| 1  |                | TABLE OF CONTENTS  |      |
|----|----------------|--|------|
| 2  |                |  | Dogo |
| 3  |                | 1  |      |
| 4  | Background     | l  |      |
| 5  | I.<br>II.      | California Business and Professions Code Section 22949.80 The Complaint  |      |
| 6  | III.           | Plaintiffs' Original Motion for Preliminary Injunction and This  |      |
| 7  | IV.            | Court's Order  |      |
| 8  | V.             | Recent Proceedings in Safari Club v. Bonta   |      |
| 9  |                |  |      |
| 10 | I.             | Any Preliminary Injunction Should Enjoin Only Subdivision (a) of Section 22949.80.                               |      |
| 11 | II.            | The Persons Subject to Any Preliminary Injunction Should Be Limited to Those Enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil |      |
| 12 |                | Procedure 65(d)  |      |
| 13 |                | CC 1'  |      |
| 14 | Certificate of | of Compliance  | 12   |
| 15 |                |  |      |
| 16 |                |  |      |
| 17 |                |  |      |
| 18 |                |  |      |
| 19 |                |  |      |
| 20 |                |  |      |
| 21 |                |  |      |
| 22 |                |  |      |
| 23 |                |  |      |
| 24 |                |  |      |
| 25 |                |  |      |
| 26 |                |  |      |
| 27 |                |  |      |
| 28 |                |  |      |

| 1        | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES   |  |  |  |  |
|----------|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2        | Page   |  |  |  |  |
| 3        | CASES  |  |  |  |  |
| 4<br>5   | E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr<br>934 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2019)             |  |  |  |  |
| 6<br>7   | Junior Sports Mags., Inc. v. Bonta<br>80 F.4th 1109 (9th Cir. 2023)passim      |  |  |  |  |
| 8<br>9   | Klein v. City of San Clemente 584 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2009)                    |  |  |  |  |
| 10<br>11 | Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB<br>324 US 9 (1945)                                  |  |  |  |  |
| 12       | Safari Club Int'l v. Bonta No. 2:22-cv-01395-DAD-JDP (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2024) |  |  |  |  |
| 13<br>14 | Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc. 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015)7           |  |  |  |  |
| 15<br>16 | Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court 13 Cal.3d 315 (1975)7               |  |  |  |  |
| 17<br>18 | Vivid Ent., LLC v. Fielding 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014)                       |  |  |  |  |
| 19       | Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.                                      |  |  |  |  |
| 20       | 555 U.S. 7 (2008)6   |  |  |  |  |
| 21       | STATUTES   |  |  |  |  |
| 22       | Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code   |  |  |  |  |
| 23       | 8 22040 80 (a)   |  |  |  |  |
| 24       | § 22949.80 (a)   |  |  |  |  |
| 25       | § 22949.80(b)  |  |  |  |  |
| 26       | § 22949.80(d)  |  |  |  |  |
| 27       | § 22949.80(e)  |  |  |  |  |
| 28       | § 22949.80(f)  |  |  |  |  |

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

**INTRODUCTION** 

Defendant Attorney General Rob Bonta respectfully submits this limited opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Mandate and Issue Preliminary Injunction.

"An injunction must be narrowly tailored to remedy the specific harm shown." *E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr*, 934 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation omitted). Defendant opposes Plaintiffs' motion because the proposed preliminary injunction is insufficiently tailored in two respects.

First, consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in this matter, *Junior Sports* Mags., Inc. v. Bonta, 80 F.4th 1109 (9th Cir. 2023), any preliminary injunction should enjoin only subdivision (a) of California Business and Professions Code section 22949.80. Subdivision (a) concerns advertising firearm-related products to minors and is the only statutory provision that Plaintiffs have challenged in this action. However, section 22949.80 includes another distinct, substantive regulation in subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) is a privacy provision—as opposed to an advertising one—that imposes requirements relating to the use and dissemination of minors' personal information. As described in detail below, Plaintiffs have never challenged subdivision (b), and neither this Court nor the Ninth Circuit has considered the validity of subdivision (b). Moreover, the provisions of section 22949.80 are presumptively severable, and at no time have Plaintiffs rebutted that presumption. Plaintiffs therefore failed to meet their burden of "establishing the elements necessary to obtain injunctive relief" as to subdivision (b). Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009).

It is true that, since the filing of Plaintiffs' complaint, the parties and courts have often used references to "section 22949.80" or "AB 2571" as a shorthand for the advertising regulations in subdivision (a). But that does not change the substance of what has—and has not—been litigated in this case. Moreover,

subdivisions (c) through (f) of the statute inform how to interpret and enforce both subdivisions (a) and (b). Thus, limiting the injunction to subdivision (a) is therefore the only way to issue an injunction consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the appeal.

Second, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, any preliminary injunction should enjoin only Defendant, his officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone of them. *See* Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65(d). It should not specifically enjoin "all District Attorneys, County Counsel, and City Attorneys" in the State, per Plaintiffs' proposed order. *See* ECF No. 59-3 at 2.

Defendant respectfully asks this Court to limit any preliminary injunction in these two respects.

#### **BACKGROUND**

### I. CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 22949.80

Section 22949.80 contains two separate subdivisions that regulate speech or conduct. Subdivision (a) is the subdivision Plaintiffs challenge in this action. *See* Background, section II, *infra*. It states: "A firearm industry member shall not advertise, market, or arrange for placement of an advertising or marketing communication offering or promoting any firearm-related product in a manner that is designed, intended, or reasonably appears to be attractive to minors." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22949.80(a)(1).

Subdivision (b) of section 22949.80, meanwhile, does not purport to regulate any advertising or similar types of communications. *Id.* § 22949.80(b). Rather, it limits the use and dissemination of the personal information of minors. *Id.* 

Subdivision (b) states:

"A firearm industry member publishing material directed to minors in this state or who has actual knowledge that a minor in this state is using or receiving its material, shall not knowingly use, disclose, compile, or allow a third party to use, disclose, or compile, the personal information of that minor with actual knowledge that the use, disclosure, or compilation is for the purpose of marketing or advertising to that minor any firearm-related product."

Id.

Section 22949.80 also includes an express severability provision. *Id.* § 22949.80(f).

#### II. THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs filed the operative Complaint on July 8, 2022. ECF No. 1. The Complaint purports to "challenge the constitutionality of California Business & Professions Code section 22949.80, which makes it unlawful for any "firearm industry member" to "advertise, market, or arrange for placement of an advertising or marketing communication concerning any firearm-related product in a manner that is designed, intended, or reasonably appears to be attractive to minors." *Id.* at 2-3 (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22949.80(a)(1)). The Complaint regularly cites subdivision (a) of section 22949.80 (*id.* at 3, 14, 15, 16) and alleges injuries and causes of action arising out of the advertising regulations in that provision (*see, e.g., id.* at 30-36). The Complaint does not mention or cite to subdivision (b) of the statute at any point. It also does not mention subdivision (b)'s privacy regulations, or even allude to them. This Court later acknowledged in its order denying the original motion for preliminary injunction that the Complaint does not challenge the constitutionality of the regulations in subdivision (b). ECF No. 35 at 6 n.3.

# III. PLAINTIFFS' ORIGINAL MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THIS COURT'S ORDER

Plaintiffs filed a preliminary injunction on July 20, 2022. ECF No. 12. In the motion, Plaintiffs sought to "enjoin enforcement of section 22949.80." ECF

- 1 No. 12-1 at 30 (Memorandum of Points and Authorities). The motion also used
- 2 the term "AB 2571," the statute's enacting legislation. See ECF No. 12-1.
- 3 | However, consistent with the Complaint, all of Plaintiffs' arguments in the motion
- 4 related to the statute's advertising regulations in subdivision (a). See id.; ECF No.
- 5 | 21 (Reply brief). Plaintiffs' motion did not once mention subdivision (b) or its
- 6 privacy regulations. See ECF Nos. 12-1, 21.

7 This Court issued a minute order denying the motion for preliminary

8 injunction. ECF No. 35. The order considered whether the requirements of

9 subdivision (a) are constitutional and otherwise subject to a preliminary

injunction. See id. The order specifically concluded that subdivision (b) of

section 22949.80 had *not* been "challenged by plaintiffs in their complaint or

12 | briefing on this motion, although [it is] evidently encompassed by plaintiffs'

request to "enjoin the enforcement of section 22949.80." *Id.* at 6, n.3. The order

therefore did not otherwise mention or discuss subdivision (b) or its privacy

15 regulations. See ECF No. 35.

10

11

13

14

16

#### IV. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RULING

- 17 Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order to the Ninth Circuit Court of
- 18 Appeals. ECF No. 37. Again, Plaintiffs' arguments concerned only the
- 19 advertising restrictions in subdivision (a). See Appellants' Opening Br., ECF No.
- 20 7, Junior Sports Mags., Inc. v. Bonta, 80 F.4th 1109 (9th Cir. 2023) (No. 22-
- 21 56090), 2022 WL 17980278; Appellants' Reply Br., ECF No. 25, *Junior Sports*,
- 22 80 F.4th 1109, 2023 WL 2226847. Plaintiffs made no mention of subdivision (b)
- 23 or its privacy regulations. Moreover, Plaintiffs did not dispute the district court's
- 24 earlier conclusion that they had not challenged the constitutionality of subdivision
- 25 (b) in either their complaint or motion for preliminary injunction.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Plaintiffs' motion
- 27 for preliminary injunction and remanded "for further proceedings consistent with
- 28 [the] opinion." Junior Sports, 80 F.4th at 1121. In the decision, the court

considered only whether the requirements of subdivision (a) are constitutional and otherwise subject to a preliminary injunction. *See Junior Sports*, 80 F.4th 1109. The court did not mention, allude to, or consider the constitutionality of subdivision (b)'s privacy regulations or whether that subdivision is subject to a preliminary injunction. *See id*. The court also took no issue with this Court's determination that Plaintiffs had not challenged subdivision (b) in their Complaint

#### V. RECENT PROCEEDINGS IN SAFARI CLUB V. BONTA

or motion. See id.

Following the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Plaintiffs' appeal, the same panel issued a short Memorandum in the related preliminary injunction appeal of *Safari Club International v. Bonta*. No. 23-15199, 2023 WL 6178500 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 2023), in which Attorney General Bonta is also the Defendant. The Memorandum stated, "For the reasons outlined in *Junior Sports Magazines v. Bonta*, No. 22-56090 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2023), we reverse the denial of preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings consistent with that opinion." *Id.* at \*1.

Thereafter, the parties in *Safari Club* submitted to the district court a Joint Status Report, in which the plaintiffs asked the Court to issue a preliminary injunction "consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion and judgment." Joint Status Report at 2, ECF No. 32, *Safari Club Int'l v. Bonta*, No. 2:22-cv-01395-DAD-JDP (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2024). Defendant took no position on that request. *Id.* When, after a brief period, no preliminary injunction had issued, Defendant informed the *Safari Club* plaintiffs that he would not oppose a new motion for preliminary injunction, but only if the motion requested "an injunction consistent with the substance and scope of the Ninth Circuit's ruling." *See* Decl. of Gabrielle Boutin in Supp. of Mtn, for an Order Clarifying Prelim. Inj. ¶ 4, ECF No. 35-1, *Safari Club Int'l v. Bonta*, No. 2:22-cv-01395-DAD-JDP (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2024). Defendant specifically explained, "[f]or example, we assume you will request an injunction only of subsection (a) of Business & Professions Code

section 22949.80, since that is the only restriction on speech that the 9th Circuit addressed in its opinion [in *Junior Sports*]." *Id*.

Before the *Safari Club* plaintiffs filed a new motion for preliminary injunction, however, the district court issued an Order Granting Pls' Mtn. for a Prelim. Inj.. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 33, *Safari Club Int'l v. Bonta*, No. 2:22-cv-01395-DAD-JDP (E.D. Cal. April 12, 2024). The Order enjoins enforcement of "California Business & Professions Code § 22949.80" by "Defendant California Attorney General Rob Bonta and the California Department of Justice, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and anyone else in active concert or participation with any of the aforementioned people or entities." *Id*.

On May 15, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion for an Order Clarifying the Preliminary Injunction. *See* Mem. of P. & and A. Supp. of Mtn. for an Order Clarifying Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 35, *Safari Club Int'l v. Bonta*, No. 2:22-cv-01395-DAD-JDP (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2024). There, Defendant has asked the court to clarify that the existing injunction enjoins the enforcement only of subdivision (a). *See id.* at 1. That motion is set for hearing on July 2, 2024. *Id.* 

#### **ARGUMENT**

I. ANY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD ENJOIN ONLY SUBDIVISION (A) OF SECTION 22949.80.

A plaintiff has the burden to show they are entitled to a preliminary injunction of the scope that they seek. *See Klein v. City of San Clemente*, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009) (the plaintiff bears the burden of "establishing the elements necessary to obtain injunctive relief"); *E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Prior to Plaintiffs' filing of the instant motion in this case, Defendant advised them that he was planning to ask the court in *Safari Club* to clarify that its preliminary injunction was limited to subdivision (a) of section 22949.80. *See* Pls' Mem. of P. & and A. Supp. of Mtn. to Enforce Mandate & Issue a Prelim. Inj. ("Mtn."), ECF No. 59-1, at 9. Defendant also explained to Plaintiffs the reasoning for this limited opposition to their motion. *Id.* at 7.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019) ("[a]n injunction must be narrowly tailored to remedy the specific harm shown" (internal quotation omitted)); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (injunctive relief is an "extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief"). Here, Plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to any injunction of subdivision (b) of section 22949.80. As this Court previously observed, Plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of the privacy regulations in subdivision (b) in either their Complaint or their original preliminary injunction motion. ECF No. 35 at 6 n.3. Plaintiffs did not challenge subdivision (b)'s constitutionality in the Ninth Circuit appeal. And, at no stage have Plaintiffs established any of the elements necessary for injunctive relief as to subdivision (b). Instead, Plaintiffs' arguments and showing has been limited to the advertising regulations in subdivision (a), which is presumptively severable from the rest of the statute. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22949.80(f) (severability provision). See Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Severability is . . . a matter of state law" (ellipsis in original)); Vivid Ent., LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 574 (9th Cir. 2014) ("California law directs courts to consider first the inclusion of a severability clause in the legislation . . . 'The presence of such a clause establishes a presumption in favor of severance" (quoting Cal. Redev. Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal.4th 231, 270 (2011)). Although this is a rebuttable presumption, Plaintiffs have never attempted to meet their burden to rebut the presumption. See Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court,

The Ninth Circuit's opinion and mandate does not require this Court to preliminarily enjoin subdivision (b). Rather, it requires this Court to conduct further proceedings "consistent with" its opinion. *Junior Sports Mags.*, 80 F.4th

13 Cal.3d 315, 331 (1975) ("Although not conclusive, a severability clause

normally calls for sustaining the valid part of the enactment").

at 1121. Like this Court's appealed order, the Ninth Circuit opinion discusses and analyzes *only* the advertising regulations in subdivision (a). It does not consider whether, much less rule that, the privacy regulations in subdivision (b) are likely unconstitutional or otherwise subject to a preliminary injunction. It is true that the Ninth Circuit opinion, like the filings of this Court and the parties before it, generally refers at times to "section 22949.80" or "AB 2571." But consistent with the scope of this action, the parties and the courts have simply used those phrases as shorthand for the advertising regulations in subdivision (a). *See, e.g., Junior Sports Mags.*, 80 F.4th at 1113. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit described the challenged regulation as follows:

AB 2571, as later amended by AB 160, is codified at § 22949.80 of the California Business and Professions Code. The statute mandates that "[a] firearm industry member shall not advertise, market, or arrange for placement of an advertising or marketing communication offering or promoting any firearm-related product in a manner that is designed, intended, or reasonably appears to be attractive to minors." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22949.80(a)(1).

*Id.* at 1114; *see also id.* at 1113 ("this case is about whether California can ban a truthful ad about firearms used legally by adults and minors—just because the ad "reasonably appears to be attractive to minors"). No phrase or label used for rhetorical convenience can change the substance of the Court's legal discussion and analysis.<sup>2</sup>

Defendant's own references in prior briefs to "section 22949.80" or subdivisions (c) and (e) of the statute are irrelevant to the issue of whether Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that subdivision (b) should be preliminarily enjoined. *See* Mtn. at 8-9. Even if those references were relevant, they do not indicate that Defendant thought that Plaintiffs challenged subdivision (b), despite Plaintiffs' failure to mention, much less discuss, that provision in their Complaint or briefs. Each of Defendant's references was made to support his argument that *subdivision* (a)'s advertising regulations are constitutional and not subject to a preliminary injunction. *See, e.g.*, Defendant-Appellee's Answering Br. at 4-5, 15-16, 20, 34, ECF No. 20, *Junior Sports*, 80 F.4th 1109 (9th Cir. 2023) (No. 22-56090), 2023 WL 1768545; Pet'n for Rehearing En Banc at 3-4, ECF No. 49, *Junior Sports*, 80 F.4th 1109.

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction of subdivision (b) because their proposed order in support of their original motion for preliminary injunction sought to enjoin enforcement of "AB 2571, codified at Business & Professions Code section 22949.80" and the Ninth Circuit did not suggest that narrower relief is appropriate. *See* Mtn. at 8. However, this Court denied that motion, rejected the proposed order, and recognized that Plaintiffs had not challenged subdivision (b)'s constitutionality. Later, the Ninth Circuit simply determined that the advertising regulations in subdivision (a) were properly subject to a preliminary injunction and that this Court should conduct proceedings consistent with that determination.<sup>3</sup> The Ninth Circuit did *not* conclude that this Court should have adopted Plaintiffs' previously-submitted proposed order. *See Junior Sports*, 80 F.4th 1109.

Plaintiffs also argue that subdivision (b) should be enjoined because it is "wholly reliant on the marketing of firearm industry members that the Ninth Circuit has found to be protected speech." Mtn. at 10. But during the preliminary injunction proceedings, Plaintiffs never explained, much less proved, why this is so. Plaintiffs do not claim to have submitted any evidence or cited any legal authorities on this point. (Had they done so, then Defendant would have fairly had the opportunity to rebut those submissions and citations.) Logic alone does not dictate that subdivision (b)'s privacy regulations necessarily prevent Plaintiffs from speaking as described in subdivision (a). For example, why do Plaintiffs need to "knowingly . . . disclose" to third parties the personal information of a minor in order to publish firearm advertisements directed to minors? *See* Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22949.80(b). And, why must publications knowingly use the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Indeed, after the Ninth Circuit issued the opinion, but before mandate issued, the Ninth Circuit panel rejected Plaintiffs' request that it immediately issue a preliminary injunction. *See* Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, ECF No. 44, *Junior Sports*, 80 F.4th 1109 (9th Cir. 2023) (No. 22-56090); Order, ECF No. 48, *Junior Sports*, 80 F.4th 1109 (9th Cir. 2023) (No. 22-56090).

personal information of minors, instead of their parents with whom they live? *See id.* Plaintiffs do not attempt to address these or similar questions, and the answers are not obvious. In any event, neither this Court nor the Ninth Circuit has determined that subdivisions (a) and (b) must stand or fall together. Indeed, the Legislature did not think so, having included a severability clause in AB 2571.

Finally, there is no need to preliminarily enjoin subdivisions (c) through (f) of section 22949.80. *See* Mtn. at 10. Again, a preliminary injunction must be narrowly-tailored. *E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr*, 934 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). Unlike subdivisions (a) and (b), subdivisions (c) through (f) do not proscribe any speech or conduct. Rather, they simply inform how subdivisions (a) and (b) are to be interpreted and enforced. *See* Cal. Bus. & Prof Code § 22949.80(c) (providing definitions of terms); *id.* § 22949.80(d) (describing conduct *not* affected by the statute); *id.* § 22949.80(e) (describing how the statute is enforced); *id.* 22949.80(f) (severability provision).

# II. THE PERSONS SUBJECT TO ANY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE ENUMERATED IN FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 65(D)

If this Court issues a preliminary injunction, it should also limit the scope of the persons bound by the injunction. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), a preliminary injunction binds only the following persons who receive actual notice of the injunction: "(A) the parties; (B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d); see also Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 US 9, 13, 65 (1945) (courts may not grant injunction "so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according to law").

Here, in their proposed order, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the conduct of "Defendant, his employees, agents, successors in office, and all District Attorneys,

| 1  | County Counsel, and City Attorneys holding office in the state of California, as   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|----|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2  | well as their successors in office." ECF No. 59-3 at 2. This Court should decline  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3  | to enjoin the conduct of this list of persons, as many are not parties to this action.   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4  | The Court should instead issue the injunction against only those persons identified  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | in Rule 65(d)—Defendant, his officers, agents, servants, employees, and  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | attorneys, and other persons in active concert with them. Plaintiffs have not  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | provided any legal authority or argument for enjoining any persons other than  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | those listed in Rule 65(d).  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | CONCLUSION   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | For the reasons described above, Defendant respectfully submits that any   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11 | preliminary injunction issued by this Court should enjoin only enforcement of  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12 | section 22949.80, subdivision (a), and enjoin only those persons enumerated in   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 13 | Federal Rule of Procedure 65(d).   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 15 | Dated: May 20, 2024 Respectfully submitted,  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 16 | ROB BONTA Attorney General of California MARK R. BECKINGTON  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 17 | MARK R. BECKINGTON Supervising Deputy Attorney General   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 18 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 19 | <u>s/ Gabrielle D. Boutin</u><br>Gabrielle D. Boutin   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20 | GABRIELLE D. BOUTIN Deputy Attorney General  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 21 | Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Defendant Rob Bonta, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22 | General of the State of California   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 23 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 24 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 26 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 27 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 28 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

# CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE The undersigned, counsel of record for Defendant Rob Bonta, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of California, certifies that this brief contains 3364 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1. Dated: May 20, 2024 Respectfully submitted, ROB BONTA Attorney General of California s/ Gabrielle D. Boutin GABRIELLE D. BOUTIN Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Defendant Rob Bonta, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California)

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

| Case Name:  | Junior Sports Magazines Inc., et al. v. Rob Bonta, et al. | Case<br>Number: | 2:22-cv-04663-CAS-JC |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|-----------------|----------------------|--|--|--|--|
| I hereby certify that on May 20, 2024, I electronically filed the following documents with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system:  DEFENDANT'S LIMITED OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENFORCE MANDATE AND ISSUE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION |   |                 |                      |  |  |  |  |
| I certify that <b>all</b> participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be   |   |                 |                      |  |  |  |  |
| accomplished by the CM/ECF system.  I declare under penalty of periury under the laws of the State of California and the United States.   |   |                 |                      |  |  |  |  |
| I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on May 20, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.         |   |                 |                      |  |  |  |  |
|   | Dora Mora   | T.              | Pora Mora            |  |  |  |  |
|   | Declarant   |                 | Signature            |  |  |  |  |
| SA2022302966<br>66804362.docx   |   |                 |                      |  |  |  |  |