Case	2:23-cv-10169-SPG-ADS	Document 59 #:1941	Filed 10/28/24	Page 1 of 29	Page ID
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	ROB BONTA Attorney General of California MARK R. BECKINGTON Supervising Deputy Attorney General CHRISTINA R.B. LÓPEZ Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 312610 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013-1230 Telephone: (213) 269-6106 Fax: (916) 324-8835 E-mail: Christina.Lopez@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Defendant Rob Bonta IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
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11	CALIFORNIA RIFLE & PI	STOI	2:23-cv-10169		
12	ASSOCIATION, INCORPO	ORATED; THE		TROR RONTA?	SANSWED
13	SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION; GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA, INC.; GUN OWNERS FOUNDATION; GUN OWNERS OF CALIFORNIA, INC.; ERICK VELASQUEZ, an individual; CHARLES DEFENDANT ROB BONTA'S ANSV TO FIRST AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT Judge: The Honorable Sherilyi				
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15	MESSEL, an individual; BR individual; CLARENCE RI	IAN WEIMER, ar		Peace Garnett	
16 17	individual; KEITH REEVES and CYNTHIA GABALDO STEPHEN HOOVER, an in	S, an individual, N, an individual;	Action Filed:	December 5, 20	23
18		Plaintiffs	,		
19	V.				
20	LOS ANGELES COUNTY	CHEDIEE			
21	DEPARTMENT; SHERIFF	ROBERT LUNA,			
22	in his official capacity; LA V DEPARTMENT; LA VERN POLICE COLLEEN FLORI	VE CHIEF OF			
23	capacity; ROBERT BONTA capacity as Attorney Genera	, in his official			
24	California; and DOES 1-10.				
25		Defendants			
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ANSWER

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 8, and 12, Defendant Rob Bonta, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California, answers Plaintiffs' First Amended and Supplemental Complaint (ECF No. 55) as follows:

INTRODUCTION1

- 1. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 1 appears in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and that the Constitution and authority cited in Paragraph 1 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 1 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 1 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 2. The allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 2 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. The allegations in the second sentence of Paragraph 2 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 2 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 3. The Attorney General admits that the authorities cited in footnote 1 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 3 and footnote 1 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 3 and/or footnote 1 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 4. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 4 appears in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and that Bruen speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the motivation of the Supreme Court or purpose of the quoted language and on that basis denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 4.
 - 5. The Attorney General denies the allegations in Paragraph 5.

¹ For the convenience of the Court and the parties, this Answer imports the primary headings utilized by Plaintiffs in the First Amended and Supplemental Complaint. To the extent that any response is required to the substance of the headings, the Attorney General denies all allegations contained in or suggested by the headings.

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- 6. The allegations in Paragraph 6 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 6 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 7. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 7 and on that basis denies them.
- 8. The allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 8 are legal argument and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 8 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 8 and on that basis denies them.
- 9. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 9 and on that basis denies them.
- 10. The allegations in Paragraph 10 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 10 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 11. The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 11 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 11 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 12. The Attorney General admits that Senate Bill 2 and the prior law referenced in Paragraph 12 speak for themselves. The Attorney General denies the remaining allegations, if any, in Paragraph 12.
- The allegations in Paragraph 13 are legal argument and/or conclusions to which no 13. response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 13 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.

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- 14. The Attorney General admits that California does not honor carry permits from any state other than California. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 14 and on that basis denies them.
- 15. The Attorney General admits that the process for obtaining a permit to carry firearms in California is set forth by statute and regulation and that those authorities speak for themselves.
- 16. The Attorney General admits that the authorities cited in Paragraph 16 speak for themselves. The Attorney General otherwise denies the allegations in Paragraph 16.
- 17. The Attorney General admits that the authorities cited in Paragraph 17 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 17 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 17 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them. The Attorney General denies any constitutional violation.
- 18. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 18 appears in the Article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution, and that the Constitution and authority cited in Paragraph 18 speak for themselves. The Attorney General denies the remaining allegations, if any, in Paragraph 18.
- 19. The allegations in Paragraph 19 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 19 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them. The Attorney General denies any constitutional violation.

PARTIES

- 20. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 20 and on that basis denies them.
- 21. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 21 and on that basis denies them.
- 22. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 22 and on that basis denies them. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 22 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is

- required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 22 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 23. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 23 and on that basis denies them.
- 24. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 24 and on that basis denies them.
- 25. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 25 and on that basis denies them.
- 26. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 26 and on that basis denies them.
- 27. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 27 and on that basis denies them.
- 28. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 28 and on that basis denies them.
- 29. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 29 and on that basis denies them.
- 30. The allegations in Paragraph 30 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 30 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 31. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 31 and on that basis denies them.
- 32. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 32 and on that basis denies them.
- 33. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 33 and on that basis denies them.

- 34. The Attorney General admits that the statute cited in Paragraph 34 speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 34 and on that basis denies them.
- 35. The allegations in Paragraph 35 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 35 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 36. The allegations in Paragraph 36 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 36 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 37. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 37 and on that basis denies them.
- 38. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 38 and on that basis denies them.
- 39. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 39 and on that basis denies them.
- 40. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 40 and on that basis denies them.
- 41. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in the first two sentences of Paragraph 41 and on that basis denies them. The allegations in last sentence of Paragraph 41 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent the allegations in the last sentence of Paragraph 41 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 42. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 42 and on that basis denies them.
- 43. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 43 and on that basis denies them.

- 44. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 44 and on that basis denies them.
- 45. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in the first two sentences of Paragraph 45 and on that basis denies them. The allegations in last sentence of Paragraph 45 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent the allegations in the last sentence of Paragraph 45 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 46. The Attorney General denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 46 and on that basis denies them.
- 47. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 47 and on that basis denies them.
- 48. The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 48 and on that basis denies them.
- 49. The Attorney General denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 49 and on that basis denies them.
- 50. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 50 and on that basis denies them.
- 51. The allegations in the second sentence of Paragraph 51 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent the allegations in the second sentence of Paragraph 51 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 51 and on that basis denies them.

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- 52. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 52 and on that basis denies them.
- 53. The Attorney General admits that California does not honor carry permits from Nevada and that the process for obtaining a permit to carry firearms in California is set forth by statute and regulation, which authorities speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 53 and on that basis denies them.
- 54. The allegations in the last sentence of Paragraph 54 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in the last sentence of Paragraph 54 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 54 and on that basis denies them.
- 55. The allegations in Paragraph 55 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 55 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 56. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 56 and on that basis denies them.
- 57. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 57 and on that basis denies them.
- 58. The Attorney General admits that California does not honor carry permits from Florida and that the process for obtaining a permit to carry firearms in California is set forth by statute and regulation, which authorities speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 58 and on that basis denies them.
- 59. The allegations in Paragraph 59 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 59 may be deemed factual,

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- the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 60. The Attorney General admits that the statutes cited in Paragraph 60 speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 60 and on that basis denies them.
- 61. The Attorney General denies that the process for obtaining a carry permit in California is unconstitutional. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 61 and on that basis denies them.
- 62. The Attorney General denies that the process for obtaining a carry permit in California is unconstitutional. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 62 and on that basis denies them.
- 63. The Attorney General denies that the process for obtaining a carry permit in California is unconstitutional and any implication that the Second Amendment needs to be "restored" in California. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 63 and on that basis denies them.
- 64. The Attorney General denies that the process for obtaining a carry permit in California is unconstitutional and any implication that other firearm restrictions in California challenged by Plaintiff CRPA are "unlawful." The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 64 and on that basis denies them.
 - 65. The Attorney General admits the allegations in Paragraph 65.
- 66. The Attorney General admits that Defendant Robert Luna is the elected Sheriff of Los Angeles County and that the statute cited in Paragraph 66 speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 66 and on that basis denies them.
 - 67. The Attorney General admits the allegations in Paragraph 67.
- The Attorney General admits that Defendant Colleen Flores was formerly the Chief 68. of Police of the La Verne Police Department, that Defendant Samuel Gonzales succeeded

- Defendant Colleen Flores as the Chief of Police of the La Verne Police Department, and that the statute cited in Paragraph 68 speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 68 and on that basis denies them.
- 69. The Attorney General admits that he, Rob Bonta, is the Attorney General of California and that Article V, section 13 of the California Constitution sets for the duties of that office and speaks for itself. The Attorney General denies any allegations in Paragraph 69 inconsistent therewith.
- 70. The allegations in the last sentence of Paragraph 70 are characterizations of relief Plaintiffs seek to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in the last sentence of Paragraph 70 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 70 and on that basis denies them.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 71. The Attorney General admits that the statutes cited in Paragraph 71 speak for themselves and that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims.
- 72. The Attorney General admits that the statutes cited in Paragraph 72 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 72 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any remaining allegations in Paragraph 72 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 73. The Attorney General admits that the statutes cited in Paragraph 73 speak for themselves and that venue in this juridical district is proper.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

74. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 74 appears in *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and that *Heller* speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 74 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 74 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.

be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.

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(2010) speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 75 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 75 may

The Attorney General admits that McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742

- 76. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 76 appears in *Heller* and that the cited authorities speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 76 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 76 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 77. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 77 appears in *Bruen* and that *Bruen* speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 77 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 77 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 78. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 78 appears in *Bruen* and that *Bruen* speaks for itself.
- 79. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 79 appears in *Bruen* and that *Bruen* speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 79 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims and legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 79 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 80. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 80 appears in California Penal Code section 26150(a) and that the cited statutes speak for themselves.
- 81. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 80 appears in California Penal Code section 26205 and that section 26205 and the prior law cited in footnote 2 speak for themselves.
- 82. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 82 appears in California Penal Code section 26190(b)(2) and that section 26190 and the prior law cited in footnote 3 speak for themselves.

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- 83. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 83 appears in 2 California Penal Code section 26175(g) and that section 26175 and *Bruen* speak for themselves. 3 The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the 4 allegations in Paragraph 83 regarding local requirements and on that basis denies them. The 5 remaining allegations in Paragraph 83 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no 6 response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 83 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them. 8 84. The Attorney General admits that local issuing authorities have the option to require 9 a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit. The Attorney General 10 denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. 12 85. 13 14 15
 - The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* speaks for itself. The Attorney General denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 85 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 85 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
 - 86. The Attorney General admits that local issuing authorities have the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit and that the process for obtaining a permit to carry firearms in California is set forth by statute and regulation, which authorities speak for themselves. The Attorney General denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 86 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 86 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
 - 87. The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* speaks for itself. The Attorney General denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional.

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- 88. The Attorney General admits that the statutes and Senate Bill 2 cited in Paragraph 88 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 88 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 88 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 89. The allegations in Paragraph 89, including footnote 4, are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 89 or footnote 4 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 90. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 90 appears in California Penal Code section 26202(a)(9) and that section 26202 and Senate Bill 2 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 90 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 90 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 91. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 91 appears in California Penal Code section 26202(a)(10) and that section 26202 speaks for itself.
- 92. The Attorney General admits that California Penal Code section 26202(a)(3) and Senate Bill 2 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 92 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 92 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 93. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 93 appears in California Penal Code section 26202(a)(5) and that section 26202 and Senate Bill 2 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 93 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 93 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 94. The Attorney General denies that any of the criteria set forth in California Penal Code section 26202(a) are unconstitutional. The allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 94 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. The allegations in the last sentence of Paragraph 94 are a characterization of the relief Plaintiffs seek to which no

- 95. The Attorney General denies that California Penal Code sections 26202(a)(3), (5), or (9) are unconstitutional. The allegations in Paragraph 95 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any of the allegations in Paragraph 95 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 96. The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* and the letters referred to in Paragraph 96 speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 96 and on that basis denies them.
- 97. The Attorney General admits that the Legal Alert referred to in Paragraph 97 and *Bruen* speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 97 are legal arguments, legal conclusions, and/or characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 97 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 98. The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* and the letter referred to in Paragraph 98 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 98 and footnote 5 are legal arguments and/or conclusions or characterize Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 98 and/or footnote 5 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 99. The Attorney General admits that the correspondences and responses referred to in Paragraph 99 speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 99 and on that basis denies them.
- 100. The Attorney General admits that the statement by Sheriff Alex Villanueva set forth in Paragraph 100 and California Penal Code section 26150 speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 100 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is

- required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 100 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 101. The allegations in Paragraph 101 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any of the allegations in Paragraph 101 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 102. The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 102 and on that basis denies them.
- 103. The Attorney General admits that the letter quoted and discussed in Paragraph 103 speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 103 and on that basis denies them.
- 104. The Attorney General admits that the correspondence and letter referred to and reproduced in Paragraph 104 speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 104 and on that basis denies them.
- 105. The Attorney General admits that the letter referred to in Paragraph 105 speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 105 and on that basis denies them.
- 106. The Attorney General admits that the letter quoted in Paragraph 106 speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 106 and on that basis denies them.
- 107. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 107 and on that basis denies them.
- 108. The Attorney General admits that the Public Records Act response quoted in Paragraph 108 speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 108 and on that basis denies them.

- 109. The Attorney General admits that the correspondence and letter referred to in Paragraph 109 speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 109 and on that basis denies them.
- 110. The Attorney General admits that the web page quoted and cited in Paragraph 110 and footnote 6 speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 110 and on that basis denies them.
- 111. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 111 and on that basis denies them.
- 112. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 112 and on that basis denies them.
- 113. The Attorney General admits that the web pages cited in Paragraph 113 and footnotes 7–13 speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 113 and on that basis denies them.
- 114. The allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 114 characterize Plaintiffs claims to which no response is required. To the extent any of the allegations in the first sentence in Paragraph 114 and the remaining allegations in Paragraph 114 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to their truth and on that basis denies them.
- 115. The Attorney General admits that the web pages cited in Paragraph 115 and footnotes 14 and 17–18 speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 115, including footnotes 15–16, and on that basis denies them.
- 116. The Attorney General admits that the web pages cited in Paragraph 116 and footnotes 19–22 speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 113 and on that basis denies them.

1 117. The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* speaks for itself and denies any 2 constitutional violation. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to 3 the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 117 and on that basis denies them. 4 The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* speaks for itself and denies any 118. 5 constitutional violation. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to 6 the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 118 and on that basis denies them. 7 119.

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- 119. The Attorney General admits that the web page cited in Paragraph 119 and footnote 23 speaks for itself. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 119 and on that basis denies them.
- 120. The Attorney General admits that California Penal Code section 26190 speaks for itself and denies any constitutional or statutory violation. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 120, including subparts a and b and footnote 24, and on that basis denies them.
- 121. The Attorney General denies any constitutional violation. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 121 and on that basis denies them.
- 122. The Attorney General denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations, if any, in Paragraph 122 and on that basis denies them.
- 123. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 123 and on that basis denies them.
- 124. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 124 and on that basis denies them.
- 125. The Attorney General denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 125 and on that basis denies them.

- 126. The Attorney General denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations, if any, in Paragraph 126 and on that basis denies them.
- 127. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 127 and on that basis denies them.
- 128. The Attorney General admits that California does not honor carry permits from any state other than California. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 128 and on that basis denies them.
- 129. The Attorney General admits that the process for obtaining a permit to carry firearms in California is set forth by statute and regulation and that those authorities speak for themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 129 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 129 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 130. The Attorney General admits that California does not honor carry permits from any state other than California and that the process for obtaining a permit to carry firearms in California is set forth by statute and regulation, which authorities speak for themselves.
- 131. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 131 appears in *Heller* and that *Heller* speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 131 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 131 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 132. The Attorney General admits that the laws referred to in Paragraph 132 speak for themselves. The Attorney General denies the remaining allegations in Paragraph 132.
- 133. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 133 appears in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) and that *Obergefell* speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 133 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 133 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.

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134. The Attorney General admits that *Obergefell* speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 134 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 134 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.

135. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 135 appears in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) and that Shuttlesworth speaks for itself. The Attorney General denies that any individual is permitted to defy California law. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 135 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 135 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.

PLAINTIFFS SEEK DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

- The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* speaks for itself and denies any constitutional violation. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 136 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 136 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- The Attorney General admits that the district court opinion and statutes cited in 137. Paragraph 137 and footnote 26 speak for themselves and denies any constitutional violation. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in footnote 26 and on that basis denies them. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 137 and footnote 25 are characterizations of Plaintiffs claims and the relief Plaintiffs seek to which no response is required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 137, including footnote 25, may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 138. The allegations in Paragraph 138 are characterizations of the relief Plaintiffs seek to which no response is required. To the extent any of the allegations in Paragraph 138 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 139. The Attorney General admits that California Penal Code section 26150 speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 139 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to

which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 139 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.

- 140. The Attorney General denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 140 are characterizations of the relief Plaintiffs seek to which no response is required. To the extent any of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 140 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 141. The Attorney General admits that California Penal Code section 26190 speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 141 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 141 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 142. The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* and California Penal Code section 26190(f)(1) speak for themselves and denies that the option to require a psychological exam as part of the process for obtaining a carry permit is unconstitutional. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 142 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 142 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 143. The allegations in Paragraph 143 and footnote 27 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims and the relief Plaintiffs seek to which no response is required. To the extent any of the allegations in Paragraph 143, including footnote 27, may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them. The Attorney General denies that the relief described in the allegations in Paragraph 143 is warranted or proper.
- 144. The allegations in Paragraph 144 are characterizations of the relief Plaintiffs seek to which no response is required. To the extent any of the allegations in Paragraph 144 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them. The Attorney General denies that the relief described in the allegations in Paragraph 144 is warranted or proper.
- 145. The allegations in Paragraph 145 are characterizations of the relief Plaintiffs seek to which no response is required. To the extent any of the allegations in Paragraph 145 may be

deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them. The Attorney General denies that the relief described in the allegations in Paragraph 145 is warranted or proper.

146. The Attorney General admits that *Bruen* speaks for itself. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 146, including subparts a–h, are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 146, including subparts a–h, may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.

FIRST CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF U.S. CONST. AMENDS. II, XIV RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 42 U.S.C. § 1983

AGAINST DEFENDANTS LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF ROBERT LUNA, AND DOES 1-10

- 147. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by references his answers in the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
- 148. The allegations in Paragraph 148 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 148 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.
- 149. The allegations in Paragraph 149 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 149 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.
- 150. The allegations in Paragraph 150 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 150 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.
- 151. The allegations in Paragraph 151 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 151 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.
- 152. The allegations in Paragraph 152 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 152 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.

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153. The allegations in Paragraph 153 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 153 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.

SECOND CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF U.S. CONST. AMENDS. II, XIV RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 42 U.S.C. § 1983

AGAINST DEFENDANTS LA VERNE POLICE DEPARTMENT, LA VERNE CHIEF OF POLICE SAMUEL GONZALEZ, AND DOES 1-10

- 154. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by references his answers in the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
- 155. The allegations in Paragraph 155 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 155 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.
- The allegations in Paragraph 156 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus 156. no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 156 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.
- The allegations in Paragraph 157 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 157 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.
- 158. The allegations in Paragraph 158 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 158 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.
- The allegations in Paragraph 159 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus 159. no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 159 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.
- 160. The allegations in Paragraph 160 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 160 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.

THIRD CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF U.S. CONST. AMENDS. II, XIV RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 42 U.S.C. § 1983

AGAINST ATTORNEY GENERAL ROB BONTA, AND DOES 1-10

- 161. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by references his answers in the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.
- 162. The Attorney General admits that the quoted language in Paragraph 162 appears in *Bruen* and that *Bruen* speaks for itself. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 162 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 163. The allegations in Paragraph 163 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 163 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 164. The Attorney General admits that California does not honor carry permits from any state other than California and that the process for obtaining a permit to carry firearms in California is set forth by statute and regulation, which authorities speak for themselves.
- 165. The allegations in Paragraph 165 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 165 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 166. The allegations in Paragraph 166 are characterizations of Plaintiffs' claims to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 166 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 167. The allegations in Paragraph 167 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 167 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.
- 168. The allegations in Paragraph 168 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 168 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.

VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE AGAINST DEFENDANTS LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF ROBERT LUNA, AND DOES 1-10

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169. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by references his answers in the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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170. The allegations in Paragraph 170 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 170 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.

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171. The allegations in Paragraph 171 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 171 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.

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172. The allegations in Paragraph 172 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 172 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.

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173. The allegations in Paragraph 173 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 173 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.

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FIFTH CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE

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AGAINST DEFENDANTS LA VERNE POLICE DEPARTMENT, LA VERNE CHIEF OF POLICE SAMUEL GONZALEZ, AND DOES 1-10

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174. The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by references his answers in the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.

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175. The allegations in Paragraph 175 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 175 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.

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176. The allegations in Paragraph 176 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 176 require a response, the Attorney General denies them.

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1 177. The allegations in Paragraph 177 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus 2 no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 177 require a 3 response, the Attorney General denies them. 4 178. The allegations in Paragraph 178 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 178 require a 5 6 response, the Attorney General denies them. 7 179. The allegations in Paragraph 179 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus 8 no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 179 require a 9 response, the Attorney General denies them. 10 The allegations in Paragraph 180 are not directed to the Attorney General and thus 11 no response by him is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 180 require a 12 response, the Attorney General denies them. 13 SIXTH CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF U.S. CONST. AMENDS. XIV 14 EQUAL PROTECTION 42 U.S.C. § 1983 15 AGAINST ATTORNEY GENERAL ROB BONTA, AND DOES 1-10 16 The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by references his answers in the 181. 17 foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 18 182. The Attorney General admits that the processes for obtaining a California 19 identification card or driver's license are set forth by statute, regulation, or other rule and that 20 those authorities speak for themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form 21 a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 182 and on that basis denies 22 them. 23 183. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of 24 the allegations in Paragraph 183 and on that basis denies them. 25 184. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of 26 the allegations in Paragraph 184 and on that basis denies them.

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The Attorney General admits that the process for obtaining a permit to carry

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2 firearms in California is set forth by statute and regulation and that those authorities speak for 3 themselves. 4 186. The allegations in Paragraph 186 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no 5 response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 186 may be deemed factual, the 6 Attorney General denies them. 7 187. The Attorney General admits that the authorities cited in Paragraph 187 speak for 8 themselves. The remaining allegations in Paragraph 187 are legal arguments and/or conclusions 9 to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 187 may be deemed 10 factual, the Attorney General denies them. 11 SEVENTH CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § 2 12 PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 AGAINST ATTORNEY GENERAL ROB BONTA, AND DOES 1-10 14 The Attorney General re-alleges and incorporates by references his answers in the 188. 15 foregoing paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 16 189. The Attorney General admits that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 17 IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution and other authorities quoted and cited in Paragraph 189 18 speak for themselves. 19 190. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of 20 the allegations in Paragraph 190 and on that basis denies them. 21 191. The Attorney General admits that the process for obtaining a permit to carry 22 firearms in California is set forth by statute and regulation and that those authorities speak for 23 themselves. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of 24 the remaining allegations in Paragraph 191 and on that basis denies them. 25 192. The Attorney General lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of 26 the allegations in Paragraph 192 and on that basis denies them.

1 193. The allegations in Paragraph 193 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no 2 response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 193 may be deemed factual, the 3 Attorney General denies them. 4 The allegations in Paragraph 194 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no 5 response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 194 may be deemed factual, the 6 Attorney General denies them. 7 EIGHTH CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF U.S. CONST. AMENDMENT XIV 8 **DUE PROCESS OF LAW** 42 U.S.C. § 1983 9 AGAINST LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, SHERIFF ROBERT LUNA, LA VERNE POLICE DEPARTMENT, LA VERNE CHIEF OF 10 POLICE SAMUEL GONZALEZ, ATTORNEY GENERAL ROB BONTA, AND **DOES 1-10** 11 195. The allegations in Paragraph 195 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no 12 response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 195 may be deemed factual, the 13 Attorney General denies them. 14 The allegations in Paragraph 196 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no 15 response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 196 may be deemed factual, the 16 Attorney General denies them. 17 197. The allegations in Paragraph 197 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no 18 response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 197 may be deemed factual, the 19 Attorney General denies them. 20 The allegations in Paragraph 198 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no 21 response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 198 may be deemed factual, the 22 Attorney General denies them. 23 The allegations in Paragraph 199 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no 199. 24 response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 199 may be deemed factual, the 25 Attorney General denies them. 26 27

200. The allegations in Paragraph 200 are legal arguments and/or conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent any allegations in Paragraph 200 may be deemed factual, the Attorney General denies them.

The Attorney General denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief requested in the Prayer following Paragraph 200, or to any relief whatsoever. To the extent the Prayer contains any factual allegations, the Attorney General denies them.

DEFENSES

In addition to the foregoing responses to the allegations in the First Amended and Supplemental Complaint, and without admitting any allegations contained therein or taking on the burden as to any matter for which the burden falls on Plaintiffs, the Attorney General asserts the following defenses based on information and belief. By asserting the following defenses, the Attorney General does not knowingly or intentionally waive any additional defense. The Attorney General reserves the right to amend this answer and these defenses. The Attorney General further reserves the right to assert or rely upon other defenses as may become available or apparent during discovery or other proceedings in this action. The Attorney General further reserves the right to rely on defenses raised by other parties in this action.

FIRST DEFENSE

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims are barred because they lack standing.

THIRD DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel, laches, unclean hands, and/or waiver.

FOURTH DEFENSE

To the extent the Attorney General has undertaken any conduct with respect to the subjects and events underlying Plaintiffs' First Amended and Supplemental Complaint, such conduct was, at all times material thereto, undertaken in good faith and in reasonable reliance on existing law.