Why a San Diego lawsuit challenging California’s restrictions on pepper projectile launchers is now tied to two major Second Amendment cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.
By C.D. Michel | Updated November 2026
California allows law-abiding adults to carry pepper spray for self-defense. It also generally permits ownership of air-powered BB guns and other less-lethal projectile devices, subject to applicable restrictions. But when those technologies are combined in a device that launches chemical-irritant projectiles, California law imposes criminal prohibitions.
That distinction is now being challenged in federal court.
In Schiller v. Bonta, a lawsuit filed in San Diego in December 2025, two California residents and Byrna Technologies, a manufacturer of less-lethal defensive launchers, contend that California’s restrictions violate the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs argue that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms extends to modern defensive weapons that use compressed gas to launch pepper-filled projectiles.
The litigation raises an important question: Does the Second Amendment protect less-lethal alternatives to firearms, or can California prohibit particular defensive weapons simply because legislators disfavor their design or method of operation?
That question has become even more consequential because the federal judge overseeing the case has suspended proceedings pending a Supreme Court decision in two major Second Amendment cases involving semiautomatic rifles.
The San Diego Lawsuit: Schiller v. Bonta
The lawsuit was filed December 3, 2025, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California by Sandy Schiller, Lucas Alonso-Martinez, and Byrna Technologies, Inc.
Schiller and Alonso-Martinez are California residents who wish to possess pepper projectile launchers for lawful personal protection. Byrna manufactures compressed-gas launchers designed to fire chemical-irritant projectiles that rupture on impact, releasing an irritant intended to temporarily incapacitate an attacker.
These devices are marketed as less-lethal alternatives to conventional firearms. They provide a defensive option for people who prefer not to use a firearm or who want another means of responding to a potentially violent confrontation.
But California’s statutory scheme restricts their availability.
Under Penal Code sections 17240 and 17250, the state defines chemical irritants and devices intended to discharge them as forms of tear gas and tear gas weapons. Section 22810 generally permits qualifying adults to possess certain aerosol pepper sprays for self-defense, but expressly prohibits purchasing, possessing, or using tear gas weapons that expel a projectile or deliver the chemical agent through a method other than aerosol spray. Section 22900 imposes additional restrictions on the sale and possession of prohibited tear gas weapons.
The result is a statutory distinction between ordinary pepper spray and devices that deliver a similar irritant through a projectile.
The plaintiffs maintain that this distinction unlawfully deprives Californians of a constitutionally protected means of self-defense.
Importantly, the case concerns the chemical-irritant projectile restrictions, not a categorical ban on every compressed-gas launcher or every type of nonchemical projectile.
The Supreme Court Has Already Recognized That Less-Lethal Weapons Can Be “Arms”
The constitutional argument begins with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the word arms.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, including self-defense.
The Court rejected the notion that constitutional protection is confined to weapons associated with eighteenth-century military service. Rather, the Amendment’s text extends to bearable weapons, subject to the recognized historical limitations on the right.
That principle became particularly important in Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411 (2016).
In Caetano, the Supreme Court vacated a Massachusetts decision upholding a stun-gun prohibition. The state court had relied on the weapons’ modern origin and other characteristics to exclude them from Second Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning and reaffirmed that the Amendment extends, at least presumptively, to bearable arms developed long after the founding.
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, emphasized in a separate concurrence that stun guns were used for lawful self-defense and could provide a less dangerous alternative to firearms.
The implications for pepper projectile launchers are substantial.
If a modern stun gun can qualify as a constitutionally protected arm, the mere fact that a defensive weapon uses compressed gas or chemical irritants cannot automatically remove it from the Second Amendment’s coverage.
That does not establish that every regulation of such a device is unconstitutional. It does, however, provide a strong foundation for challenging categorical prohibitions on modern defensive weapons.
California’s Unusual Distinction Between Pepper Spray and Pepper Projectiles
California’s laws create a difficult distinction to justify constitutionally.
A person who satisfies the statutory requirements may generally possess a handheld aerosol pepper spray for self-defense. Adults may also generally own BB guns and certain other compressed-gas projectile launchers, subject to restrictions on their use and possession in particular locations.
But California prohibits the chemical-projectile configuration challenged in Schiller.
That raises an obvious question: Why should delivering a chemical irritant from a handheld aerosol container receive different constitutional treatment from delivering it through a compressed-gas projectile?
The state may contend that chemical projectiles present risks not associated with ordinary pepper spray, including injury from projectile impact, misuse at greater distances, or dangers associated with particular deployment methods.
Those are legitimate factual subjects for litigation. But identifying a perceived safety concern does not, by itself, establish that a categorical prohibition is consistent with the Second Amendment.
Under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), courts must examine whether a restriction on conduct covered by the Amendment’s text is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.
The state must therefore do more than assert that its preferred method of delivering a defensive chemical agent is safer.
The relevant legal questions concern the constitutional status of these devices, their lawful defensive use, and whether the state can identify sufficiently analogous historical restrictions supporting its modern prohibition.
Why the San Diego Case Has Been Put on Hold
The most important development since the original lawsuit is the court’s September 3, 2026 order staying the proceedings.
U.S. District Judge Anthony J. Battaglia granted a joint request by the plaintiffs and California Attorney General Rob Bonta to suspend the case pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of Viramontes v. Cook County and Grant v. Higgins.
Those consolidated Supreme Court cases address whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect possession of AR-15-platform and similar semiautomatic rifles.
At first glance, semiautomatic rifles and pepper projectile launchers seem to present very different controversies.
But they share foundational constitutional questions.
In requesting the stay, the parties identified three issues that the Supreme Court may clarify:
The parties did not agree that the Supreme Court’s eventual ruling would necessarily control the pepper projectile case. Nevertheless, both recognized that the decision could significantly affect how the district court analyzes the challenged restrictions.
Judge Battaglia agreed.
The court vacated pending deadlines and ordered the parties to submit a joint status report within 30 days after the Supreme Court decides Viramontes and Grant.
The Supreme Court has scheduled oral argument in the consolidated cases for December 2, 2026.
As of this update, the pepper projectile case remains stayed. The court has not decided whether California’s restrictions violate the Second Amendment.
Why “Common Use” Matters to Less-Lethal Weapons
The relationship between the cases illustrates a larger disagreement in modern Second Amendment jurisprudence.
Under Heller, weapons in common use for lawful purposes receive constitutional protection, while the historical tradition permits restrictions on weapons that are dangerous and unusual.
But courts have differed over how those concepts operate.
Must an arm already be widely possessed before it qualifies for protection? How should a court evaluate common use when the government has prohibited the weapon and thereby suppressed its availability? And does the fact that a defensive device is less lethal than a firearm affect the constitutional analysis?
These questions are especially important for modern defensive technologies.
A rule requiring widespread ownership before a weapon receives constitutional protection could create a serious problem: a jurisdiction might prohibit an emerging defensive technology before it becomes widely adopted, then cite its limited ownership as evidence that the weapon is unprotected.
That approach risks allowing government restrictions themselves to determine the scope of the constitutional right.
The Supreme Court’s resolution of Viramontes and Grant may provide guidance on how common use should be established and what evidence is necessary to prove it.
Although those cases concern semiautomatic rifles, their reasoning could have implications for other bearable weapons, including less-lethal defensive devices.
The Broader Danger of Narrowly Defining “Arms”
The pepper projectile dispute also raises questions beyond any particular manufacturer’s product.
Some courts have treated certain firearms components and accessories, including magazines and suppressors, as falling outside the Second Amendment’s text because they are not independently capable of functioning as weapons.
Those disputes are not identical to the question presented by a complete pepper projectile launcher. Nevertheless, they reflect a broader controversy concerning the constitutional meaning of arms.
A narrow interpretation risks making the Amendment’s protection depend too heavily on labels or technical classifications rather than the actual function of the device.
A firearm must have the components necessary to operate. Defensive technologies may likewise rely on specialized ammunition, chemical agents, electrical systems, or other mechanisms to perform their intended protective function.
The constitutional inquiry should account for that practical reality.
At the same time, whether a particular component or accessory receives independent constitutional protection remains a separate legal question. The Supreme Court has not resolved all such disputes.
What Heller and Caetano establish is that the Second Amendment is not confined to a list of weapons available in 1791.
That principle should remain central when courts consider new technologies developed for lawful self-defense.
The Right to Choose a Less-Lethal Means of Self-Defense
There is an additional policy tension worth recognizing.
Less-lethal defensive weapons are often selected precisely because their users wish to avoid employing deadly force.
A person who chooses a pepper projectile launcher rather than a conventional firearm may be seeking a means of stopping an assault while reducing the likelihood of a fatal injury.
Such devices are not harmless, and no weapon can guarantee a nonfatal outcome. Nevertheless, their intended defensive role distinguishes them from conventional firearms.
California’s statutory scheme permits qualifying individuals to possess firearms and ordinary pepper spray while restricting a device designed to provide an alternative means of personal protection.
That arrangement deserves constitutional scrutiny.
The Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms; it does not necessarily guarantee access to every conceivable defensive device without regulation. But neither should a state be able to exclude a bearable defensive weapon from constitutional protection merely because it employs unfamiliar technology.
The constitutional question must be answered through the Supreme Court’s governing framework, not by treating legislative preferences as conclusive.
What Happens Next?
The next major development will come from the United States Supreme Court.
Oral argument in Viramontes and Grant is scheduled for December 2, 2026. A decision could clarify the role of common use, the dangerous-and-unusual exception, and the constitutional standards governing restrictions on categories of arms.
After that decision, the parties in Schiller v. Bonta must report to the district court concerning its implications and propose how the litigation should proceed.
Whether California ultimately can enforce its restrictions on pepper projectile launchers remains unresolved.
But the larger constitutional issue is already clear.
The Second Amendment’s protection cannot reasonably be understood as limited to a handful of traditional weapons while excluding modern tools designed for lawful personal defense merely because they are different.
How the Supreme Court defines the scope of protected arms will influence not only disputes over firearms and magazines but potentially the future of less-lethal defensive technologies as well.
For California gun owners, Schiller v. Bonta is therefore a case worth watching.
This article discusses pending litigation and provides general legal information, not legal advice. The challenged California provisions remain subject to enforcement unless and until applicable judicial relief or legislative changes provide otherwise.
Michel & Associates, P.C. represents individuals, businesses, and organizations in firearms law, constitutional litigation, and related matters.
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