returned to me following the Bruen opinion, that I didn't want to duplicate effort. First of all, my time, as I'm sure your time, my law clerk's time is valuable.

And so I thought that perhaps there was some way that we could approach a joint methodology for dealing with all of these cases, essentially, at one time and in one -- in one way. So my understanding of -- of Heller, is that Heller has not changed. It has not been overruled. It is still good law.

Bruen, the Bruen opinion, I believe, discarded the intermediate scrutiny test that I also thought was not very useful; and has, instead, replaced it with a text history and tradition test. Now, the text history and tradition issue is pretty much common, I think, to all of these cases.

There may be some nuance as to whether, for example, in some case the -- the history and tradition may effect ammunition. In another case, it may effect the type of weapon,

for example, whether it's a rifle or a dirk or a dagger. But
in the end, it's the same. We're basically looking at the same
body of history and tradition that we're going to be looking at
in all of the cases.

So I have an idea of how this case ought to go forward, and I'll tell you what I would like to have -- by the way, I might add, I'm not sure, Mr. O'Brien, whether you filed the supplemental brief in the Fouts case. I'm not sure who filed that.

MR. O'BRIEN: Yes, Your Honor, I did.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me compliment you on that, because one of the things that I thought you did that I really appreciated was you filed several declarations. One of those declarations did a historical analysis of several rules, laws, regulations, and so on and so forth, all of which I have read, I might add. So --

You can sit down.

2.2

-- I found that to be very, very helpful.

But I would like to ask you folks to do something a little bit different; very similar. But I don't have the staff. I don't have, really, the resources to do this, at least not to do it in a timely fashion.

So I thought that I would ask you to do something for me, which is to, essentially, do a similar survey as,

25 Mr. O'Brien, you did in the -- in the Fouts case.

And I would like that survey, if you would. I mean,
I'm sure you all have access to Excel spreadsheets and so on.
But I'd like to see a survey that does the following for me:
First of all, on a chronological bases, starting with date, the date of any law, regulation, ordinance, restriction. And I'm going to refer to those from now on as "restrictions." Okay.
Generically, okay, restriction or regulation. Okay.

So if you could start out chronologically, if you would give me the date, and then if you would tell me what was it that was restricted. So, for example, in many of those regulations, they regulate dirks, daggers, metal knuckles. In some cases, it might be storage of gunpowder or cartridges. Some of them, some of these, are "use" regulations. In other words, you cannot use these while committing a crime. You cannot use them while breaking and entering into somebody's property. You cannot display them in anger.

So what is it exactly that the law or the regulation restricted? What type of weapon? What was the weapon that was being restricted? Was it a knife? a Bowie knife? a stiletto? metal knuckles? pistols? rifles? Then I would like to know whether or not that statute was repealed and, if it was repealed, what was repealed by, and was it replaced by something else? And if so, if you would do the same analysis? Again, continuing a chronological order. Right?

And then, finally, whether or not that regulation or

restriction was reviewed by court or courts? And if so, what was the -- what was the outcome? For example, was it found to be unconstitutional, or was it found to be constitutional? And if you'll give me a citation so that I can then go and look at the cases and see what the cases say.

2.2

I think -- so to pose an example, I think there are one or two regulations that I have found that restricted -- specifically restricted billys. Okay. So in the Fouts case, I think that would be particularly relevant. I think I found one or two that restricted rifles and shotguns. I think I found one or two that restrict certain ammunition, cartridges.

Right. I think I found one that restricts a weapon that can fire more than 16 or 18 rounds. And I found one that dealt with machine guns and automatic rifles.

You see, that's the sort of thing that I've read through that I've captured, but I can't really capture it in a way that I think that the Supreme Court would like us to do it, which is a chronological order, so that we can determine what regulations, what tradition exists with regards to restrictions at the adoption of the Second Amendment; and then I think, secondarily, at the time that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.

I think with that body of information, I think this

Court would be in a much better position to make a decision as

to what to do in each one of these cases.

So the cases have been sent back to me, given the Bruen opinion, and I'm now going to attempt to deal with them, but I don't want to have to deal and read the same stuff over and over and over again, because I've already read some of it twice. And, frankly, there's a lot of material there. I don't know how many boxes of five-inch binders I have, but it's a lot, and I have only so much time.

So I would suggest both sides, if you can, please do that for me. Okay. And I think that would be very helpful.

Now, as far as actually setting a hearing to -- to hear your arguments on these, I don't think there's any use in taking any evidence, meaning testimony, from anyone in any of these cases.

I mean, the history and tradition is what it is. I don't need, you know, Mr. Spitzer or Mr. Cornell to tell me what his view of the history and tradition is. I see no point in that; nor do I think any additional discovery is necessary or additional expert work is necessary. So, anyway, that's my -- that's my initial thought on this case.

If anyone has any suggestions on how we can go about proceeding with these cases, I would love to hear your views.

I may not adopt your suggestion, but I'll certainly consider it. So if -- if anybody wants to address what I have said, or anything else on how we proceed with these cases, please feel free to speak up.

1 Maybe we'll start with Duncan, since it was the first 2 case that I dealt with.

So do you have anything you want to add?

MS. BARVIR: Should I move here?

2.2

THE COURT: Yeah. Whatever. If you feel comfortable there at the table, that's fine.

MS. BARVIR: Again, Anna Barvir for Plaintiff Virginia Duncan.

Thank you, Your Honor, for your thoughtful consideration of all four matters. I'm sorry. I'm -- we've heard what -- that Your Honor is asking for from each party. I think that makes a lot of sense, though I do want to, I think, perhaps, focus the Court a little bit on what Plaintiffs' view as the kind of proper way of reviewing this case. And in our position, it doesn't really rely on -- it actually shouldn't rely, and it might be improper to rely on the sorts of -- even the laws that Your Honor is referencing in this survey and/or spreadsheet that we were talking about just now.

It is our position that Heller already tells -- Your Honor, tells all of us how to analyze this. The -- this is an arms banned possession case. So the Heller court then, backed up by the decision in Bruen, already handled that entire analysis. The analysis starts with --

THE COURT: But if that were so, why would the Ninth Circuit have kicked it back to me? I mean, I agree with you in

concept, but, you know, the Ninth Circuit kicked it back to me,
so...

MS. BARVIR: Excuse me. I think that's a good
question, and perhaps that's why Your Honor is, I think,
intelligent, smart to ask the parties to do what we're doing.
But I think that -- excuse me -- the Ninth Circuit also has a
lot of these -- had a lot of these cases before it. And,
obviously, all of the pro Second Amendment cases had gone up to

I'm not trying to cast aspersions, but I think we can all kind of agree that we've seen a lot of decisions that are not upholding lower-court decisions that strike California state laws, gun control laws, just overturned.

en banc, and perhaps the Court wasn't willing to handle those

So perhaps they'd like to see that Your Honor do some more work on this case, but I don't think it requires --

THE COURT: Would you like some water?

MS. BARVIR: Yes.

2.2

at that point.

I don't think that that requires us to do a new analysis of all the history that's out there. The Heller court was very -- had done a very detailed deep dive into all of the historical laws that are banning possession of arms and other types of gun control laws since the Founding and before.

And it found that the test is if it's -- excuse me -- that the only time the State can lawfully ban a firearm or

other type of arm that is protected by the Second Amendment is if it's dangerous and unusual. The flip side being, typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes or other -- we've also heard it called the "common use" test. And so that test came out of the Court's analysis of the history and tradition.

So if the Court -- so the question that really is posed -- that Duncan poses this Court today, is whether or not magazines, and maybe more specifically magazines capable of holding more than ten rounds, are protected arms, bearable arms, under the Second Amendment's text.

And then, secondly, if there -- excuse me -- otherwise, if there's a longstanding tradition, meaning are they dangerous and unusual. And this Court has already found that -- I mean, we have a really large record showing that they're not dangerous and unusual. And several courts have agreed with that finding both in the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have found it or they have been willing to accept it. And I don't think that Heller or -- I mean, I'm sorry -- I do not think Bruen changed that outcome.

So that's what we would like Your Honor to consider and to look at and perhaps think about when we are doing this search for more historical restrictions.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question that I think has troubled me somewhat. So I think facts matter. And in

certain -- and in cases -- every case, there are parties that have greater access to evidence than others. Right. And at least in California, we have a presumption, for example, that when a party has the largest body of evidence but fails to present it, there's a presumption that if the evidence were to be considered by the Court, that the presumption would be that the party who has a greater body of evidence, that it would be held against him.

2.2

Now, one of the things that I'm concerned about, for example, is I just read someone said, "There's no evidence that a homeowner has ever fired more than ten rounds in defense."

And I kind of think that that's -- I mean, I think probably the best evidence of that would be the State. The State would have the investigative reports, police reports, and so on, to explain that.

But I wonder if you agree with that statement, that there are no cases where a homeowner or a business owner has ever fired more than ten rounds in defense. And if so, and if that's the case, have you provided the Court with any information to support that?

MS. BARVIR: I don't -- I don't, standing here, know that that's true. I think that part of that is -- it's a kind of a false thing to do when you're limited to that number, anyway, but also --

THE COURT: I understand you. I understand -- I hear

you. I hear you. But I -- particularly in the Miller case, I took issue with Ms. Alan's -- Ms. Alan's analysis. And then I think I read something recently -- I can't recall which court it was -- but somebody said, "Oh, there's no evidence that a

And defense -- and of course all that anyone has to do is go on the Internet and do a cursory search and find out that that's not true.

MS. BARVIR: Right.

homeowner has fired more than ten rounds."

2.2

THE COURT: And I wonder if you've done that.

MS. BARVIR: I think when we were here on MSJ -- and that's why we had this conversation several years ago.

THE COURT: You know, I'm sorry. But as I said, I have four of these, and if I get you all confused with one another, please forgive me. You know, I'm not as young as I used to be, so...

MS. BARVIR: None of us are.

When we were here on MSJ, I think we had this conversation as well. And a lot of times that was coming from -- you know, from Plaintiffs' side was coming from, I guess you could say, anecdotal news stories. Because we don't -- we aren't the State. We don't have access to those same sorts of records.

I don't think that it's true that that's never happened. That there's no evidence that it's ever happened.

```
But, again, even if it never happened, which I find
1
 2
    extraordinarily hard to believe -- the police do it all the
    time -- it's not a relevant matter because the test --
 3
             THE COURT: Yeah, I know.
 5
             MS. BARVIR: -- for common use is typically
 6
    possession.
 7
             THE COURT: I heard you. I know that. But I was just
    wondering if you agreed with that statement that there's no
8
 9
    evidence that the homeowner has ever fired more than ten
10
    rounds, and just wanted to pick your brain on that.
11
             Okay. I distracted you.
12
             MS. BARVIR: That's okay. I have nothing more to add.
13
             THE COURT: Okay. Great.
14
             MS. BARVIR: So thank you for your time.
15
             THE COURT: Sometimes -- sometimes less is more.
16
    Okay.
17
             Anyone else? No one else? Gee, I'm so glad.
18
             MR. KELLY: Your Honor, could I be heard?
19
             THE COURT: No. Sorry. I've heard all I need to
20
    hear.
21
             No. Go ahead.
22
             MR. KELLY: So the State would like to renew its
23
    request for an addition discovery period, not a lengthy
24
    discovery period in this action. Just a three-month is all we
25
    would ask for.
```

```
1
             THE COURT: Tell me why.
 2
             MR. KELLY: Sorry, Your Honor?
 3
             THE COURT: Tell me why.
             MR. KELLY: There's two reasons: First of all, this
 5
    is a brand-new area of law, and it's a brand new area of
 6
    historical analysis. And a three-month period would give our
 7
    experts more time to actually look into this. I think we
8
    submitted a declaration from Professor Schrag, who details the
    types of work that is required of historians when they approach
 9
10
    an issue like this.
11
             And, also, Professor Cornell in his declaration also
12
    said that, "This work is still ongoing, and we did our level
13
    best" --
14
             THE COURT: What happens in three months when the work
15
    stops? What's the -- what's the miracle? Was the miracle
16
    pertinent? Drops down in three months and work stops?
17
             MR. KELLY: Well, Your Honor, obviously, I can't
18
    represent that new evidence will be found, but that's also
19
    because I don't know what I don't know, at this point, and
20
    neither do our experts.
21
             So we would, again, renew our request for an
2.2
    additional discovery period followed by supplemental briefing.
23
             And -- excuse me -- I had another point to make on
24
    that.
25
             THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
```

```
1
             MR. KELLY: So we would also want an opportunity for
2
    our experts to examine the evidence, the new evidence that the
    plaintiffs included in their response to our supplemental
 3
    briefing. And that would also give our experts a chance to do
 5
    so, and then --
 6
             THE COURT: So give me an example.
 7
             MR. KELLY: So I will give -- one moment, Your Honor.
             So the Plaintiffs brought or included a declaration
8
 9
    from Ashley Hlebinsky, who claimed that "repeating rifles were
10
    not commonly owned in the nineteenth century," presumably in
    response to our declaration from Professor Vorenberg.
11
12
             THE COURT: I'm sorry. They said "they were not"?
13
             MR. KELLY:
                         They were not commonly owned in the
14
    nineteenth century.
15
             THE COURT: She says they were not.
16
             MR. DILLON: No.
17
             THE COURT: No. I think you're wrong. I think you're
18
    opposite. I think she says --
19
             MR. KELLY: Opposing counsel will correct me if I'm
20
    wrong.
21
             THE COURT: Yeah, I think you're wrong. I think she
2.2
    said the opposite.
23
             MR. DILLON: I don't believe that's the case that she
24
    said they were not.
25
              (Court reporter interruption.)
```

```
1
             MR. DILLON: John Dillon on behalf of the Miller
 2
    defendants.
             THE COURT: Yeah. So she said they were commonly
 3
    owned.
 5
             MR. DILLON: Yeah.
             THE COURT: So the Model 94 Winchester --
 6
 7
             MR. DILLON: She was rebutting Dr. Saul Cornell's
    statement that these guns were, in fact, not common. That's
8
 9
    what his testimony was, Your Honor.
10
             THE COURT: All you got to do, if you look at
    Professor Cornell's declarations and you look at the website
11
    that he refers to -- to Winchester -- to the Winchester
12
13
    company, if you look at that website, you see that, in fact,
    they were commonly owned.
14
15
             So, I mean, what are you going to do? You going to --
16
             MR. KELLY: Your Honor, if --
17
             THE COURT: How are you going to -- I mean, if you
18
    look at Mr. Vorenberg's declaration, and you look at -- for
19
    example, as I sit here right now, I can recall one instance
20
    that he talks about where two miners were mining for borax.
21
             Do you recall the incidents?
22
             MR. KELLY: Sorry. Do I recall the incidents, Your
23
    Honor?
24
             THE COURT:
                         Yeah.
25
             MR. KELLY: I do not, no.
```

THE COURT: Okay. So two miners were mining for borax. And I can't recall whether it was Montana or Wyoming or Nebraska, or whatever. These are just two miners, two common folks that were miners for miners -- I mean, mining for borax, and they're attacked by a band of 40 Indians. And these two miners happen to have Henry rifles, and they were able to defeat the 40 Indians that were attacking them.

2.2

So the point -- the point was, if you look at Mr. -- Professor Cornell's -- if you look at Professor Vorenberg's materials, which I have looked at, you see that the statement that they were not commonly owned is just not true.

For example, there's a statement in there about how after the Civil War many of the -- of the soldiers, when they were released from duty, were, in fact, allowed to buy the repeating rifles and took the repeating rifles home.

And you can do the statistical analysis, by the way, which I sat down and did because maybe I have too much time on my hands. But there was an awful lot of those weapons that wound up in civilian hands.

So, I mean, the evidence is there. You can call, I suppose, this person for a deposition and take her deposition. But I don't think, no matter what she says, it's not going to contradict her own experts' declarations and the materials that they themselves refer to.

You follow what I'm saying? Okay.

```
1
             MR. KELLY: Your Honor, I do have another example of
 2
    something we would want to explore and --
             THE COURT: Okay. Give me one more.
 3
             MR. KELLY: So the Plaintiffs also include a
    declaration from Clayton Cramer --
 5
             THE COURT: Okay.
 6
 7
             MR. KELLY: -- presumably in response to Professor
    Roth's position that mass murder was not a new phenomenon or --
8
 9
    excuse me -- mass murder, yes, correct, is a new phenomenon at
10
    this point. And we would want -- to my knowledge, Mr. Cramer
11
    was not disclosed as an expert, was not deposed in any prior
12
    proceeding in Duncan.
13
             And we would first want an opportunity for Professor
14
    Roth to examine the new evidence that the Plaintiffs have
15
    brought, as well as potentially depose Mr. Cramer on that
16
    issue.
17
             THE COURT: Well, before I get to that issue, let me
18
    point out something, Mr. Kelly. I don't know how long you've
19
    been in this case. But you said something about -- going back
20
    to the reason why you needed three months; that you needed --
21
    that this was a new area and so on and so forth.
2.2
             Did I get you right?
23
             MR. KELLY: That's correct, Your Honor.
24
             THE COURT:
                         Yeah. How long you have been in this
25
    case, Mr. Kelly?
```

MR. KELLY: Several weeks, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's not fair to dump you into a case like this. Mr. -- Professor Cornell has gone on record and stated -- in 2017, Professor Cornell stated that he had been researching and writing on the history and tradition of Second Amendment regulations for two decades. That's 20 years, 20 years before 2017. We're now in 2023. Add five years to that; that's 25 years. That's a quarter of a century that Professor Cornell has been writing, researching on the history of and tradition of the Second Amendment.

And I've read an awful lot of that material.

Professor Cornell cites to Spitzer. Spitzer cites to

Vorenberg. Vorenberg cites to Bazilli. Bazilli, I think it

is, who cites to -- these folks have been working on this for a really, really long time.

In 2000- -- well, as you probably know in the Rhode -- Rhode case, I issued an opinion where I said that the State's regulation had no historical pedigree, and I was right. The Ninth Circuit asked the State to file a supplemental brief on the issue of the historical pedigree.

In response to that request from the Ninth Circuit, the State at Footnote 3, page 11 of its response, cites to Saul Cornell and Nathan DeNino, "A Well Regulated Right. The Early American Origins of Gun Control," 2004, surveying firearms regulations from Founding era through the nineteenth century.

```
Mr. Kelly, with all due respect, Mr. Cornell and all
1
 2
    these other folks have been researching and writing on this
    issue for 25 years. We're not here, looking -- this is not a
 3
    question for the missing link. We're not looking for truffles.
    If it's a history and tradition, 25 years of research and
 5
    writing should have disclosed it by now.
 6
 7
             And as you know, probably in Bruen -- I think it was
    in Bruen. It might have been in Heller, as well, where the
8
 9
    Court said, "Look, 'a lot of' doesn't show a history and
10
    tradition." Right. So I don't think -- I mean, with all due
11
    respect, I understand what you're doing, and I appreciate that.
12
    And I'm sorry that you got dumped into this just a few -- just
13
    a few weeks ago.
             But, realistically, you don't need more time. I might
14
15
    give you a little more time to depose the one expert, and that
16
    might be it, but that's about it. Okay.
17
             MR. KELLY: Thank you, Your Honor.
18
             THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else you
19
    wanted to add?
20
             MR. KELLY: Actually, a point of clarification, Your
21
    Honor.
2.2
             THE COURT:
                         Sure. Go ahead.
23
             MR. KELLY: Would Your Honor like us to submit one set
    of briefing for all four matters, or one for each matter?
24
25
```

THE COURT: I'm open to suggestions. I don't want to

1 have to be rereading the same stuff over and over and over 2 again. So what do you think?

2.2

MR. KELLY: Your Honor, I think they should be heard separately. I think as Your Honor said, you know, there is some overlap here in terms of the historical analysis, et cetera. But there's also enough nuance among the cases that, I think, both, as a matter of fairness, and to make your burden easier, they should be heard separately.

For example, I think the textual analyses is different in these case; the first prong under Bruen as to whether the regulated items constitute arms under the Second Amendment.

And our position is a different analysis in each case.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, what you say makes sense.

All right. So how about if what we do is we have a joint historical analysis? In other words, what I suggested at the very beginning of this hearing? How about if we have that as one?

And, yes, I can understand how you might want to argue, for example, that in the Fouts case, looking at the historical analysis, there's, you know, history and tradition. And that you might want to brief that separately.

Yeah, I can understand what you're saying. I'll hear from the Plaintiffs in just a second, see if they have a different idea. But that makes sense. I can go along with it.

MR. KELLY: Thank you, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 2 Anyone else? All right. Let's go back to the Plaintiffs. Anyone 3 have anything you want to comment in response? 5 MR. BRADY: Sure, Your Honor. Sean Brady on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 6 7 I think that makes sense. But to address the nuance, there are some things that are going to sort of be 8 9 boilerplate with respect to this compendium of Excel 10 spreadsheet of the laws. If the State prepares that, they're going to have to prepare that for all the cases. Right. So it 11 12 wouldn't be an additional burden on them. 13 THE COURT: I want you to look at it, and see if you 14 agree or disagree because I want to know, you know, if there's 15 disagreement. Right. 16 MR. BRADY: If Your Honor would like us to meet and 17 confer, you know -- I guess our position is that it's the 18 State's burden to research and present these laws, and they've 19 had adequate time for that. We don't need to get into --20 THE COURT: I think I agree. But I think it's always 21 really a good idea to meet and confer. So if you could do 2.2 that, that would be wonderful. 23 MR. BRADY: Absolutely. And if Your Honor wants us to 24 do that prior to -- instead of dressing it in our opposition 25 and meeting and conferring beforehand, we're more than happy to

1 do that. 2 THE COURT: Why don't you do that. And then if there's any disagreement, if there's any disagreement, then we 3 can deal with that later. Right. So here's something that I do with jury instructions. I ask the parties to meet and confer and come up with an 6 agreed-upon body of jury instructions. Okay. And then if 7 8 there are any jury instructions that they disagree with, then 9 they can file a brief to tell me what instructions they 10 disagree with and what other instructions they want me to give. 11 Perhaps this is a good policy for us to apply here. 12 If you meet and confer and agree on the historical analysis, 13 then that's great. You can submit that. And if there are any 14 disagreements, then you can submit that separately. 15 How's that? That work? 16 MR. BRADY: I think that works, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Kelly? 18 MR. KELLY: Yeah, that works for us, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Great. 20 MR. BRADY: This meet-and-confer process, though, is 21 there going to be another status conference or -- that's my 22 only concern. Or are we just going to address it in our 23 briefing? 24 THE COURT: No. I don't think we need another 25 meet-and-confer conference after this. I think -- look, I

don't want to slow-walk these cases. These are important cases both to the State and to the Plaintiffs and the people that insist that they have these rights, and I think we need to move these cases along.

2.2

So a meet-and-confer. Give me an agreed-upon historical analysis, and then what I will do is I will give you a time period for that to be filed. I'll give you a time period for additional briefs to be filed, and then we're going to have hearings, and we're going to put these cases to bed.

MR. MOROS: Your Honor, one question.

Is the State to be limited in the presentation of its laws to laws before the year 1900? Because I know in their supplemental briefing, they went into twentieth century laws, and our position is those aren't relevant. But if you want a comprehensive view, just to get everything.

THE COURT: You know, frankly, I don't see much point in those because I think that there would be so many laws. I mean, let's face it, after -- there came a point when -- when they began to grow exponentially.

I think in the Bruen opinion it talks about -- the way I see it, it places greater emphasis on those laws that were, essentially, in effect at the time the Second Amendment was adopted, and then with a secondary emphasis at the time that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment by reference. I think that's the time period.

```
1
             In fact, I think the one -- if I'm not mistaken, the
    one statute that regulates -- that was submitted in the Fouts
 2
 3
    case, it talks about machine guns and automatic rifles, is a
    1927 statute, if I'm not mistaken; which, frankly, I thought
 5
    was irrelevant, anyway.
             So why don't we limit it to -- how about this?
 6
 7
    about, let's say, 20 years -- how about an arbitrary and
8
    capricious number that I'm going to give you? Twenty years
 9
    after the Second Amendment was incorporated by the Fourteenth
10
    Amendment -- or the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
11
    that?
12
             MR. MOROS: So, 1888. Okay.
13
             THE COURT: All right. Twenty years after the
14
    Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
15
             MR. KELLY: Your Honor, we would object to that.
16
             THE COURT: Why?
17
             MR. KELLY:
                          In Bruen, it specifically says that
18
    statutes after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification can be
19
    used as evidence so long as they do not conflict with the
20
    restrictions that were in place prior to then around the
21
    Founding and the Reconstruction period.
2.2
             So we would want to reserve our right to introduce
23
    those laws if -- if we do, in fact, do that.
24
             THE COURT: Can you cite me to the page in Bruen?
25
             MR. KELLY: Yes, Your Honor.
```

1 THE COURT: And if that were the case, why would --2 why would the Supreme Court have overturned the New York statute on concealed carry? Since there were -- I would 3 imagine there's probably 100, if not 200, statutes that have prohibited the methodology for obtaining concealed carry 5 permits. 6 MR. KELLY: So, Your Honor, the page we're referring to is at 142, Supreme Court page 2153, Note 28. 8 THE COURT: Can you read it for me? Because I -- I 9 10 don't have a photographic memory. 11 MR. KELLY: Sure, Your Honor. Just give us one 12 moment. 13 Your Honor, the footnote says: "We will not address 14 any of the twentieth century historical evidence brought to 15 bear by respondent or their amici. As with their 16 late-nineteenth-century evidence, the twentieth century 17 evidence presented by Respondent's in the amici --" 18 (Court reporter interruption.) 19 MR. KELLY: "-- the twentieth century evidence 20 presented by Respondents and their amici does not provide 21 insight into the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts earlier evidence." 2.2 And we would argue that that footnote would allow us 23 24 to introduce statutes and regulations post-Reconstruction so 25 long as they do not contradict earlier restrictions.

THE COURT: The problem with that, though, as I said -- how many -- how many laws have been enacted? I mean, just look at California. Let's just take, for example, the Miller case, right, the AR-15-type regulations.

How many of those laws have been enacted since 1927?

Lots and lots and lots. But how does that help me

decide the history and tradition of regulation of rifles --

MR. KELLY: I think, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- at the time the Second Amendment was adopted, or at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted?

All that tells me is -- has happened after the Civil War when states found out that, yes, they could restrict certain firearms. Right. That all of a sudden there was an explosion of restrictions because the states found out, "Hey, guess what? We can do this." So then they did it.

But how does that help me determine the history and tradition of these laws at the time the Second Amendment was adopted or at the time that the Nineteenth -- I mean the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted?

MR. KELLY: Your Honor, I'm only speculating that these laws are out there. I personally do not know. I think we would just want to reserve our right and not be barred from doing so should it come to that.

THE COURT: I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll let you file a separate one. You can file -- you can file a separate

```
survey, and we'll call it "Post 20 years after" -- "20 Years
1
    After the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment."
 2
             How's that?
 3
             MR. KELLY: That sounds good, Your Honor.
 5
             THE COURT: And include as many as you want.
                                                            In fact,
    the more the merrier.
 6
             MR. DILLON: Your Honor, if I may?
             THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.
 8
             MR. DILLON: I just wanted to clarify on the parameter
 9
10
    of exactly what you're requesting. As I heard you, you're
    looking for a single spreadsheet-style chronological order of
11
12
    all the statutes, ordinances, restrictions that the State can
13
    come up with that identify what was restricted, what act was
14
    restricted, whether it was a law that was repealed or not
15
    repealed, and whether or not it was ever brought before a
16
    court.
17
             And then they'll present -- they'll draft that
18
    document with no argument, no expert witness testimony.
19
             THE COURT: Correct.
20
             MR. DILLON: It will just be a straight list of the
21
    laws. We will have a chance to review it as Plaintiffs. And
2.2
    like a summary judgment, if we have a contested issue of the
23
    summary of the law that they present, we can note that contest
24
    in the -- you know, a joint document? Is that what you're --
25
             THE COURT: Sounds reasonable. Sounds reasonable to
```

1 me.2 MR. DILLON: No problem. Thank you, Your Honor. MR. KELLY: Your Honor, I think we would object to 3 that as well. I think we would want, if we need to, to 5 introduce experts to interpret some of the laws and the standards --6 7 THE COURT: No. 8 MR. KELLY: -- in the language --9 THE COURT: No. 10 MR. KELLY: -- and the statute --THE COURT: No. Look -- no, no. 11 12 Mr. Kelly, with all due respect, I don't need -- every 13 one of these experts that you've put forth, I have read, just like experts that they have put forth, like Mr. Copill, for 14 15 example. Your experts -- these are people that have, you know, 16 biased points of view. I mean, Mr. Bosey, for example -- I 17 hope I'm pronouncing his name. The fellow who worked for --18 MR. MOROS: Kimber, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Kimber. Yeah. Who at some point in time 20 had an epiphany and realized that all the work that he'd been 21 doing for all these years, selling these weapons to the public 2.2 was not good. And now he works -- he's a consultant for 23 Everytown -- I'm trying to remember. 24 Anyway, look. These people's opinions of what these 25 statutes say, right, means nothing. It means nothing.

like, I remember -- I think it was Justice Brier in -- I think it was Bruen, who talked about, "Well, we need to have this factual record," and this and that, what have you.

No. 702 says that the admission of expert testimony is help -- is possible if, because of the expert's knowledge, skill, or experience, it will assist the trier of fact. Okay.

But there's nothing. I mean, I've read these declarations. Every one of these folks come in here with a biased -- it's not like they're really neutral experts, okay, or they're not experts who've come up on these opinions as a result of these cases, okay, doing research for these cases.

These are all people that already come with preconceived ideas and opinions, but their opinion is not worth any more than your opinion or her opinion. They're going to tell me, "Well, in my opinion, if you look at this statute, this statute means that -- you know, that the State of Wyoming regulated concealed carry of brass knuckles," and so I can read that. I can figure that out by myself.

MR. KELLY: Well, Your Honor, I think the issue that we might have with simply creating a spreadsheet and submitting it to the Court doesn't take into account that restrictions were found in places other than statutes. In our supplemental briefing, we -- Professor Vorenberg testified as to how, for example, in the Reconstruction period, the U.S. Army acted to restrict firearms with magazines or carrying more than ten

1 rounds. 2 THE COURT: When was the Reconstruction period? was after the Civil War. 3 MR. KELLY: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yeah. It was after the Fourteenth 5 Amendment? 6 7 MR. KELLY: It was during the same period, Your Honor; during the same time period. 8 9 THE COURT: And why would I want to give -- in fact, I 10 think there was some discussion about this. I thought maybe it was in Bruen. 11 12 Why would I want to give any credit to -- to what the 13 U.S. Army was doing in their territories? In fact, I think, 14 wasn't it Bruen that somewhat criticizes applying laws that 15 were regulations that were used in territories that --16 MR. KELLY: Your Honor, it goes to the history and 17 tradition of firearm regulations. That may not be a statute. 18 THE COURT: But, look. If it's the State's position 19 that there's a long history and tradition to regulating 20 firearms, if that's your position, you don't need to present 21 any evidence. I'll buy that. I understand that. 2.2 Any time the State can get their -- the ability to 23 regulate something, they'll do it, and they've been regulating 24 firearms for a long time. Right. But that doesn't mean that

it's an analog to the particular statute that's at issue in the

25

cases that I have before me.

2.2

So the fact that, for example, in the territories in the Reconstruction period, the Army may not have wanted to have people to have this, that or whatever, that doesn't help me.

It's not an analog.

Yes, we know. We know. We know. We don't have -- I don't need to take testimony of the fact that there's a history and tradition in the United States in regulating firearms.

Right. But if that were the test, if that were the test,

Heller would not have been decided the way it was, and neither would McDonald, and neither would Bruen, and neither would

Caetano.

That's not the test. But the test is, is there a reasonable analog? It doesn't have a twin. It doesn't have to be a twin. But is there a reasonable analog in the history and tradition of firearm regulation or arms regulation? Because in the Fouts case, we're dealing with billy clubs.

Is there an analog in the history and tradition of regulating this type of weapon, this type of conduct, this type of behavior? That's what we're looking at.

So, anyway, all right. Anyone else?

Yes.

MR. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, just wanted to check.

With respect to Fouts and Rhode, what the Court's requesting here, what effect does it have on kind of the

existing posture of those cases?

2.2

With respect to Fouts, the Plaintiffs have an opposition brief due on the 22nd, currently. And Rhode, there hasn't been any order with respect to briefing. So I'm just trying to check and see what's the -- what is kind of the process going forward.

THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate your mentioning that.

So here's what I'd like for you to do. As I said,
Professor Cornell, Spitzer, and some of these other folks, they
have been working on this for a really long time. So it really
shouldn't take them really long to be able to come up with
this -- with a survey that I've requested. So I'm going to ask
that that be done within 30 days. Okay.

I will then -- given that, I will then give each side an opportunity to file a brief, and the reason why I use the word "brief," it's because I want it to be brief. Okay. I'm not going to -- I'm not going to require a 25-page maximum, but I don't think it needs to be 25 pages for you to tell me what the analogs are that I should apply in your case. And I'll give you 30 days to do that. Then I'll give you 10 days to each side to file a response.

Now, Mr. Kelly, you said you wanted to take somebody's deposition, and I'm more than happy to give you a chance to depose someone. See what happens.

1 So who did you want to depose? 2 MR. KELLY: Mr. Cramer, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Cramer. Whose witness is Mr. Cramer? 3 MS. BARVIR: Clayton Cramer is the Duncan Plaintiffs' 5 declarant. He was responding, I think, to Professor Roth. I would think that if Your Honor is going to give the 6 7 State some time to depose our witness, we should also get the 8 chance to depose Mr. Roth. He was also not disclosed at any 9 point prior to filing that. 10 THE COURT: You each have 20 days to work out an 11 agreement to -- one, to depose Mr. Cramer, to depose Mr. Roth. 12 Okay. 13 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Yes, Your Honor. I'm with --14 Stephen Stamboulieh for the Fouts Plaintiffs. 15 Plaintiff Cramer is also going to be our expert even 16 though we're outside the discovery deadline. He has, 17 obviously, not been disclosed to them as an expert, just like 18 their witnesses were not disclosed to us as an expert. 19 I'm not really sure that he needs to be deposed since 20 he's just going to be responding to Mr. Spitzer's declaration 21 of what the -- what he's found the historical analogs to be. 2.2 So I'm not really sure, other than wasting money and time, what 23 a deposition would bring to them. 24 I did have one question, and I -- the page length for

the supplemental briefs, my understanding of the local rules is

that we were limited to 25 pages. We have not filed motions to strike. We have not tried to burden the docket with anything.

I figured I would just ask the Court.

Do we have the same page limit that the Defendants do, which I believe was 36 pages? We're not going to burden --

2.2

THE COURT: I don't think we need 36 pages, especially if we're breaking it up. Okay. So we've got -- so we have the -- so we have the historical survey. Right. I don't know why you would need 36 pages. So why would you need 36 pages to tell me that the history and tradition of arm regulations -- I'm going to use the Fouts case -- for billys is consistent with the history and tradition of that which has been provided to me by way of that survey? You don't need 36 pages; 25 pages, max, for any opening brief, and 10 pages for any reply.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Let me go back one step, Your Honor.

They filed the supplemental brief that this Court

ordered. I'm not sure the actual date; October 17th, I

believe. And they took 36 pages. Ours is coming up. The

response is due on the 22nd.

So my question to the Court, and perhaps the Court just answered me when you limited it to 25 pages. The reason that we might need to go a little bit beyond that page limit, Your Honor, is they've raised this issue and said that there's really been no historical analysis of the "dangerous" -- and

```
they corrected it to be "or unusual" instead of "dangerous and
1
 2
    unusual" language.
             THE COURT: Yeah. I noted that. I noted that.
 3
    found that to be rather distressing, even though in the -- in
 5
    the past, they have referred to some instances as "dangerous or
    unusual." But as Justice Alito pointed out in his concurring
 6
 7
    opinion in Caetano, anyone with a ninth-grade education can
8
    read the Heller opinion and determine that, in fact, it is
 9
    "dangerous and unusual," i.e., the conjunctive, not a
10
    disjunctive.
11
             So I don't know why that keeps popping up. I mean, I
12
    heard some supposedly distinguished legal scholar make that
13
    same error, and I don't know whether that's intentional or not.
14
    I hope that's not intentional.
15
             MR. STAMBOULIEH: Well, the Supreme Court said
    "dangerous and unusual," Your Honor, so we're going to go with
16
17
    what the Supreme Court --
18
             THE COURT: That's a good thing to do.
19
             MR. STAMBOULIEH: Right.
20
             THE COURT: That's a really good thing to do.
21
             MR. STAMBOULIEH: So my question, Your Honor -- and
2.2
    I'm sorry for taking so long on this.
23
             THE COURT: It's okay.
24
             MR. STAMBOULIEH: We have briefed "dangerous and
25
    unusual." It takes us beyond 35 pages. It's about 35 pages.
```

We've briefed it. So to the extent the Court wants to see it -- if the Court limits us to 25, we'll cut the "dangerous and unusual" and just cite back "see Supreme Court. See Justice Alito" who references Caetano --

THE COURT: Are you saying -- are you talking about whether or not the weapon is dangerous and unusual, or are you talking about the fact that the test that some folks referred to it as "dangerous or unusual"? You follow what I'm saying? Are you talking about the weapon? Because, certainly, I can understand, particularly in your case, talking about whether or not the weapon is or is not dangerous and unusual.

But I don't want to talk about whether or not the test is "dangerous and unusual" or "dangerous or unusual." That has been decided by somebody who's way above my pay grade. Okay.

MR. BECK: Alan Beck for the Plaintiffs Fouts, Your Honor.

Our briefing also indicates that the phrase "dangerous and unusual" doesn't actually refer to any sort of intrinsic property of an arm. Historically, in Heller, the Court references the tradition of prohibiting carrying "dangerous and unusual" weapons.

And after we took a look at what that actually was, that -- that typically refers to prohibitions on carrying in certain manners, that were actually what terrified people.

So our position is that the possession of any weapon

```
cannot be justified simply through this historical tradition of
1
 2
    carrying dangerous and unusual weapons, because it doesn't
    refer to types of weapons; it refers to certain types of
 3
    conduct with weapons.
             And in light of the fact that the State's brief was
    36 pages, we're just hoping to have an equal-length brief as
 6
 7
    the brief they filed so we can demonstrate that to the Court,
    Your Honor.
8
 9
             THE COURT: And you've already prepared this, you're
10
    telling me?
11
             MR. BECK: Yes, Your Honor.
12
             THE COURT: Okay. File it.
13
             MR. BECK:
                         Thank you.
14
             THE COURT: File it. Thank you for making my life
15
    that much more difficult, but whatever. Okay. File it.
16
    done.
17
             Okay. So -- so --
             MR. O'BRIEN: Your Honor --
18
19
             THE COURT: You have 30 days to file the survey.
20
    have 30 days after that to file any brief that you wish to
21
    file. And this goes for both sides. Having looked at the
2.2
    survey, having made your decisions, et cetera, you've got
23
    30 days after that to file your brief. You've got 10 days
24
    after that to file any opposition that you want to in that
```

brief. You have 20 days to depose Mr. Cramer and Mr. Roth.

1 Anything else? 2 MR. O'BRIEN: Your Honor, if I may. With respect to 3 the survey due in 30 days --THE COURT: Yes. MR. O'BRIEN: -- we would request, if possible, to 5 6 extend that to 60 days. 7 THE COURT: I could probably do it -- if I had the time and the resources, I think I could probably do that in 8 9 probably less than two weeks. The State has unlimited 10 resources. You can do this. Trust me, you can do it. I've looked at it. And if I had the resources and the time to do 11 12 it, I could do it in probably -- I could probably do it in a 13 week. MR. O'BRIEN: Well, you know, I understand where the 14 15 Court is coming from. 16 I think that there's a couple of issues. One, we do 17 have a holiday period, and I think that our resources will be 18 limited at least, you know --19 THE COURT: Yeah. I hear you. I feel your pain. 20 MR. O'BRIEN: -- to the last week, so I think to 21 expand beyond that, that takes away one week. 2.2 Also, as we note, even in Fouts, even, you know, in a 23 case where, you know, we provided a lot of that historical, you

know, information, it's still, I think with respect to what the

Court's asking for, is going to, you know, require, you know,

24

```
some additional time, especially in researching each of those
laws and determining whether or not they were challenged, and
what the -- what the disposition was in those cases.
```

2.2

THE COURT: I would imagine, Mr. O'Brien, with all due respect, that whoever came up with that -- I don't know, whatever it is, 40 pages, 30 pages of statutes or whatever, already has, pretty much, that information. And if they submitted it to the Court for purposes of persuading the Court, they should also have the information to determine, for example, whether or not that statute has been previously held unconstitutional or constitutional, and should be able to provide me with a citation.

I don't think 30 days is unreasonable. I understand, but my order remains. All right.

Is there anything else? I'm sorry. I don't --Yeah, go ahead.

MR. O'BRIEN: One more, Your Honor.

You know, we would just also request with respect to -- as you're allowing for -- I believe, in the Miller or the Duncan cases, for deposing Professor Cramer. I don't know what Professor Cramer or Mr. Cramer will testify to with respect to Fouts. I would -- if we need to depose him, and I don't know if they're -- you know, we want to have that opportunity to do so if we need.

THE COURT: Well, if you don't know what you want from

them in Fouts, what's the point of deposing him?

2.2

MR. O'BRIEN: Well, we need to have an opportunity to review his -- his declaration and --

THE COURT: Was the declaration already filed or not?

MR. STAMBOULIEH: The declaration is not filed yet,

Your Honor. The declaration, I would think, is probably
substantially complete. It's a rebuttal of Mr. Spitzer's

expert report.

THE COURT: Tell you what we'll do. Let's leave that up in the air. You take a look at it. When you get the opposition -- opposition, you get the declaration.

I've read Mr. Spitzer's declaration. I'd say it's probably one of the better ones I think that I've read. If after you read -- and, hopefully, you'll read it pretty quickly. But it isn't Mr. Cramer -- or is it Professor or Mr. Cramer? I hate to insult people. But whatever it is he says, if you think you need to depose him, let me know and let me know quickly.

And if I decide that, in fact, that deposition is necessary, I'll probably order that deposition to be taken on very short notice, in which case I will allow you to take the deposition of Mr. Spitzer. And we'll take it from there.

We're going to get all this done, folks, in the time period that I have set.

As I said, these are important cases to the State and

to the Plaintiffs and to the -- to the People of the State of California. So I want to move it along. And that's that.

MR. BRADY: Regretfully, Your Honor, I have to raise one issue --

THE COURT: What's that?

Okay. I really appreciate you all being here.

2.2

MR. BRADY: -- about the Rhode case that may, unfortunately, complicate things.

And that is, the Rhode case, the analysis is a little bit different than these other cases which have to do with whether these specific items, right, are protected. Here we're talking about -- I don't think that there's any dispute that ammunition is protected, and sale of it. But what I suspect the State, and what we've seen in the Ninth Circuit briefing, their position is going to be that background checks on any arm, regardless, are going to be covered historically, because Bruen suggested that background checks on carry license are going to be protected.

Our position is, obviously, going to be ammunition is different, right, because the State admits that this is the very first time that ammunition background check has ever been put in place. So our position is going be that's treated differently.

But I think that we need, potentially, a backup argument to make in case the State's argument carries the day

```
that background checks are generally okay or outside the scope
1
 2
    of the Second Amendment, and that is to point out that even if
    background checks on ammunition are outside of the scope of the
 3
    Second Amendment, at some point the burden on them becomes so
 5
    great that --
             THE COURT: Well, I already decided that. Didn't I
 6
 7
    already decide in the ammunition case --
8
             MR. BRADY: Yes.
             THE COURT: -- that I thought that requiring people to
 9
10
    pay $19 every time they buy ammunition is unreasonable?
11
             MR. BRADY: Correct.
12
             THE COURT: I thought I decided that.
13
                         You did, Your Honor.
             MR. BRADY:
14
             THE COURT: So we don't need to rehash stuff that
15
    we've already gone through.
16
             I think the question -- I think the question is:
17
    there any history or tradition that supports these background
18
    checks?
19
             Now, with that, Counsel, let me just say this.
20
    Bruen case did say that background checks were okay, right,
21
    with regard to the concealed carry. Now, they also said,
2.2
    however, that you can't impose unreasonable restrictions
23
    because, you know, you can regulate the Second Amendment out of
24
    existence by imposing regulations on something. Right.
25
             MR. BRADY: Correct. And that's what I was getting
```

at, Your Honor. If you're saying that your previous findings
are the law of the case and the findings up to this point --

THE COURT: I'm not changing my mind.

MR. BRADY: Okay. Then I -- so no --

THE COURT: You know, but I do want to raise something, by the way. You know, I'm glad you mentioned that. I'm going to take a wild guess that your position is that any background check for buying ammunition is not reasonable. I'm putting words in your mouth. Okay.

Now, I said that this regulation -- which is not what the legislature had originally enacted; right?

MR. BRADY: Correct.

2.2

THE COURT: This -- the way the bureaucracy has now regulated purchases of ammunition is unreasonable. But I guess what I'm offering to you folks to talk about is whether or not -- and I don't expect that this will be fruitful, but I have to offer it because I think it's possible that if there was a consent decree that said that the regulation of purchasing ammunition as set forth by the legislature in the legislative enactment would be what would be required, my analysis might be very different.

And so I'm thinking that that perhaps might be a way to compromise a resolution of that case. I just offer that as an idea, folks, but you can do with it whatever you wish.

I've spent about as much time on this case as I'm

going to. So I need to go, unless there's something really, 1 really, really important you need to address. 2 MR. BECKINGTON: Your Honor, I apologize for testing 3 your patience. I'll be very brief. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BECKINGTON: Just for the clarification of the 6 7 record, we did have a motion for reconsideration. We did have requests, I think, both in the Miller and in Fouts and Rhode 8 9 for the additional time to do discovery, to submit evidence, 10 et cetera. 11 Is the Court making a formal rule on those matters --12 THE COURT: Nothing -- nothing is -- the only thing 13 that has changed -- the only thing that has changed since I 14 issued my rulings on the cases that I've issued rulings is what 15 Bruen -- the Bruen opinion says, which is that we consider the 16 history and tradition of the firearm regulation or the arm 17 regulation. Okay. That's the only thing that has changed. 18 All right. Thank you. Thank you very much. 19 MR. O'BRIEN: Just one other thing, Your Honor. 20 Apologize. Is the Court going to be issuing a written order? 21 We did the best we can to kind of keep track of what you were looking for with respect to the survey, but I just wanted to 2.2 23 clarify that as well. 24 THE COURT: Well, you couldn't write that fast?

I tried, Your Honor.

MR. O'BRIEN:

1 MR. DILLON: We have to summarize, Your Honor. 2 MR. O'BRIEN: Yeah. 3 THE COURT: We'll do our best. I'll issue a written Thank you very much. And I appreciate you all being 4 order. 5 here. (The proceedings were adjourned at 11:50 a.m.) 6 7 -000-CERTIFICATE 8 9 I, Abigail R. Torres, certify that I am a duly qualified and acting Official Court Reporter for the United 10 States District Court; that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings as taken by me in the 11 above-entitled matter on December 12, 2022, and that the format used complies with the rules and requirements of the United 12 States Judicial Conference. 13 DATED: December 20, 2022, San Diego. S/ABIGAIL R. TORRES 14 Abigail R. Torres, CSR No. 13700 15 U.S. Official Court Reporter 16 17 18 19 20 21 2.2 23 24 25